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
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to his theory of language, arguing to the effect that the *Tractatus* is for the sake of ethics—rather than of language *per se*. It will be shown that Wittgenstein regards the subject matter of ethics, namely, ethical value, as something “higher” than facts on the one hand, and draws a limit to the validity of language by setting forth a picture theory of language on the other. Our point is that Wittgenstein’s theory of language is only instrumental to his ultimate concern for the ethical.

The *Tractatus* includes 7 major propositions and 519 commentary ones, totaling 526 entries. Approximately 500 propositions are clustered around topics about the world, language, and logic. First in proposition 6.41, Wittgenstein makes his view of ethics explicit:

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. (6.41)⁶

Wittgenstein’s thesis is that value does not exist in, but lies outside, the world. The argument can be reconstructed as this: All that happens and is the case, is accidental. Value is not accidental, therefore, value is not within the sphere of what happens and is the case. And, since what happens and is the case, is a fact, hence, value is not any kind of fact. As the totality of facts is the world, value is not part of the world.

Not all kinds of value are non-accidental. The kind of value that is not accidental is ethical value. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between ethical and non-ethical values in terms of a distinction between what he calls absolute value and relative value. In a later paper “Lecture on Ethics,” Wittgenstein characterizes the distinction as that judgement of relative value is in its real nature a statement of facts while judgement of absolute value is not.⁷ For example, the proposition “This man is a good runner,” is upon analysis merely a statement of facts. It amounts to saying that “he runs a certain miles in a certain number of minutes.”⁸ In contrast, the experience of wondering at the existence of the world, and the feeling of guilt, have an intrinsic and absolute value; the right expression for it “is not any proposition *in* language.”⁹ Relative value, or, as what we call non-ethical value, can be expressed by proposition, for it is just a certain property of things in the world. Absolute value, or, as what we call ethical value, can only be assigned to the moral subject, that is, the will, which is not part of the world of facts.

Ethical value is non-accidental and absolute because it carries some sort of necessity. Wittgenstein says,

And similarly the *absolute good*, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would, *necessarily*, bring

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: Value v.s. Fact

Dr. Chung Ming TSE

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has commonly been viewed as a treatise mainly concerned with a theory of logic and a theory of language in relation to the world. The view, with some variations, has been held by, among others, those philosophers who were personally and academically connected with Wittgenstein. Russell thinks that "Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language."¹ Malcolm regards the book as "a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the idea that language is a picture of reality."² Anscombe and Black share a similar view.³ These authorities of Wittgensteinian studies seem to be of an opinion that the ethical theory contained in the *Tractatus* is insignificant compared to the theories of logic and language.

However, the authorities are challenged. An issue is raised about the concealed purpose, the true nature, and the underlying idea of the treatise. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, in their work *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, call for a reconsideration of the popular diagnosis of the *Tractatus*. The popular view, as mentioned above, is referred to as a "logical" approach of interpretation. But, it is argued, "one must accept the primacy of the 'ethical' interpretation"⁴ of the book. Janik and Toulmin report,

Engelmann characterized Wittgenstein's basic idea as that of separating ethics from any sort of intellectual underpinning. Ethics was a matter of 'wordless faith'; and Wittgenstein's other concerns were viewed as arising, predominantly, out of this fundamental idea.⁵

If Wittgenstein's basic idea is really so, the popular view of the *Tractatus*, such as Russell's or Anscombe's, must be said to have missed the spirit of the book. Instead, it would be tenable to understand the *Tractatus* as an attempt to safeguard ethics against any presumptuous intrusions of science by drawing a limit to propositional language. Yet, it may be too soon to make any conclusive remark about this matter until we have more evidence and stronger arguments.

This paper, though not enough to settle the issue of interpretation mentioned above, has yet a modest aim to give more support to the ethical approach of interpretation. Our presentation will expose Wittgenstein's ethical view in relation

about or feel guilty for not bringing about.¹⁰

The kind of necessity that ethical value has, is, of course, not logical necessity; it can be nothing else but practical necessity, a morally coercive force upon the will to bring about the good. Facts simply *are*, but the good *ought to be*, and is, therefore, morally necessary.

If ethical value is not accidental, and therefore, not a fact, there can be no proposition about it. Wittgenstein's theory of language assures this important point. Propositions, according to Wittgenstein, fall into three categories: proposition of science, proposition of logic, and proposition of philosophy. Only propositions of science bear sense, that is, represent facts in the world. Logical propositions are nothing but tautologies and contradictions, and, as such, they are senseless; "they do not represent any possible situations," and "they are not pictures of reality." (4.462) Lastly, philosophical propositions are nonsensical because they arise from ignorance of "the logic of our language." (4.003)

Logical propositions and philosophical propositions are not propositions in the strict sense, for they do not meet the essential requirement for a proposition. The requirement is that a proposition "should be able to communicate a *new* sense." (4.027) To have sense means to be able to "represent possible situations," (4.031) and that means that "it depicts the facts." (4.061) The relation between a proposition and the world is an "internal relation of depicting" (4.041), or, in other words, a "representational relation." (4.462) Wittgenstein uses a now famous metaphor to characterize this relation: A proposition is a "picture" of reality; it reaches out to touch and measure reality. If a proposition is not a "picture," it would represent nothing and would fail to be a sense-bearing proposition at all. Thus, "the general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand." (4.5) Of all the three kinds of proposition, only propositions of science satisfy this general requirement, and, therefore, are the only kind of proposition that makes sense.

Given the premises that ethical value lies outside the world and that a proposition depicts possible situations or facts in the world, it follows that "it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics." (6.24) Representational relationship cannot possibly hold between propositions and "non-facts" such as ethical value, since there are, in this case, no concatenation of things that answer to them. Wittgenstein says, "Our words will only express facts."¹¹ What is not a fact is not expressible in language. If ethics is that which is not concerned about facts, "it is clear that ethics cannot be put into words." (6.421)

Ethical values are "mysticals" for Wittgenstein. They are mystical because they cannot be spoken of in language; they simply "make themselves manifest." The will, the meaning of life, the existence of the world, and God are among those which lie beyond the world, and, consequentially, beyond the capability of language. (6.41; 6.423; 6.43; 6.432; 6.44) These inexpressibles are not things unreal or

inferior to the real, that is, facts; instead, they are more superior, "higher." (6.42; 6.432) They constitute a transcendental realm where "we must pass over in silence." (7)

For Wittgenstein there are clearly two distinct *worlds*: the world of facts and the world of ethical value. The world of facts is accidental while the world of value is necessary; the former can be spoken of in language while the latter cannot be spoken of. But the distinction is not simply a logical or a metaphysical one; it is at the same time an axiological division. Wittgenstein does not simply regard the two *worlds* as merely different from each other; he emphatically gives axiological preference to ethical value: Ethical value is "higher" and, by implication, fact is lower.

What his criterion of evaluation is, of course, an interesting topic to inquire into, but the fact that he assigns a higher position to ethical value is remarkably indicative of the orientation of the *Tractatus*. By defining sensible propositions as pictures of facts, he is in virtue setting a limit to language; and, as science is a body of true propositions, he is curbing any presumptuous advance of science, particularly of what may be called pan-scientism.

The opinion that science as a totality of true propositions can explain everything is very wrong, because its proper domain is the world of facts and facts alone; and there is still a world of *non-facts*. Thus Wittgenstein says,

The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. (6.371) Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if *everything* were explained. (6.372)

What Wittgenstein is saying is that attempts to solve the ethical or religious problems by ways of science are illusory, resulting in nothing but nonsensical utterances. If science should make any claim about matters of ethics, it must be nonsensical and illegitimate. "Propositions can express nothing that is higher," Wittgenstein says. (6.42)

The popular view that the main thesis of the *Tractatus* consists in a theory of logic and language is not groundless, but is misheaded. On the basis of the evidence and arguments presented above, we are obliged to suggest that the *Tractatus* is not so much a treatise of logic and language *per se* as it is a *critique* of language to establish certain theses about ethics. By a critique of language we mean, after Kant, an analysis of the logic of language so as to define its proper application and limit. The point of the whole *Tractatus*, then, may very well be this, that scientific language, and, along with it, the logic of scientific inquiry, have no place in the realm of ethical values. If this is the real message Wittgenstein wants to convey, we might think of casting aside the logical approach to the *Tractatus* and explore

the other route instead. Wittgenstein's riddle: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them." (6.54) Do we understand him, and correctly? He has been uttering propositions *nonsensical*, and, as he reminds us, ethical propositions are *nonsensical*. So, what is the point of the *Tractatus*?

Notes

1. Bertrand Russell, "Introduction to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*," in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by D. F. Peare & B. F. McGuinness, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), p. x. It is worthwhile to note that Wittgenstein himself did not approve of Russell's comment. For more details, see Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 11–2.
2. Malcolm, *A Memoir*. p. 8.
3. G. E. M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967), p. 8. See also Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 8.
4. Allan Janik & Stephen Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), p. 25.
5. *Ibid.*
6. The text we use here is the English translation (of the *Tractatus*) by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, 2nd edition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971). In this paper, quotes from the *Tractatus* are indicated by the code numbers that identify the propositions in the text.
7. The paper, read to a society in Cambridge in about 1929, was later published in *The Philosophical Review* Vol. LXXIV (January, 1965): 3–12. It was well discussed by Theodore Redpath in his article, "Wittgenstein and Ethics," in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language*, ed. by Alice Ambrose & Morris Lazerowitz (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 95–119.
8. Wittgenstein, "Lecture," cited by Redpath, "Wittgenstein and Ethics," in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language*, p. 99.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
11. Wittgenstein, "Lecture," quoted by Redpath in *ibid.*, p. 103.

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 11. Plochmann, George Kimball, & Lawson, Jack B. *Terms in Their Propositional Contexts in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus': An Index*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1962.
 12. Redpath, Theodore. "Wittgenstein and Ethics." In *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language*, pp. 95–119. Edited by Alice Ambrose & Morris Lazerowitz. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972.
 13. Winch, Peter. "Facts and Superfacts, Superfacts." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 33(1983): 398–404.
 14. Pitcher, George. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. N. J.: Englewood Cliffs, 1964.
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維根斯坦《叢論》之解釋：價值對事實

謝仲明

大綱

對《論叢》全書主旨之診定，流行的說法是認為它是提供一套語言—邏輯理論。持此看法者包括羅素、Anscombe，及 Black 等人。

但對《論叢》實可有另一解解釋。Engelmann、Janik、及 Toulmin 認為它是一本關於倫理學的著作。

本文支持此倫理學的解釋。論證如下：

Wittgenstein 的語言理論，規定了命題之意義，乃在於其所圖像之事實 (facts)。倫理價值，不在此事實世界之內；故語言無法表達倫理價值。Wittgenstein 認為倫理價值是「更高的」、「超越的」。

對《論叢》全書的主旨，可有如下之理解：Wittgenstein 的語言理論，是對語言（特別是科學語言）作一康德式之「批判」，確定語言之性質、功能、及限度，以界定其所能有之「合法使用」（借康德語），而保障倫理價值之自身性質——使之免於流為科學語言或「科學主義」之對象。

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HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD

CHAN WING-CHEUK

Abstract

Whether the later Husserl abandons his transcendental idealism through the introduction of the concept of life-world? This question has puzzled the Husserlian scholars since the rise of French phenomenology. Our paper tries to give a negative answer to this question. In supporting our position, we make use of some unpublished manuscripts written by the later Husserl.

I Introduction

The status of Husserl's later thought is one of the most important but controversial themes among Husserlian scholars. Joseph Kockelmans points out, "In the *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty gives the impression that Husserl's original ideas of the transcendental subjectivity were later replaced by his ideas of the life-world".¹ Paul Ricoeur also believes that there is a progressive abandonment of the idealism in Husserl's later thought. Accordingly, the transcendental reduction signifies less a return to the ego than to the life-world.² Gerd Brand even identifies phenomenology as the transcendental science of life-world.³ But, on the other hand, Roman Ingarden denies that there is any thing new in Husserl's *Crisis*. According to Ingarden, Husserl never departs from the idealistic position even in his last period.⁴ Gadamer also agrees that in *Crisis* Husserl does not abandon his "old goal of transcendental phenomenology, a goal that is firmly based in the transcendental ego".⁵

Since the concept "life-world" plays a key role in this controversy, a clarification of this important concept will help us correctly understand Husserl's later thought and hence find out an answer to the question "Does Husserl abandon the transcendental idealism in his later thought?"

First of all, we have to make clear the meaning of the term "life-world". "Life-world" is a concept employed by Husserl but without thematic clarification. It belongs to the category of "operative concepts" — as called by Eugen Fink.⁶ But one can easily find out that there are ambiguities in the concept of the life-world. For example, according to David Carr, there are at least two meanings of the term "life-world"; on the one hand, it means the perceptual world, on the other hand, it means the cultural world. But can we find out a unified use or most comprehensive meaning of this term? In order to answer this question, we will start with an

analysis of Husserl's different uses of this term.

The relation between the life-world and the scientific world is also a puzzling problem. Husserl points out that there is only one world. Then what is the status of scientific world? On the other hand, life-world is pre-scientific; but Husserl points out that the scientific world also belongs to the life-world. In what sense is the scientific world included in the life-world? All these "paradoxical" questions concern the autonomy of the life-world. In order to find out answers to them we have to go back to Husserl's philosophy of science. Otherwise the "identity and difference" relationship between the life-world and the scientific world would not be clarified.

According to Husserl, the life-world has its universal structures. These universal structures are called by Husserl "the *a priori* of the life-world". So we can have an ontology of the life-world. In fact, as pointed out by Mohanty, to describe the *a priori* structures of the life-world is one of two major tasks proposed by Husserl in *Crisis*.⁸ But what are these universal structures? What is the status of the *a priori* of the life-world? What is the methodical procedure to discover these *a priori* structures? These questions concern the very possibility of the ontology of the life-world or the eidetic phenomenology of the life-world. It is important for us to find out what are Husserl's answers for these questions.

As pointed out by Ludwig Landgrebe, it is only in Husserl's later thought that the world itself thematically becomes a phenomenological problem.⁹ In his *Ideas I*, Husserl only concerns with the problem of the constitution of the objects. The problem of the constitution of the world itself is not proposed. So the problem of the origin of the life-world itself is a new theme in Husserl's later thought. In other words, in Husserl's later thought, the centre of the constitutional analysis shifts from the thinghood of things to the worldhood of the world. Accordingly, the epoché proposed in his *Ideas I* must be extended "to the universal horizon [of objects] of the experience of the pre-given world".¹⁰ According to Husserl, even the life-world itself is constituted by the transcendental subjectivity. But in maintaining this thesis, Husserl has to encounter the following difficulties. First, since the life-world is always pre-given, so, in what sense is the life-world itself constituted by the transcendental subjectivity? Second, by the horizational character of the life-world, it seems that "the universal horizon of the life-world also necessarily embraces transcendental subjectivity"; then "what is this world-constitutive subjectivity that is itself a part of this world?"¹¹ Finally, in light of the historicity of the life-world, how is phenomenology as a "rigorous science" possible? In order to find out how Husserl would answer these important questions, we will start with an exposition of Husserl's analysis of the relationship between the life-world and the transcendental subjectivity.

In light of all these clarifications of the nature of the life-world and its constitutional problem, we will try to give a definite answer to the problem of the

status of Husserl's later thought, namely, the question of whether the later Husserl is still a transcendental idealist.

II. The Meaning of "Life-World"

If the fundamental principle of phenomenology is "back to things themselves", then reductionism must be the major opponent of phenomenology. For reductionists always try to explain something in terms of other things and hence reduce the former to the latter. Actually, Husserl's phenomenology begins with the enterprise of anti-reductionism, anti-psychologism, in particular. This anti-reductionist tendency prevails even in Husserl's last work. One of the major themes of *Crisis* is anti-scientific objectivism. In this work Husserl tries to provide a new introduction to phenomenology through the refutation of scientific objectivism.

Scientific objectivism claims that only the natural scientific method is the legitimate approach in understanding the reality. It is only the world of science that can be regarded as real world. In short, the scientific world is the only reality.

According to Husserl, the scientific objectivists err in their blindness to the fact that natural science is essentially a method and hence erroneously take "for *true being* what is actually a *method*".¹² Husserl points out that "the proper return to the naivete of life — but in a reflection which rises above this naiveté — is the only possible way to overcome the philosophical naiveté which lies in the [supposedly] "scientific" character of traditional objectivistic philosophy".¹³ Accordingly, return to the life-world is the only way to overcome the philosophical naiveté of scientific objectivism.

But what does Husserl mean by the term "life-world"?

In *Crisis*, Husserl introduces the concept of life-world by contrast it to the scientific world. Husserl points out that the life-world is the world of pre-scientific, intuitive experience from which natural science abstracts and of which it is the representation. In this sense, the life-world is characterized as the "meaning fundament" of natural science.¹⁴ As opposed to the exact and objective nature of the scientific world, the life-world is subjectively relative. In fact, while the scientific world is in principle non-intuitable "logical substraction", the life-world is the universe of what is intuitable in principle.¹⁵ That is to say, the life-world is the world "that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experientible".¹⁶

From these characterizations, it is clearly seen that the term "life-world" means the perceptually experientible world which is given to us prior to any idealization. That is to say, the life-world is primarily a world of perceptual experience or a perceptual world. In other words, it is a world of perceived "things".

But, on the other hand, Husserl also uses the term "life-world" to mean our surrounding world, the field of our everyday experience. That is to say, "life-world"

also means the world of social-cultural experience. As human surrounding world, the life-world also includes the scientific theories themselves, i.e., the sciences as cultural facts. Hence, the life-world in this sense "extends further than that of 'things'".¹⁷

The difference between the life-world as perceptual world, i.e., the world of perceptual experience, and the life-world as human surrounding world, i.e., the world of social-cultural experience, is obvious. In fact, while the perceptual world "is *not* historically relative phenomenon but the constant underlying ground of all such phenomena, the world from which the scientific interpretation takes its start and which it constantly presupposed", the human surrounding world is essentially historically and culturally dependent.¹⁸

Accordingly, we can clearly see that there are, at least, two different meanings of the term "life-world". On the one hand, it means the pre-predicative perceptual world; on the other hand, it means the human surrounding world.

Is it possible to find out a unified meaning of the term "life-world"?

In order to answer the question, let us first clarify the relationship between the perceptual world and the human surrounding world.

In spite of their differences, the perceptual world is "the lowest stratum underlying every human fashioning of the world"; namely, it is the "pre-given 'material' for any historically formative surrounding world".¹⁹ That is to say, all human surrounding worlds are founded on the perceptual world. In fact, the perceptual world "is a realm of something subjective which is completely closed off within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in all experiencing, all thinking, all life, thus everywhere inseparably involved".²⁰

Can we say that both the perceptual world and the human surrounding *belong to the same "world"* — a world in the most comprehensive sense?

In fact, Husserl insists that there is only one real world. He points out that the world "exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it".²¹ Moreover, according to Husserl, "The world is given to us.... not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon".²² That is to say, "the life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always there, existing in advance for us, the 'ground' of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical".²³

Hence, one may have a most comprehensive meaning of the term "life-world", namely, the life-world as the pre-given universal horizon. As pointed out by Mohanty, "we may regard the life-world as the horizon within which all other worlds are constituted and given, it is not itself another world beside them. It is, as the horizon within which they are given, also the condition of their possibility".²⁴

But how to account for the relationship between the life-world in the most comprehensive sense, on the one hand, and the perceptual world and the human surrounding world, on the other?

Insofar as the relationship between the life-world in the most comprehensive

sense and the perceptual world is concerned, we can say that the perceptual world is nothing but the life-world in the most comprehensive sense presented in the perceptual experience. On the other hand, the human surrounding world is essentially the life-world in the most comprehensive sense when the latter is not only given in the perceptual experience but also in the social-cultural experience. Corresponding to different cultural experience, the life-world in the most comprehensive sense may be given as different human surrounding worlds. In fact, the different human surrounding worlds may be regarded as the different world-pictures of the same life-world in the most comprehensive sense.

Accordingly, the life-world in the most comprehensive sense is nothing but the objective correlate of the whole stream of living experience. It does not exist as an object but rather as the universal horizon of all objects.

Although scientific experience, as cultural experience, also belongs to our living experience, one cannot claim that scientific experience is the only legitimate kind of living experience. In fact, the fundamental living experience, perceptual experience, is wholly pre-cognitive and pre-scientific. Failing to recognise this fact, objectivists claim that the scientific world, namely, the objective correlate of the scientific experience, which is the ideal construction, is the only reality.

According to Husserl, the life-world is not the product of an idealization but rather it is the universal ground of all idealization. What results from the idealization is nothing but the superstructure which is rooted in the life-world. Insofar as the life-world is not the construction resulted from the scientific experience, Husserl describes the life-world as pre-scientific. But Husserl does not deny the positive contribution of scientific experience in the formation of a particular sub-world or cultural world. What he objects to is only the thesis that *to be is to be constructible by the scientific experience*. Husserl maintains that scientific experience is essentially only one form of the cultural experience which is possible only by being founded on the pre-scientific perceptual experience. Hence, in order to overcome the scientific objectivism, Husserl particularly claims that we have to go back to the perceptual world. Perceptual world is not only the lowest stratum of any social-cultural world, but also is the most primitive form in which the life-world in the most comprehensive sense firstly appears to us. That is why Husserl also calls the perceptual world "the original life-world". Hence, any constitutive account of the origin of the life-world in the most comprehensive sense must begin with that of the perceptual world, namely, the original life-world. This explains why Husserl so heavily emphasizes on the primacy of perceptual experience in his phenomenology of the life-world.

From the above clarification, we can conclude that the life-world in the most comprehensive sense is nothing but the world of our living experience. Insofar as perceptual experience is the fundamental living experience, the perceptual world is regarded by Husserl as the original life-world. Namely, since the life-world in the

most comprehensive sense firstly appears as a perceptual horizon, the perceptual world is the original life-world. In fact, all social-cultural worlds are founded on the perceptual world. The perceptual world itself is always "anonymously" pre-given "underlying" any human surrounding world. But both the perceptual world and all social-cultural worlds are essentially different aspects of two same world, the life-world in most comprehensive sense, which is always pre-given as the all-encompassing universal horizon.

III. The Life-World and The Scientific World

The life-world is always already there, no matter we are conscious of this fact or not. But we seldom try to make the life-world as our theme of reflection. Normally, we are living thematically only in a particular sub-world of the life-world, and the life-world itself is unthematic for us. For normally it is a particular sub-world of the life-world rather than the life-world itself which is the field of our interest.

The scientific world is one of the particular sub-worlds of the life-world. It is the field of scientific work. This field is determined by the interest and the goal of the scientists. As pointed out by Husserl, "The scientific world, the scientists' horizon of being, has the character of a single work or edifice growing *in infinitum*, upon which the generations of scientists, belonging to it correlatively, are unendingly at work".²⁵

In regard to its content, the scientific world, as the subject matter of systematic scientific theory, is the world of theoretical entities. A theoretical entity is an object which is absolutely identical with itself. It is "an ideally identical object which is ideal in all its determinations".²⁶ All the theoretical entities and their determinations are subjected to the laws of formal logic.

In contrast to the subjectively relative life-world, the scientific world is objective in the sense that its truths are true for everyone. It is starting with this perfection of the scientific world that objectivists argue that the scientific world is the only reality. The subjectively relative life-world, according to them, is only the mere appearance of this reality which is true in itself.

But Husserl insists that the scientific world, in essence, is nothing but the mathematically substructured world of idealities. According to him, objectivists' surreptitious substitution of the scientific world for the life-world, "the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experientible" not only commits what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" and hence distorts the nature of the life-world and of the scientific world, but also gives rise to the crisis of the European sciences and consequently the radical life-crisis of European humanity.²⁷

In fact, the scientific world is never an independent, self-subsistent, or self-

sufficient, self-contained world. Rather, the scientific world is only the "superstructure" which is rooted in the life-world. This can be shown by the following considerations.

First, the scientific entities are essentially ideal abstractions which are resulted from the formalization and idealization. As pointed out by Husserl, "by idealizing the world of bodies in respect to what has spatiotemporal shape in this world, it created ideal objects. Out of the undetermined universal form of the life-world, space and time, and the manifold of empirical intuitible shapes that can be imagined into it, it made for the first time an objective world in the true sense — i.e., an infinite totality of ideal objects which are determinable universally, methodically, and quite universally for everyone".²⁸ Accordingly, it is clearly seen that the scientific world is only an idealized world. In fact, it never reveals itself in direct sense experience.

Second, since idealization is nothing but mental operation, the scientific world is basically a mental accomplishment. This idealized mental accomplishment has its material in the life-world.²⁹

Third, as noted before, the life-world is the meaning fundament of natural science. Scientific theoretical entities are the ideal representation of things in the life-world. Apart from the reference to the life-world, theoretical constructs become senseless. In fact, all scientific theories have to be verified in the life-world.

Finally, although the scientists "relate purposively to the scientific world", they "also move simultaneously in the life-world, experiencing it unthematically".³⁰

The above clarification clearly shows that the life-world is the constant presupposition and the foundation of the scientific world. The life-world is not only the material source and the meaning fundament for the scientific world, but, in fact, it is also the *a priori* condition of possibility of the scientific world.

But Husserl also claims that the scientific world is also "included" in the life-world. He writes, "the scientific world ... like all other worlds [determined by particular] ends, itself 'belongs' to the life-world, just as all men and all human communities generally, and their human ends both individual and communal, with all their corresponding working structures, belongs to it".³¹ Since the life-world differs totally from the scientific world in nature, this makes one wonder in what sense the scientific world is included in the life-world.

As pointed out before, the scientific world is essentially a logical construction, and hence a mental accomplishment. Being as the human formations, the scientific entities, in spite of their ideality, are "essentially related to human actualities and potentialities, and thus belong to this concrete unity of the life-world whose concreteness thus extends farther than that of 'things' ".³² In other words, it is the scientific world as logical abstraction which is a human formation, rather than as the "true nature itself", that belongs to the concrete life-world, i. e., our surrounding world.

Hence, although the theoretical constructs do not belong to the life-world in the same way like stones, trees and houses, as the spiritual formations, they are "perceivable" in a broad sense and thus are included in the life-world.

IV. The Universal Structures of the Life-World

According to Husserl, "the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a *general structure*. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative".³³ That is to say, although there are many different human surrounding worlds of different peoples such as that of Chinese, European, etc., the life-world exhibits a general invariant structure to which any specific human surrounding worlds must conform. In contrast to "the objective *a priori*", Husserl calls these structural features of the life-world "the *a priori* of the life-world". Hence, the life-world itself can be the object of investigations. Husserl calls the science of the universal structures of the life-world "an ontology of the life-world".³⁴

What are the invariant structures of the life-world?

Husserl points out that "As life-world the world has, even prior to science, the 'same' structures that the objective sciences presuppose in their substruction of a world which exists 'in itself' ", i.e., the scientific world.³⁵ That is to say, first of all, we have the *a priori* of the life-world which share the same names with the objective *a priori*. For example, the life-world is already a spatio-temporal world. Of course, the spatiality of the life-world is different from the space in the ideal sense, i.e., the mathematical space. Rather, it is the space that we experience and in which we live. In regard to this spatiality, there is no question of mathematically infinitesimal divisibility or the "exactness" in the mathematical sense. The same is also true with respect to the temporality of the life-world. Similarly, the things in the life-world are actual and experientible things and differ from objects in the physical sense. Moreover, the life-world has its own causality. Of course, this causality cannot be understood in the physical sense. Rather, it is the typical regularity in the changeability of the things in the life-world.³⁶ This shows that in order to achieve an ontology of the life-world, we have first to put the objective sciences into bracket. In fact, "these *life-world* patterns themselves are not results of a lower level of idealization".³⁷ Namely, all idealizing accomplishments must refer back to these *a priori* of the life-world. For all the objective *a priori* are founded on the corresponding *a priori* of the life-world. "What the identical denotation does indicate is the essential reference of the objective *a priori* to the *a priori* of the *Lebenswelt* as its foundation".³⁸

What is the ontological status of the *a priori* of the life-world? And what is the methodical procedure to discover these *a priori*?

Since the *a priori* of the life-world is not the results of any idealization, they

are not ideal constructs. Rather, they are the empirically all-encompassing styles exhibited by the life-world itself. In other words, the *a priori* of the life-world are essentially the concrete styles shown by the life-world as a whole. But they are "general" in the sense that they remain invariant in what ever manner we imagine the life-world as modified. That is to say, they are the *a priori* of the life-world because of their being essential to any possible surrounding world. In a sense, they are essentially "concrete universals".

Accordingly, in order to disclose the *a priori* of the life-world, we first have to "bracket" all the objective sciences, and then perform the free imaginative variations of any possible human life-world. In other words, freely vary it in imagination, i.e., construe the varieties of possible life-world merely as possible, and to see what remains invariant throughout this variation. Hence, the *a priori* of the life-world are disclosed by the eidetic variation rather than by the idealization or formalization.

V. Life-World and Consciousness

According to Husserl, an ontology of the life-world is still a mundane discipline. For it never questions the validity of the mode of givenness or the origin of the world as a whole. It is a science which is achieved within the "natural attitude". In this sense, like the objective sciences, an ontology of the life-world is also *naive*. Hence, an ontology of the life-world is not qualified to be an ultimate science of the life-world.

An ultimate science of the life-world, according to Husserl, can only be obtained by the procedure of transcendental criticism. For "a real understanding of the world can mean only an understanding of it in its origination as a product of conscious process, and such an understanding can be attained only *after* the reduction has been performed".³⁹ Accordingly, in order to achieve an ultimate science of the life-world, we have first to perform the epoché to the world itself. That is to say, we have to suspend the "natural attitude" which "dogmatically" takes the validity of the life-world itself for granted. Then by the phenomenological reduction the world itself is lead back to its constitutive source, the transcendental consciousness. It is clearly seen that an ultimate science of the life-world is essentially a transcendental phenomenology of the life-world.

In his early constitutional analysis of perception of an individual thing, Husserl already discovered "a structure that he eventually saw as a determination of 'the world': the world as the *horizon* of [objects of] particular acts and, first of all, as the horizon of [objects of] acts of perception".⁴⁰ Accordingly, any correct constitutional analysis requires an explication of the world itself. In fact, in *Ideas I*, in performing the phenomenological reduction Husserl already put the whole

world into the bracket. But in his actual performance of the constitutional analysis during this period, Husserl only concentrated on the analysis of the thinghood of the things within the world, and left the problem of the constitution of the world itself as unthematic.

In Husserl's later constitutional analysis of perceptual experience, the life-world itself still only appears as the immediate horizon of objects of perception, namely, as a perceptual field. Husserl points out that in the intentional activities of consciousness through which a perceived thing is given, there is a level of passive synthesis. Prior to any active synthesis, i.e. the spontaneous acts on the part of ego, there is a level of passive experience. It is within the background of this passive experience that any active synthesis, e.g., judgment, is possible. But as correctly observed by Ludwig Landgrebe, if we understand the term "world" the whole set of necessary horizons of objects of any experience, i.e. as a total, universal horizon, then one must say that the constitutive investigation that Husserl carried out along this line is only the tracing of the constitutive origin of the "worldly" things, i.e., of what exist in the world, rather than the constitutive origin of the world itself.⁴¹ In other words, this line of constitutive investigation does not go beyond the level of "worldly" things to the level of the world itself.

But even from the standpoint of common sense, everyone knows the the world itself is different from all "worldly" things. The world itself is not one "worldly" object among the other. Rather, it is the field in which every "worldly" object appears. Accordingly, "it does not attain original givenness in the manner characteristic of particular objects".⁴² As pointed out by Husserl, "This difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for them".⁴³

In fact, if the world itself is put into bracket by means of the phenomenological reduction, there must be the task of the transcendental-phenomenological clarification of the origin of the life-world itself. In other words, we have to show in what sense or manner that the life-world itself as the all-encompassing, pre-given horizon also finds its constitutive origin in the transcendental consciousness. For any constitutive analysis guided by an unclarified notion of world is in no sense radical and ultimate.

Actually, even prior to any philosophical thematization, we have experience of the world itself. An explication of our pre-philosophical awareness of the world itself certainly provides a clue to the constitutive analysis of the life-world itself. This is one of the major tasks that Husserl carried out in *Crisis*.

Starting with an analysis of the intentional-historical development of objective sciences, Husserl tries to clarify the essential nature of the scientific world and its relation to the life-world. According to Husserl, the scientific theory is nothing but "garb of ideas" which is rooted in the life-world. The life-world as horizon is

always pre-given in the sense of having-already-been-there. This having-already-been-there not only signifies that the life-world as the perceptual horizon is the presupposition for the possibility of any "worldly" things, but also means the "historicality" of the life-world in the broad sense. Putting it in another way, this having-already-been-there means "that men have already been at work fashioning such a world horizon and have transmitted their awareness to those who followed after".⁴⁴ That is to say, the life-world as human surrounding world in a sense "is *functionally dependent* on, and inseparable from, the community of men who shape it".⁴⁵

These mundane-phenomenological observations show that the proper clue to the constitutive criticism of the life-world as an all-encompassing horizon "is this pre-given world, *not* as it has been determined by natural science but as the world of immediate sensuous experience".⁴⁶ In fact, the pre-given world of the present age is "polluted" by the results of natural science. Namely, our world is "no longer a pure world of original experience but a world exactly determined and determinable in itself, a world within which all particular existents in advance and as a matter of course are given to us as determinable in principle, according to the methods of exact science, and at least as a matter of principle, a world existing in itself, in a sense originally derived from the idealizations of the physicomathematical natural science".⁴⁷

Accordingly, the investigation of the constitutive origin of the life-world itself must take place in the following two stages:

First, the retrogression from the pre-given surrounding world with all its sedimentations of sense, including its science and scientific determination, back to the original life-world.

Second, the investigation of the subjective operations from which the original life-world is given.⁴⁸

In other words, first of all, we have to return from the pre-given life-world as our surrounding world to the original life-world as perceptual world. For owing to the historical development of the formation of our surrounding world, the existing things are already products of our theoretical cognitive activities. They are no longer the objects of immediate experience. That is to say that "The world in which we live and in which we carry out activities of cognition and judgment, out of which everything which becomes the substrates of a possible judgment affects us, is always already pre-given to us impregnated by the precipitate [*Niederschlag*] of logical operations".⁴⁹ Hence, "our surrounding world" cannot be regarded as the ultimate, original life-world. Accordingly, a retrogression to the original life-world, i.e., the life-world as perceptual world, is necessary for constitutional analysis of the world as pre-given horizon. Hence, as pointed out by Husserl, "this retrogression to the original life-world is not one which simply takes for granted the world of our experience as it is given to us but rather traces the historicity already deposited in it to

its source — it is in this historicity that the sense of a world as existing in itself and objectively determinable first accrues to world on the basis of original experience and intuition”.⁵⁰ Husserl terms this first stage of the two-stage retrogression “destruction” or “dismantlement” of the idealization.⁵¹

As matter of fact, Husserl carried out two different ways of destroying or dismantling of the idealization. The first is given in *Crisis* while the second can be found in *Experience and Judgment*. The first way starts with the intentional-historical reflection of the actual development of natural science. In this direction, Husserl carefully analyses the intentional history of our modern world. In pointing out that the scientific world is a logical construction, Husserl leads us back to the life-world as perceptual world which is the meaning-fundament of natural science. The second way proceeds in the transcendental-genetic or genealogical approach. In clarifying the origin of the predicative judgment which plays an important role in the formation of scientific theory, Husserl discloses that predicative judgment must be founded on the pre-predicative experience. In other words, the pre-predicative experience is the presupposition for the possibility of predicative judgment. Husserl explicitly points out that the world of pre-predicative experience is precisely the original life-world.

One must notice that no matter proceeds by the intentional-historical or the transcendental-genetic approach “such regressive inquiry does not involve seeking the factual, historical origin of these sedimentations of sense”.⁵² One must distinguish the intentional history from the factual history, and the transcendental genealogy from the genesis in the empirical sense, respectively. While the investigations of the factual history and of the genesis in the empirical sense essentially belongs to the natural scientific category; the investigations of the intentional history and of the transcendental genealogy can be carried out only after the epoché of the objective scientific attitude. For these latter tasks concern the foundation of objective sciences rather than subject matter investigated by the empirical, objective sciences.

The second stage is the regression from the original life-world to its constitutive source — transcendental subjectivity. This is the proper task of the transcendental-phenomenological clarification of the origin of the world itself.

Husserl explicitly states, “the life-world indeed is nothing simply pregiven. It also is a structure which we can question regarding the modes of its constitution”.⁵³ As pointed out by Werner Marx, “for the phenomenologist there can be no salutary, genuine and ultimate primordial world”.⁵⁴ The “world” itself is also an index of a subjective system of intentional accomplishments on the part of transcendental ego. But in what way is the original life-world constituted by the transcendental subjectivity?

Although Husserl gives us detailed expositions of the first stage of the two-stage retrogression, e.g., in *Crisis* and *Experience and Judgment*, he merely mentions

the associative and affective structures of the sensuous field itself which is the presupposition of any particular "data" within it. But he did not undertake any constitutional analysis of the intentional accomplishments through which a sensuous field itself is given in these later works.⁵⁵ On the other hand, from the horizontal structure of the life-world, we learn that "no matter how greatly we impoverish the predelination of already acquired types of existents, a ready-made horizon always remains, if anything at all can still be grasped".⁵⁶ All these make one wonder if the transcendental-phenomenological clarification of the origin of the original life-world itself is an impossible dream.

In fact, by the horizontal character of the life-world, namely insofar as the world is the universal horizon, it seems that the transcendental subjectivity also necessarily is embraced by the life-world. But then, as asked by Husserl himself, "How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity constitute the whole world?"⁵⁷ Clearly, there is a paradox of human subjectivity. Human subjectivity, on the one hand, is the subject for the world, and on the other hand, is the object in the world.⁵⁸ How to solve this paradox?

The only way out of this paradox is to make a distinction between subjectivity as constituting subject and subjectivity as human being. It is true that subjectivity as human being belongs to the world and hence is embraced by the world-horizon. But subjectivity as constituting subject is "worldless" in the sense that it does not belong to the life-world.⁵⁹

Then how does this "worldless" transcendental subjectivity constitute the life-world itself?

As insightfully and clearly indicated by Landgrebe, the answer can be found in Husserl's theory of the constitution of time-consciousness. It is in this direction of investigations does Husserl "investigate what subjectivity accomplishes not only by way of constitution inside the predelinated horizon but also by way of constitutively forming the horizon itself".⁶⁰ According to Husserl, time itself is constituted by the absolute subjectivity. Husserl points out that there are, at least, two types of temporality, namely: the objective, outer time of transcendent objects and the inner time of immanent objects. While the inner time is the condition of the possibility of the outer time, itself is constituted by the absolute consciousness. In fact, the absolute consciousness, which is the consciousness of time, "accomplishes not only the production of immanent unities of duration in inner time but also — in the structures of primitive impression, retention, and protention — the constitutive production of the possibility of enduring and passing away in general, the possibility of apprehending something as enduring, becoming, or remaining".⁶¹ Hence with the appearance of the temporal modes "now", "past" and "to come" of inner time, a totally new dimension, "temporal field" is disclosed. Temporal field not only is the "place" where "enduring" is "happened", but in particular grants the possibility for the world to be given as an universal horizon.

As noted before, the "pre-giveness" of the life-world as horizon essentially means its "having-already-been-there". In fact, the "having-already-been-there" is essentially a mode of temporality. The possibility of this mode of temporality presupposes the retentive function of the transcendental consciousness. On the other hand, the horizonal anticipation, which is another essential feature of the experience of the life-world as horizon, grounds its very possibility in the protentive function of the transcendental consciousness.⁶² Hence, it is clearly seen that the life-world itself is a temporal givenness. It is temporality which makes possible the givenness of the life-world as horizon. In other words, without the dimension of time that the life-world cannot acquire the meaning as an universal horizon. Insofar as time itself is originated in the time-consciousness we can conclude that the life-world as horizon is constituted by the transcendental ego.

But Landgrebe points out that "the consciousness of time is precisely an accomplishment that produces an universal form; and this form is nothing, unless it has content. In the beginning, and for a time after, "content" meant for Husserl that which is passively pre-given — the sensuously given and its arrangement in a field — which then becomes the basis for every constitutive grasping of an object. If the world, in its entire horizonal structure — which, after all, is not only temporal — is to be understood as a constituted product of transcendental subjectivity, then this ultimate pre-giveness cannot be allowed to stand simply as such".⁶³

Historically speaking, Husserl gives us two different interpretations of time-consciousness in his early writings, namely: a schematic interpretation and a non-schematic interpretation.⁶⁴ In the schematic interpretation, Husserl admits that there are passively pre-given sensory "contents" immanent to the absolute time-constituting consciousness, which are to be animated by the appropriate apprehensions. But in his non-schematic interpretation, Husserl rejects the schema "content of apprehension — apprehension". Instead, he directly identifies the *experiencing* of immanent temporal objects with the absolute time-constituting consciousness. In other words, "Husserl distinguishes between the constituting 'primal consciousness' ... which is identified with experiencing or sensing and the experienced or sensed contents, which are *constituted* 'immanent' temporal unities'".⁶⁵ This means that Husserl finally "draws a sharp distinction *within consciousness itself* between two dimensions, one constituting in the ultimate sense, the other constituted but still immanent".⁶⁶

Hence, according to the non-schematic interpretation, the sensory "contents" belong to the constituted dimension of consciousness. "There will be no more talk of contents of the ultimate flow of consciousness, for the slice or momentary phase of the flow is purged of all its contents; it 'really' contains nothing but experiencing consciousness. It simply *is* experiencing", as pointed out by John Brough.⁶⁷ As a consequence, for the "primal consciousness" the sensory "contents" cannot be regarded as simply pre-giveness. Rather, they are constituted

by the ultimate constituting "primal consciousness".

Then, in what sense can we say that these sensory contents are constituted by the absolute subjectivity?

In order to account for this constitution, Husserl introduces the distinction between the "vertical intentionality" and the "horizontal intentionality". While the vertical intentionality directs towards the immanent temporal object, the horizontal intentionality extends along the absolute flow of time-consciousness itself. Although these two are inseparable, the horizontal intentionality is the condition of possibility for the vertical intentionality. For "the horizontal intentionality, preserving in proper sequence the elapsed phases of the absolute flow, at the same time preserves the intentional correlates of those phases on the immanent objective level, thereby making possible the flow's vertical intentionality".⁶⁸ It is not difficult to see that the horizontal intentionality is the deepest level of subjective accomplishment through which the life-world is originated as an universal horizon. As pointed out by Gadamer, "The primal life remains primal ego".⁶⁹ Consequently, within the framework of Husserl's non-schematic interpretation of time-consciousness, the sensory contents and hence the life-world itself is constituted by the transcendental ego.

In deed, the original life-world as a whole is not constituted by a particular perceptual act or a certain set of perceptual acts, but rather is constituted by the whole stream of perceptual consciousness life. For, in contrast to worldly objects, the perceptual world itself (the original life-world itself), is the objective correlate of the whole stream of perceptual conscious life. At each time, the original life-world only given as a co-presented perceptual horizon of a particular object. As pointed out by Husserl himself, the act of perception is always an intentionality "simultaneously as implicit project (*Vorwurf*) and as retro-spect (*Rückschau*)".⁷⁰ It is in virtue of this functional structure of intentionality that is the life-world itself "anonymously" given to us as the perceptual horizon of particular objects. Hence, in a manuscript written in 1933, Husserl says, "Der passiven Synthesis im strömenden Leben als im Wandel ständig horizonthaft Welt bewusst haben entspricht es, dass die Welt, die ständig als eine raum-zeitliche Universum bewusst, nicht thematisch bewusst ist und die Identität der Welt nicht thematisch konstituiert ist durch eine aktive Identifikation." (AVII 7, p. 3) Since the possibilities of project and retro-spect presuppose protention and retention, respectively, the horizon-consciousness is essentially temporal.

It is true that the constitution of the life-world achieved in inner time-consciousness is still formal. In order to give a full constitutive account of the concrete content of the perceptual world, one has to point out the subtle structures of our perceptual consciousness. But one must notice that all these syntheses of perceptual consciousness have to ground their possibilities in the universal synthesis of time-consciousness. In other words, all of them are on the higher level of constitutive accomplishments which presuppose the universal synthesis of time-consciousness.⁷¹ That is why the later Husserl has to characterize "Die Zeitlichkeit

als Urform des Welterfahrenden Lebens."⁷²

Clearly, this account of the constitution of the life-world itself only points out that time-consciousness is the condition for its possibility. But one must notice that what Husserl means by "origin" is nothing but origin in the sense of condition of possibility. Hence, to clarify the origin in the transcendental-phenomenological sense is to find out the condition which makes it possible. We cannot understand the term "origin" as "the adequate cause and sufficient reason".⁷³ Transcendental constitution, according to Husserl, is primarily understood as "original formation of meaning".⁷⁴ Accordingly, we cannot expect the constitutional analysis would explain to us what is the cause for the given. Transcendental phenomenology only concerns with the constitution of the "meaning" of the given. It tries to point out the subjective intentional functions in this constitution. Transcendental subjectivity is essentially a "meaning-giver" rather than a creator of the universe. It is not responsible for the metaphysical origin of the given. Hence, the proper task of the constitutional analysis of the origin of the life-world itself is to disclose the condition which makes it possible to acquire a meaning as the universal horizon, i.e., to clarify, to explicate the "meaning" of its pre-givenness, rather than to search for the final cause which creates the whole world or the sufficient reason which explains *why* there is a world. In fact, the life-world itself is said to be originated in the transcendental subjectivity precisely for it acquires its sense as "universal horizon" from the latter.

As correctly emphasised by Gerd Brand, "Für Husserl ist also Transzendentalphilosophie diejenige, die nach der letzten in Erfahrung und Erkenntnis 'Welt' konstituierenden 'Subjektivität' fragt, wie er an anderer Stelle ausführt: 'Und eben als diese wäre sie allgemein als transzendente Subjektivität zu bezeichnen. Damit wäre ein allgemeinsten Begriff von Transzendentalphilosophie gegeben: auf diese Subjektivität zurückfragen und versuchen, es verständlich zu machen, wie in ihr das Weltvorstellen, und zwar als Geltungsleistung aussieht.'"⁷⁵

Finally, the above clarifications also throw light to the question concerning the possibility of phenomenology as "rigorous science". Since the transcendental subjectivity as the meaning-giver is basically "worldless", it is also "ahistorical". This ahistorical transcendental ego not only makes possible the perceptual world but also the historical human surrounding world. As a task of self-criticism of the transcendental ego, phenomenology in the Husserlian sense is nothing but to make explicit the forms of productive intentional functions of the transcendental subjectivity through which the whole life-world is given. Insofar as the transcendental ego itself is ahistorical, the forms of these productive intentional functions are not history-laden. Hence, in spite of the historicity of our surrounding world, transcendental phenomenology as the self-criticism of the transcendental ego is possible to be developed as a "rigorous science", in principle.

VI. Is the Life-World Incompatible with Transcendental Phenomenology?

Owing to the horizational character of the life-world and Husserl's concentration on the research on this topic, many scholars claim that Husserl departs from the phenomenological idealism in his last phase of philosophical development.

Is this claim justified?

In order to find out an answer for this important but also controversial question, let us start with an exposition of Husserl's concept of phenomenological idealism.

According to Husserl, "the whole spatial-temporal world... is *according to its own meaning mere intentional Being*, a Being, which has merely secondary, relative sense of a Being *for* a consciousness".⁷⁶ That is to say, insofar as its meaning is concerned, the world is constitutively dependent on the transcendental consciousness. This is the major thesis of Husserl's phenomenological idealism. But as pointed out by Husserl himself, "Phenomenological idealism does not deny the actual existence of the real (*realen*) world (and primarily of Nature)... Its only task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world".⁷⁷ Hence, it is not correct to say that phenomenological idealism is a metaphysical idealism which "dissolves the reality of the world into the reality of consciousness".⁷⁸ Rather, it is an idealism of meaning, or, as called by Richard Holmes, an "epistemological idealism".⁷⁹

In the previous section, we have already seen that for Husserl the life-world as horizon is still regarded as constituted by the transcendental consciousness. The main task of his phenomenology of the life-world is to investigate the subjective accomplishments on the part of the transcendental ego through which the life-world itself is constituted. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that Husserl abandons his phenomenological idealism in his later thought.

Perhaps for those understand his idealism as metaphysical, Husserl's focus on the life-world which transcends the transcendental subjectivity certainly makes them feel that Husserl abolishes his early idealistic position. But to say that phenomenological idealism is a metaphysical idealism is to misunderstand the nature of Husserl's transcendental idealism. Husserl does not deny transcendence. He only insists that transcendence is transcendence *in* immanence. As pointed out by David Carr, it is not correct to say that because the life-world is a horizon, "consciousness is not intentionally related to it".⁸⁰ In fact, this is confirmed by Husserl himself, "the objective background, from which the perceived object of the *cogitatio* emerges as the glance of the Ego singles it out, is an *objective* background in a really experienceable sense".⁸¹

As a whole, our exposition makes clear that Husserl does not abandon his phenomenological idealism in his phenomenology of the life-world. As pointed out by Mohanty, "*Crisis* does *not* mark a totally new beginning in Husserlian meditations,

but extends the philosophical commitments already made to a new dimension of experience".⁸² On the other hand, we agree with Brand that "Genau wie die Begriffe 'Transzendentalphilosophie', 'Phänomenologie' darf der Husserl'sche Begriff des 'Idealismus' nur aus seinem Philosophieren selbst geschöpft werden."⁸³

Conclusion

Our above exposition and clarification at least make clear the following points.

First, although the concept of "life-world" is ambiguous, namely, it means the perceptual world, on the one hand, and the human cultural world, on the other hand, there exists an unified sense of this term. Life-world in the most comprehensive sense is essentially the all-encompassing universal horizon. In other words, life-world in the most comprehensive sense is not only a perceptual horizon but also appears as the different social-cultural horizons to different cultural communities. In fact, the different human surrounding worlds are resulted from different "world-pictures" of the life-world itself. But life-world *in itself* is always one.

Second, scientific world is essentially one of the sub-world of the life-world. In other words, it is one of the surperstructures which are rooted in the life-world. Being a logical construction, the scientific world is only an ideal representation of the life-world. Hence, to replace the life-world by the scientific as claimed by the scientific objectivism is to commit an error. For it takes true being what is actually a method.

Third, prior to any idealizations, the life-world itself exhibits a general structure. This *a priori* structure is common to any possible human surrounding worlds. Hence, we cannot treat the life-world as a choatic manifold which receives its structural order only from the scientific construction.

Fourth, although in the natural attitude the life-world in the most comprehensive sense always pre-given as the universal horizon, it is constituted by the transcendental consciousness. Actually for Husserl, the life-world as the universal horizon is nothing but the objective correlate of the whole stream of the conscious life. In particular, the original life-world is the objective correlate of the whole stream of perceptual conscious life. That is to say, insofar as the perceptual experience is the fundamental experience, the life-world is firstly presented as the perceptual world. It is clearly seen that the possibility of the life-world itself is dependent on the unity of the whole stream of conscious life. Since the *fundamental form* of the universal synthesis of the unity of the whole stream of the transcendental conscious life, "the form that makes all other syntheses of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing *consciousness of internal time*", temporality, as the correlate of time-consciousness, is the condition for the very possibility of the life-world itself.⁸⁴ That is to say, synthesis of the time-consciousness

is at the lowest level of subjective accomplishments that makes possible the life-world to be given as the universal horizon. Actually, it is clearly seen that the time-consciousness is not only the ultimate ground for the constitutive presence of objects but also for that of sensory "contents".

Finally, insofar as Husserl in his last work still regarded the phenomenology of the life-world as the "universal science of subjectivity as pre-giving the world", it is incorrect to say that Husserl abolishes his transcendental idealism in his later thought.⁸⁵

Notes

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2. Ricoeur, P., *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. by Edward G. Ballard & Lester E. Embree, Evanston: Northwestern Uni. Press, 1967, P. 12.
3. Barnd, G., "The Structure of the Life-world According to Husserl", in *Man and World*, Vol. 6, 1973, pp. 143-144.
4. Ingarden, R., "What is New in Husserl's 'Crisis' ", in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol II, (1972) pp. 24-26.
5. Gadamer, H., "The Science of the Life-World", in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. and trans. by David Linge, Berkeley: Uni. of California Press, 1976, p. 194.
6. See Schutz, A., "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy", in *Collected Papers*, ed. by I. Schutz, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970, p. 92.
7. Carr, D., "Husserl's Problematic Concept of the Life-World", in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 7(1970), pp. 331-339.
8. Mohanty, J. " 'Life-World' and 'A Priori' in Husserl's Later Thought" in *Analecta Husserliana*. Vol IV (1974), p. 4755.
9. Landgrebe, L., "The World as a Phenomenological problem", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. I (1940), PP. 38-58.
10. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement", *op. cit.*, p. 161; words in the squares are mine.
11. Gadamer, "The science of the Life-World", pp. 190-191.
12. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern Uni. Press. 1970, p. 52. Hereafter: *Crisis*.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

17. *Ibid*, p. 130.
18. Carr, D, *op. cit.*, pp. 337–338.
19. Landgrebe, L., *op. cit.*, p. 54.
20. *Crisis*, p.112.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Mohanty, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
25. *Crisis*, p. 380.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
27. *Crisis*, pp. 43–49. See also: Bennett, J.B., "Husserl's *Crisis* and Whitehead's Process Philosophy", in *The Personalist*, Vol. 56 (1975), p.231.
28. *Crisis*, p. 32.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
30. Marx, W., *Reason and World*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971, p. 63.
31. Husserl, *Crisis*pp. 380–381.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 31, p. 139.
37. Mohanty, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
38. Gurwitsch, A., "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl", in *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, Evanston: Northwestern Uni. Press, 1966, p. 425.
39. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 40; words in the squares are mine.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
43. Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 143.
44. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
47. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, p. 49.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

54. Marx, W., *op. cit.*, p. 59.
55. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
57. Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 179.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
59. George J. Stack points out that Husserl, in claiming the transcendental consciousness as an ego, seems hardly explain the "identity" between empirical ego and transcendental ego; Cf. Stack, George, "Husserl's Concept of Persons", in *Idealistic Studies*, Vol IV (1974), pp. 267-275.
60. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Eley, L., "Afterword", trans. by K. Ameriks, in *Experience and Judgment*, p. 409.
63. Landgrebe, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
64. Brough, J., "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's Early Writings on Time-Consciousness", in *Man and World*, Vol.5 (1972), pp. 298-326.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 314; our underline.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
69. Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement", p. 168.
70. See Brand, G., "Intentionality, Reduction, and Intentional Analysis in Husserl's Later Manuscripts", trans. by J. Kockelmans, in *Phenomenology*, ed. by J. Kockelmans, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967, p. 198.
71. Sokolowski, R., *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964, p. 100.
72. Cf. Gerd Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955, p. 54.
73. Sokolowski, *op. cit.* pp. 192-193.
74. Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 63.
75. Brand, *op. cit.* p. 42. It should be noted that the paragraph that cited by Brand comes from Husserl's Manuscript *K III I* (pp. 20-21) which is written during the *Crisis* period.
76. Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. by W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Collier Books, 1972, p. 139.
77. Holmes, R., "Is Transcendental Phenomenology Committed to Idealism", in *The Monist*, Vol 59 (1975), p. 102.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
80. Carr, D., *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*, Evanston: Northwestern

- Uni. Press, 1974, p. 177.
81. Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 223.
 82. Mohanty, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
 83. Brand, *op. cit.* p. 46.
 84. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960, p. 43.
 85. Husserl, *Crisis*. p. 147.

胡塞爾對“生活世界”之現象學分析

摘 要

究竟晚期胡塞爾有無因為“生活世界”一概念之引進而放棄其超越觀念論之立場呢？自從所謂法國現象學出現後，這一問題便一直困擾著學界。本文將為這一問題提供一個否定性的解答，為了支持我們的論點，本文引用了晚期胡塞爾一些尚未發表的手稿。

品鑒人格氣象的解釋學

蔣年豐

這篇文章要探究的主題是中國古代學術思想中所含帶的品鑒人格氣象這門獨特的學問。本文認為這門學問的基本精神性質上是解釋學的。本文先從牟宗三先生的見解著手，對他的見解給予某些必要的申論。之後，本文提出六個論證，分別是(一)品鑒聖賢人格氣象這門學問在孔孟早就具備，並非如牟先生所強調的從宋儒才開始；(二)孔子本人其實比北宋諸儒更能正視人天生秉具的才藝與技能——這一點無疑地拓寬了這門學問所涵蓋的範圍，甚至將魏晉名士的人格品鑒也包含進來；(三)品鑒人格氣象與詩教的比興表現有聯，這門學問在語言表達上運用了相當鮮明的隱喻意象；(四)這門解釋的學問包含了形體哲學的要素在內；(五)在人格氣象的品鑒下，聖賢與名士乃以被詩化的藝術品的姿態呈現出來；(六)中國這門獨特的學問在很多重要的論點上呼應了當前解釋學的課題。以解釋學去重新開發中國的經學精神是我認為今後經學研究可以走出的一個新方向，而本文所論「品鑒人格氣象的解釋學」即是一個開端。在詮釋方向上選定這門特殊的學問作為開端，動機在於由此我們可以很明晰地對照出中西解釋學同中帶異的地方。

牟宗三先生在其著作《才性與玄理》中論述《人物志》的義理模式時，提到順著《人物志》的品鑒才性，自然地可開出一個美學境界。此境界造就了清談中的藝術化的生活情調。從清談裏我們看到了一方面魏晉文人涵具著高貴的飄逸之氣，另一方面則美學境界中的貴賤雅俗的價值觀念也成為評判人物的標準。牟先生並說這種文化傾向所開出的乃是美學精神與藝術性的才性主體。①這是魏晉玄學的成就，至於宋儒其成就則在於順著孟子的規模下來而講義理之性，以建立人的道德主體性為職志。在這個工作方向上，則宋儒一方面立真正的普遍人性之尊嚴，另一方面以義理之性涵蓋氣質之性而談變化氣質。如此的努力之下，使得德性人格向上無限發展成為可能，也使得生命中天定而不可變的才性成為相對可變的才性。故宋儒講學中獨有一門「觀聖賢氣象」。這種學問的內在根據是聖人之天資才性所展現的姿態，在成德之學中，為道德精神所化所潤，轉而為聖人之氣象，不復是原始之風姿或神采。故宋儒總是說聖賢氣象，不說聖賢之風姿或神采。②

牟先生所講的宋儒乃是指二程。在《心體與性體》第二冊，談到程明道時，牟先生還特別別立一節—〈聖賢氣象篇：對於聖賢人格之品題〉。在這一節中，他從《二程全書·遺書》錄下二十七條二程論聖賢氣象的話語，其中最具有代表性的是：

△程子：「仲尼，元氣也。顏子，春生也。孟子，並秋殺。盡見：仲尼無所不包；顏子不違如愚之學於後世，有自然之和氣，不言而化者也；孟子則露其才，蓋亦時然而已。仲尼，天地也。顏子，和風慶雲也。孟子，泰山巖巖之氣象。觀其言皆可以見之矣。仲尼無迹，顏子微有迹，孟子其迹著。」

△問：橫渠之書，有迫切處否？〔伊川〕曰：子厚謹嚴，纔謹嚴便有迫切氣象，無寬舒之氣。孟子却寬舒，只是中間有些英氣。纔有英氣，便有圭角。英氣甚害事。如顏子便渾厚不同。顏

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子去聖人只毫髮之間。孟子大賢，亞聖之次也。或問：英氣于甚處見？曰：但以孔子之言比之，便見。如冰與水精，非不光，比之玉，自是有溫潤含蓄氣象，無許多光耀也。③

除了二程之外，朱熹與象山也擅長於觀聖賢氣象，而且他們的看法大體上與二程所見略同。如朱子門人問他從明道的評述：「顏子合下完具，只是小，要漸漸恢廓；孟子合下大，只是未粹，要索學以充之」莫非可看出顏孟二賢才具有別？朱子回答說：「然，孟子覺有動蕩底意思。」④朱子在他處又說：「孔門只一個顏子合下天資純粹。到曾子便過於剛，與孟子相似；世衰道微，人欲橫流，不是剛勁有脚跟底人，定立不住。」⑤此外，朱子之觀聖賢氣象也延及孔門其他弟子，如：子路、子貢、仲弓、曾點、漆雕開、子夏、子游、子張；朱子也品題了北宋諸儒的人格氣象。象山也說過：「夫子以仁發明斯道，其言渾無罅縫；孟子十字打開，更無隱遁，蓋時不同也」，以及「元晦似伊川，欽夫似明道；伊川蔽固深，明道却通疏。」⑥

壹：

本文首先要論證的要點是觀聖賢氣象在孔孟早就有，並非從宋儒才開始。先論孟子，他說：△伯夷，聖之清者也；伊尹，聖之任者也；柳下惠，聖之和者也；孔子，聖之時者也。孔子之謂集大成。集大成也者，金聲而玉振之也。金聲也者，始條理也；玉振之也者，終條理也。始條理者，智之事也；終條理者，聖之事也。（〈萬章下〉）

△伯夷隘，柳下惠不恭。（〈公孫丑下〉）

△孟施舍似曾子，北宮黜似子夏。夫二子之勇，未知其孰賢；然而孟施舍守約也。……孟施舍之守氣，又不如曾子之守約也。……有若曰：「豈惟民哉？麒麟之於走獸，鳳凰之於飛鳥，泰山之於丘垤，河海之於行潦，類也。聖人之於民，亦類也；出於其類，拔乎其萃，自生民以來，未有盛於孔子也。」（〈公孫丑上〉）

而孟子之觀聖賢氣象其實是承襲孔子的衣鉢。《論語·微子》便記載孔子對伯夷、柳下惠、虞仲等隱士人格氣象的品題，以及孔子以「無可無不可」對自己的道德實踐的定位。此外，《論語》中又記載：

△子曰：「大哉，堯之爲君也！巍巍乎，唯天爲大，唯堯則之！蕩蕩乎，民無能名焉！巍巍乎，其有成功也！煥乎，其有文章！」（〈泰伯〉）

△子曰：「巍巍乎，舜、禹之有天下也，而不與焉。」（〈泰伯〉）

除了善於體會先聖先賢的人格氣象之外，孔子亦善於品題自己學生的，如

△子貢問曰：「賜也何如？」子曰：「女器也。」曰：「何器也？」曰：「瑚璉也。」（〈公冶長〉）

△子曰：「雍也，可使南面。」（〈雍也〉）

△子謂仲弓曰：「犁牛之子，騂且角，雖欲勿用，山川其舍諸？」（〈雍也〉）

△…子曰：「由也升堂矣，未入於室也。」（〈先進〉）

△…子曰：「師也過，商也不及。」（〈先進〉）

受到孔子的影響，顏淵也善於描述聖賢氣象，他讚嘆孔子之道時，說：「仰之彌高，鑽之彌堅，瞻之在前，忽焉在後。」（〈子罕〉）事實上，《論語》一書的編纂者很精於刻畫聖賢氣象，如：

△子之燕居，申申如也，夭夭如也。（〈述而〉）

△子溫而厲，威而不猛，恭而安。（〈述而〉）

△閔子侍側，闐闐如也；子路，行行如也；冉有、子貢，侃侃如也。子樂。「若由也，不得

其死然。」（〈先進〉）

〈鄉黨〉對孔子日常生活中人格氣象的描述更是細膩。這些描述文字可以看出觀聖賢氣象在先秦儒家已蔚然為大宗，不必始於北宋諸儒。

貳：

本文要論證的第二個要點是孔子本人其實比北宋諸儒更能正視人天生秉具的才藝與技能，如

△子曰：「如有周公之才之美，使驕且吝，其餘不足觀也已！」（〈泰伯〉）

△子曰：「從我於陳蔡者，皆不及門也。」德行：顏淵、閔子騫、冉伯牛、仲弓。言語：宰我、子貢。政事：冉有、季路。文學：子游、子夏。（〈先進〉）

△子路問成人。子曰：「若臧武仲之知，公綽之不欲，卞莊子之勇，冉求之藝，文之以禮樂，亦可以為成人矣！」（〈憲問〉）

上面第一個引文值得注意的是孔子很欣賞周公的才能。這一點也讓我們對何以孔子欣賞管仲有更清楚的體會。第二及第三個引文值得注意的是冉求雖為季氏宰，剝削人民，但他所秉具的高超的政治才能，孔子却可以獨立出來欣賞之。孔子對人之資質才智的把握很具體，很精確，所以他在教育上可以循循善誘，使人成德達材。例如他說：「由也果，……賜也達，……求也藝」（〈雍也〉），又說：「柴也愚，參也魯，師也辟，由也喭。」（〈先進〉）他對人的心理性格也有精確而詳細的分析，如：少年戒之在色，壯年戒之在鬥，老年戒之在得（〈季氏〉）。這番話在當今的心理學中還是屹立不搖。此外，孔子描述小人格時說：「狂而不直，侗而不愿，忼忼而不信，吾不知之矣。」（〈泰伯〉）這個描述將人性的複雜與曲折刻畫得淋漓盡致。「好仁不好學，其蔽也愚；好知不好學，其蔽也蕩；好信不好學，其蔽也賊；好直不好學，其蔽也絞；好勇不好學，其蔽也亂；好剛不好學，其蔽也狂」（〈陽貨〉）這段話更是從心理分析來說明知識教育的重要。今日看來仍有相當高的參考價值。洞悉人的心理機制，正視人的資質才智，皆有助於品鑒人格氣象，孔子說：「吾之於人也，誰毀誰譽？如有所譽者，其有所試矣。」（〈衛靈公〉）這句話很可看出品題人格氣象的艱難。

叁：

孔子品鑒人格氣象的學問是落在道德修養的脈絡中進行的。但品鑒人格氣象並不一定需要這個脈絡，只要不與道德規範全面衝突即可。《世說新語》中所描述各種魏晉名士的人格氣象即是如此的模式。它所刻畫的並不是「立體的」道德氣象，而是順著自然生命發出的片面性的道德光輝，⑦如：

△…〔郭〕林宗曰：〔黃〕叔度汪汪，如萬頃之陂；澄之不清，擾之不濁，其器深廣，難測量也。」（〈德行〉）

△王戎目山巨源：「如璞玉渾金，人皆歛其寶，莫知名其器。」（〈賞譽〉）

△王戎云：「〔王〕太尉神姿高徹，如瑤林瓊樹，自然是風塵外物。」（〈賞譽〉）

無論是儒家式或是魏晉式的品鑒人格氣象，它們都運用了相當鮮明的隱喻意象。這一點很值得深入探究。本文要論證的第三個要點即是品鑒人格氣象與詩教的比興表現有關聯。第一位在文獻上發現這個線索的是朱自清。他在《詩言志辨》裏認為朱子《近思錄》的「觀聖賢氣象」其精神活動與「言外之義」的「興」相近。朱子說韋應物的詩「真是自在，氣象近道」。朱自清說這種對氣象的品鑒在觀念上正是從「興於詩」、「詩可以興」來，只不過又加以擴充罷了。⑧除了「言外之義」，「興」也可表現為「象外之境」，即是所謂的「別趣」、「意興」、或「興趣」。這

種「象外之境」，朱自清認為從漢末至晉代即拿來品題名士，他引《世說新語》郭林宗品題黃叔度的話作例證。這種品題後來又借來評論詩文。鍾嶸、司空圖、嚴羽，乃至金聖嘆都屬於這種傳統。⑨

朱自清這個見解相當具有啓發性。可惜他並未充分發展這個觀念，也沒有仔細思考人格氣象之品鑒這門學問的開創者—孔子—與《詩經》比興表現法的關係。以下是出自《詩經》的文句：

△南有樛木，葛藟纍之，樂只君子，福履綏之。（〈周南·樛木〉）

△桃之夭夭，灼灼其華，之子于歸，宜其室家。（〈周南·桃夭〉）

△麟之趾，振振公子。（〈周南·麟之趾〉）

△節彼南山，維石巖巖，赫赫師尹，民具爾瞻。（〈小雅·節南山〉）

△振鷺于飛，于彼西雝，我客戾止，亦有斯容。（〈周頌·振鷺〉）⑩

這五首詩都用了比興的表現法，而且都是在描摹人之才貌或品德的氣象；尤其是〈樛木〉、〈節南山〉、與〈振鷺〉更是明顯，與孔子描摹人格氣象時所用的文學表達並無兩樣。孔子平常以《詩》《書》教人，而詩教以「告諸往而知來者」的聯想著稱。這對孔子的文學表達有很大的啓發作用，如：看到宰予晝寢時，他說：「朽木不可雕也，糞土之牆不可朽也」（〈公冶長〉）；感嘆政治倫理淪喪，則說：「觚不觚，觚哉觚哉」（〈雍也〉）；感嘆自己的心志不再如少壯時期那麼激切，便說：「甚矣吾衰也，久矣吾不復夢見周公」（〈述而〉）；在齊國聽到先王之樂，十分快樂，便形容說：「三月不知肉味」（〈述而〉）；嫌子路過於勇猛無智，則說：「暴虎馮河，死而無悔」（〈述而〉）；形容君子時窮乃見其志節，則說：「歲寒然後知松柏之後彫也」（〈子罕〉）；嘆世風日下，無力回轉，則說：「鳳鳥不至，河不出圖，吾已矣夫」（〈子罕〉）；自表其救世心願始終不渝，則說：「吾豈匏瓜也哉？焉能繫而不食？」（〈陽貨〉）⑪以上這些話語之使用譬喻的意象都承襲了比興的精神。

當然，這些話語所描摹的並不是人格氣象。那麼孔子是在哪個節骨眼上將詩教比興的精神接到人格品鑒上去呢？這個問題要扣緊孔子的「樂教」才能得到正解。徐復觀先生認為，孔子對於音樂的重視貫遠出於後世的人們的想像之上。「這一方面是來自他對古代樂教的傳承，一方面是來自他對於樂的藝術精神的新發現。」⑫徐先生以《論語·憲問》所記載的「子擊磬於衛，有荷蕢而過門者曰：『有心哉，擊磬乎！』」來說明孔子在演奏時，人格與音樂是融為一體的。⑬此外，《論語》上又記載：

△子曰：「〈關雎〉樂而不淫，哀而不傷。」（〈八佾〉）

△子曰：「師摯之始，〈關雎〉之亂，洋洋乎盈耳哉！」（〈泰伯〉）

由此可見孔子體會音樂之深。而且有一點更重要的，却為徐先生所忽略，那就是孔子描述音樂韻味與境界所使用的語言與《論語》一書用來描述人格氣象的語言十分類似。

△子語魯大師樂，曰：「樂其可知也。始作，翕如也。從之，純如也，皦如也，繹如也。以成。」（〈八佾〉）

其中的「翕如」、「純如」、「皦如」、「繹如」都是音樂韻味與境界的描述語；它們在語法上與「申申如也」、「夭夭如也」、「闐闐如也」、「侃侃如也」十分類似。依孔子之見，人格氣象與音樂是融而為一的，因此他可以從對後者的品鑒中來品鑒前者。所以，

△子謂〈韶〉：盡美矣，又盡善也；謂〈武〉：盡美矣，未盡善也。（〈八佾〉）

這段話即表示舜在人格氣象上比武王又高出一等。從孔子的讚美—「無為而治者，其舜也與！夫何為哉？恭己正南面而已矣」（〈衛靈公〉）可以看出舜的政治人格的風範。孟子雖然沒有品鑒音

樂的故事，但他之品鑒人格氣象却從孔子的品鑒音樂得到啓示，這一點可以從以下他的敘述看出一「可欲之謂善，有諸己之謂信，充實之謂美，充實而有光輝之謂大，大而化之謂聖，聖而不可知之謂神。」（〈盡心下〉）我們可以說，在孔子，品鑒人格氣象與音樂境界乃是同一回事；但從孟子開始，品鑒人格氣象便不再與樂教有所關聯，自己獨立出來了。這也是周文疲蔽，禮崩樂壞後必然的走向。

肆：

本文要論證的第四點是，中國這種品鑒人格氣象的學問包含了形體哲學的要素在內；意思是說，被品鑒的人物其人格氣象的養成正是形體哲學所關切的。就儒家而言，氣象乃是道德精神流貫瀰漫於一個人的言談舉止而產生的；氣象也可說是身體力行的成果。簡單地說，氣象是實踐的，而非思辨也。孟子的敘述：「君子所性，仁義禮智根於心；其生色也，粹然見於面，盎於背，施於四體，四體不言而喻」（〈盡心上〉），與明道的敘述：「若夫至仁，則天地爲一身，而天地之間品物萬形爲四肢百體」（《宋元學案·明道學案》）最能道出聖賢之煥發人格氣象時其形體所表現的樣式。就魏晉的才性品鑒而言，他們也強調言談舉止的優雅美妙。這種美感是實踐性的，也包含形體哲學的側面。從《人物志》所說的：

物生有形，形有精神，能知精神，則窮理盡性。性之所盡，九質之徵也。然則平陂之質在於神，明暗之實在於精，勇怯之勢在於筋，疆弱之植在於骨，躁靜之決在於氣，慘澤之情在於色，衰正之形在於儀，態度之動在於容，緩急之狀在於言。^⑭

便可清楚地看到形體在魏晉的才性品鑒中所佔的地位。牟先生從「道德/才性」的角度來辨別儒家與魏晉之品鑒人格氣象的基本差異。本文並不否認這個基本差異的存在，但不想繼續追蹤下去。本文想從另一個哲學角度來考量儒家與魏晉在品鑒人格氣象上的差異。我們認爲儒者所說的人格氣象其中的形體享有一存存論的地位，質言之，其中的形體具有超越性，超越了自然軀體的限制，故孟子會說：「上下與天地同流」與「萬物皆備於我矣」（〈盡心上〉）。但在魏晉思想這邊，形體純粹是被人認知與觀賞的，並不具有如此飽滿的超越性。也可以說，聖賢氣象的形體展現出存有有意義的活動，烘托出境來；而《人物志》所描述的形體則無法如此飽滿地展現這種活動，因爲此時形體並沒有全然超越自然軀體的限制一事實上，它的美感正好表現在個人表演之中。人們或許會認爲黃叔度的氣質如萬頃之波，這難道不表示其形體能展現出存有有意義的活動嗎？本文對此持比較保守的態度。當我們說形體能表現出存有有意義的活動時，我們指的是此時在概念上形體與天地萬物有種「並生」或「爲一」的體驗。在魏晉人物所崇敬的莊子思想中，「天地與我並生，萬物與我爲一」的體驗是可能的，然而要享有這種體驗，在莊子看來，我們偏不能矜持天生形體的優雅美妙，所以《莊子》一書中悟道者每每是殘廢者。換句話說，魏晉名士對形體之美有所矜持。這一矜持使得形體的地位仍然隸屬於形而下的，儘管它的優雅美妙會引起觀賞者某些形上意境的聯想。所以在儒家或莊子能體現的某些哲學境界在魏晉名士上並不見得能夠完全體現。^⑮因此，本文認爲魏晉名士優雅美妙的舉止中散發出來的道德光輝是片面性的，並非是立體性的。

伍：

本文要論證的第五個要點是，就能煥發人格氣象而言，聖賢與名士皆可被視爲藝術品。孔子對曾點「浴乎沂，風乎舞雩，詠而歸」的藝術情境非常首肯。曾點所刻畫的即是人格氣象全然藝術品化的境界。每當孔子讚賞堯、舜、禹無爲而治的人格氣象時，他事實上也把他們藝術品化了或說詩化了。後世儒家及魏晉思想之品鑒人格氣象皆循此精神，所以品鑒如同在品味詩的意義與

境界，並用山、水、風、月、松、玉、奇獸、禮器等意象來形容。這門學問在中國是極大的傳統。何以中國能開展出這個傳統，而西方竟然付之闕如呢？原因之一是古代中國思想並不執著於觀念論的「心」或實在論的「物」去抽象地把握人的生命，而強調從「性情形氣」具體地感知人的生命。在西方提倡人應該成為藝術品的哲學家以尼采（F. Nietzsche）最著名，其姿態也最強烈。尼采說過，他的藝術形上學立場乃是：這個世界只能被證實為美感經驗而已。^⑩而美感乃是「一堆流動的譬喻」。在尼采看來，藝術活動乃是人的創造性的活動，藝術也是最高級的人文表現。而藝術活動即表現在以譬喻的語言去勾勒這個世界的意義。在此美感活動中，這世界才得到證實。^⑪這個勾勒意義的活動即是進行一種解釋（interpretation）。尼采的看法可以偏激到認為這個世界沒有客觀實證的事實，只有解釋。^⑫尼采又認為，除了人之外，沒有什麼是美的。^⑬這句話是相當反西方傳統的藝術觀的。他說：「藝術並非模倣自然，而是自然的形而上的補充，它躍升至與自然並立的地位以克服自然。」^⑭職是之故，在尼采思想中，自然是必須受轉化的，而人必須成為藝術品才可貴。^⑮尼采自己心中即曾以歌德為完美人格的化身。^⑯

根據海德格的解釋，所謂人成為藝術品乃是基於人能夠讓自己生命中創造性的「衝創意志」（the will to power）順暢地表現出來。而很重要的是此衝創意志並不是心理現象或物理現象。它是形體現象，所以衝創意志具體的表現為情感、情緒、感受、指揮。^⑰尼采認為衝創意志乃是自動自發、自立自強、自我提昇的。^⑱這些特性都會在形體現象中表現出來。尼采特別批評觀念論說，這些都不是它所能掌握的。就某個意義而言，尼采乃是要建立「藝術生理學」。對此，海德格引尼采的話：「當然，美學只不過是應用生理學而已」來佐證。^⑲這種見解重大的意義是，美感經驗不被化約為心理的內容，而被還原到形體的狀態（bodily states）。更重要的是，在這種藝術觀之下，我們的形體乃是統一身心的整體，在概念上，不能再被分解。^⑳所以尼采分析說，當我們感受到藝術的快樂時，乃是在形體上體會到力量感與豐盛感。而且當我們感受到美的快樂時，我們並不是感受到我們有具形體，我們乃是感受到形體以其狀態充滿了我們，讓我們由著形體而印證自己。^㉑簡言之，這是一種實踐、行動，而非思辨與冥想。所以總括地說，依尼采之見，在實踐過程中，衝創力表現出來的形體現象即是藝術之美。^㉒而有此藝術美感的人物即是一藝術品。

由上面的論述看來，儒家、魏晉的「才性」之學、以及尼采似乎都以形體哲學為基礎，企圖建立一個以品鑒人格氣象為宗旨的解釋學。解釋學在古代西方以解釋經典文獻為工作重點，後來也發展到解釋歷史、藝術、甚至政治意識形態。在精神上，解釋學乃是從語言文獻的解釋去理解人的生命表現。這種理解過程並儘量避免任何知識論—邏輯學格局的限制。在不受此限制下，解釋學乃力求從具體的生命表現中去解釋其特殊意義。中國古代的學問也有此精神。其中經學傳統正是重要的一支，因為這個傳統裏，對語言文獻之意義給予正確掌握乃是最基本的課題，而其目的則在於透過對語言之體會去理解古人對生命的各種洞見。在這種空氣下，由於中國對人的生命特重具體地感知其性情形氣，因此品鑒人格氣象的解釋學自然而然地被發展出來。

陸：

在要思考如何以解釋學重建中國經學之前，我們最好先思考我們傳統所擁有的這門獨特的人格氣象的解釋學是否呼應了當前解釋學的課題。這也是本文要探究的第六個論點。解釋學大師伽達瑪（H.-G. Gadamer）認為「所有的理解都是解釋」。^㉓這句話有很多涵義。其中之一是理解乃在掌握意義，因此理解一定是帶著主觀成見的解釋。當然，這種主觀並不表示是任意隨便的，而是有客觀意義的主觀性。這種現象在人格氣象的解釋學裏相當明顯，尤其是儒家的，因為這

種解釋學並非是科學上客觀意義的探究，而是出自於自家生命的體認。程明道說：「昔受學於周茂叔，每令尋仲尼顏子樂處，所樂何事？」^⑩周濂溪叫二程兄弟尋孔顏樂處時，並非要他們客觀地去考證孔顏快樂的原因，而是要他們自己回到自己的生命中去體認人人都具有的孔顏式的自在精神。事實上，伽達瑪認為在解釋的活動中都存在著一個「玄思的情境」(speculative situation)。^⑪在這個情境中，問者與被問者在一個辯證的關係中被合一化了；也就是說，主客之間有個緊密的連屬性。^⑫伽達瑪又說這是種「映照關係」(mirror relation)，^⑬也就是互為主體性。儒家人格氣象的解釋學即是要我們與聖賢打照面，讓彼此的人格光輝能互相朗照。當孟子說聖人復起不易吾言時，當象山說四海之內聖人心同理同時，即實現了這種映照關係。又依伽達瑪之見，「藝術品其實是在它之改變經驗者的經驗之中獲得存在的。」^⑭這句話對人格氣象的解釋學相當貼切。當我們看到「仲尼，天地也；顏子，和風慶雲也；孟子，泰山巖巖之氣象也」時，孔顏孟的藝術生命並非外在地擺在那裏，其氣象之美是被我們欣賞者在修心養性、變化氣質中獲得認知。

伽達瑪認為藝術的本質乃是 play。^⑮這個概念如果依照亞里士多德《政治學》中的意旨正與中國經學傳統中所謂的「優游涵泳」十分切近。孔子讚賞曾點的「浴乎沂，風乎舞雩，詠而歸」即是讚賞他能體會出聖賢學問中有這等境界。明道很能體會這種境界，他說：「十五、六歲與弟伊川受學於濂溪，即慨然有為聖賢之志，嘗自言再見茂叔後，吟風弄月，有吾與點也意。」^⑯《近思錄》上記載明道說：「周茂叔胸中灑落，如光風霽月。」對此敘述，朱子註曰：

△天理周流，本無窒礙，中有未淨，故多係累。周子心契太極，其胸中精瑩明徹，不疑所行，實有以得失仲尼顏子之樂，是以灑灑落落，如光風霽月，清曠高遠之象。若有一毫私吝心，何處得此耶？故李延平每誦此言，此為善形容有道者氣象。

朱子又有周子贊：「風月無邊，庭草交翠」。^⑰這種人格氣象的藝術境界自然令人優游涵泳，其樂融融。明道的人格氣象更能體現此種境界。《宋元學案》記載：「侯仲良曰：朱公揆見明道於汝州，歸，謂人曰：『某在春風中坐了一月。』」^⑱伊川撰〈明道先生行狀〉也說：「先生資稟既異，而充養有道，純粹如精金，溫潤如良玉。寬而有制，和而不流，忠誠貫於金石；孝悌通於神明，視其色，其接物也如春陽之溫；聽其言，其入人也如時雨之潤…」^⑲由以上的論述可以看到中國人格氣象的解釋學最能證實伽達瑪所持的藝術即表現優游涵泳的見解。

依明道的體驗，不只是品鑒人格氣象，連品鑒天地萬物之氣象亦可享有優游涵泳的藝術效果，因為此時天地萬物亦藝術品化了。《宋元學案》記載：^⑳

△觀雞雛可以觀仁。

△觀天地生物氣象。

△靜後見萬物皆有春意。

△張橫浦曰：明道窗前有茂草覆砌。或勸之芟。曰：「不可，欲常見造物生意。」又置盆池，畜小魚數尾，時時觀之。或問其故。曰：「欲觀萬物自得意。」

不過有一點是人格氣象的解釋學與伽達瑪的解釋學思想不符合的地方。依伽達瑪之見，我們之欣賞藝術品是需要審美距離的。這個距離是時間的距離。這個觀點受到不少學者的批評，以為如此的話，則正確的評價當代藝術品豈非不可能了？^㉑中國人格氣象的解釋學則可以品鑒當前活生生的人物之人格氣象。其實伽達瑪強調的是過去與現在的傳承關係，他將重點擺在「任何藝術品都具有「同時性」；即使過去的藝術品也可在任何時間出現而仍舊保持著它的意義。所以「同時性」也就是「無時性」。^㉒伽達瑪的解釋學相當肯定古典教養。^㉓這一點與儒家思想比較接近；魏晉

思想在這方面就淡薄多了。伽達瑪這種立場正有助於我們分辨儒家與魏晉人格解釋學的趣向。

伽達瑪認為解釋學基本上是語言的，因為理解與語言息息相關。^④不僅如此，他又在他的學說中完成「存有論的轉折」(ontological turn)，^⑤尤其是在詩化的語言(poetic words)上，他闡明語言乃關係著存有，^⑥即：

語言沒有獨立的生命，它與進入到它之中的世界無法分離。只有當世界進入它時，世界才成爲世界。而且語言只有當世界在語言之中形現時才是語言。因此，語言的原始人文性即意指人之在世存有的基本語言性。^⑦

這段話可以說明伽達瑪存有論意義的解釋學的中心思想：世界即是語言，語言即是世界。^⑧當然，這種境界一定要在解釋學的情境裏才能成立。伽達瑪這個思想很重要。它可以很適當地說明何以古人在描摹人格氣象時喜歡用比興式的譬喻。比興式的語言即是詩化的語言；在這種意象生動鮮明的語言裏，我們可以具體地體會聖賢所體現的世界。當伊川說明道純粹如精金、溫潤如良玉、既如春陽之溫、又如時雨之潤時，伊川即是在烘托明道的道德世界以及我們志於道時應有的道德世界的氣象。事實上，聖賢所說的語言最接近伽達瑪所謂的詩化語言。

△程子：「孔子言語句句是自然，孟子言語句句是實事。」

△明道：「聖人之言，冲和之氣也，貫徹上下。」^⑨

所以依古人之見，我們開始入學讀書即表示從此進入到聖賢的語言世界中；而且，我們所看到的並不是一堆符號，而應是一個解釋學的情境——這個情境乃是人存處於世的最「真實」的情境。^⑩

以上論述的是中國人格氣象的解釋學很吻合伽達瑪解釋學的意旨。而更有趣的是伽達瑪解釋學的缺憾也可能正是人格氣象解釋學的缺點。哈伯瑪斯(J.Habermas)批評伽達瑪太過於一味地接受傳統與權威，對社會體制與政治意識形態的批判不夠。^⑪也有人認為伽達瑪解釋學對政治意義的實踐，不夠正視。^⑫這些批判相當得體的。的確，人格氣象的解釋學只能當作一個更大更完整的解釋學體系的一部份。要不然的話，社會與政治批判在讀古書中必然遭受扼殺。這是相當可怕的事，這表示中國古代文化永遠無法開出現代化的民主體制來。因此，除了人格氣象的解釋學之外，我們還得從古代的經典文獻中開展出別種面貌的解釋學。

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附 註

①見牟宗三之《才性與玄理》(台北：學生書局，一九七四)，頁五〇。

②同上書，頁六〇。

③見牟宗三之《心體與性體》第二冊(台北：正中書局，一九七五)，頁二四五～二四九。

④見黎清德編訂之《朱子語類》第六冊(台北：文津出版社，一九八六)，頁二三五二。

⑤同上書，頁二三五三。

⑥見《陸九淵集》(台北：里仁書局，一九八一)，頁三九八、四一三。

⑦依牟宗三，魏晉人物縱然才性優美却不可說有氣象。本文不取法於此，而認為凡是從人的形體、才性所煥發來的不與道德相違的美感都是氣象。此外，牟先生認為魏晉人物才性之美與道德精神不相干，本文認為太強了點。他們的人性之美也不能違反道德。事實上，他們是利用自然的秉賦爲素材順著去表現某道德片面的精彩，不是刻苦自勵鍛鍊出來的，缺乏一種立體感。

- ⑧ 見朱自清之《詩言志辨》(台北：漢京文化公司，一九八三)，頁八五。
- ⑨ 同上書，頁八六～八九。
- ⑩ 朱自清在同上書也提到這幾首詩使用比興的情況，見頁四九～五六。
- ⑪ 關於《論語》的文學藝術的表現手法可參考施友忠的〈《論語》的文藝〉。該文蒐集在《中國古典文學論叢一冊二：文學批評與戲劇之部》(台北：中外文學月刊社，一九七六)，頁一～三一。
- ⑫ 見徐復觀之《中國藝術精神》(台北：學生書局，一九七六)，頁五。
- ⑬ 同上書，頁六。
- ⑭ 見劉邵之《人物誌》(台北：金楓出版公司，一九八六)，頁三五～三六。
- ⑮ 關於魏晉思想與莊子在「人之個性」這個觀念上的差異，可參見唐君毅之《中國哲學原論：原性篇》(台北：學生書局，一九七四)第五章。當然，本文並非曹薩他的論點，只是有不少暗合之處。
- ⑯ F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), P. 143.
- ⑰ J. P. Stern, Nietzsche (Cornwall: Fontana Press, 1978) P. 139.
- ⑱ W. Kaufmann(ed), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: The Viking Press 1954), P. 458.
- ⑲ Ibid., P. 526.
- ⑳ The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, P. 142.
- ㉑ W. Kaufmann (ed.), Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), P. 156.
- ㉒ Ibid., pp. 154 - 156.
- ㉓ M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume One: The Will to Power as Art (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), P. 38.
- ㉔ Ibid., PP. 42, 52
- ㉕ Ibid., P. 91.
- ㉖ Ibid., P. 96.
- ㉗ Ibid., PP. 98 - 99. 海格德如此描述: We do not "have" a body; rather we "are" bodily.
- ㉘ Ibid., PP. 76, 138.
- ㉙ H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden & J. Cumming (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), PP. 350, 360.
- ㉚ 見黃宗義之《宋元學案》(台北：河洛出版社，一九七五)，卷十三，頁二三。
- ㉛ Truth and Method, P. 428.
- ㉜ Ibid., P. 419.
- ㉝ Ibid., P. 423.
- ㉞ Ibid., P. 92.
- ㉟ Ibid., P. 104. 關於這一點亦可參考高宣揚先生之《解釋學簡論》(台北：遠流出版公司，一九八八)一五四～一五六。
- ㊱ 《宋元學案》，卷十三，頁三四。

- ⑳朱子編訂之《近思錄》（台北：商務印書館，一九六七），頁三三四、三三五。
- ㉑《宋元學案》，卷十三，頁三八。
- ㉒《近思錄》，頁三三五。
- ㉓《宋元學案》，頁一九、二七、二九、三八。
- ㉔關於審美距離，可參考Truth and Method，P. 113。關於學者對伽達瑪的批評，可參考張德興先生之〈歷史·本文·解釋〉一文，收在《超越挑戰與應戰》（大陸上海：文藝出版社，一九八八）頁二八一～二八二。
- ㉕見薛華先生之《黑格爾與藝術難題——一段問題史》（北京：新華書店，一九八六），頁一七一～一七四。
- ㉖同上書，頁一七七。
- ㉗Truth and Method，P. 357.
- ㉘Ibid., P. 434.
- ㉙Ibid., PP. 426 - 427.
- ㉚Ibid., P. 401.
- ㉛Ibid., PP. 401, 443.
- ㉜引自《心體與性體》第二冊，頁二四五、二四七。
- ㉝Truth and Method，P. 446.
- ㉞關於這一點可參考J. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), P. 155.
- ㉟例如R. J. Bernstein, Philosophical Profiles (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), P. 104.

The Abstract of
“Hermeneutics for Appraising the Spirit of Human Personality”

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This paper is intended to investigate into the problem concerning the unique discipline of the appraisal of the spirit of human personality, as contained in ancient Chinese thought. This paper takes it that the fundamental position of this discipline is hermeneutic. This paper starts from a discussion of Sir Mou's view of this problem. Some necessary points are made to justify his view.

Then follow six arguments. a) This discipline has already been formed and employed even since the date of Confucius and Mencius, not created by the Confucians of North Sung Dynasty as Sir Mou claims. b) Confucius himself left more rooms than the Confucians of North Sung Dynasty did for appreciating the crafts and abilities shown by individuals — this no doubt widens the scope of this discipline, even covering the appraisal activities proceeding among the intellectuals during the time of Wei and Chin Dynasties. c) This unique discipline has some bearings on the literary expressions, the so-called “analogy and metaphor” issued from the teaching of Poetry Classic. To be sure, this discipline uses lots of metaphorical images to guide readers' imagination to grasp the unique characters of saints and distinguished intellectuals. d) This hermeneutic discipline contains many elements of the philosophy of the body. e) During the course of the appraisal of the spirit of human personality, saints and distinguished intellectuals are regarded as poeticized works of art. f) This typically Chinese discipline in many aspects echoes many issues emphasized by modern hermeneutics.

This paper actually presupposes a necessary task of reinterpreting the spirit of the Chinese tradition of classics through modern hermeneutics. This paper just purports to play the role of a starting step of this giant enterprise. And the motivation behind choosing this special topic lies in that it does contribute to making a sharp contrast between the different directions of both Chinese and Western hermeneutics.

**Mutual immanence of Buddha and All Sentients:
The Social Aspect of Buddha.**

Yih-hsien Yu

Abstract

The paper is an attempt to explore the social aspect of the conception of Buddha through an examination of the doctrine of the trikaya of Buddha. As it was told by the Mahayana Buddhists, there are three bodies of a Buddha, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, which represent the eternal, transient, and blissful aspects of Buddha respectively. From this doctrine, the well-received doctrine in Chinese Buddhism, that "Buddha is related to (or as) all sentient and all sentient are related to (or as) Buddha" developed. It in turn later brooded a notion of the mutual immanence of Buddha and all sentient, which was most vividly expounded by Hua-yen Master Ch'en Kuan. These doctrines evidently reveal the prominent social character of Buddha - social in terms of an all embracing relation between supreme being and human beings - which entails a highly philosophical and humanistic significance. And the force of Buddhist religion as an unceasing inspiration for human endeavors may locate its source in this ideal sociality.

Furthermore, it should be acknowledged here that the author was indebted to Charles Hartshorne's, a process philosopher, pantheistic exploration of the sociality of God, which inspired her to undertake a philosophical analysis of the sociality of Buddha. From the standpoint of comparative philosophy, there are remarkable similarities between the concept of God in the doctrines of process philosophy and the concept of Buddha in Mahayana Buddhism. These have long been taken notice of by many philosophers, both East and West, it seems to be worthwhile again to take a look of the commonness of these two philosophies with regard to the sociality of the supreme being in the future studies.

It may well be recognized as one of the most ostensible features of any world-widespread religion that it must have an account of the universal relation between the supreme being and the world, or all mankind. For if a religion is to be widespread, it must not only provide a description of the source of divinity but also relate it to human beings in general, regardless their differences with respect to races, ranks, intelligence, sexes, etc, such that the religion in question can appeal

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to all mankind, not to any particular group of people. By this impartial character of the worldwide religion, a notion of universal equality is naturally accommodated to all men, and eventually becomes a significant religious motif inspired all its followers. This in fact can be construed as an extension of the comprehensive loving nature of any universal religion, or we may say, of its inherited social character (i.e. the supreme being's relatedness to all), that unites the supreme being with all mankind.

This social character of religion is essentially different in two of the most influential religions in the East and West, Christianity and Buddhism. In the West the Christians hold that God, as the supreme being, is transcendent and different from this world, however, is the cause and order of the existence of this world. God as the creator of all beings and of mankind bestows his fatherly love and benevolent grace upon all men, and through his mercy only that the salvation of men becomes possible. Hence as the created, loved, and saved men should love God with full heart and strength in return. So the Christians posit a loving relation between the supreme being and mankind, and at the same time they assert that the former to be something external to and separated from the latter. In the East, Buddha is considered as a supreme being not in the sense of a supernatural power or a personal God transcendentally existing, rather as a spiritual status that can be attained by all sentient beings who achieve self-enlightenment. The universal relation that associates Buddha with human beings is based on his wise envisaging the potential Buddhahood of them and his compassion for their ignorance of this treasureable potentiality. It is told that Buddha has long been reposed in nirvana and unfettered by the chain of life and death, it was for the sake of teaching ignorant human beings the enlightening path that Buddha came to this world and shared the sufferings with them. Here, however, according to the basic doctrines of Buddhism both Buddha and the sentient beings come into being following the same principle of dependent origination. Buddha coexists with all sentient beings, not as something transcendent, rather as a result of the accumulations of innumerable karmas and deeds through eons of ages. By this way, Buddha became realized through the ever changing cosmic process and existed in this world, not in any other world.

Buddha's co-presence with and compassion for all sentient beings does make him a supreme being socially related to all men, instead a supernatural power exclusively beyond men. This humane feature of Buddha may avoid the dichotomic difficulty produced by a transcendent notion of God, however, it may also handicap Buddha's being the principle of ultimate reality, that a supreme being is required to be. For how can a human be a universal principle in an ultimate sense with which a high religion must be concerned? Perhaps in view of this, later Mahayana Buddhists developed a doctrine of the threefold body (the trikaya) of a Buddha,¹ which explicitly gives a panentheistic interpretation of Buddha, and provisionally lays down the metaphysical foundation for the doctrine of the mutual immanence of

Buddha and the sentient. The panentheistic interpretation of the nature of Buddha was most vividly expounded by the Hua-yen school of Chinese Buddhism, which is the main subject of our present discussion.

Some further remarks is required here with respect to the above statements. First, here we understand the term "panentheistic" by taking Charles Hartshorne's version, which seems to us can be fittingly applied to Buddhism in terms of the doctrine of the trikaya of a Buddha. Hartshorne says panentheism tends to give a dipolar account of the nature of the supreme being which suggests the contrast aspects of deity. "Eternity," "temporality," "caused," "uncaused," all the contrary pairs, can be attributed to "God" as different aspects of his reality.² Moreover, Hartshorne observes, the main feature that distinguishes panentheism from pantheism and theism is that the panentheistic deity comprises all the relative, contrary things and therefore in some aspects it is distinguishable from and independent of all things, just as the traditional theistic deity is, while in other aspect it is included in the actual whole and within all things, just as the pantheistic deity is.³ Following this description of panentheism, we may say the doctrine of threefold body (trikaya) of a Buddha is undoubtedly a panentheistic one. As Vijnanavada school of Mahayana Buddhism proposes, there are three bodies (or we may say aspects) of a Buddha: Nirmanakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Dharmakaya. Buddha as a transforming being accessible to all kinds of sentient, e. g., taking the human shape to be Siddhattha Gotama, he demonstrates the Nirmanakaya (the transforming body) of a Buddha. Buddha as a caused supreme being by accumulated deeds and merits, i.e. the enlightened Buddha entering nirvana, he shows the Sambhogakaya (the Blissful body) of a Buddha. Still more, Buddha as uncaused supreme being (metaphysically the universal principle, the ultimate reality, the pure substance that prevails all beings as a perennial element of them), he is the Tathagatagrabha (the Womb of Tathata, the Suchness) that indicates the Dharmakaya (the essential body) of a Buddha. Although the transforming and the blissful Buddha is temporal, caused, contingent, coming into being and ceasing to be, the essential Buddha is eternal, uncaused, necessary, and never coming into being nor ceasing to be. Thus the doctrine of the threefold body of a Buddha displays the feature of panentheism: that Buddha is of dipolar nature, and that in one aspect Buddha is the reality itself and in another aspect Buddha is distinguished from the reality, he is in a way a human or a caused supreme being and at the same time the ultimate metaphysical principle or uncaused supreme being.

This panentheistic character of the trikaya of the Buddha has given a most desirable "theological" foundation for the social relations between a supreme being and the world. Buddha as the supreme being is at the same time, from another aspect, human, he is capable of transcending and yet is immanent in this world. He immensely embraces all sentient, not only as an abstract principle but also as incarnated human or the enlightened teacher. Thus, the doctrine of trikaya of a

Buddha demonstrates a balanced, two-sided social relations of the supreme being to the sentient.

To put the thing more concretely, one may first consider the social nature of Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya. The transforming Buddha, for example taking the shape of being Siddhattha, the prince of Sakyas, forsook the heirdom to his father's throne and abstained earthly love and enjoyment to devote himself to the finding of explanations and solutions for the universal suffering of mankind. It was out of his tremendous compassion and wisdom that made him decide to lead a religious life and eventually become a great teacher of mankind, who not only attained self-enlightenment but also taught the proper path to liberation to all human beings. Similarly and even with greater empathy for human conditions, the blissful Buddha deferred his entering into nirvana and sojourned in this world in order to evoke the inward Buddhahood of every suffered, karma-laden human beings. Thus these gracious Buddhas are related to all mankind affectionately and pedagogically. Nevertheless it might be argued that they only religiously exalt one of the noble qualities of human nature – sympathy, to its perfection, they leave the metaphysical relations of a supreme being to all mankind in question. While the essential Buddha, Dharmakaya, admitted to be the ultimate reality immanent in all existences, is indubitable the universal principle upon which the metaphysical relations of Buddha, as an uncaused supreme being, to all humans is established.

Secondly, as it is indicated in the *Mahaparinirvana Sutra*, *Sri-mala-Simhanada Sutra*, *Avatamsaka Sutra* and innumerable many other places, the term “Dharmakaya,” as a synonym of Tathagatagarbha,⁴ also denotes the primordial mode of non-differentiated or indiscernible reality, the ineffable Suchness, in which differences and dichotomies of all kind, subject-object, mind-body, being-becoming, infinite-finite, eternal-temporal, absolute-relative, nirvana-samsara, pure-defilement, and even Buddha and the sentient, are dissolved. Just as it is taught in many sutras, this ultimate reality Tathagatagarbha defies any attempt of conceptualization, discrimination, or categorization issued by the intentional function of conscious mind; it is impartially pregnant with all existences and has them as what they are. Thus, Dharmakaya in the sense of Tathagatagarbha has provided the ontological ground for the indiscernibility (or equality) of all existences. With the same logic, since both Buddha and the sentient are parts of this ultimate reality and have an equal share of it (i. e. they all have Tathagatagarbha as their ground of existence), they are coexistent with one another with no intrinsic difference.

This ontological principle of Tathagatagarbha was later widely received by many Mahayana Buddhists and taken as the metaphysical foundation for the idea of the equality of Buddha and the sentient. Buddha and the sentient are indistinguishable in Tathagatagarbha and therefore equal to one another. This, however, shall not be merely understood as a proclamation of religious democracy among the sentient and the Buddha, but shall be construed as an affirmation of the ultimate

truth of reality. A truth necessarily follows from the ontological designations of Buddha and the sentient, as their existences are indiscriminably included in Tathagatagarbha. Also, since Tathagatagarbha is admitted to be the perennial element of every existence, it is said to be the invaluable part of human nature, whose original state is pure and immaculate. This is told most clearly in the *Lankavatara sutra* through the mouth of Mahamati,

The World-honored One, according to what you said, the Tathagatagarbha is immaculate by its own nature,... it ingresses into the bodies of all sentient just like priceless jewelry drops and tangles with filthy clothes.⁵

Thus though phenomenally the sentient are constantly subject to the afflictions of desire (raga), repugnance (patigha), ignorance (avijja), conceit (mana), etc., and are unaware of their precious nature Tathagatagarbha, they are substantially and potentially of the same nature as Buddha. Based on this, it is argued that Buddha and the sentient are intrinsically equal in terms of their possession of Tathagatagarbha as their ultimate nature.

To associate or identify Buddhahood with Dharmakaya through Tathagatagarbha is another important move for the development of the doctrine of the trikaya of a Buddha, which again vouches the equality of Buddha and the sentient. For it has been one of the basic tenets of Buddha that all sentient are inherited with Buddhahood and therefore potentially a Buddha.⁶ The Buddhahood is described as the enlightened state of mind which is devoid of any defilements of desire, aversion, and ignorance. It is the pre-conscious mode of mind—non-discernment—which is pure and detached. This description of Buddhahood is very close to Tathagatagarbha which is said to be possessed by every sentient as the immaculate part of his nature. In fact in many places, most explicitly in the *Mahaparinirvana sutra*, Buddhahood is said to be identical with Tathagatagarbha.⁷ Now Buddha and the sentient are considered equal for both having Tathagatagarbha, similarly they can be considered equal for both having Buddhahood. It was told that Vasubandhu had written the *Treatise of Buddhata* to elaborate this idea and maintained that Buddhahood is in fact one aspect of Tathagatagarbha.⁸

Now it may be observed this affirmation of all sentient's having Buddhahood and therefore being equal to Buddha is of tremendous religious and humanistic significance. It not only optimistically asserts some highest religious spiritual status can be equally attained by all human beings, but also implies that there is no transcendent supernatural power as personal God, rather only the greatest human endeavour toward a transcendent spiritual realm, coming from the ultimate inwardness of human nature. All human beings are capable of becoming Buddha and therefore are potentially buddhas. This teaching of Buddha, according to the later Mahayana Buddhist interpreters, meant to evoke the innermost awareness of suffer-

ed human beings, to inspire them to reach the perfection of humanity and to alert them to respect their fellowmen for their being equal in terms of all having Buddhahood. And we may understand it at least as an outcome of positive intention of religious meliorism.

To recapitulate the foregoing discussions, based on the original teachings of Buddha and later Mahayana Buddhist interpretations, the triad of Dharmakaya, Tathagatagarbha, and Buddhahood could be considered as the "theological," ontological, and humanistic foundations for the ultimate equal social relation of Buddha to the sentient. Among the three, Tathagatagarbha is taking the central position which bridges up Dharmakaya and Buddhahood, and makes them different dimensions of the same reality. This statement can find its support in Vasubandhu's commentary of Saramati's *Uttaratantara*, when Vasubandhu attempts to explain the meaning of the saying that all sentient have Tathagatagarbha by a Gaya,

The Dharmakaya of Buddha is abundant and prevailing,
The Suchness refuses any distinguishing,
Buddhahood is all sentient's real having,
And that is perpetual being.

and also in his further emphases,

This Gaya speaks of three important meanings of Tathagata's saying that all sentient possess Tathagatagarbha all the time: First, it is because the Dharmakaya of Tathagata prevails all sentient's bodies that the Gaya says Buddha's Dharmakaya is abundant; Secondly, it is because the ultimate reality of Tathagata is indiscernible that the Gaya says the Suchness refuses any distinction; and thirdly it is because all sentient have Buddhahood as their authentic nature that the Gaya says the Buddhahood is their real having.⁹

So far we have concerned ourselves with the religious and metaphysical foundations for the Buddhist ideal of the equality of Buddha and the sentient. They are evidently, however, also the theoretical foundations for the doctrine of the mutual immanence of Buddha and the sentient later developed by the Hua-yen School of Chinese Buddhism. To be more specific, as we have slightly come across above, the triadic notions of Dharmakaya (as the object of indiscriminate mind), Tathagatagarbha (as both the object and the subject of indiscriminate mind), and Buddhahood (as the subject of indiscriminate mind) are all closely related to the supposed highest level of mental achievement, namely, the indiscriminate, detached, enlightened state of mind. This mental achievement may technically be termed as Bodhi or immaculate mind by nature and eventually become the ultimate material ground for the mutual existences of Buddha and the sentient. The immaculate enlightened

mind, or its synonyms Tathagatagarbha and Buddhahood, are impartial and all-embracing, it has both Buddha and the sentient and even itself in it without any differentiation. As it is said in one of the Gayas of the *Avatamsaka Sutra*,

Mind as a dexterous painter,
Capable of distributing fabulous colors,
Drawing illusory pictures,...
Since all dharmas are indebted to this producer,
Including the mind itself, Buddha and the sentient
All are of the same nature,
Thus one shall see the substance and the essence
Of Buddha and the mind
Boundlessly pervade all-over.¹⁰

Founded on this basic notion of the non-differentiation of mind-Buddha-sentients, later the Hua-yen master Ch'en Kuan advocated the doctrine of mutual immanence of Buddha and the sentient. The authentic, immaculate mind, Ch'en Kuan observed, either actually of a Buddha or potentially of a sentient is essentially the same. In view of this, he held, we might say there was no Buddha's mind other than the sentient's minds, and, to put in other words, no sentient outside Buddha's mind or no Buddha outside the sentient's mind. Buddha and the sentient were mutually existent.

In his *Commentary on the Avatamsaka Sutra*, Ch'en Kuan has used this idea of the mutual immanence of the minds of the Buddha and the sentient to explain the preaching-listening relation between them. Phenomenally Buddha taught the sentient the path to enlightenment by preaching dharmas to them. The sentient, being unaware of the dharmas, must listen to the Buddha. At this level, Buddha appeared to be different from the sentient. While in Ch'en Kuan's view, since there was no difference between immaculate minds of Buddha and the sentient, there should be no difference between Buddha and the sentient; the preaching Buddha and the listening sentient were in a way the same and mutually existent.

Expanding this view, Ch'en Kuan suggested four stages of the preaching-listening relation between Buddha and the sentient. At the first stage, Buddha's preaching dharmas should be taken literally. If one regards the sentient as contained in Buddha's mind and all the dharmas as a manifestation of Buddha, there is only the Buddha who preaches dharmas and no sentient listen to him. At the second stage, the sentient's listening is taken literally. If one sees no Buddha other than that in the sentient's minds and all dharmas as the manifestations of the sentient, then there are only sentient who listen to the dharmas but no Buddha who preaches them. At the third stage, both the preaching Buddha and the listening sentient

are taken literally. In this case the existence of Buddha's mind does not obstruct the existence of sentient's minds, there is Buddha in the sentient's minds preaching dharmas to the sentient who are in the Buddha's mind, and conversely, there are sentient in the Buddha's mind listening to the preaching of the Buddha who is in the sentient's minds. Finally at the fourth stage, neither the preaching Buddha nor the listening sentient are taken literally. In this case the Buddha should not be regarded as bare Buddha for he is immanent in the sentient, nor the sentient be regarded as mere sentient for they are immanent in the Buddha. So neither sentient nor Buddha exist as what they are; the sentient in the Buddha's mind do not listen to Buddha's preaching, nor the Buddha in the sentient's minds preaches.¹¹

In all these different forms, Buddha and the sentient are dissolved in the great social reality of immaculate mind, which not only guarantees the equality of Buddha and the sentient but also provides the spiritual ground for their mutual immanence. This seems to us a social ideal of most sublime kind that a religion can provide, which not only inspires human beings to seek for the highest spiritual value on their own, but also guide them to respect each other for they all are equal in an ultimate sense.

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2. Hartshorne, Charles, and Reese, William L., *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976).
3. _____, Charles, *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
4. Sharma, Chandradhar, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983).
5. *Tripitaka Sinica*, vol. 12, *Sri-mala-Simhanada Sutra. Mahaparinirvanasutra*
6. *Uttaratantra*, (Taipei: Buddhist Publisher, 1980).
7. Vasubandhu, *Treatise of Buddhata*, Chinese version.

Notes

1. According to Chandradhar Sharma the doctrine of threefold bodies of Buddha was first held by Vijnanavada school of Mahayana Buddhism. See Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), p. 109.
2. Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 1-17.
3. Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press,

- 1948), pp. 88–92.
4. In the *Uttaratantra* the various meanings of Tathagatagarbha are explained as follows, “With respect to the meanings of Tathagatagarbha, there are four in number: Dharmakaya, Tathagata, arya-satya (Noble Truths), and Nirvana.” Besides this, in many other sutras the identification of Dharmakaya with Tathagatagarbha can also be found. Especially see *Sri-Mala-Simhanada sutra* in *Tripitaka Sinica*, vol. 12, pp. 217–222.
 5. Lankavatara Sutra, *Tripitaka Sinica*,
 6. This belief of Buddha is clearly indicated in the *Mahaparinirvanasutra*. See *Tripitaka Sinica*, vol. 12, pp. 365–838.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 407.
 8. Vasubandhu, *Treatise of Buddhata*, Chinese version translated by Prarmartha. (Taipei: Buddhist Publisher, 1980), p. 107.
 9. *Ibid.*, p. 107–108.
 10. *Avatamsaka Sutra*, in Li Tung-hsuan, *Synoptic Expositions of the Avatamsaka Sutra* (Taipei, Hsin-wen-feng Publisher, undated), vol. 1, p. 465.
 11. Ch'en Kuan, *Commentary on the Avatamsaka Sutra*, vol. 1, (Taipei: Hua-yen Lotus Society Pub., undated), pp. 50–54.

生佛互在：論佛的世間性

俞懿嫻*

摘 要

本文試就傳統「佛有三身」的思想，以及華嚴經提出「心佛與衆生、是三無差別」的原理，對大乘佛學中「佛」的概念做一哲學剖析，以彰明佛的世間性——「佛」不只是宗教上的超越境界，佛也現實內存於世間，與衆生相即不離。佛有法、報、應化三身，其中法身與如來藏、自性清淨心、佛性等觀念相互會通，足令華嚴澄觀大師提出「生佛互在」的理論，使佛具世間性的哲學意旨更爲深刻。又佛有三身，法身無因、周遍法界，不生不滅；報應化身有因，化現世間，因緣生滅，故可說一佛同時具足無因超越與有因內在等對立性質。這樣的「佛」概念正與歷程哲學家哈茨洪提出萬有在神論中的「上帝」概念相類，哈氏認爲唯有這樣的「上帝」概念能使超絕存有具有「神聖相對性」，與衆生同喜同悲，不離世間，始符宗教真諦，而這也是「生佛互在」之說的本旨。

菲律賓華僑同化政策的起源與菲化運動的醞釀

呂士朋

摘 要

一、華僑經商移殖菲律賓，時逾千年之久，對菲島開發之貢獻極大。西班牙統治時期，西人鑒於華僑人多勢衆，對其統治權構成極大威脅，乃擬以宗教力量同化華僑，但成效不彰，乃以屠殺或放逐對付華僑。

二、美國統治時期，除依據美國排華法案限制華人進入菲島外，並不措意於同化問題。而歐風美雨吹遍世界，英文成爲國際語文，華僑多接受英文教育，自動步向同化之途。

三、美治時期之華僑工商業，蓬勃發展，掌握全菲總投資額逾百分之四十。故自菲律賓自治政府成立後，菲化運動興起，但因奎松總統之遠見，僅部分推動菲化，而對華僑影響最大之零售業、勞工、米黍業菲化，均暫行擱置。

四、二次大戰後菲律賓獨立，菲化運動乃狂飆不止，但並未解決菲國經濟危機。而華僑之漸爲菲人同化，已爲無可避免之事實。

一、菲律賓華僑同化問題的背景

華僑何時移殖菲律賓，年代甚難稽考，但據菲島考古發現之中國古物，以及中國歷史文獻之印證，中菲間之經常交往僅可溯自西元第十世紀末年。（註一）十三世紀南宋地理學者趙汝迺所著之諸番志，記載中國商人的足跡，已遍達麻逸（今Mindoro島）、三嶼（今Calamian、Palawan、Busuanga三島）以及呂宋島西南海岸諸地。他們以瓷器、金鐵鼎、烏鉛、琉璃珠、鐵針運往上述諸島，換取當地之土產黃臘、吉貝、眞珠、番布、椰心簞等（註二）。元末明初，麻逸貿易漸衰，代之而起者爲呂宋島，中國商人前往貿易者日益增多（註三）。

西元一五七一年（明隆慶五年），西班牙征服呂宋，定馬尼拉爲首府，統治全菲。其第一任總督列伽斯比（Miguel López Legaspi）佔領馬尼拉時，即見有華僑一五〇人居住該地，從事於絲織品、棉布與其他雜貨之販賣（註四）。當時菲島經濟狀況，其生產不足以應付西班牙經營此一殖民地之消費需要，因此西人之物資供應，不得不仰賴於鄰近之中國輸出，於是對華商前往貿易及僑居，極表歡迎，保護亦極週到，而善於經營之我國福建商賈，乃源源前往呂宋；過去分散於麻逸、三嶼諸地之貿易，轉而集中於西人統治中心之馬尼拉。華商每年將大批絲織物、工業製品、原料、糧食運來菲島，使遠離本國及墨西哥之西人，可就近獲得補給，而墨、菲間之貿易亦得以迅速發展。由於華商在物資上不斷之補給，大力支持了西班牙人在菲島之拓殖活動，不但使列伽斯比之遠征隊獲得意外之成功，且使西班牙得以控制菲律賓達三百二十七年之久（註五）。

據箭內健次之研究，在一五八〇年代，華船來菲之數目，每年平均約二十艘，一五九〇年代則增至三十餘艘，而至十七世紀初年，每年平均至四、五十艘之多；隨着西人在菲地位之日益穩固，華船之來航亦愈增多（註六）。中國之載籍對此情形，亦有描寫，明史呂宋傳謂：「閩人以其地近且富饒，商販至者數萬人，往往久居不返，至長子孫。」（註七）東西洋考呂宋條：「今華人

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之販呂宋者，乃販佛郎機（指西班牙人）者也。華人既多詣呂宋，往往久住不歸，名為壓冬，聚居潤內（Parian，即八聯市場）為生活，漸至數萬，間有削髮（改信天主教）長子孫者。」（註八）

菲島西班牙人對華商之存有戒心，始自一五七四年（萬曆二年）中國海盜林鳳對馬尼拉之襲擊，林鳳以船艦六十二艘，兵士、水手近三千人之實力，雖予西人以重大打擊，但終為西軍擊退，轉據馮嘉施蘭（Pangasinan），與西軍相持四個多月後，離菲率眾他去（註九）。林鳳事件後，西總督龍其慮（Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa）乃在馬尼拉市區東北巴石河（Pasig River）畔，設立Parian（八聯市場）集中所有華商在其中居住貿易，周圍有柵牆，日間開放，夜間關閉。八聯之地則在西總督所居王城（Walled City）西軍槍砲之射程內。西總督並派西官吏為管理官，對華人商業經營和活動嚴加管制，課征繫船稅及三分稅（註十）。西人雖對華人猜忌，然於商業以至日常生活上，又不能不仰賴華商；而華商貪獲厚利，亦多樂受西人驅使，由是華商來菲僑居者日增。比西人恐自身無法控制華商之時，輒藉故屠殺，計自十七世紀以至十八世紀六十年代，西人屠殺華僑凡四次：一六〇三年（明萬曆三十一年）屠殺二萬三千人，一六三九年（明崇禎十二年）屠殺二萬二千人，一六六二年（清康熙元年）屠殺二千人，一七六三年（乾隆二十八年）屠殺六千人（註十一）。每逢慘案發生後，八聯商業停頓，菲島經濟趨於衰退，遂致西官吏及教士深感不便，於是復招徠華商，鼓慰有加，華商之來非者又漸漸多矣（註十二）。自一七六三年以後，西人對付華僑，改採大批放逐政策，較大規模之驅逐凡三次：一七五五年（在一七六三年以前）、一七六九年、一八二八年。然遭受驅逐之華僑，大多祇離開馬尼拉，而逃往其他島嶼或呂宋山中。故放逐政策未能產生多大效果，反使菲島商業停頓、社會不安。遂致西人不得不取消驅逐令，代之以徵人頭稅或限制職業等措施，以抑制華僑商業勢力之擴展（註十三）。迄西領末期，據一八八六年之人口普查，菲島華僑人口為九萬三千五百六十七人（是年菲島總人口為五百九十八萬五千人）（註十四）。

菲律賓華僑同化問題，早萌芽於西班牙統治時期。西班牙人征服菲島，於一五七一年建立統治權。然西人在菲島的統治，其主要力量不是軍事的征服，而是宗教的同化。列伽斯比初抵呂宋時，所部僅二百三十名兵士，即在十六世紀晚期，菲島之西班牙官兵亦僅一千多人，絕無可能憑藉武力征服此一廣濶之群島。然而隨着遠征軍同來的傳教士，却發揮了近乎奇蹟的無比力量，向菲人傳播天主教，獲得顯著的成果，今天菲律賓之能成為東方唯一的天主教國家，百分之八十以上之菲人係天主教徒，西班牙的傳教士在宣揚宗教與教化菲人的成就上，極為輝煌；接受天主教信仰的菲人，都效忠西班牙，服從西人指揮，為西人征服佔領菲島而効力。所以真正征服菲島的，不是西班牙的武力，而是西班牙的教士（註十五）。西班牙傳教士同化菲人之工作，雖極為順利，但同化華僑之努力，却告失敗。終西班牙統治時期，菲島西總督府對華僑嚴加防範，施行若干歧視與壓迫的政策，乃至利用藉口大肆屠殺或驅逐華僑，都種因於對華僑實施同化政策的失敗。

二、西領時期宗教同化華僑的失敗

西領時期菲島當局之華僑政策，一為僑居數目的限制，二為居住地區的限定，三為華人零售商的取締。此三者或同時辦理，或分別施行，全視實際需要而定。此外，又加徵華僑關稅、居留稅與貢稅，或誘迫華僑改信天主教。凡此無一不是為抑止華人商業勢力的擴展，或為同化華人的

重要措施（註十六）。

西班牙在非島建立殖民統治後不久，華商來菲貿易者激增，僑居者日衆。據西人之報告，一五八八年（明萬曆十六年）僅馬尼拉一地之華人，已達一萬以上（註十七）。一六〇三年，即第一次華僑大屠殺那年，馬尼拉聚居之華僑已達三萬人，其他地區，合計又有數千人。居留非島華商人數如此之多，超過西班牙人十倍有餘，當然引起統治當局的戒懼（註十八）。西班牙人殖民非島，對非島土人之傳教工作，十分成功，此於一五八六年墨西哥太守維拉曼力克侯爵（Marques de Villamanrique）上西王腓力伯二世之報告中，得見端倪（註十九）。然人數衆多之華人與非島土人之廣泛接觸，使得非島土人染上閩粵人民之習俗或迷信，對西教士之教化非人頗有不良影響。菲島西總督維拉（Santiago de Vera，任期自1584年5月至1590年5月）及主教薩拉查（Domingo de Salazar，1581年3月到任）有鑑於此，決定要從宗教上同化華人，乃積極推行對華僑之傳教工作。西教士開始向華人傳教，早在十六世紀八十年代之前，據薩拉查主教記述，當彼於一五八一年蒞任馬尼拉之時，居住於巴石河對岸敦度村（Tondo）之許多華人，其中已有一部分是天主教徒；又據聖·奧斯丁（San Augustin）記述，奧斯丁會教士竟以非島土語向華人說教，致華人教徒對教義殆無所知。薩拉查主教蒞任後，力促各傳教會推教士學習華語，用華語向華人傳道。一五八七年，始指定多明我會四位教士，專事華人佈道工作，其中兩位教士不久即精通華語，且有一位會寫漢字。四位教士分掌兩處教堂，一為八聯市場旁之聖·迦布烈（San Gabriel）教堂，一為敦度村附近之Baybay岬教堂，他們與華人接觸頻繁，因而使不少華人逐漸傾向天主教（註二十一）。當時雖有若干華人受洗成為教徒，但其中不少人却以信教作為向西人討好或居留馬尼拉之條件，實非出自真正之慕道熱忱，此等教徒一旦離開非島，即會放棄天主教而恢復其舊有之偶像崇拜。薩拉查主教為遏止此種投機風氣，因而下令凡華人改宗領洗者一律強制剪髮，並禁止重返中國。但此種處置對在非華人無異是一大侮辱，許多華人雖傾向天主教，但不敢公開領洗。薩拉查之剪髮令，似曾嚴格執行，張燮所著東西洋考（1616年刊）呂宋條，謂在非華人「間有削髮長子孫者」，可為明證。一六二一年（明天啓元年），竟出現華人受洗禮時繳納特許金可免剪髮之規定，於是剪髮令意義全失，特許金成為非島西政府之一種不名譽稅收矣（註二十二）。

十八世紀中葉，菲島西政府執行宗教之同化政策益烈。一七五五年（乾隆二十年）總督阿蘭地亞（Manuel de Arandia）遵西班牙國王訓令，驅逐非天主教徒之華人出境。阿蘭地亞規定以是年六月三十日為改信天主教日，華人至是日不肯改宗者，一律予以驅逐。結果，被逐出境之華人達二千零七十名，為研究教義而獲准留住者一千一百零八名，改宗為教徒而獲准僑居者五百十五名（註二十三）。一七六六年（乾隆三十一年）四月十七日西班牙王詔令：菲島所有華僑，包括天主教徒在內，凡在英國佔領馬尼拉期間（1762～1764）曾犯暴行者，一律驅逐出境，僅真正之天主教徒始准繼續居留，但不准持有武器，祇能從事農業和商業，非獲長官許可，不准離開其各自的村莊（註二十四）。此一驅逐令於一七七八年（乾隆四十三年）解除，華僑獲准居留馬尼拉城，同時華工亦獎勵入境（註二十五）。而宗教之同化政策，終西領時期，均廣續推行，但始終不能產生多大效果。

西教士對非人的教化工作，如播種於沃土之上，生枝發葉，開花結實。惟獨對華僑的宗教同化工作，直如播種於砂礫之上，萌芽都極不易。其故何在？蓋華人有其悠久的文化傳統，定型的

生活習慣，原有的佛教信仰與祖先崇拜，不易接受同化。何況居留菲島的華僑，旨在謀生致富，日後能以衣錦還鄉、頤養家園，因此對於學西班牙文、信仰天主教，都不感覺興趣。華人中間有少數學習西班牙語文者，並不是要研究西班牙文化，只是為便於與西人交往、做生意。也有少數華僑形式上信仰天主教，主要為可以取得與非人雜居的權利（非天主教徒之華人，只能集中居住僑區），對謀生有不少便利（註二十六）。

西教士同化華僑工作既告失敗，於是轉移目標，對「密司底蘇」（Mestizo，即華非混血種）入手，在這方面的工作，則獲得顯著之成功。華僑來菲，大多隻身，為解客居寂寞，與當地女子結婚或同居者，為數不少，所生子女，稱為密司底蘇（按混血種人，在菲島人口佔相當高之比例，約四分之一，最多為華非混血，再次為西非、美非、日非混血）。西教士對華非混血兒施行之教化工作，所以能夠成功，主要原因在於父親忙於做生意，教養子女之責任，完全由母親負擔。由於母親為天主教徒，當然把子女送往天主教學校，受西班牙式教育（西領時期無華僑學校），結果密司底蘇都成為天主教徒，諳西班牙語文。他們在思想上都效忠西班牙，對華僑採取不友善態度，甚至在長大成人後，看不起父親。當殖民地當局對華僑實施苛暴政策時，密司底蘇常數典忘祖，反而甘供西人驅策，為西人之爪牙（註二十七）。此實為菲島華僑的最大悲哀。

三、美治時期華僑逐漸接受同化

一八九八年（清光緒二十四年）美西戰爭，美國擊敗西班牙，西班牙在菲律賓之統治權轉讓給美國。美國統治菲律賓之四十八年間（1898～1946），由於美國是一新興強國，而中國國勢衰落，故美國統治者對菲島數以萬計之華僑，並無戒懼之心，因此也不把華僑同化問題，看做是殖民地統治的要着。

西領末期，據Reyes Lala氏之估計，全菲華僑人口總數約為十萬人，而在馬尼拉者為四萬人（註二十八）。但一九〇三年（清光緒二十九年）美統治當局首次的全菲戶口調查，全菲華僑人口僅為四萬一千零三十五人。一九一八年（民國七年）的普查華僑人口為四萬三千八百零二人。Victor Purcell根據這兩次普查，認為西領末期估計華僑有十萬人，必然是言過其實（註二十九）。但亦有學者認為由一八九八年美軍入馬尼拉至一九〇三年臨時軍事政府撤銷期間，因菲島各地動亂，華僑生命財產頗有損失，故回國避亂之華僑甚多，人口減少殆為當然之事。美國據菲後，根據美國國內之排華法案，對華人移民入菲同樣加以限制，故華僑人口增加有限（註三十）。直至一九三九年，全菲人口普查，華僑人口總數增為十一萬七千四百八十七人。同年中國駐菲總領事館實施華僑總登記，計算全菲華僑總數約為十三萬人，其中在馬尼拉者為五萬人（註三十一）。據Purcell氏之研究，美治時期菲島華僑所得之實惠，可能比菲島人口中任何其他份子為多。排華法案阻止了華人的大量移入，但三十多年當中，華僑人數仍增多三倍。西領時期，褫奪華僑權利之法律措施極為嚴苛，但美治時期，這些措施均告廢止，而行政之革新，使華僑不再受任何苛捐雜稅和陋規之勒索（僅若干地方華僑仍要向地方當局繳納一筆貢稅）（註三十二）。

一九〇四年（清光緒三十年），有小呂宋中華商務局之成立，其後又演變為中華總商會。該會成為華僑商業與社會組織的中心。會員分為兩類：米商、零售商、舊貨商等屬於一類，其中包括馬尼拉的華僑商人社會，另一類則為其他商業行號及個人。這個頗有勢力之組織，其活動又分為兩種，一是商業性的，一是屬於公民生活的。在商業性活動方面，商會搜集並散發關於商情之

消息，調查並擔保華僑商人之信用，籌劃中國商品之展覽，從事研究商業之問題與方法，以及在經濟危機嚴重時期，提供會場研討，及設立一個採取對策之機構。在公民生活活動方面，商會為慈善目的發動籌募基金，其重點在於造福華僑。一九三七年（民國二十六年）對日抗戰爆發後，為支援祖國，「中國難民籌賑會」基金成為籌募之主要目標。同時，商會也為菲律賓之各種社會事業如紅十字會、醫院等，籌募了相當數目的基金。商會並為僑社本身與辦華僑學校，成立社交俱樂部，一所現代化醫院及一個公墓。中華總商會、中國總領事館及國民黨菲律賓支部（均係美國統治後相繼成立）構成一個三位一體的機構，凡有關僑社的問題，他們都向中國政府、菲律賓當局和菲律賓公眾，陳述他們的觀點（註三十三）。

由於美治時期之民主作風，華僑社會也從西領時期之甲必丹制度，演變為自己組織商會以團結自強，而隨着時代潮流之進步，華僑也主動讓其子弟接受英文教育，自動而和緩地步入同化之途。蓋美國統治菲島之後，立即實施英文教育，基於英文教育在美國本土所收到同化各民族之宏大效果，他們認為英文教育在菲島推行，不但可以同化菲人，也能逐漸同化居留菲島之華僑，此種看法，衡諸日後之發展，大抵正確，雖則英文教育對菲人所發揮之效果，遠比華僑為大。自十九世紀以來，英國稱霸世界於先，美國強盛繼之在後，加之工業之進步、貿易之興盛、海運之發達，使英文成為國際商業之通用語言，其重要性日增。菲島華僑學校之設立，始於西領末期；到了美治時期，凡華僑聚居稍多之地，均集資延師設立僑校，僑校課程，雖以教授華文科目為主，但英文概列為必修科。由於風氣開通，華僑普遍認識教育之重要，多送其子女入學，接受英文教育（民國以後，中國國內教育多採美制，初中以後均習英文，對菲島華僑亦有影響）。即華僑之成年人，其有進取心者，亦常利用餘暇，補習英文。由於華僑肯於接受英文教育，不自覺地自動走上同化之途；惟同化之進度，由於華僑有較重之舊文化傳統，遠較菲人為迂緩而已。菲島華僑青年一輩接受英文教育之結果，思想行動，逐漸發生變化，態度不像年老一輩之保守，比較認識世界大勢與時代潮流，在服飾方面，放棄唐裝，改穿西裝，婦女不再纏足，已纏足者也相率放足。「民主」之理念與「科學」之方法，也逐漸為僑界所注意（民國八年之五四運動，高唱民主與科學，對菲島華僑青年影響很大）。華僑信仰基督教或天主教者，其數漸多。菲島華僑原來自成其社會，與菲人大不相同，但與菲人間之交往已漸多。若以一九四六年（美國統治結束，菲島獨立）之華僑與僑社，拿來和一九八八年（美國統治開始）之華僑與僑社相比，可以發現其面目迥然不同，英文教育之同化力量，實非常偉大（註三十四）。

四、自治時期非化運動的醞釀

十九世紀後半期，也就是西領末期，菲人漸告覺醒，不但有政治獨立的要求，也有提高自己經濟地位的希望；華僑在菲島數百年之慘澹經營，掌握了零售商業、批發商業與土產買賣業的優越地位，且與菲人有日常生活之密切接觸，自易激起菲人之妒忌。美國治菲四十八年，華僑工商業在自由與安定之環境中，獲得充分發展之機會，十九世紀前四十年，華僑在菲之經濟事業，突飛猛進，菲島零售商業與國內貿易，幾乎全在華僑控制與掌握之中。非化運動就是要由菲人掌握工商農礦各業的經營權，以提高菲人的經濟地位和生活，此一運動打擊的對象，表面上是整個外僑，但實際上是華僑為目標。

一九三二年（民國二十一年），正當日本人對菲國經濟開始作有系統之滲透之前，根據菲政府農商部之估計，華僑在菲總投資共達菲幣五億餘元，其對各業投資額如下：

零售商業	269,143,622 元	椰 干 業	9,000,000 元
米麥紮業	76,000,000 元	烟 業	8,000,000 元
出 口 業	70,000,000 元	苧 麻 業	3,000,000 元
入 口 業	58,000,000 元	木 業	1,800,000 元
棉毛織品業	12,000,000 元	合 計	506,943,622 元

華僑之投資估計佔菲島總投資額之 42.1%，而非律賓人則僅佔 28.6%，美國人佔 8.5%，日本人佔 7.83%，其他各國僑民合計為 12.97%。由以上估計看來，華僑之實力實居於菲島最主要之經濟地位，而華僑投資之最大特點，即其半數以上之資金是在經營零售商業上（註三十五）。而且華僑的批發商，其採買人和推銷員遍佈菲島每一角落，負責供應各省華僑商人和最小之零售商（註三十六），構成了脈絡相連之商業網。

一九三四年（民國二十三年）三月二十四日，美國羅斯福總統（Franklin D. Roosevelt）批准「泰丁—麥杜非法案」（Tydings-Mcduffe Law），准許菲律賓自治。根據此一法案，規定十年作為菲島走向獨立之過渡時期，在此期間，菲島將召開制憲大會（The Constitutional Convention），制定憲法，成立自治政府。一九三四年七月三十日，菲律賓制憲大會開幕，出席代表二百零二人，均由人民選舉產生。會中除討論籌備獨立之大計外，菲化案幾成為最主要之議題，從一九三四年七月三十日起至一九三五年三月八日大會閉幕為止，先後提出十大菲化提案，茲列舉如下：（一）天然富源菲化。（二）土地菲化。（三）公共企業菲化。（四）零售商業菲化。（五）米黍及其他穀物營業菲化。（六）勞工菲化。（七）教育菲化。（八）簿記菲化。（九）公共工程菲化。（十）反對外僑子女菲化（註三十七）。

十大菲化提案中，第一、第二、第三及第十項均獲得通過，在憲法上明文規定天然富源、土地與公共企業之菲化，及在憲法「公民」一章中，不准外僑子女歸化為菲籍（註三十八）。而對華僑影響最大之零售商業、勞工與米黍穀物業，都沒有能通過，此實因當時參議院議長（自治政府成立後之總統）奎松（Manuel L. Quezon）之睿智與遠見，有以致之。蓋激烈之全面菲化，不僅將使華僑資金大量外流，即對菲島經濟亦屬有害無利，而事實上非人亦難立即取代華僑在零售業及米黍業之地位。奎松說：

「在我執政之下，一個重要目的是要予非人以各種便利，提高其在商業活動的地位。這種決策，乃基於明慧的理智，而不是起於狹隘與激越的民族主義。國家的經濟，除非永久建立於人民的腦筋與腕力、勤勞與毅力的基礎上，將不能獲得穩定力量。但人民不可以希望政府，將予以特殊權利，此種權利乃與公共的利益抵觸，並忽略外僑在非合法經營商業之權利。外僑在非的地位，除國籍法律所加以保障的權益外，尚有受平等與公平待遇的權利；因為他們當島民尚不知從事商業時，曾經協助非國經濟的開發。非國商人所能望於政府，亦即政府所能供給他們的，乃過去他們所未曾享受的便利，例如銀行制度、貿易與交通的便利，與從事生產事業的機會。換句話說，政府給予非人從事較多工商企業以便利與鼓勵。但非人必須善為把握這種機會。他們必須以真摯的態度，明智的努力與堅定的意志，去開拓他們的前路。並須準備接受競爭，因為只有在公平競爭下，他們才能有權利希望得到政府的保護。所以我們不可能，而且也不應該採取一種政策，足以使人誤會為排斥外僑。我並不相信商業的菲化，除却公共企業在急需時外，國家專攬經濟是與我政治社會哲學相反的。同時，我也反對生產與支配日用品的措施，這將帶給國家更大的災難（註三十九）。

況且當時日本僑民在非島也經營若干百貨店，奎松所說「使人誤會排斥外僑」，其真正之外交顧忌，當暗指日本也。

制憲大會雖未通過零售商業非化案，但卻另行通過一議決案，授權國會制定有關零售非化之法律。自一九三五年菲律賓開始自治至太平洋戰爭爆發（一九四一年十二月）之五、六年間，自治政府之衆議院，曾數度通過零售非化案，但參議院之態度則比較慎重。奎松總統本人並不反對零售非化之原則，但鑒於國際形勢緊急，頗顧慮蓄意南進之日本，不贊成在時機未成熟以前，即躁急實施零售非化。因此在太平洋戰爭爆發前，零售非化運動，可以說有驚無險（註四十）。二次大戰後，菲律賓於一九四六年獨立，非化運動蜂起雲湧，終於在一九五四年五月，由衆、參兩院先後通過零售商非化案，而由麥克塞塞（Ramon Magsaysay）總統簽署（1954.6.19）施行（註四十一）。而米黍非化案也在一九六一年通過施行（註四十二）。

在美治時期，美國態度對非島非化運動，也有相當的緩衝作用。早在一九二一年（民國十年），菲殖民議會曾通過「簿記文字非化案」（Book-keeping Act），禁止華商用華文記帳，必須用英文記帳，結果此案為美國大理院院長塔虎脫予以否決，其判詞最後一段謂：

「菲律賓簿記律，禁止華商用華文記帳，則是剝奪華商在營業上不可或缺之利器。而原律實是純粹對付華人，則更是一種歧視的待遇，不予華人以在法律上之平等保護。本院今根據以上種種理由，宣布該律無效。非大理院判詞，應即駁回。」（註四十三）

而非島華僑為抗議簿記法案，特向美國國會呈遞備忘錄，此一備忘錄情文並茂，道盡華僑對非島開發之功績，相當打動美國高齡政治家們之心弦，備忘錄曰：

「華僑商人並非新客，他們是菲律賓群島的一部份，正如山川溪谷為美麗的群島之一部。沒有人知道他們是什麼時候來的，因為他們來的時候太早，遠非人所能記憶。……當西班牙人於一五二〇年初來群島時，他們就發現華僑商人在群島上從事經營各種商業。幾乎不可能稱他們為外國人——他們是菲律賓生活的一部份。他們從未不響應為公眾服務的徵召，他們構成群島的商業階段，正如菲律賓人為官吏與農民階級一樣。對菲律賓群島的生活適當運行而言，每一階段的存在對其他階級均有不可或缺的必要。每一階段均有它應承擔的任務。官吏們統治，農民們生產；而負擔支出的則為商人，因為維持政府的稅收大部來自他們。……他們擔負着菲律賓產業生活中商業的那一環。這些散佈於群島各省的商人貸款給菲律賓人，以資助他們生產及推銷他們的產物。華僑商人收購他們的產物，將之輸出，再把菲律賓人所需要的貨品輸入。華僑商人構成群島商業生活的必要因素，對於他們的所業，沒有聽見抱怨的話。他們普遍被人承認為公平、誠實和方正。他們的聲譽高於世界各地所能發現的任何類似商人團體的聲譽。」（註四十四）

美治時期非化運動之醞釀，實為菲律賓獨立（一九四六年）後非化運動狂飆、非化法案層出不窮之先聲。故美治時期之四十多年期間，實為非島華僑之黃金年代。

五、結 論

(一)華僑經商移殖菲律賓，已逾千年之久，對非島開發之貢獻極大。西領時期，西人鑒於華僑人多勢衆，對其統治權構成重大威脅，乃擬以宗教力量同化華僑，但成效不彰，乃以屠殺或放逐對付華僑。美治時期，美國以國力強盛，對華僑無戒懼之心，除依據美國內排華法案限制華人入非外，並不措意於同化問題。然歐風美雨吹遍世界，英文成為國際語文，華僑感於教育之重要，

接受英文教育，自動步向同化之途。

(二)美治時期，華僑工商事業在自由與安定環境中，突飛猛進，掌握全菲總投資額逾百分之四十。菲律賓自治後，菲化運動興起，但因奎松總統之遠見，僅通過將天然富源、土地與公共企業菲化及不准外僑子女歸化列入憲法，其他對華僑影響最大之零售商、勞工、米黍業菲化，均暫行擱置。但二次大戰後菲律賓獨立，民族主義高張，各類菲化案相繼通過施行，而獨於華僑歸化入籍則嚴格限制。一九六二年，自由黨再度執政，鑒於各類重要菲化案均已通過施行，但並未解決菲國經濟危機，從此菲化運動始漸趨緩和。

(三)菲島華僑歷經美治時期英文教育之陶冶，獨立以後菲化政策之狂飆，近二十年來，無論是否加入菲籍，正在緩慢而自然地為菲人同化，此為適應生活環境不得不然的變遷。陳烈甫氏在析論菲律賓華僑同化問題時，列舉十事：1.飲食的習慣；2.服裝的習慣；3.語言的應用；4.教育的重點；5.閱讀報刊的習慣；6.電影的愛好；7.婚嫁的情形；8.跳舞的嗜好；9.生活的享受；10.對僑社的熱心。說明華僑逐漸與菲人同化之傾向。而年紀愈輕的菲化氣息愈重，但是還不會變成十足的菲人（註四十五）。長此以往，同化問題終將成為歷史之陳跡，是可以預期的。

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Overseas Chinese in the Philippines— Problems of Assimilation and the Beginning of the Philippinization Movement

Lu Shih-peng

It is probably over a thousand years ago that the earliest Chinese immigrants began to settle down in the Philippines for business activities. Following the Spanish occupation of the Philippines in the late 16th century, more and more began to rely on such Chinese for their activities in supply of goods and the general development of commerce, bringing in an ever-increasing influx of Chinese merchants and settlers. They continued to grow in such large numbers that the Spanish authorities began to worry and apprehend. The Spanish, therefore, resorted to massacre and banishment of Chinese settlers in the Philippines on every possible pretext. But since these measures soon crippled the local economy, the Spanish had to try to attract more Chinese merchants to the Philippines again. The Spanish had been successful in their Catholic assimilation of the Filipino natives, they began to try a similar program of assimilation for the Chinese, which remained fruitless during the period.

During the period of American rule (1898–1946), no such assimilation measures were attempted by the Americans. As the United States was a strong nation, they were not afraid of the Chinese as the Spanish had been before. However, under the trends of the times, most overseas Chinese wanted their children to receive English education, which eventually led to assimilation.

In 1934 the Philippines attained self-government. At the law-making convention for the new Constitution, ten different motions of Philippinization were proposed, all aiming at economic autonomy for the whole nation. Only three of them, however, found their way into the Constitution, leaving out proposals of far-reaching consequences for overseas Chinese, such as the Philippinization of retailers, dealers in rice and corn, and labourers. This was brought about chiefly because of the foresight of Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth (1878-1944). These attempts in the early years of the Commonwealth, however, heralded the thoroughgoing movement of Philippinization after the nation achieved its independence.

一九二〇年代星馬華僑政治意識成長之研究

古 鴻 廷

摘 要

近年來，所謂「海外中國」Exterence China 的研究已成爲 國近代史的課題之一，而星馬地區，由於華僑人數衆多，歷史較久，尤爲學者重視。

第一次世界大戰前後，中國備受西方列強及日本帝國主義的侵略、壓迫，國內民族主義思潮澎湃，知識份子奮起救國，反日運動風起雲湧，星馬華僑的民族意識也在當地知識份子激勵提倡下高度發揚，從事反日運動。

由於英殖民政府對華僑教育的消極態度和忽視政策，華僑社團創設的華文學校得以逐漸成長發展，並且大量採用國內出版的書籍，聘請國內的教師，歷時既久，星馬地區華僑的民族主義思潮逐漸與國內的潮流匯合，產生強烈的「效忠祖國」的政治意識。華文學校在這一方面的成就，必須歸功於中國國民黨在此地區內多年來在推動黨務和吸收黨員所做的努力。

另一方面，當時的國際情勢也有助於星馬華僑政治意識的興起和發揚。因爲英國殖民政府當局已感到日本經濟南進的威脅，華僑的反日情_緒運動在一定的程_度上可以遏阻日本南進的野心。同時也可以減低華僑對英國統治不滿情緒之效。

一、導 言

海外華人政治意識的萌芽與成長，與近代中國受外國壓迫及中國政治活躍份子的倡導，有密切的關係。我國自秦「統一天下」之後，直到清季西力東漸，東亞地區並無一獨立文明的國家與我國對峙，所以我國少有外交經驗（註一）。自認爲包括所有已知的文明地區的我國，自稱「天下」而缺乏近代「民族國家」的概念。元末雖有反蒙人統治之觀念出現，但滿人入主我國後，極力剷除這種以漢族爲中心的思想，使漢人原發性之雛形“民族主義”觀念消失，代之而起的“文化主義”，強調我國文化之包容特質與傳統之社會價值，未能以“種族、語言、共同歷史與文化”爲基礎作一群體之整合，進而凝成“民族”。因而，當時人民的政治效忠目標來自文化上認同，而不是民族主義（註二）。

在列強勢力一再衝擊下，“主權”觀念逐漸發達（註三），民族意識亦告抬頭，爲救亡圖存，清廷遂進行“自強運動”（註四），立憲派與革命黨亦分別致力於本身主張之推行。清廷、立憲派及革命黨三大政治力量間的衝突，對馬來亞之華僑社會產生巨大之衝擊。原來不被重視之僑胞，成爲各方面爭取之對象，清廷一再派遣官吏前往星馬地區宣慰僑胞，並對華僑領袖出售官銜，以吸引僑胞之效忠，立憲派及革命黨則分別宣傳其政治理想，爭取僑胞之人力及物力支持（註五）。星馬華僑之政治意識因而醒覺而發展。

二、中國國內政局對華僑之刺激

一九二〇年代，中國內受軍閥之政治迫害，外受列強不平等條約之縛束，一次大戰期間，中國知識份子深受“民族自決”主張所吸引，原以爲中國可在戰後廢除不平等條約，國際現實政治

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在巴黎和會的表现，對中國知識份子無疑為一沉重打擊，“五四”事件的爆發，引起了一連串的排外事件（註六），星馬地區之華僑亦受波及。在中國國內發生的「五四運動」，經海峽殖民地華文報章的報導，很快便得到星馬華人社會熱烈回響與同情，對日經濟制裁活動迅速展開。一些富有煽動性之仇日標語，出現於新加坡各角落，而許多經營日貨之華商及日人公司之華人僱員，都先後接到匿名恐嚇信，檳榔嶼與吉隆坡也先後發生反日騷動，群眾破壞日貨，襲擊日敵。日人則多緊閉門窗，足不出戶，以免遭受傷害。群眾並與警方發生衝突，造成傷亡。在抵制日貨方面，則因日貨價廉物美，適合購買力弱之當地居民，且日貨代理人多為華商，在當地華人壓力下，勉強順應時勢，難免陽奉陰違，不肯積極推行，因此未能持久。雖然如此，此次受國內“五四運動”之衝擊，激發星馬華人認同中國的政治意識之成長（註七）。

民國十四年（一九二五）三月十二日，中山先生逝世於北京。消息傳至星馬，星馬各地華人商店及社團，多下半旗誌哀，各地紛紛舉行追悼會，追悼會上，當地華文報章上對孫先生之國民革命活動及其抵抗帝國主義侵略之事蹟與主張，中國當前政治情況與未來政治可能的發展，皆一再敘述、討論與報導（註八）。

民國十七年（一九二八）五月，日本駐山東軍隊企圖阻撓國民革命軍北伐，射擊中國軍民，並殺害戰地政務委員會交涉員蔡公時，是為“濟南慘案”。消息經星馬報章報導後，當地華人社會立即作出反應，對日本實行經濟抵制運動，並在各地成立“山東慘禍籌賑會”。籌賑會在陳嘉庚發起並領導下，發動籌款，陳嘉庚宣稱，“如死者未葬，傷者未醫，逃亡離散者無家可歸，若能捐籌鉅款以救濟之，則傷者可醫，散者可聚。”（註九）

此次反日經濟抵制運動，維持約十個月之久，在此期間，日貨之銷售，受到相當大的打擊，輸入馬來亞之貨物，大幅下降（註十）。在籌款方面，至「山東籌賑會」結束時，共募得一百三十四萬元叻幣。在籌款過程中，更有不少感人場面，如“海天遊藝會”的演劇，該會會長八十長者陸寅杰與總司理吳勝鵬，均粉墨登場，表演唱歌以募款。膠廠工人義捐、小客車義駛，甚至小坡新街及長泰街之妓女捐獻夜渡資（註十一）。

一位星馬當地之華裔學者認為“濟南慘案”是星馬華僑政治史上之分水嶺。在這以前，星馬華僑之民族主義運動仍在萌芽階段，停留在半公開、少數人之活動狀態。以往同盟會之活動及五四運動所引起的學界漣漪，都不能說是具有群眾性質、有效果的運動。而此次的山東籌賑運動，卻為一有目標、有系統、有全盤計劃、有強大領導層、有工、商、學三界支持之運動，不但突破了華族社會傳統的幫界、階段、語言範圍，也獲得星馬僑界中英文知識份子之支持。而在思想意識上，“山東籌賑會”的宣傳與廣泛之募捐活動，無疑的加強了華族社會親中國的政治與文化覺悟，隨著日本侵華的加劇，華族社會之民族主義思想，亦相對而蔓延深入（註十二）。

三、中國之黨政機構與星馬華僑

民國之建立，曾得力於海外華僑之相助，故民國成立後，政府便開始注意僑務工作。民國七年（一九一八），北京政府參加歐戰，招募華工赴歐，於國務院下設僑工事務局，民國十一年（一九二二）改設僑務局（註十三）。廣州政府則於民國十三年（一九二四），於大元帥府大本營附設僑務局，兩年後，中國國民黨第二次全國代表大會，通過改組僑務行政機構，成立僑務委員會，直隸國民政府，旋撤。總觀在一九二〇年代初期，中國國內政局不安，軍閥割劇，北京政府所設之僑務機構，因無人力、財力，成效不彰。廣州政府雖與星馬華僑關係較深，但亦偏重於金

錢上之捐募，對僑教工作無暇顧及。民國十七年（一九二八），國民政府奠都南京，在大學院下，設立華僑教育委員會，主管僑教（註十四）。不久，中國國民黨中央委員會決議恢復僑務委員會，次年，將僑務委員會改隸中央黨部，民國二十年（一九三一），再將僑務委員會改隸國民政府行政院（註十五），以迄於今。

國民政府之僑務委員會，職掌包括：監督海外移民，指導、監督海外華僑之政治、經濟、社會及教育各方面生活，并指導華僑子弟歸國就學，以及處理海外華僑之爭執糾紛事件（註十六）。僑務委員會及外交部之僑務司，且指派僑務特派員，其職權在不與駐外使領抵觸情形下，對華僑社區之各種結社、學校、新聞組織及其他一切公共團體負指導責任，僑校及其他社團均須向其登記，始能獲我國政府給予法律地位（註十七）。

國民政府定都南京後，中國進入“訓政”時期，執政之中國國民黨與國民政府間之黨政關係密切，為配合駐外使領館及執行僑務委員會之工作，中國國民黨中央執行委員會之海外部曾設立華僑運動講習所（註十八），培養推動華僑社團中工作的幹部，其目的在爭取海外華僑支持國民革命。由於國民黨與馬來亞華僑，關係既久，此區僑胞絕大部份多為閩粵人民，鄉土觀念濃厚，而移居馬來亞之華僑，雖較前往荷屬東印度群島僑民之遭遇為佳，英殖民地政府亦給予相當程度之法律保護，然當時旅馬來亞地區之華僑，多數仍為第一代移民，曾受教育者為數不多，通曉英語者甚少，已歸化當地而能參與當地政治活動者，當然為數更少。在心理上深盼祖國政府強大，家鄉生活改善，故對宣傳中國民族主義運動之中國國民黨及國民政府，給予相當之支持。

一般說來，在第二次世界大戰以前，馬來亞地區之華僑，多半以“幫”為其政治、社會與經濟的群體，幫的結構主要表現於地緣性組織，如會館；血緣性組織如宗祠；以及同一方言群對某種行業之控制。這些組織，使華僑與同鄉保持聯繫，獲得幫助，而對其產生歸屬感（註十九）。此外，由於當時在馬來亞地區之華僑，多半以華僑身份自居，關注中國的政治發展，新的移民更是積極參與中國國內的政治活動（註二十）。而中國國民黨及其前身之同盟會，曾在馬來亞華僑社會中活動很久，一九二〇年代，中國國民黨可說是當時馬來亞華僑中，唯一有組織之政治團體，故其對馬來亞華僑之政治意識有相當大的影響。

民國八年（一九一九），中山先生改組黨務，以中國國民黨取代中華革命黨，并繼續在海外進行黨務之推動。在一九一九年十月所公布的中國國民黨規約，相當注意海外工作，並且制頒了海外總支部通則及海外支部通則（註二十一），次年，馬來亞地區之黨部隨之改組（註二十二）。

從一九二〇～一九二四年間，馬來亞之中國國民黨支部藉著華語學校及書報社的宣傳，吸收黨員，發展黨務。民國九年（一九二〇）新加坡支部第一分部成立，一年後，第一分部之黨員人數為一百人左右，並開辦啓明學校，同時在該校教授三民主義。一九二二年，分部黨員人數增至一百五十餘人，一九二三年更增加到三百五十餘人（註二十三）。而在第二分部，則以同文書報社為其聚會及宣傳機關，加緊黨務之推動（註二十四）。一九二四年，中國國民黨召開第一次全國代表大會，中國國民黨再次改組，馬來亞之黨部亦隨之更改。中國國民黨於中央執行委員會下設一海外部，專司海外黨務，海外部下更有一南洋總支部，負責馬來亞地區之工作（註二十五），并由新加坡之第一、第二分部而擴增到第四、第五分部。中國國民黨採聯俄容共政策之後，共黨在馬來亞之活動日趨活躍，引起英殖民政府注意，也增加了英殖民政府對中國國民黨的戒備（註二十六）。民國十四年（一九二五），中山先生逝世於北京，四月十二至十三日，由新加坡之中國國民黨支部領導，於新加坡舉行全僑追悼孫中山大會，到壇行禮或致祭者，逾十萬人。在吉

隆坡和巴生的中國國民黨支部，也相繼發動追悼會之舉行。然而，這種吸引僑胞參與國內政治發展的行動，卻遭到英殖民政府對中國國民黨的壓制（註二十七）。根據新加坡第一及第二分部黨史的記載，有韓海邱、韓釗準、朱儒煥、陳寶儒等人密通華民政務司，搜索同文書報社及黨員黃昌積寓所，並搜查啓明學校，將所有一切文件俱行搜獲，同文書報社被封禁，啓明學校也遭封閉，黃昌積、朱拔英、蘇烈南三人被拘禁後驅逐出境（註二十八）。然中國國民黨黨員仍在夜校的掩護下繼續活動。一九二六年二月二十八日，四十一位啓明夜校師生，因開會計劃抵制日貨，而遭殖民政府逮捕，啓明夜校因而關閉（註二十九）。

在馬來亞之中國國民黨，因國民政府北伐成功，而於民國十七年（一九二八）前後之短暫期間，獲得公開活動的許可。除了新加坡外，在馬來亞其他地區，中國國民黨亦有相當程度之發展。民國十六年（一九二七）時，馬六甲已有區分部十一，通訊處二，共有黨員八百餘人（註三十），在霹靂則有十五個區分部（註三十一）。然而，中國國民黨的活動不久復遭壓制。民國十九年（一九三〇），金文泰任總督後，對在馬來亞之中國國民黨採取嚴厲壓制政策，不准中國國民黨在殖民地有所活動或捐款及徵收月捐等事，違者處以重罰并驅逐出境，在金文泰治理下的馬來亞，中國國民黨黨員常遭逮捕，黨務幾近停頓，黨員人數驟減（註三十二）。

四、星馬地區之華文教育

馬來亞地區之華僑，與其他中國人一樣，非常重視子女教育問題。早期之移民，因人數少，經濟力量薄弱，受教育之人數不多（註三十三）。一八八〇年代以後，移民人數增加，星馬地區由於工商逐漸發達，文化事業因而興起，義塾取代私塾，受教育人數擴大，華僑社會因而可自己培養與維護其傳統。

英殖民地政府，着重英、巫語教育以培養協助統治之人才（註三十四），對華文教育採取放任態度。起初，英語教育吸收了許多學生，一些華僑亦送其子弟前往英語學校，結果造就了過多的書記人才，因而殖民地政府逐漸集中注意於技術訓練。在這種情形下，華族子弟便很少再進入英語學校。一九二〇年代時，英語教育與大部星馬華僑無關，大多數華僑子弟都送往華文學校。造成這種現象，大約有兩大原因，首先，人口中有一大部分是屬於移民性質，許多華僑子弟到星馬時，已超過進入英語學校的年齡；其次，當時一般人都認為英語教育只能培養文書人員這種“白領”職業，然這方面的就業機會已很稀少（註三十五），並且職業訓練又與華僑的傳統知識追求不相符合，因而在一九二〇年代，星馬華語學校吸收了大部分華僑子弟，國民政府也一再大力推動華僑教育，并准許海外僑校向中國申請立案，承認其學業資格（註三十六），同時鼓勵華僑子弟回國就學（註三十七）。

在教育上，英殖民地政府，雖將大部人力、物力投注於英語及馬來語教育，但也曾以補貼制度，試圖置華語學校於監督之下，然而，華語學校反應冷淡，華校教師認為接受監督，將侵害到教師之教學自由，由於他們的反對，阻止許多學校之董事會去申請這種帶條件之補助（註三十八）。英殖民地政府因尚未瞭解華語學校在星馬地區扮演角色之重要性，對華校之不願接受監督，在一九二〇年以前，并未採更積極之政策。

由於英殖民地政府對馬來亞地區之華文教育，一向採取放任態度，大體而言，只要華語學校的活動，不直接危害到殖民地之治安，不對英國之統治權挑戰，殖民地政府便不干涉。然而馬來亞地區之華文教育，固然不太受殖民地政府之干涉，但殖民地政府也甚少對華文學校給予經費上

之支持（註三十九），所以，當時華文學校之經費，必須大部分依靠當地的華僑社區，一般說來，許多僑校沒有理想的校舍，或新式的設備，必須儘量節省各種開支，教師的待遇也很菲薄。經費的來源，通常都由經濟情況較好的華商負擔，這些華商，有以個人直接捐款方式，成立董事會，支持僑校的興建與維持，有的則通過各方言群的會館組織來辦學校。星馬地區之僑辦學校，最初俱為小學，以後才逐漸擴充，增加職業課程，進而開始創辦中學，第一所華文中學為一九〇四年在檳城創辦之中華學校，一九一七年，檳城之鍾靈學校擴設中學，一九一九年，新加坡及檳城分別創辦華僑中學，以後各地華校逐漸擴辦中學（註四十）。星馬之華僑教育，雖在經濟困難情況下慘淡經營，繼續維持與成長（註四十一）。

地緣性之會館，原為凝結來自同一方言群移民之結合，協助并約束同一方言群之移民，凡遇同鄉有病或遭災難，則集資相助，年老無依者，則或措籌川資，助其返回祖國，或補助其生活費；死亡者，提供棺木、墓地，會館內且常安置同鄉之神位，以慰死者；當然，這些會館除了提供互助外，并以扶助華僑教育，促進文化為目標（註四十二）。

由各方言群華僑組成的會館，在星馬華僑社會中，一直扮演著重要的社會、經濟與政治的角色，在興辦與維護華文教育的任務上，亦有其不可忽視的貢獻。一九〇六年，福建幫商人創辦道南學校，起先借用閩商陳金鐘氏之住宅，民國元年（一九一二），在閩僑領袖陳嘉庚領導下，建立新校舍。民國十八年，福建會館改組，設立教育科，致力僑教，正式接辦道南學校。以往廣幫所建立之養正學校（一九〇五年），客幫之啓發學校（一九〇四年），應新學校（一九〇六年），潮幫之端蒙學校（一九〇六年），都只收錄本方言群之學生。由於道南學校首先打破幫派的隔膜，收錄其他方言群之學生，其後，各校效尤，華僑教育中因不同地緣會館組織，所建立學校間的隔膜，因而大為減少，而不同方言群之子弟因混合在同一學校，而產生相同意識的機會，也因而增加。

當民國六年（一九一七），“國語”運動在中國國內展開後，國語逐漸取代各地方言，成為各級學校之教學媒介。三年後，北京之中國政府，正式下令，以國語作為法定教學媒介，星馬地區之各級華文中、小學亦於一九二〇年採用國語為教學媒介（註四十三）。在馬來亞的華文中、小學，國語的推行，雖因教師來自中國各省，其國語發音並不純正，然而，一般說來，國語的應用，遠比中國國內發達（註四十四），因為在星馬地區，華僑雖來自閩、粵兩省，但可粗分為福建（即閩南）、廣府、潮州、海南及各類客家方言群，相互間在口語上無法溝通，因此，國語成為各方言群間的共同溝通工具。

當新加坡華校於民國八年（一九一九）設立南洋華僑中學時，星馬地區并無合格之中學教師，且華僑教育一向被視為中國教育之一環，因此函請國內教育界推介教員，經上海教育會之協助，聘任湖南籍之涂開輿為首任校長，安徽之李幼泉等四人為教師，建校經費自民國七年起，屢次由星馬各地僑界捐助，逐漸擴建，民國十四年（一九二五），且建峻一可容納千人之大禮堂，耗資叻幣十三萬元（註四十五）。由於殖民地政府及中國當局都無甚資助，建校經費及維持費，除小部份來自學費外，其餘來自僑界，“有的本着愛國興學之心而自動出錢出力；有些則是被勸說而捐輸；更有一些劇團義演募款以助學。學生方面也利用時機演劇籌款，以充學校之經費。”（註四十六）

“五四”運動發生前，星馬地區就已有許多華文中、小學遍佈全區，當時英殖民地政府對馬來亞地區之華文教育採消極放任政策，任其自生自滅，當然，殖民地當局對華文教育訓練出來的

學生，亦不承認其學業資格。英殖民地政府對華文教育這種跡近完全放任的政策，後因馬來亞地區華文學校之響應“五四”運動，及參與許多“傾向中國”之政治活動，而屢作修改（註四十七）。一九二〇年十月海峽殖民地頒佈教育法案，次年，馬來聯邦亦公布類似條例（註四十八），規定教師須經註冊承認，這些條例旨在監視殖民地之各類學校之經營，企圖消滅與殖民地利益衝突之教育活動，授權殖民地總督可對教導有關革命或與殖民地利益衝突的學校，宣佈其為非法團體而加予取締。為反對此項註冊法令，華文學校之領導人曾一再力爭反對，結果導致代表余佩臬、莊希泉及鍾樂臣等被驅逐出境（註四十九）。但實施註冊條例初期似未對星馬僑校發展有重大影響，馬來亞地區新成立之華校數目，仍繼續成長，自一九二〇年至一九三〇年間，星馬地區共有一四七間華文學校創立（註五十）。據陳嘉庚回憶錄稱，“雖校長教師須經註冊承認，若無不法行動，却亦無何干涉，且時常派視學員到校視察，對衛生上甚加注意，唯三民主義書籍不許教授。”（註五十一）

星馬地區的僑校，其課程與教材，都受中國國內教育發展的影響，課程固然沿襲中國體制，教科書也都來自中國，早期馬來亞僑校，如一八五四年設立之萃英書院，即為以一私塾形式而成立，旨在承繼中國的儒家教化，期冀子弟接受聖賢傳統，達到立身處世之道，廿世紀以降，始逐漸脫離私塾形式，課程亦由四書五經轉變成新式教育內容，以適應社會之需求（註五十二）。然其教育體制與教材，仍緊緊追隨中國，以中國的教育制度為依歸，也依中國的教育法令、規定而設立。當中國方面規定“小學修業年限六年，前四年為初級小學，後二年為高級小學。中學修業年限六年，前三年為初級中學，後三年為高級中學。”（註五十三）馬來亞各地的僑校亦皆遵照這種規定而切實實行（註五十四）。各校教師亦函請中國教育部分派（註五十五）。

至於教科書方面，星馬之華僑中、小學校，一開始就採用上海之商務書店或中華書店出版之教科書。由於當時並無專為華僑子弟撰寫之教科書，商務版或中華版之教科書，充其量只描敘及討論中國之情況，這種現象後曾因僑校之反應而稍作修改，加入適應當地環境之材料（註五十六）。二十世紀二十年代，隨著中國國內民族主義運動之發展，政治色彩之材料，逐漸滲入教材之中，許多排外事件都編入中、小學課本之中，因而引起英殖民地政府之不滿。據當時擔任英殖民地政府官員之巴素日後回憶宣稱，中國出版之教科書，充滿反英宣傳，例如述及一九二五年之“五卅慘案”時，一幅身穿制服之英警向徒手群眾開槍之插圖赫然出現。在歷史教科書上，亦大量出現類似甚具煽動反英情緒之描述。巴素認為，這種教科書對馬來亞地區華語學校學生灌輸了仇英的思想，當然很難為殖民地政府接受（註五十七）。在殖民地政府禁止此類教科書進入馬來亞地區後，商務書店及中華書局只好另為華僑學校編印一套可為英殖民地政府接受的教科書，當然，這種政策純為一消極減少反英情結的作法，因為華語學校教科書完全出自中國，內容完全是關於中國的材料，書中未提及馬來亞之歷史、地理等，與當時生活有關之人、事、物（註五十八）。

五、星馬地區之華文報紙

對已不在學校的馬來亞華僑識字者而言，中文刊物，尤其當地出版之報章雜誌，不但提供必需資訊，更在指導公共意識上居於領袖地位。馬來亞當地出版之中文報紙，出現甚早，一八三七年，原由廣州出版之“東西洋考每月統計傳”，因受清政府之壓力，移至新加坡，繼續出版近一年，至鴉片戰爭前才停刊。在一八三八年至一八八一年間，新加坡中文報業上，出現一段空白，

其主要原因，不外為當時華僑人口稀少，且文化水準不高（註五十九）。英法聯軍之役後，清廷明令准許華工前往海外謀生，馬來亞因胡椒、甘蔗、豆蔻之種植，以及錫礦之開採，大批華工湧入，而新加坡為東南亞地區之主要轉口港，位居東南亞航運之要津而日趨繁榮，一批華僑富商興起，華僑社會中識字人士增加，為中文日報的出現，提供有利條件（註六十）。一八八一年，叻報（一八八一至一九三一年）創刊，為星馬地區第一份中文日報，其創報之目的，據叻報資料宣稱，“本報居停，生長炎洲，沈潛學海，曩歸祖國，讀書十年，嘗概夫叻地同僑，囿於舊俗，身之與國，漠不相關，愆然憂之，遂以覺世牖民，引為己責，念裨風教者莫良於報，於是毅然奮發，獨任其難。”（註六十一）一八九四年以前，叻報言論偏重當地事務，甲午戰爭以後，我國政局動盪不安，叻報減少許多說教式的文章，逐漸增加有關中國情況之探討。一般說來，叻報對中國政治的立場，始終是親當權派的（註六十二）。由於創辦初期（一八八一至一八九〇年），星馬地區沒有第二家中文報紙，叻報遂成一枝獨秀，報壇亦平靜無事。一八九〇年前後，星報（一八九八年），日新報（一八九九年）陸續創立，其中星報言論，甚為保守，堅決反對僑居星馬之僑胞接受西化觀念（註六十三），天南新報及日新報則支持改革（註六十四）。戊戌政變後，保皇黨、革命黨紛紛到海外宣傳，星馬成為保皇、革命兩派的文宣較力場所，革命黨人在星馬所辦之中興日報（一九〇七至一九一〇年），石叻總滙新報（一九〇六至一九四六年），先後加入筆戰，激發星馬華僑知識份子政治意識的覺醒與發展。至一九二〇年代，叻報及石叻總滙新報仍然存在，加上廿年代創辦之光華日報（一九二七年至今），南洋商報（一九二三年至今，兩年前始與星洲日報合併為聯合早、晚報），新國民日報（一九一九至一九四〇年）及南鐸日報（一九二三至一九四五年）（註六十五）。星馬地區之中文報紙，提供僑胞許多不同觀點之消息與評論。而於民國十三年（一九二四）改組後的中國國民黨，更運用其組織力量，在其所有之報紙，於馬來亞華僑中，鼓吹中國民族主義之政治意識，當時，中國國民黨直接控制了新加坡之新國民報，吉隆坡之益群報，檳榔嶼之光華日報及雙溪大年之南洋時報（註六十六）。這些源自中國卻在馬來亞發行之華文報紙，成為傳達與聯繫馬來亞華僑與中國本土，尤其南方革命政府的重要資訊工具，許多有關中國民族主義及革命政府之活動與理論，都經由這些黨營報紙達到馬來亞華僑社會。民國十四年三月十二日，中山先生逝世於北京，馬來亞地區之華文報紙，亦在新國民報之領導下，大幅刊登中山先生之種種事蹟及其革命理論，一向採保守態度，支持當權派的叻報，亦開始刊登許多中山先生之主張（註六十七）。

馬來亞地區之華文報紙，除了報導許多中國國內發生之重要事件外，也常在當地發動以中國為效忠目標之活動。民國十六年（一九二七）三月，在新加坡發生之“牛車水事件”（註六十八），各華文報紙大幅刊載，并稱中山先生之逝世日為國忌日（註六十九）。同時，所有馬來亞之華文報紙都以“民國”為紀元。各報都闢有“祖國”或“國內”新聞版面（註七十），明顯表示馬來亞地區之各華文報，不論其政治及社會主張、立場，都以中國為其政治認同之目標。隨著中國國內政治局勢的演變，馬來亞地區之華文報紙亦更積極呼籲華僑關懷“國事”。領導中國國民革命之中國國民黨之黨員及其宣傳機關，固然不放棄任何可鼓吹效忠中國政治意識之發展，連以馬來亞當地僑胞生活為中心之叻報，亦不得不一再號召僑胞勿忘祖國。民國十五年（一九二六）三月，叻報竟對廣州國民政府之黃埔軍校作一連續九天之詳盡報導，并在報導軍校各項軍事及政治訓練時，不彈其煩地介紹國民政府之政治理念（註七十一）。國民政府北伐後，叻報更出版“黃花崗紀念專刊”，倡導僑胞之愛國精神（註七十二）。

六、討 論

政治意識的興起與發展，與外來刺激似有密切關係，生物體之“人”需透過社會化之過程成爲“社會”，也經由政治化過程而成爲“政治人”。在“生物人”轉化成“社會人”及“政治人”過程中，教育扮演著重要角色。教育與大眾傳播皆爲提高國民之民族意識的有力工具（註七十三），廿世紀以來，馬來亞華文教育之逐漸發達，培養了馬來亞地區華文源流僑胞對中華文化之認同感。一九二〇年代，中國外受列強，尤其日本之侵略，內受軍閥割據之壓迫，民族主義之意識在中國知識份子中成長。以往中國國民黨倡導之國民革命，以及其他政治活躍份子發動以中國爲政治認同的各種活動，曾獲得馬來亞地區僑胞之廣大回應，如今各級華語學校之使用來自中國本土的教科書，更一再強化受教者對中國作政治認同之意識，英殖民地政府雖自“五四”運動後，逐漸體認華語教育對馬來亞華僑之影響，以及中國本土所出版教科書對英殖民統治之可能危害，但卻未能制定有效之策略。爲防止華僑社會中的中文學校會產生不利於殖民統治，一九二〇年後，殖民地雖一再針對漏洞，頒佈各種條例、學校規章，以圖阻止星馬華僑子弟產生效忠中國之政治意識，然而，英殖民地政府之規定，並未能割斷星馬僑校與中國本土間的聯繫。其主要原因約可分爲兩項，首先，英殖民地政府並無積極消除傾向中國政治意識的有效策略，只要馬來亞華校無明顯反英之活動，殖民地政府對僑校便只作消極之監督。第二，英殖民地政府在馬來亞之教育，主要在培養少數英語教育人才，幫助其統治星馬，因而，殖民地政府從未訓練星馬華語學校所需之教師，亦未鼓勵出版“適合”當地華語學校所需之教科書，而讓馬來亞地區之華文中、小學校完全依賴來自中國之教師及教科書，在這種情形之下，馬來亞僑校培養出來之學生，自然與其祖國關係密切，對中國國內政治發展情況之關懷程度，遠比其對僑居地之馬來亞，來得密切。

由於語言、教育背景、出生所在地以及政治權力之行使等等因素，一九二〇年代居住於馬來亞地區之華僑，泰半無法參與當地之政治活動，英屬馬來亞殖民政府，雖比荷屬東印度、菲律賓及南美各地政府對華僑寬大，但並無積極之“同化”政策，居住於馬來亞之華僑，充其量爲較其他地區少受些歧視的寄居者。雖然，能衣錦還鄉者不多，但爲數甚多之第一代移民及其受華文教育之子女，仍以中國爲其情感上之歸依目標，而此種情感上之認同，經中國國民黨之努力，華文教育之培養以及華文報紙之鼓吹，許多馬來亞華僑產生對中國之政治效忠，以中國爲其政治認同目標，原來以各方言群組成的“幫”爲認同目標之情感，因着面對共同敵人而逐漸擴大，而這種擴大的有利工具，則爲共同之語言。以往，中國文字上之統一，曾提供“中國”境內人民在文化上融而爲一的基礎，發展成一中華文化。清季以來，中外之間之持續衝突，曾激發星馬華僑向中國關注的情緒，早在中華民國成立之前，星馬華僑即曾杯葛日貨，表示他們對日本侵犯之不滿，以及他們在政治上認同中國之情感（註七十四）。如今，“國語”之推行與逐漸使用，更提供受過華文教育之馬來亞華僑，一項容易彼此溝通之工具，使以“中國”爲一整個之政治意識得於急速發展，民國十七年（一九二八）星馬地區華僑對“濟南事件”之反應，適足以說明一九二〇年代星馬華僑在以中國爲政治效忠目標上之發展。以往一小撮人參加的活動，已成爲一參與人數衆多，超越幫界，深具政治意義之活動。

在這時期，除中國國民黨之活動外，共產黨亦在星馬華僑中相當活躍。在中國國民黨之“容共”期間，共黨份子借中國國民黨之名義及機構，推動其工作（註七十五），民國十六年（一九二七），中國國民黨在國內厲行清黨，不少共產黨員逃往國外，雖因星馬華僑社會之特殊環境，

未能急速發展，但亦在中國國民黨之一些分部中，造成分裂（註七十六）。然而，英殖民地政府對溫和份子和激進份子一視同仁，企圖加予限制（註七十七），但又擔心激怒民國十六年以後已掌握中國政治權力的中國國民黨，不願或不敢採取嚴厲手段，以致成效不彰，任由馬來亞華僑以中國為政治效忠目標之意識繼續成長。

向中國認同之華僑，因中國民族主義運動者之努力，成為中國名符其實的“臣民”，國民政府建都南京之後，因未能注意星馬當地之政治發展，忽略當地土著民族主義之興起，而繼續將星馬華人“中國化”，而星馬華人在中國民族主義之激動下，積極參與中國之國民革命運動，並對祖國作人力、財力上之貢獻，造成日後土著民族對華僑之誤解與敵視（註七十八）。一九二〇年代之星馬華僑，其政治意識之興起，由於局限於對中國之政治認同意識之發展，而未能演變成一種普遍的政治意識的覺醒，更未促進僑胞積極參與當地之政治活動，因而當日後土著民族主義興起後，受華文教育之星馬華僑無法在當地政治上扮演舉足輕重之角色。

註 釋

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註八：叻報、新國民日報，民國十四年三月及四月。

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註十：古鴻廷，“兩次大戰期間星馬華僑反日意識成長之探討”，中國海洋發展史論文集(三)（南港，中央研究院三民主義研究所，民國七十七年），第483頁。

註十一：楊進發，“山東籌賑會與陳嘉庚”，崔貴強、古鴻廷合編，東南亞華人問題之研究（新加坡，教育出版社，1974），第145～146頁。

註十二：同上書，第146～147頁。

註十三：周勝泉編，海外華文學校教育（台北，僑務委員會編，民五十八年），第30頁。

註十四：同上書，第18頁。

註十五：同上書，第31頁。

- 註十六：長野朗著，黃朝琴譯，中華民族之國外發展（上海，暨南大學，民十八年），第 276 頁。
- 註十七：同上書，第 280～285 頁。
- 註十八：同上書，第 301 頁。
- 註十九：新加坡華人會館沿革史編輯委員會，新加坡華人會館沿革史（新加坡，1986），第 53 頁。
- 註二十：同上書，第 117 頁。
- 註二十一：羅家倫，革命文獻（台北，中國國民黨中央委員會，黨史史料編纂委員會，民五十七年）第八輯，第 5～9 頁。
- 註二十二：楊進發，“辛亥革命與星馬華族的國民黨運動（1912～1925）”，辛亥革命與南洋華人研討會論文集（台北，國際關係研究中心，民七十五年），第 110 頁。
- 註二十三：中國國民黨新加坡支部第一分部歷年沿革史，民國二十四年六月，中國國民黨黨史會檔案 002/33。
- 註二十四：中國國民黨駐南洋英屬新加坡第二分部黨史，民二十一年十二月，中國國民黨黨史會檔案 002/21。
- 註二十五：中國國民黨中央執行委員會海外部報告書，民十四年一月，中國國民黨黨史會檔案 002/50。
- 註二十六：中國國民黨駐南洋英屬新加坡第二分部黨史。
- 註二十七：楊進發，“辛亥革命與星馬華族的國民黨運動（1912～1925）”，第 120～121 頁。
- 註二十八：中國國民黨新加坡支部第一分部歷年沿革史，中國國民黨駐南洋英屬新加坡第二分部黨史。
- 註二十九：Yeo Hwee Joo, “The Chinese Consulate-General in Singapore, 1911–1941”, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 41, Part 1 & 2, 1986, P.82.
- 註三十：有關中國國民黨駐馬六甲直屬支部及駐霹靂直屬支部資料，參閱海外黨務通訊，第一卷第四期及第一卷第十期，收集於中國國民黨中央委員會第三組編，中國國民黨在海外（台北，民五十年），第 361～368 頁。
- 註三十一：巴素著，劉前度譯，馬來亞華人史（檳榔嶼，光華日報社，民國三十九年），第 159 頁。英殖民地政府對馬來亞地區之中國國民黨之種種活動，曾有詳細記載，其檔案編號為 C.O. 273/537。
- 註三十二：同上註。
- 註三十三：中國國民黨駐南洋英屬新加坡第二分部黨史。
- 註三十四：巴素著，劉前度譯，馬來亞華人史，第 160 頁。
- 註三十五：巴素著，郭湘章譯，東南亞之華僑（台北，正中書局，民五十七年），第 487 頁。
- 註三十六：多賀秋五郎編，近代中國教育史資料（台北，文海，民六十五年重印），“民國篇”（中），第 484～485 頁及 571 頁。
- 註三十七：同上書，第 486 頁。
- 註三十八：巴素著，劉前度譯，馬來亞華僑，第 161 頁。以 1931 年為例，馬來亞地區之 818

間華文學校，只有 153 間接受政府之補助。參閱 C.O. 273/579，*Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs*, No. 19, March, 1932.

註三十九：許甦吾，新加坡華僑教育全貌（新加坡，南洋書局，1950），第 9～11 頁。

註四十：周勝泉編，海外華文學校教育，第 17 頁。沈瑞英，“南洋華僑中學校之創建”，南洋大學亞洲文化研究所研究報告集刊（新加坡，1975），第 109～115 頁。

註四十一：巴素著，郭湘章譯，東南亞之華僑，第 484 頁。

註四十二：有關星馬地區華僑會館之活動，參閱吳華，新加坡華族會館史三冊（新加坡，南洋學會，1975），溫州會館，溫州會館四十週年紀念特刊（新加坡，1963），兩湖會館，新加坡兩湖會館慶祝廿週年紀念特刊（新加坡，1967），南洋客屬總會，南洋客屬總會第三十五、三十六週年紀念刊（新加坡，1967），新加坡華人會館沿革史編輯委員會，新加坡華人會館沿革史，茶陽會館，新加坡茶陽會館百年紀念刊（新加坡，1958）。

註四十三：巴素著，劉前度譯，馬來亞華人史，第 160 頁。

註四十四：同上書，第 163 頁。

註四十五：華僑中學，華中金禧紀念冊（新加坡，1969）。陳嘉庚，南僑回憶錄（新加坡，民三十五年），第 20 頁。

註四十六：叻報，民國九年五月二十九日，十一年四月二十二日。

註四十七：Gwee Yee Hean, “Chinese Education in Singapore”, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 25, Part 2, 1970, 第 100～127 頁。

註四十八：一九二〇年之條例第三十七條規定，“凡經總督及議政局在憲報宣佈禁用之書籍，則各註冊學校內之人不得用之。”一九二六年之條例第二十七條更明白規定，“禁用不適宜之書籍。”有關英屬三州府學校普通章程（1920年），學校註冊條例（1926年），及英屬馬來聯邦政府學校註冊條例（1934年），參閱，張正藩，近六十年南洋華僑教育史（台北，中央文物供應社，民國四十五年），第 41～57 頁。

註四十九：宋哲美，星馬教育研究集（香港，東南亞研究所，1974），第 71 頁。

註五十：張正藩，華僑教育綜論（台北，商務印書館，民五十九年），第 12～16 頁。

註五十一：陳嘉庚，南僑回憶錄，第 21 頁。

註五十二：許甦吾，新加坡華僑教育全貌，第 14～16 頁。

註五十三：唐青，新加坡華文教育（台北，華僑教育叢書編輯委員會，民四十三年），第 216 頁。

註五十四：這種三、三制的中學體制，直到民國五十一年（1962）才在新加坡教育部指示下改為英制的四、二制，即中學為四年制，再加二年高中（或稱為大學先修班）。參閱，丁莉英，新加坡華校課程及教科書的演進初探（1951～1972）（新加坡，南洋大學榮譽學位論文，1973）。

註五十五：沈瑞英，“南洋華僑中學校之創建”，第 111 頁。民國十一年中國國內改革學制，將初等小學四年，高等小學二年改為三、三制之六年小學，次年，馬來亞各華校隨而改革。參閱，丁莉英，新加坡華校課程及教科書的演進初探，第 1～12 頁。

註五十六：張正藩，華僑教育綜論，第 38 頁。

- 註五十七：丁莉英，新加坡華校課程及教科書的演進初探，第 41 頁。
- 註五十八：巴素著，劉前度譯，馬來亞華僑，第 162 ~ 163 頁。
- 註五十九：Chen Mong Hock, *The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore, 1881-1912* (Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 12-14.
- 註六十：何舒敏，“新加坡最早的華文日報—叻報（1881 ~ 1932）”，南洋學報，第 34 卷第 1、2 期（1979 年 9 月出版），第 8 頁。
- 註六十一：叻報，1911 年 12 月 11 日、12 日。
- 註六十二：見柯木林撰，“葉秀允任主筆期間（1881 ~ 1921）的叻報”，星洲日報，1973 年 6 月 12 日。
- 註六十三：Chen Mong Hock, *The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore, 1881-1912*, 第 60 頁。
- 註六十四：同上書，第 71、78、79 頁。
- 註六十五：國立新加坡大學圖書館館藏目錄。
- 註六十六：中國國民黨中央執行委員會海外部報告書，民十四年一月。
- 註六十七：新國民日報，民十四年三月十二日至四月十日。叻報，民十四年三月十三日、十六日。
- 註六十八：有關該事件之報導，可參閱，叻報，民國十六年三月十四日，新國民日報，民國十六年三月十四日、三十一日，石叻總滙新報，民國十六年三月十四日、十六日、十八日、十九日、二十一日，*Straits Times*, March 14, 18, 1927.
- 註六十九：石叻總滙新報，新國民日報，民國十六年三月十四日。
- 註七十：散見石叻總滙新報、叻報、光華日報、新國民日報、南洋時報、南洋商報、益群報等報之刊頭及編排版面。
- 註七十一：叻報，民國十六年三月八日至十七日。
- 註七十二：叻報，民國十七年四月二十七日。
- 註七十三：江炳倫，政治文化研究導論（台北，正中書局，民七十二年），第 2 ~ 3 頁。
- 註七十四：Yoji Akashi, “The Nanyang Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908-1928”, *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. 23, Part 1 & 2, 1968, P.70.
- 註七十五：當時中國國民黨中央執行委員會海外部部長彭澤民即為共產黨員，參閱中國國民黨中央委員會第三組，中國國民黨在海外，第 162 ~ 163 頁。
- 註七十六：中國國民黨駐南洋英屬新加坡第二分部黨史。
- 註七十七：Erelyn Sim Cher Lan, *The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya, 1924-27* (Singapore, University of Singapore, B. A. Honors Thesis, 1974), pp. 21-22.
- 註七十八：鄭良樹，“華人文化與馬來亞華人”，新社學術論文集第二輯（新加坡：新社，1972），第 123 頁。

附表一 英屬馬來亞華僑人口

年 代	地 區 人 數	海峽殖民地	馬 來 聯 邦	馬來屬邦及汶萊	總 計
		1921	華僑當地 出生者	144,857 人	81,976 人
	華 僑 總人口	498,547 人	494,548 人	171,682 人	1,164,777 人
1931	華僑當地 出生者	249,495 人	205,245 人	79,271 人	534,011 人
	華 僑 總人口	663,351 人	711,274 人	254,196 人	1,628,821 人

※資料來源：

C.A. Vlieland, *British Malaya: A Report on the 1931 Census* (Singapore, 1932), p. 69.

附表二 二十世紀初期馬來亞地區新成立華校數目分布表

年 代	地 區	海峽殖民地	馬 來 聯 邦	總 數
1900 ~ 1909		20	6	26
1910 ~ 1919		50	50	100
1920 ~ 1929		100	25	125

※資料來源：

周勝臬編著：海外華文學校教育，僑務委員會僑務研究室，台北，民國五十八年十月，p.p. 7 ~ 15。

張正藩：近六十年南洋華僑教育史，中央文物供應社，台北，民國四十五年五月，p.p. 9 ~ 16。

Abstract

The emergence and development of the political consciousness of the Chinese have been an important subject for many students of modern China. The presence of a sizable population of overseas Chinese in the Malaya area attracts a special attention from scholars as well as politicians. For the majority of the Chinese who went to Malaya in the early twentieth century, Malaya was a place to better their economic lives. Although few ever returned China with their savings, the dream of returning of their hometowns persisted. The political activities of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries stimulated the emergence of the political consciousness of these overseas Chinese.

In the 1920s, the nationalist sentiments grew in China. The revolutionary activists, armed with new strategies and tactics, intensified their activities among the Malayan Chinese. Their efforts were echoed by the students of Chinese schools in Malaya. Partially because of the British colonial authorities' neglect of the education needs of the Malayan Chinese, the Chinese communities set up their own schools. As the teachers and textbooks all came from China, a strong bond was developed between the students of these Chinese schools and China. And a sense of political loyalty developed among these overseas Chinese toward China.

六書形象形研究

江 舉 謙

摘 要

人類的文字始於圖繪。所以象形文字是人類文字的初階。我國文字的研究自來皆以「六書」為總綱。而「象形」則是傳統六書的第一書。所以研究中國文字又以象形為基礎。

象形文字的研究，一向以構形內容之分類為中心。而仁智之見每多歧異。落實於個別例字之辨屬，更有出入。幸而文字是客觀的事實，學者之分類與歸屬並不影響其內容。

本文重心則以「象形」之「淵源」開其端，直探溯其圖繪之實際。進而論析其「取象原理」。在深度與廣度上，全面展開研究創新境界。而象形文字之新生代，即遞變之新字，自來學者皆未注意。本文特列專章以明其徑途與實際。至象形文字構形內容之分類，則為傳統學者論見之歸納，一得之愚僅在例字之精選解說之補充而已。

引 言

宇宙萬事萬物都有它的涵義。這包括事物的稱名和內容。一般說，凡是動物多能發音，也就是多能以簡單聲音表達事物最簡單的意義，循着宇宙進化原理，高等動物的語音表達事物的涵義，也就逐漸加廣加深！到了人類突破自我意識，萬事萬物與感情思想結合，語音功能也就更加靈活，為了加強事物涵義的提示，表情、體態與手勢也隨之出現！

但無論「語音」或「表情、體態、手勢」的表意功能，在時間空間上都受到極大限制。於是人為的「實物圖繪」與「虛義符識」的形象出現。結合「涵義」、「語音」、「形象」，人類「文字」於焉產生。

「形」、「音」、「義」是文字三項要素，而「形」最後出。原始多是實物的圖繪，「日」「月」「山」「水」，「艸」「木」「虫」「魚」，與作畫無別，稍後通過人心剪裁，雖是實物却能特顯其狀，而「云」「氣」「火」「申」，「田」「阜」「泉」「井」陸續出現。人類文字第一類型就此誕生，而中國傳統六書之「象形」，也就淵源於此。

中國傳統「六書」之理論，係基於小篆構形原理之歸納。而小篆乃秦始皇之世李斯等據大篆省改之新形。嚴格言之，小篆係人工統一極為成熟之文字。與原始之「圖繪」「符識」距離頗遠。即使「日」「月」「山」「水」等這些最原始的圖繪，小篆構形也已脫離圖繪範圍。自來研究六書「象形」，並未就圖繪淵源深入分析！不知圖繪本身「繪形」「圖象」初亦有異也。

「圖繪」為畫作落實之總名，而取象原理則係「智慧」與「藝術」的結合。是以中國原始象形文字不僅富於崇高藝術美，也表現民族崇高智慧層次。

人類文字是生活的動力環節，文字的演變反映生活的進步，生活的進步也促使文字持續演變。原始象形文字基於人類生活實際需要，或構體增複，或變易為指事，為會意，為形聲。傳統六

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書中「象形」之研究多未着意於此。

六書象形之構形內容為傳統文字學者研究之重心。本文綜貫前修務求精簡而統緒分明、煩瑣支蔓轉害研究徑途也。

第一章 象形文字淵源

人類文字淵源於圖繪，這是理論與事實的印證。從理論上言，文字三要素的「形」，最初還經歷「表情」「體態」「手勢」的過渡，是以「視覺」輔助「聽覺」。而視覺最直接的功效反應，必然是實物的圖繪。從事實言，中外古老民族的原始文字莫非圖繪。但細析內容，其間仍有多種不同方式，分別顯現演進步驟與層次。

第一節 實物繪形

依據視覺直接繪畫宇宙萬物實形，這是人類象形文字的原始。由於宇宙萬物是純客觀的存在，因此原始民族的繪形也大都相同。但落實內容亦有多類。

(甲)全形精繪

這是任何民族最原始的繪形。例如：

日 實也，太陽之精。象形。

按契金文之構形皆繪畫太陽渾圓之形，契文中之尤古者更精繪光芒四射之形，小篆以下已逐漸脫離繪畫之跡。

心 人心土藏，在身之中，象形。

按古金文即繪心臟之形，饒炯據小篆仍云：「中形象心，外形象包絡」。嚴格言之，古金文已演為成熟文字而不是本來面目，小篆以下更遠離原始繪畫矣。

虎 山獸之君，从虍，虎足象人足，象形。

按原始為虎形之精繪，古象形文虎之全形仍宛然在目。契金文已演為象徵性廓郭，小篆以下已難迹本始，故許慎說解支離無當矣。

貝 海介蟲也。居陸名姦，在水名蜎。象形。

按即海中之貝殼類生物，商器金文得觚偏旁即精繪貝殼形，契金文以下則已簡化，小篆譌變上體似目，更無由迹其本矣。

(乙)略形描繪

原始民族之實物繪形，由於實物本身構形繁複，常將原形適度予以簡略。例如：

牛 大牲也。象角頭三封尾之形。

按三代吉金文存牛首鼎之「牛」，已略繪正面牛頭形。以「馬」「羊」兩字之殷代古文皆繪全形證之，似已以略形描繪矣。契金文更簡化為符號文字，小篆承之。許慎「封尾」之訓，顯非其真。

呂 脊骨也。象形。

段玉裁云：「呂象顆顆相承，中象其系聯也」。

按「呂」為人背正中節骨。數凡二十四。契金文皆略繪其二顆形。即小篆所以出也。

屮 艸木初生也。象一出形。有枝莖也。

孔廣居云：「艸木初生多兩葉對生，及其既長，則枝葉左右參差，故屮象初生之形」。

按艸木初生，不必皆為兩葉，如「木」不必皆為兩枝，此係略其形以描繪也。

山 宣也，宣氣散生萬物，有石而高，象形。

按「山」之原始本繪峰巒起伏之形。而峰巒重嶂，互聯不絕。金文父壬尊猶繪五峰。契金文一般皆略繪三峰，小篆承之，形已隱晦。「有石而高」之說，蓋未能述其本也。

(丙)附形合繪

客觀實物之形通過視覺，本易認識。然通過繪畫則或不易顯，故原始即附加他體或相關字以足之。例如：

眉（眉） 目上毛也。从目，象眉之形。上象額理也。

按契金文本繪目上毛順向一邊之形，因形不足顯，故加他體之「目」以足之又或加目圍。

小篆以下誤「眉」為額理，而以目圍（雙眼皮）為「眉」，非其朔矣。

果 木實也。从木，象果形。

按果形渾圓，僅繪其形，不足以顯，契文有作木上累累垂實之形，即此意也。後省略為一果，即小篆之所由出也。

衰 艸雨衣。秦謂之革。从衣，象形。

按艸雨衣形本即叒，金文父癸鼎繪形宛然。後譌變為「丹」，則與訓「毛丹丹」之髯之初文混，故附加相關字「衣」以足之。而「髯」之構形原理亦同。

胃（胃） 穀府也。从肉，象形。

按石鼓文謂字偏旁即略如小篆。上繪米麥碎飯在胃中，應即胃字之原始，因形不足顯，故附加相關字「肉」以明。隸楷以下，原始胃形又譌為「田」，無由明其本矣。

(丁)設形以繪

客觀實物雖有具體之形，而融入繪畫，仍需通過人心之設定。例如：

韭 韭菜也。一種而久生者也，故謂之韭。象形，在一之上，一地也。

饒炯云：「中二象葉之上出。左右象葉之旁達，正狀其滋盛丰丰形」。

林義光云：「本是八直並列以象其多，其六畫曲而附於旁，為其成文耳」。

按「韭」為菜類之一，其葉為包裹冒出，故小篆特繪兩旁包裹之形。今隸楷橫出則不類矣。

米 粟實也，象禾實之形也。

王筠云：「米之形本難象，故字不甚明豁。四點米也，十則聊為界畫耳，凡凌雜之物，皆此形也」。

按契金文皆象米粒瑣碎縱橫之狀，蓋米形難象，故中或設一畫以象籠，小篆則設十略為界劃，繪形之意皆同也。

朋 神鳥也。古文鳳，象形。鳳飛，群鳥從以萬數。

按「朋」為鳳之古文，契金文原始即繪鳥形，然無由見其為神鳥。後或加「凡」為聲，古文之形乃設為群鳥從飛之形以見意。後又或加鳥作「鵬」，遂歧為三字。

互 可以收繩者也，象形，中象人手可推握。

按「互」本象收繩之器，中為「乚」即交互纏結之繩形。上下兩畫乃所以絞結，即收繩也，乃設形以繪，後為相互之義所專，遂加竹作「筮」以復之。許慎以「互」為「筮」之省作，原始正相反也。


第二節 實形圖象

宇宙客觀實形，雖可通過視覺以見，然其形或變化無定，或難實繪，落實於文字，不得不通過理念以圖其象。此與實物之直接繪形稍異其趣矣，細分之亦有多類。

(甲)通象圖象


實形雖出客觀，但其象則需融通其共同性。例如：

云 山川氣也，象回轉之形。

按「云」乃自然界習見之形，而形本身千變萬化，一般言皆橫空迴旋。壁中古文之最古者作，即圖其通象矣。後演為「云」，形遂隱晦。加「雨」作「雲」，則以轉注復其本義也。


气(乞) 雲气也。象形。

饒炯云：「气之形與云同，但析言之，則山川初出者為气，升於天者為云。合觀之，則气乃雲之散蔓，云乃气之濃歛」。

按气之形無定，以「云」之古體例之原始當作，圖畫其通象也。

申 神也。七月陰气成，體自申東，从白自持也。

按「申」為電之本字。契金文下及石鼓，皆作屈曲閃電之形，蓋電為空中陰陽激耀，有形而多變，故古文皆圖其屈折閃耀之通象。小篆形義皆失，遂加「雨」作，今隸遞變，莫由知其本矣。

雨 水從雲下也。一象天，一象雲，水霽其間也。古文。

按「雨」之本形為水滴。壁中古文於雨滴之上圖象天幕，其義乃明。契金文形製繁多，要皆圖天幕通象於其上，雨滴則無定。小篆以下定為四點，而「天」與「雲」之通幕則隱晦不明矣。

(乙)定象圖象

自然界之「云」「气」「申」「雨」等因形繁多，故不得不融通其象以圖之。大地之「田」、「阜」、「泉」、「行」形亦不一，亦必需定其形象以畫之。

厂 山石之厓巖，人可居，象形。

饒炯云：「案山石之厓巖謂山邊，人可居謂厓巖有穴可居人」。

王筠云：「左之斗絕者山也，上之橫覆者厓也。土山不能橫出，故曰山石之厓巖。」

按原始人類穿山穴居，後乃鑿石山嵌空而居，此「厂」即從側面圖其定型。

田 陳也。象形。□十，阡陌之制也。

饒炯云：「田為樹穀之地，鱗次比列，阡陌相聯，封畛溝洫有條不紊，故曰陳也。」

按田畝之形必有阡陌田界，而大小參差。契金文以下特著方正，中有介劃以定其象以畫之。

泉 水原也。象水流出成川形。

王筠云：「上半象泉，下半似川字，要是全體象形，非从川也」。

按契金文「泉」字兩型，一象從地底噴出形，一象從石穴流出涓涓形。小篆定形於石穴之流出，而下體譌似川。今隸作白水，失其朔矣。

行 人之步趨也。从彳于。

羅振玉云：「行象四達之衢，人所行也」。

按道路之形難畫，蓋大小曲直非一也。而四通之十字路可以定一其類型。故契金文象之。小篆譌變，許慎說解其形義皆失之矣。

(丙)造象圖象

人間萬物雖皆有形，然落實於文字之圖繪，有時不得不根據事理加以造作以圖其象。例如：
阜 大陸，山無石者，象形。

按契金文略如小篆。戴侗云：「山之岡隴坡陀下陟者也」。王筠亦云：「蓋如畫坡陀者然，層層相重累也」。然此皆據後出之體，不足以溯其初，原始應側倒，畫其山坡層層下陟。契金文以下並豎立，如「車」「目」之例，不足以迹其本矣。

羽 鳥長毛也。象形。

饒炯云：「鳥長毛者，謂鳥翹之長毛也」。

按鳥翹之長毛可以全形精繪，然落實於文字則取疊兩羽以圖其象。契金文以下皆如此作，與本形稍有異矣。

瓜 瓠也。象形。

按瓜之種類極多，或長或短，或圓或扁，或結於枝，或依於藤。此則畫藤蔓外披，中瓜實長垂，造象以圖其象也。

糸 細絲也。象束絲之形。

絲 蠶所吐也。从二糸。

徐灝云：「蠶所吐爲糸，糾合以成絲，故从二糸」。


按蠶所吐細絲爲直而長，肉眼難辨，故造成把捲曲之形。原始應卽「幺」字。或端緒上下出，卽糸之所由也。絲則其複體，實際同爲一字，皆造作之象。契金文「幺」「糸」「絲」無別，可以迹其本矣。


(丁)設象圖象

宇宙萬物或有形，而形難圖繪。或無形，而理可推設。古人落實於文字卽設象以圖之。例如

鬼 人所歸爲鬼，从人，象鬼頭。鬼陰氣賊害，从厶，禩古文从示。

按「鬼」之爲物，神秘幽眇不可得而見。以意度之，當與人別，所不同者唯其頭之惡耳。故特著其首，下則人形也。契金文或跪或立，或作女人形，意無別也。後又或增附「示」以見意。小篆以下改从「厶」，以見陰厶賊害。壁中古文兼而有之。原始蓋設爲設象之圖也。

井 八家一井，象構韓形，之象也。

按井爲汲井，鑿地取水也，雖有形，而形難象，故特設四韓交構之形以畫之。契金文或加中點以示汲水之。卽小篆之所由出也。今隸已省中點，仍與原始契金文同。

巴 蟲也。或曰食象蛇也。象形。

饒炯云：「象其侈口突目形」。

按山海經云：「巴蛇食象。三歲而出其骨」。則「巴」乃神活中之巨蟒，以意度之，必巨首廣身而奇長。然身與長難畫。落於文字，特設爲巨首以畫之。自小篆以下似已難迹其初矣。

玉 石之美有五德。象三玉之連。一其貫也。

段玉裁云：「貫謂如璧有紐，聘圭有繫」。

按「玉」爲石之美者，有形而難象，古者以玉爲貨幣，故取五玉而以小繩貫之。契金文猶存其迹。後或省爲三。繫繩之緒亦不貫出，卽小篆之所本，蓋皆設形以畫也。今隸又加點乃有瑕疵之意，與初文異。

第二章 象形文字取象原理

文字源於圖繪，則象形文字取象原理必然與繪畫原理直接有關，但文字功能兼及客觀的通情達意。所以其取象原理更需通過人類共同認知，落實說卽人類知性。分述如下：

第一節 內在知性原理

文字的功能建立在主觀的表情顯意和客觀的通情達意的基礎上，因此它的取象原則是：

(甲)取最常見之形

宇宙事物瞬息多變，外顯之形隨之移易，卽日常所見亦不一致，故象形文字之形必取其最常見。例如：

月 闕也。太陰之精。象形。

王筠云：「月圓時少，闕時多。故作上下弦時形也」。

按契金文「月」字，皆作上下弦時之象，無有作渾圓之形者。蓋月最常見爲闕，「日」則相反。故一取其圓，一取其闕。埃及古文及克雷特文莫不皆然，正所謂人同此心也。

目 人眼，象形，重童子也。

按許說「重童子」，係據小篆構體而誤釋。人之童子常見皆單，重童子之形，代不一見。

契金文並畫眼珠，中一瞳子。演變爲篆而豎作，瞳子以二橫畫代之，致有此誤也。

衣 依也。上曰衣，下曰裳。象覆二人之形。

徐灝云：「上爲曲領，左右象袂，中象交衽。此象形文明白無可疑者，許君蓋偶未審耳」。

按上服曰衣，契金文構形亦多。篆象襟衽左右掩覆，蓋取最常見之形也。

皿 飯食之用器也。象形。

段玉裁據篆爲說云：「上象其能容，中象其體，下象其底也」。

按「皿」爲飯食之器，形非一種，契金文以下皆有容有體有較附，取最常見之形也。今隸譌變則無由見其本形矣。

(乙)取最獨特性質

宇宙萬物各有其獨特性質，象形文字通過人們共同知性特取著其形。例如：

火 燬也，南方之行。炎而上，象形。

王肅云：「火之性炎盛而升上」。

按火性特殊，焰皆上升。凡繪火，焰必上騰。契金文猶存此象。小篆稍有譌變，左右光焰離立，然上騰之迹仍可見也。

水 準也。北方之行。象衆水並流形。

饒炯云：「象衆水並流，中象深處，波濤平易，渾然流行之形。兩旁象淺處，波濤洶湧，時斷時連之形」。

按契金文並象水流蜿蜒曲折自上而下奔流之形，蓋水性必向低處流也。

(丙)取合人情所樂見

宇宙萬物之形，通過視覺予人不同感受，尤以人類之表情為然。象形文字之原始即重視人情樂見之取象。例如：

口 人所以言食也。象形。


段玉裁云：「言語飲食者口之兩大端」。

饒炯云：「篆象口唇閉而兩角上侈之形」。

按口之形極易表現人類喜怒之情，凡人怒憎則口閉而兩角下垂，喜樂則口微張而兩角上侈。契金文均取此象，今隸以下並失其意矣。

百（首） 頭也。象形。

徐灝云：「此篆下象口，中畫象頭，上直畫象鼻莖，左右曲象面顴。首之形略具矣」。

按首之形原始當於面繪目與口之形。而目之上翹或下垂最能顯示「凶狠」或「和善」之相。金文多存目形，後世學者據篆為說，多有未洽。以意度之，古當作，篆已譌變，今隸更不可說矣。

(丁)取合社會之禮俗

社會禮俗之影響文字之構形，會意字最為明顯，原始象形圖繪亦有多見。例如：

女 婦人也。象形。

孔廣居云：「象側立頰首，斂手曲膝，柔順事人之象也」。

饒炯云：「象柔媚婉弱，與臣象屈伏同意。謂女貴貞節，常兩手相掩，斂膝靜坐」。


按男女之形，人皆能見，落實於文字之圖繪則頗不易顯。據契金文「女」字構形，皆為側跪而兩手交疊之形。故一般多從貞靜柔婉之禮教釋之，又或以為古者掠婚，女字象兩手被縛踞地之形。兩說皆可通，要皆取合社會之禮俗也。

臣 牽也。事君也。象屈服之形。

徐鍇云：「莊子曰擊踞曲拳，人臣之事也。稽顙服之甚也，肉袒服之盡也，故於文臣象人屈服之狀也」。

按「臣」字構形，自來說解皆未得其當。許君「象屈服之形」，溯其初證原可以通，後世乃就人形全體為釋，則牽強不能達矣。據契金文「臣」皆為目字之側書。今「臥」、「監」等字皆从「臣」作，而皆為俯首垂視之象，蓋古代戰俘之馴服者也。戰俘之凶頑者或刺瞎其目，即「民」字之所出，而恭謹馴服者，乃圖側目以示俯首垂視，此乃據禮俗以繪形也。

(戊)凸顯最有代表性部份

宇宙萬物多有通象，亦有異構。如「象」之與，特在首之不同耳。象形文字之圖繪多凸顯此具有代表性之部份也。例如：

馬 怒也。武也。象馬頭髮尾四足之形。

饒炯云：「象其昂頭怒目揚尾奮鬣展行之形」。

按馬字之圖繪，自契金文以下雖有變異，然皆具馬頭髮尾之形，一見即可辨其為馬也。董作賓以為古人制作動物字通例為：「略圖全形，抽象特點。故馬之鬣鬃、牛羊之角、虎之口，皆特著此代表之形以顯之。」

象 長牙鼻南越大獸。三年一乳，象耳牙四足之形。

按金文且辛鼎仍繪象之全形，即長鼻、長牙、豐首巨身與尾之真象。後乃逐漸簡化，然其廓郭仍凸顯其長鼻牙，蓋象之異於他物者即此之代表也。篆文之上體爲長鼻、長牙之迹遂爲人忽略矣。今隸更難以溯其本始矣。

第二節 外在藝術原理

文字源於圖繪。象形文字之構形，除內在的知性原理，尤需依據外在藝術原理。因此它第二類取象原則是：

(甲)取正面之形

宇宙萬物之形由於觀察角度不同，而有不同形象，落實於文字則需把握顯現其形之難易，一般物形多取其正面。例如：

自 鼻也。象鼻形。

白 此亦自字也。

饒炯云：「自即鼻之古文，外象鼻體。上兩歧象額理，中兩畫象額理」。

按「自」即象人鼻正面視之之形。鼻上紋理多少無定，故兩字實不別也。

艸 百卉也。从二山。

高鴻縉云：「按山字象形。作艸者應是複體」。

按「艸」象百卉正面視之之形。山字亦然，蓋百卉面面皆同，古圖繪皆正視也。

(乙)取側面之形

凡物之正面可以圖繪，然落實於文字每以側面爲便易。例如：

鳥 長尾禽總名也。象形。

隹 鳥之短尾總名也。象形。

段玉裁云：「短尾名隹，長尾名鳥。析言則然，渾言則不別也」。

饒炯云：「案鳥與隹皆禽之總名。古文無分。後乃有長尾短尾之別，故从隹之字多从鳥。从鳥之字多从隹也」。

按契金文「鳥」「隹」不別。並象禽獸側面圖繪之形。

犬 狗之有縣颯者也。象形。

徐鍇云：「颯足趾高象。犬之長體垂耳也」。

徐灝云：「按犬象形，橫視之絕肖。故曰視犬之字如畫狗也」。

按原始圖繪，犬象狗張口翹尾側面形。契金文豎畫則便於書刻也，凡動物如虎彪等莫不皆然。

(丙)取切面之形

凡物之圖繪，落實於文字僅外形不足以顯者，或外形難以圖象者，則取其切面以明之。例如：

凵 張口也。象形。

朱駿聲云：「一說坎也。塹也。象地穿，凶字从此」。

饒炯云：「按其音，則凵又當爲坎之古文」。

按「凵」象地塌陷之坑。故「凶」从之，而訓「惡也」。平視無可象，故取切面象之。「

「冎」字亦正从此象也。

肉 載肉。象形。

徐鍇云：「肉無可取象，故象其爲載肉」。

饒炯云：「案篆象載肉平面之形。中乃肉之紋理。以生肉難象，取狀於載。與血同意」。

按「載」爲切肉，而肥瘦相間最易識，故字取切面以顯之。

又今隸之「凹」「凸」，其取形之理亦同。

(丁)取俯視之形

凡物之形有不能平視側視或切面者，或取俯視則明矣。例如：

因 就也。从口大。

朱駿聲云：「按口大俱非誼。江氏永曰象茵褥之形。中象縫線文理。按即茵之古文，江說是也。席篆古文作廡，蓋从因尸象形」。

按契金文並象茵褥，中乃縫線之理。古「宿」字亦正从此。蓋俯視之形也。

川 貫穿通流水也。虞書曰澮く距川。言深く之水，會爲川也。

王筠云：「象長流之形」。

羅振玉據契文爲說，云：「象有畔岸，而水在中」。

按契金並有兩作，一象滔滔長流，一象兩畔有岸而大水流其中，蓋皆取俯視之形也。

(戊)取仰觀之形

凡物有在高空出現者，古圖繪文字即取象仰觀之形。例如：

晶 精光也。从三日。

徐灝云：「晶卽星星之象形文。故「晶」「晶」字从之」。

按「星」之形爲點點閃耀于高空。原始仰觀即以數點象之，遞變爲三小圓圈，又或注點于中，卽「晶」字所由出也。落實於文字易與三「日」混，故又加「生」爲別之。今則省爲「星」，罕有朔本矣。

飛 鳥翥也。象形。

段玉裁云：「象舒頸展翅之狀」。

王筠云：「直刺上飛之狀，不見足也」。

按「飛」象鳥奮翅高翔，人仰觀之，僅見其張展兩翅而隱約其首之形。

(己)取重複之形

凡物之形有分之可單，合之可複，初無二義。如山屮屮屮，嚴格言之皆屮也。古圖繪文字之取形，亦有取其重複者。例如：

竹 冬生屮也。象形。

王筠云：「蓋竹葉異於他物，其形左右紛披。篆文象在上之葉」。

饒炯云：「竹爲屮類，凌冬不凋，故云冬生屮。象竹兩旁對枝葉形」。

按「竹」爲兩片竹葉形。金文分立。契文聯貫。篆文蓋由金文出也。葉本一片，此則取重複之形。

二水也。

王筠云：「蓋林卽水之異文。凡疊二成文者如𣎵、𣎵、𣎵、𣎵等字，皆當與本字無異」。

按古圖繪一水二水多通用，如流^ㄅ、涉^ㄅ、^ㄅ次。則「水」乃取水重複之形，故意義皆不別也。

^淼 三泉也。

饒炯云：「案說解云三泉也。夫就部屬^泉从^水，重文原从泉觀之，則^淼亦泉之重文。例如共籀文以三崑，乃籀文从三乃之比」。

按古圖繪多取複體如虫^𧈧、七比之例。則^淼應即取泉重複之形也。

第三章 象形文字之演變

文字爲人類生活的重要工具，隨著生活的進步而提高其重要度，也由於文字的重要性不斷提高，文字本身也就逐漸演變以適應。除了涵義的逐漸擴伸，讀音的不斷歧分，最重要的形構也向多面遞變。以今天通用的隸楷言，即使孔子復生，辨認也十分困難。

尤其是象形文字，它直接源於圖繪，隨着時代的發展，人類生活文明的提昇，形制的變化也最大，即以「書寫方式」言，今天「日」「月」兩字對照原始圖繪，也是迥然莫由知其同本矣。至於「實質內容」，其演變更是多面。綜觀古今，分別縷述如下：

第一節 演變爲複體

文字的「書寫方式」，其演變途徑爲由繁而簡，但文字的「實質內容」，基於各種因素必然由簡而繁。如數字之由「一」而「弌」，又段以「壹」，即其明證。象形文字之演變，其理亦同，細分之又可析爲各型。

(甲)增複顯形。例如：

^鬲 鼎屬。象腹交文三足。

^鬲 (^鬲) 鬲也。古文亦鬲字。象孰飪五味气上出也。

段玉裁云：「鬲^鬲本一字。鬲專象器形。故其屬多謂器。^鬲兼象孰飪之气，故其屬皆謂孰飪」。

按「鬲」爲小形之鼎。金文多見，其形宛然。小篆譌變爲三截，無由溯其本矣。「鬲」則爲其複體，原始應作「鬲」，上象孰飪气之冒出，後乃譌附於兩旁，失其誼矣。今隸「鬲」字即由此省，非弓矢之「弓」也。

^葉 楸也。葉薄也。从木，世聲。

^葉 艸木之葉也。从艸，葉聲。

吳大澂說文古籀補據金文齊子仲銅確認：「葉，古葉字。象木之有枝葉也」。

容庚云：「葉，孳乳爲葉」。

按契金文皆於木上標識記號，即「葉」之所由出也。原始圖繪本畫枝上葉形。後乃簡化。篆文以下譌爲「世」，許君說解遂歧爲兩字。實則「葉」由「葉」孳乳，增複以顯其形也。

此外如「子」之於「孳」，「頁」之於「眷」，其理皆同。而「虜」與「虎」，「聿」與「聿」，許君亦未能迹其本。

(乙)增複定形。例如：

^手 辨別也。象獸指爪分別也。

番 獸足謂之番。从𠂔，田象其掌。

徐灝云：「𠂔象獸指爪，中四點：其體，十其分理也。直畫微屈以別於米粟字耳。引申爲辨別之義」。又云：「𠂔番古今字。番蹠亦古今字」。

朱駿聲云：「按此番字，實卽𠂔之異文也」。

按「𠂔」爲獸足之象形文，踐於田野則其形可顯，故或增田以定其形，是「𠂔」「番」實爲一字。此由「審」「審」同字可證知矣。許君偶不察乃歧爲二，不知辨別之訓義正獸足之引申也。

𦏧 所以籛者也。象形。

其 籛文。

箕 小篆。

羅振玉云：「其形字初但作𦏧，後增丌，後又加竹作箕。許君錄後起之箕字而附諸形於箕下者，以當時通用之字爲主也」。

按籛箕之原始圖繪卽圖其形。契金文猶存其制，後於增支架，契金文形制非一，卽籛文「其」之所由出也。小篆增竹作箕，明其爲竹器，增複以定之也。

此外如「蜀」之原始作𧈧，契金文並可證。而「厶」之於「女」，理亦一貫。

(丙)增複強義 例如：

畷 耕治之田也。象耕屈之形。

𦏧 小篆。从田。

王筠云：「凡既耕既耜之後，田之文理詰屈正如畷字。古文畷字象形。小篆加田以表之耳」。

按契金文並象耕治之田及其溝涂屈曲之形，或嫌形義欠明，乃增複「田」字以強調其意也。

它 虫也。从虫而長，象冤曲垂尾形。

蛇 或體从虫。

饒炯云：「案它而訓虫，殆以重文爲說解。但同爲象形，而一畫其曲，一象其舒。然則分爲二義。或篆以虫从它，又合二體爲一字。皆後世複體而形取茂密者也」。

羅振玉云：「案它與虫殆爲一字，後人誤析爲二，又並二字而爲蛇，尤重複無理」。

按「虫」爲蛇類爬蟲，象蜿蜒冤曲之形。它則特著其首之異，疑爲蛇類中之異種，或卽所謂眼鏡蛇也。故上古艸居患它，相問無它。或體增複「虫」字，乃強調其義也。

此外如「戶」與「屎」、「卜」與「𠂔」、「𠂔」與「稟」與「廩」，其增複之理皆可尋繹也。

(丁)增複復義 例如：

來 周所受瑞麥來麩，一來二縫，象芒束之形。天所來也。故爲行來之來。

麥 芒穀。秋種厚埋。故謂之麥。從來，有穗者也。从夂。

秣 齊謂之麥秣。从禾，來聲。

徐灝云：「按來本麥名。廣雅曰大麥麩也，小麥麩也，是也。古來麥字祇作來。段借爲行來之來，後爲借義所專，別作麥秣。而來之本義廢矣」。

按「來」卽「麥」「秣」之象形文。契金文形制宛然。後借爲行來往來，乃增「夂」或「

禾」以復之。許君析爲三字，未察其本始矣。

求 皮衣也。象形。古文。

裘(裘) 小篆，从衣，求聲。

段玉裁云：「(求)此本古文裘字。後加衣爲裘，而求專爲干請之用」。

徐灝云：「求裘古今字，因求借爲干求，故加衣作裘」。

按契金文「求」字多見，原始即繪皮衣之象，後世「求」義他段，乃增衣以復其義。

勿 州里所建旗，象其柄有三游。雜帛幅半異所以趣民，故遽稱勿勿。

旄 或从旡。

按「勿」爲原始象形字，因爲段借所移義。後乃增「旡」以復之。

又按此類古今字其例至多。如「尢」與「尢」、「主」與「炷」、「申」與「電」等皆是也。

第二節 演變爲指事

文字由圖繪而演進，其途徑變化紛歧繁多，後世「六書」乃漢代學者歸納小篆構形原理之大類。各書內容並無絕對之界定，尤其「象形」「指事」兩書皆出於「形」，所謂「依類象形」之文是也。一般言之，象形之「形」爲實形，指事之「形」爲虛象。然虛實之間亦非絕對，尤其古代圖繪與小篆之構體既多差異，而訓義之取向，亦不一致。故「象形」「指事」之認定，每有不同，然由「象形」而「指事」之遞變，仍可跡其理也。

(甲)段實形以指事 例如：

高 崇也。象臺觀之形。

徐灝云：「按高非臺觀之名，乃爲崇高之義，而取於臺觀，造字有此一例」。

按契金文與小篆同。皆象崇樓高屋之形。蓋樓臺之實形，而訓義不取實而取虛。所謂「視而可識，察而見意」，乃變象形爲指事矣。

夕 莫也。从月半見。

徐鍇云：「月字之半也。月初生則暮見西方，故半月爲夕」。

段玉裁云：「莫者，日且冥也，日且冥而月且生矣。故字从月半見」。

按「月」本象太陰之缺，原始圖繪「月」「夕」無別。契金文亦然。月初生隱約其形，後即以爲暮時之稱。小篆乃特爲之別，由實形而虛象矣。

大 屈也。从大。象形。

按契金文並象人走時兩臂上下揮擺之形。嚴格言之，仍爲人之實形。唯兩臂揮擺，必屈其肱，故訓義爲屈，段實形而訓虛義也。小篆改爲側首垂臂，形雖略變而理固同也。

大 天大地大人亦大。故大象人形。

王筠云：「大小是其本義，而難爲象也。天大地大人亦大，故借人形以指之」。

按契金文「大」象人張臂正立之形，段人形之體態以示大小之意。由象形變入指事，理至顯然。

(乙)設具象以指事 例如：

齊 禾麥吐穗上平也。象形。

徐灝云：「禾麥在地，彌望皆平。物之至齊者也。故造象取焉。小篆參差，取書勢可觀耳。」

按據契金文原始圖繪乃依禾麥吐穗上平之理，設三枝平齊以明其意。因不便書，後乃遞變爲參差之象。小篆以下變其形。楷書更無以迹其本矣。

七 變也。从到人。

段玉裁云：「人而倒，變七之意也」。

饒炯云：「篆从人反而到之。蓋人反常已爲非類，又从而到之，尤見其誼爲變異矣」。

按人在實際生活中並無此反倒形體，而人間變化之事多有，乃設此象以見意耳。

凡 疾飛也。从飛而羽不見。

段玉裁云：「飛而羽不見者，疾之甚也。此亦象形」。

饒炯云：「凡卽迅之古文。其从飛省者，造字遠取諸物也。蓋迅疾之事凡物皆有，情亦難狀。唯飛較疾，而飛不見羽則尤疾」。

按疾迅之義難狀，乃設鳥翥翔疾飛之首以達「識而可識，察而見意」之義也。

片 判木也。从半木。

王筠云：「木字象形。木可分半也。而字之形不可分半也。木以上出者爲枝葉，下注者爲木根，而片以成焉」。

按「片」乃人爲設具之象，以見破木之意，嚴格言之僅去枝根之半，未剖分其榦。此乃造字而非真實之圖繪，非實物之形，乃心意之象也。

第三節 演變爲會意

象形文字之原始乃圖繪實物，而會意乃「此類合誼以見指搃」。功能之基礎迥異，故象形演變爲會意，大都爲書寫譌變，訓釋未諳，正確之例實不多見也。

(甲) 構形實際演變 例如：

く 水小流也。廣只深尺謂之く。

𠂔 古文从田从川，畎，篆文く。从田犬聲。

桂馥云：「詩節南山正義云匠人注云壟中曰𠂔。則𠂔是壟中小水之名」。

按「く」爲象形文。象小水涓涓蜿蜒之形。古文从田从川則爲會意。小篆从田犬聲，則爲形聲矣。今隸又作圳。

癸 冬時水土平可揆度也。象水從四方流入地中之形。癸承壬，象人足。

癸 籀文以𠂔，从矢。

戴侗云：「癸鼎文作𠂔，書云一人冕，執獸，殆似三歧矛，借爲壬癸之癸」。

按前人已考定癸之原始象三鋒矛立地之形。上象三鋒，下爲柄著地。小篆譌變，許君又以段借之義申釋，無以溯其本矣。籀文以𠂔从矢，則遞變爲會意矣。


契文畢。

畢 田罔也。从革，象畢形微也。或曰田聲。

羅振玉云：「卜辭諸字正象罔形，下有柄，卽許君所謂象畢形之革也。但篆文改交錯之網爲平直相當。于初形已失，後人又加田，于是象形遂爲會意。

按「畢」原始爲田網，所以捕獲小動物者。圖繪之形宛然。漢畫象刻石猶存其真。契文亦然。金文加田，遂遞變爲會意矣。

𧈧 蟬也。狀似蟲。籀文，从虫从申。申，電也。虹小篆，从虫，工聲。

按虹之原始即圖繪橫空之蜺蜺。契文作, 猶存其形誼。籀文演變為艸, 乃會意。蓋其形蜿蜒而長, 故从虫, 橫空而閃光, 故从申, 申即原始「電」之象形文也。

(2) 構形說解譌變 例如：

声 虎文也。象形。

虎 山獸之君。从声, 虎足象人足, 象形。

段玉裁以為虎乃从声从儿, 會意。

王筠云：「先有虎而後有虎文之声。豈可謂虎从声, 且虎足豈象人足哉！」

按契金文「声」「虎」本一字, 原始圖繪繁簡有異耳, 至小篆乃歧為二形, 而許君之訓義未述其本, 一為象形, 一為會意耳。

兀 高而上平也。从一在人上。


元 始也。从一从兀。

陳柱釋元云：「元从人二。人之上為元, 元者首也。僖三十三年左傳狄人歸其元。孟子滕文公下勇士不忘喪其元是也。兀下云高而上平也。从一在人上。今以古文上皆作一, 篆文皆作二例之。則元兀當為一字」。

林義光云：「兀蓋與元同字, 首也。从人, 一記其首處, 與天同意」。


按「元」「兀」二字以「天」之契金文證之。原始圖繪為畫側面人形而特著其首。金文齊危壺「天」上之首即演變為「二」矣。故「元」「兀」自是同字, 原始並畫人側立巨首。而「二」「一」並為上字。音讀亦不應有異。總而言之, 「元」「兀」原始為象形, 譌變為會意也。

向 北出牖也。从宀从口。詩曰塞向墮戶。

徐灝云：「古者前堂後室。室之前為牖, 後為向。故曰北出牖。古鐘文作, 象形」。

按契金文並象窗牖之形。小篆譌變為从宀从口, 許慎據以說形, 非其朔也。

中 內也。从口丨, 上下通也。

按契金文作, 明象旌旗, 其旂飄偃之形。古代部落立旌旗於域中, 引申乃有「內」、「正」之義。後世省其旂, 形遂不顯。許君據篆為說, 遂遞變為「會意」!

第四節 演變為形聲

文字三要素為「形」「音」「義」。始於「義」, 而終於「形」。而「音」則為任何文字發展之主力。任何文字的發展必需結合語音才能根植堅強生命活力。所以漢文字的發展軌跡, 形聲字的比例一直不斷提高。新製的文字固然以形聲為主流, 原有的「象形」「指事」亦乘機變入形聲。至其內容可分述如下：

(甲) 增附聲旁者 例如：

角 獸角也。象形。

觜 雉舊頭上角觜也。从角, 此聲。

按原始獸角與羽族之嘴, 皆為圖繪, 而兩者構形酷似而易混。詩經行露篇「誰謂雀無角」

。「角」即「嘴」之原始象形文也。後乃加「此」為聲以別。小篆以下變為形聲。許君未辨識契金古體, 亦無由溯其本矣。

𦉳 庖犧所結繩以漁, 从冂, 下象网交文。

罔 或从亡。

徐灝云：「罔象形。其形略，故又作罔，从亡聲。」

按契金文並象網形。即小篆所由出也。因形不足顯，後乃加「亡」為聲旁。今習用又加「糸」旁。

尢 尫也。从大，象偏曲之形。

篆文从𠂔。

徐鍇云：「尫，一足跛曲也。」

按「尫」原始即繪人一足跛曲之形，因形不顯，後乃加「𠂔」為聲旁，今隸又譌為「王」聲。

此外如今隸「犬狗」、「豕豬」等，皆其例也。

(乙)改制形聲者 例如：

鳥 雛也。象形。

雛 篆文以佳音。

段玉裁云：「謂鳥即雛字。此以今字釋古字之例。古文作鳥。小篆作雛。」

按金文鳥尊即繪「鳥」形。後世形不足顯，乃以「昔」為聲。即小篆所由出。今習作「鵠」，又改為从鳥昔聲。

市 鞞也。上古衣蔽前而已。市以象之。

鞞 篆文从韋，从𠂔（聲）。

高鴻緝云：「市，象形字。後世以其為衣也，作袂。以其為絲製也，作紱。又以其為革製也，作鞞作鞞。」

按金文多見，原始皆象人蔽前之帶。後乃改以形聲字作。小篆从韋，𠂔聲。

岳 東岳。三者之所以巡狩所至。古文，象高形。

嶽 从山，獄聲。

按岳之原始即繪山嶺重巒之形。古文猶存其迹。小篆以下改為「嶽」，从山，獄聲。遂遞變為形聲字矣。今兩字並通行。

(丙)誤為形聲者 例如：

宮 室也。从宀，躬省聲。

段玉裁云：「按說宮謂从宀呂會意亦無不合。宀繞其外，呂居其中也。呂者脊骨也，居人身之中者也。」

徐灝云：「鐘鼎文字屢見。皆从二口，不从呂。疑室有窗牖之形。」

羅振玉云：「从呂，从口象有數室之狀。从口象此室達于彼室之狀。皆象形也。說文解字謂从躬省聲，誤以象形為形聲矣。」

按契金文明為圖繪居室之形。羅振玉據契文之構形為說，至確。

穴 土室也。从宀，八聲。

朱駿聲云：「按象嵌空之形，非八字。」

按上古巢居穴處，金文偏旁正象土室鑿空形。原始蓋象形。至小篆譌為从宀从八。許慎又以為「八」聲。則以象形為形聲矣。

第四章 象形文字之構形內容

象形文字直接源於圖繪，是人類文字的始基，也是漢文字傳統六書的第一書。而它的取象原理却已融入高度的人文精神。隨着生活的進步，文字構形必然有各種變化。早期象形文字為適應社會需要，即有部份變入他書，凡此種種，從理論到實際，前三章已全面深入論析，最後則需綜論象形文字的構形內容。

象形文字構形內容是客觀的事實，研究的分類則是主觀的歸納。自來學者並不一致，落實於個別構形的認定，亦有很大出入，所以象形文字分類迄無定論。段玉裁注說文解字，分為「獨體」與「合體」兩大類，其言曰：

「有獨體之象形，有合體之象形。獨體如日月水火是也。合體者从某而又象其形。如眉从目，而以厂象其形。衰从衣，而以𠂔象其形是也。獨體之象形則成字可讀。駘於从某者，不成字不可讀。會意則兩體皆成字，故與此別」。

根據象形文字之取象及演變之原理與徑途。段氏之分類殊嫌疏略。王筠說文釋例則分「正例」與「變例」兩種。而正例又依對象析為「天地」、「人類」、「動物」、「植物」及「衣服器械屋宇」等五類。變例則析為十類。迹其實際，非惟煩瑣無義，辨析亦欠精當。近人朱宗萊文字學形義篇又綜為三例，即：純象形；合體象形；變體象形。茲融貫其淵源演變，以小篆為準，綜合前人論說，析為四類，仁智各見，不必以求絕對也。

第一節 獨體象形

象形文字之原始大都為獨體，除前舉之「日」「月」「山」「水」、「云」「气」「申」「雨」、「山」「韭」「米」「瓜」、「糸」「絲」「衣」「皿」、「口」「自」「首」「女」等習見之外，仍有其他。例如：

人 天地之性最貴者也。象臂脛之形。

儿 仁人也。古文奇字人也。象形。

卩 瑞信也。象相合之形。

容庚云：「此三字實為一字。人象人側立之形，卩象人踞伏之形。儿則其筆畫小異者也」。

按人形之圖繪，正面為「大」為「天」，側面立形為「人」為「儿」為「兀」為「元」，踞形為「卩」。契金文「人」「儿」「卩」仍不別。許君據小篆分為三，訓義亦非其朔矣。

耳 主聽也。象形。

徐灝云：「象耳輪郭及竅之形」。

按契金文皆取耳輪外郭之形，左右亦不別也。小篆以下則取左耳之形矣。

又 手也。象形。手之列多，略不過三也。

徐灝云：「篆手腕及指側視之形。側視故若三指」。

按人之手形有多作。「ナ」「又」專象左右手之側視形。「手」專象正面豎立形。「爪」「𠂔」專象左右掌下張形。後世乃歧為五字。

止 下基也。象艸木出有址。故以止為足。

王筠云：「許君大誤矣。止者趾之古文也。上象足指，下象足跟。一引申為行止，再引申

爲止物。若基址自以阼址爲正」。

按原始圖繪卽畫足掌之形。契金文已簡化爲輪郭。小篆再變，非其朔矣。

牛 大牲也。象角頭三封尾之形。

按原始圖繪當牛全形。今所見三代吉金文存牛首形鼎已簡爲牛頭之形。至契金文更簡化爲象徵性之符號矣。小篆卽由此出，應爲象兩角兩耳牛面之形。

魚 水蟲也。象形。魚尾與燕尾相似。

饒炯云：「案魚爲水蟲之總名。象頭身鱗尾之形。今篆斷其歧尾爲火，非也」。

按契金文魚字皆繪其全形。石鼓文之魚尾已譌作「火」形。小篆承之。魚之首亦稍改變，又省其鱗翅矣。

冊 符命也。象其札一長一短中有二編之形。

饒炯云：「古人小事書於方，大事書於冊。蓋竹削不編曰簡，編之曰冊。古者符命用冊敕臣，意蓋取此。其實冊本簡編通名」。

按契金文皆象竹簡貫編之形。簡數多寡則不定。小篆定爲五。今隸又減爲四也。

刀 兵也。象形。

饒炯云：「古刀柄有環。篆文上正象之。左象刀口，右象刀背。下象刀尖。今篆作兩歧者非也」。

按原始圖繪刀字畫全形。契金文已簡化爲象徵式筆劃。小篆承之。今隸偏旁作「刂」，益不似矣。

戶 護也。半門曰戶。象形。

門 聞也。从二戶。象形。

饒炯云：「案戶與門皆象形。而說解於戶云半門曰戶。門云从二戶，皆非許君書例，當是校閱旁注而誤入正解者。古人於室作戶，意在保貨藏。於塾作門，意在通內外。故戶以護爲音，門以聞爲音。聲在而義卽附焉耳」。

按契金文「戶」與「門」各自獨立象形。本是二物，不必云「半門曰戶」，「从二戶」也。

宀 交覆深屋也。象形。

段玉裁云：「古者屋四注。東西與南北皆交覆也。有堂有室是爲深屋。象兩下之形，亦象四注之形」。

按契金文與小篆並同。象屋宇正面視之形。

第二節 加體象形

象形文字或有僅形不足以顯者，古人造字乃加「他體」卽形體之其他部份以明之；或加「同類字」卽義類共同之字以顯之。例如：

(甲)加他體者

兒 頌儀也。从人。白象人面形。

徐鍇云：「頌，古容字。白非黑白字。直象人面。」

按人之容儀本作白，象人面形。上出者或爲冠帶，不足顯，加人（儿）以足之。今隸加豹省聲作「貌」。

朵 樹木垂朵朵，从木，象形。

徐鍇云：「今謂花爲一朵。亦取其下垂也。此下从木，其上几，但象其垂形」。

按許慎說文記疑「垂」當作𠂔，即「花」也。字本作「𠂔」即花朵之象形，不足顯，加他體木以足之。

朮 木芒也。象形。

徐灝云：「木芒謂枝莖所生刺也。从木建類，象形上當有从木二字」。

按木上芒刺多叢生左右出。契文繁簡不一。金文與小篆略同，芒刺木身不足顯，故加木以明之。

黍 木汁，可以蒸物。从木，象形。黍如水滴而下。

段玉裁云：「木汁名黍，因名其木曰黍，左右各三皆象汁自木出之形也。」

按「黍」本身象水滴形，左右三滴即其象也。不足以顯，故加木以明之。今字多借漆水之字爲之。

又 手足甲也。从又，象叉形。

徐灝云：「此字本象手甲。故从又。引申而兼足甲也」。

王筠云：「从又，手也。點象甲形」。

按康熙字典引云：「象其甲指端生形」。字本作點畫以象指甲形，不足顯，乃加他體「又」（手）以明之。

(2) 加同類字者

石 山石也。在厂之下。口象形。

徐灝云：「口象石形。其形略，故从厂」。

按「石」之本形當作「口」，此與凡畫外廓者易混，且與方圓或包圍之字亦難別，故加同類字「厂」以明之。

谷 口上阿也。从口，上象其理。啣，谷或如此。臙或从肉从肅。

徐灝云：「谷者口內上曲處，故曰口上阿。阿曲也。彡象其理。」

按篆文以「彡」象口上彎曲之紋理。不足顯，故加「口」以明之。

蜀 葵中蠶也。从虫，上目象蜀頭形。中象其身蛸。詩曰蛸者蜀。

按契金文爲獨體象形，上目即以象「蜀」之頭。古文字多以目代首，如「馬」及「冒」皆是也。下則象「蜀」身之蛸，後因形遞變而不足顯，篆乃加同類字「虫」以明之。俗又再復作「蠶」，則累贅不可以理說矣。

𡗗 璞也。从土，一屈象形。

段玉裁云：「𡗗之形略方，而體似無尾者，故从土，而象其形」。

按據篆文下屈象土塊形。不足顯，故加同類字「土」以明之。

霽 雨雪也。从雨，𠂔象霽形。詩曰霽雨其濛。

按霽之原始本象雨點下滴之形。雨滴之形易混他物，不足以顯爲雨滴也，故加同類字「雨」以足之。如「晶」、「云」、「申」之爲「雷」、「雲」、「電」，其理正同。

第三節 省變象形

象形文字之本形，或取以省略，或取以變易，以示爲物中之一形者皆屬之。雖爲數無多，仍

爲象形文字包容之一類也。

(甲)省形者

烏 孝鳥也。象形。

段玉裁云：「烏字點睛，烏則否。以純黑故不見其睛也」。

饒炯云：「烏篆象近視側面形。烏亦鳥，但純黑而難見其目，故从鳥而省其目以爲烏字」。按古金爲純獨體象形。然「烏」與「鳥」實難分別。故小篆即就「鳥」字省去其睛，以見爲純黑不辨其睛之「烏」。此係造字之形，非實際之形。「烏」固有睛也。

丂 伐木餘也。从木，無頭。

段玉裁云：「謂木禿其上，而僅餘根株也」。

按此字从木而省去其主幹。象木上禿之形，以見爲伐木之餘。

了 子無臂也。象形。

王筠云：「了子子皆从子省以見意。了無兩臂。子無右臂，子無左臂」。

按「子」原始圖繪象幼兒在襁褓中，兩臂外伸而足裏併之形。省兩臂爲「了」，省右臂爲「子」，省左臂爲「子」，皆造字想像之形，非習見有此事實也。

(乙)變形者

木 木之曲頭，止不能上也。

徐鍇云：「木方長，上碍於物而曲也」。

按此字係變木之主幹上彎曲，即曲頭之木也。曲頭之木即止而不能上長矣。此係造字之理，不必實有其物也。

交 交脛也。从大，象交形。

段玉裁云：「从大，而象其交脛之形」。

按「大」爲人正面張臂分腿挺立形。「交」則變其兩脛相交而立，即交脛而立之人也。

夂 傾頭也。从大，象形。

徐鍇云：「側頃其首也」。

按契金文與小篆同。並象人張腿伸臂傾頭之形。字由「大」出，故爲變體象形。

第四節 象形兼諧聲

象形文字源於圖繪，演爲文字，形或歧變而難明，故間有加聲旁以顯之者。如「角」加「此」爲聲作觥，「𠂔」加「亡」爲聲作「罔」，皆其例也。此外仍有：

壘（星） 萬物之精，上爲列星，从晶，生聲。

徐灝云：「晶卽星之象形文，因其形略，故又从生聲」。

按「晶」爲「星」之原始象形文，前賢多發其理。證以契金文，確無可疑。意其原始，應爲數點象繁星形，後簡化爲三小圈形，又或注其中，遂遞爲「晶」。因形不足顯，故加「生」爲聲。許君未能探溯其源，乃歧爲二字矣。

齒 口斷骨也。象口齒之形，止聲。𠂔 古文齒字。

段玉裁云：「𠂔者象形。餘口字也，古文獨體象形，不加聲旁」。

按契文直畫口中有齒之形，與古文略同。至篆文因口齒之形不足顯，故又加「止」爲聲。

主 鏡中火主也。从𠂔，象形，从灬，亦聲。

王筠云：「此字全體象形，其下爲鐙槃，上曲者爲鐙盃，則鐙炷也」。

按王氏所云，證以契文之形，可信。唯此字之音讀亦从形出也。

金 五色金也。生於土，从土。左右注象金在土中形。今聲。

徐灝云：「塊然之物無可取象。因其生於土，故从土。左右點象金在土中」。

按「金」乃土中金屬之總名。多爲塊狀，故以兩點畫象之，不足顯，乃加同類字「土」以明之，又加「今」聲，則爲加體象形兼諧聲也。

結 語

象形文字是人類文字的創始，也是我國傳統六書的第一書。由於它的構形原理單純，歷來研究天地，學者們的爭議也最少。正由於此，象形文字的「淵源」與「取象原理」，研究工作的深度與廣度，似都留下很多空白。至於它的「演變途徑」與內容更罕有人注意。一般研究重心多爲構形內容之分類。本文重心正欲彌補此種缺漏，就其「淵源」與「取象原理」，無論深度與廣度，皆作嘗試性探討尋繹。尤其文字本是人類文明生活的產物，隨着社會的進步而不斷演變。本文特列專章以明之，至於象形文字的構形分類，自來學者多已論列。仁智之見於「象形」本身必生影響。雖有補苴，並無創新。最大特點爲所有「例字」係經全面規劃，務求切合理論且不重複出現。唯一缺憾是古代圖繪未能以真形畫出。即契金籀篆，限於條件亦無法製版，幸而此等資料今極常見，且所引字例亦屬習用，可思而得。又著者前此已完成「指事」、「會意」、「形聲」、「轉注」、「假借」之研究。合此「象形」，傳統「六書」之內容，或可得以展現其精蘊矣。

Abstract

Human characters are derived from paintings, so hieroglyphics constitute the earliest development of Chinese characters.

This is also the reason why hieroglyphics have been regarded as the first script of the Six-Script forms. Any attempt to study Chinese characters must begin with hieroglyphics, especially the formal structure of these characters. This article is written in attempt to clarify the source and principle of hieroglyphics in depth. It also tries to summarize and syncretize various classification of the formal structure of this kind of characters. Beside, it also attempts to find out the principle and actuality the new type of hieroglyphics, which have been much ignored by scholars, were created.

「三朝北盟會編」中所見「水滸傳」之寫作素材

魏仲佑*

摘 要

「三朝北盟會編」爲一歷史實錄之書，編者以所收北宋徽、欽二朝及南宋高京朝之官方文獻與民間筆記輯撰成書，編者在該書的敘言中表明，要以這些文獻來呈現這個時代人物之功過，那麼此書無疑有很高的歷史真實性。

而「水滸傳」是一部小說，而且是一部經長時演化出來的小說。本來虛構的小說與真實的歷史，不宜加以同列並歡，然而「水滸傳」萌芽於南北宋之交盜匪蠶起的時期，自然它以這時期的政治、社會、人文等環境來做爲小說的背景。所以，我們就先把小說與同時的史料做一比對，一方可以使我們對小說更深層的瞭解，同時也可借以看出該小說演化的一些蛛絲馬跡。

序 言

本文所謂的「寫作素材」，是指未經組織化處理，或連貫性處理之前的許多零零碎碎的小故事，或小說的社會背景、政治背景、民俗背景等等。我希望由這些小說素材與小說本身之比對，能夠看出這部小說演變發展之軌跡，同時可以知道，由許多雜亂不相干的素材，經過如何的處理手續而演成一部有組織的小說。

「水滸傳」（以下簡稱「水滸」不是演史小說，因爲演史小說，其人物都是歷史上本有其人，其重要事件亦是歷史上本有其事，又事件與事件之間也本有其連貫性。所以演史小說的作者不過將人物加以活現，既有的事件加以趣味化、戲劇化的處理，作者創作力的發揮自會受到相當程度的限制。而「水滸」，見於史書的人物僅蔡京、高俅、宋江、方臘等少數人，其事見於史書者，也僅「宋江率三十六人縱橫淮南」等短短的幾個字，而演成一部一百二十回的長篇小說。（註一）從其創作性來看，「水滸」不是演史小說，已非常明顯。

一部小說總要有其發展故事的時代，以及政治、社會、文化等背景。「水滸」的場景在第十二世紀初期中國的中原一帶，正當北宋政權逐步入衰微的時期。當時中國的問題，首先是統治階層本身的腐化與敗壞，而帶來政治秩序與社會秩序的動搖，加上北方民族相繼入寇，兵燹連年，百姓生活陷於艱苦不堪的地步，遂演至強梁者嘯聚爲盜，入山據險與官軍相抗。「水滸」即以這些盜寇爲中心，而寫成的小說。雖然，這部小說可信爲長時間演化而成功的小說。（註二）但小說的基本精神，在其演化的初期已經存在。正如宋末遺民龔聖與所作宋江等三十六人贊序之云：

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宋江事見於街談巷語，不足采著，雖有高如、李嵩輩傳寫，士大夫亦不見黜，余年少時壯其人，欲存之畫贊。（周密「癸辛雜識」續集上）

這段話值得注意的，除提出這部小說的原型之外，也說明這些梁山草寇的故事如何受到時人的喜愛；且不論販夫走卒，連「士大夫亦不見黜」。這種「殺人放火的勾當」而能夠受到普遍的喜愛，甚至入元之後，這些故事被編成雜劇，在舞台上演出。筆者以為強盜小說之所以被喜愛，應有兩點因素，其一，作者處理小說素材成功，明確的說，作者能夠使強盜的惡行合理化，譬如，一個人淪為強盜，便說他是出於不得已，是官逼民反，那末他便是無罪的，責任是在官方。又如，強盜殺人，便說被殺的人罪孽深重死有餘辜，如此一來，殺人者不僅無罪，反而是正義的主持者。其二，讀者的心理有接受這種小說的傾向。因為北宋末年以來吏治極敗壞，入元以後又異族統治，百姓普遍生活於困苦之中，在現實界他們無法排除種種的不平，便從小說中惡惡相報去彌補其不平；社會沒有公義；便從小說中去求公義。另外，強盜們離奇曲折的冒險故事本身，也有其引人入勝之處。

「水滸」是一部經長時間演化而成的小說。在其長久的演化過程中，相信它會吸收許多不同時間的故事素材進入小說之中。但毫無疑問，這部小說萌芽時期，即北宋末至南宋初期，才是最為重要，也是這部小說的研究者應特別重視的時期，因為這部小說的基本性格，在其萌芽期已被確定下來。像是「官逼民反」、「忠義」以及強盜們期待「招安」，乃至許多人文背景、自然背景都是這段時間所有。至於以後增入的部份，不過增飾其花葉，對小說的性格影響不大。

「三朝北盟會編」（以下簡稱「北盟」二五〇卷，徐夢莘撰，夢莘字商老、臨江人，紹興二十四年進士，官至賓州知府，後因議論鹽法與當道意見不合，罷官歸里。他把官場進退看得很淡，好學博聞，平生著述很多。由於「每念生靖康之亂，思究其顛末，乃網羅舊聞，蒼萃同異，為「三朝北盟會編」，自政和七年（西元一一一七）海上之盟，迄紹興三十一年（西元一一六一），上下五十年。凡制紹、國書、疏書、記敘、碑志，登載靡遺。」（註三）這五十年正是南、北宋交替的時期，亦即徽宗、欽宗及南宗高宗三個朝代。關於此一實錄撰修之目的，撰修之態度及有關問題，徐氏在其自序云：

嗚呼！靖康之禍古未有也，夷狄為中國患久矣。……揆厥造端，誤國首患罪有在矣。迨至臨難，無不恨焉。……惜平仗節死義之士僅一、二，而偷生嗜利之徒，雖近臣名士，俯首承順惟恐其後，文吏武將望風降走，皆比皆是。使臣公肆凌籍，知無人焉故也，尚忍言之哉？縉紳草茅傷時感事，忠憤所激，據所聞見筆而為記錄者無慮數百家。然各有同異，事有疑信，深懼日月寢久，是非混淆，臣子大節，邪正莫辨，一介忠款湮沒不傳，於是……其辭則固之本之舊，其事則集諸家之說，不敢私為去取，不敢妄之褒貶，參考折衷，其實自見。使忠臣義士亂臣賊子善惡之迹，萬世之下不得掩沒也。……

其撰修的目的是要探究大難之原委與忠奸之分辨。資料則包括官方文獻與私家之筆記，撰修態度則撰者不擅加褒貶，只把事實呈現出來，讓事實本身去說明歷史的是非功過，言無疑是一部標準實錄。

「北盟」是為探討靖康之難而寫的，也是為歷史而寫的；「水滸」則為小說，娛情取樂為其目的。二者目的既然不同，寫作方針自然有異。但二者既是同一時代的作品，其所牽涉的政治、社會、風俗等自然有其暗合之處。於是筆者便想將二者撮要比對，以期對「水滸」這部小說能深

入一層的瞭解。

一、歷史事實

「水滸」故事中見於史實者，有「花石綱」、「招安」與「征方臘」三件事。茲依次與「北盟」之史料做比對。

甲、花石綱

成幫結隊的輸運貨物古時叫綱，宋代官差有所謂鹽綱、茶綱之類。「水滸」第十二回：「道君（徽宗）因蓋萬歲山，差一般十個制使去太湖邊搬運花石綱赴京交納。不想酒家（楊志）時乖運蹇，押著那石綱來到黃河裏，遭風打翻了船，失陷了花石綱，不能回京赴任，逃去他處避難……」花石綱就是搬運花石的運輸隊。原來徽宗政和七年（一一一七）徵發無數民夫大興勞役，在開封近郊堆造一座人工假山，因該假山位於八卦的艮方，稱為「艮嶽」，俗名「萬歲山」。為裝飾艮嶽，朝廷派人到全國各地蒐集奇木異石，而直接間接苛擾了無數百姓。這件事在當時引發了很大的後遺症，但「水滸」中顯然沒有當重要事情去處理，只是借青面獸楊志的口提到幾次，又梁山好漢中善於造船的玉幡竿孟康也是在花石綱案的逃亡者，這件事，大的也可算算是官逼民返的事例，有關此事「北盟」的記錄如下：

(1)政和初，童貫承蔡京意，大啓苑囿，以娛樂導上為遊幸之事，貫率楊戩賈詳藍從熙和誦共五大闈，徙大內之外，諸庫遷二僧寺；徙兩軍營，而改築廷福宮。五闈各有分地，自為制度，務尚華侈，不相沿襲，樓殿相望，築山引水，草木怪石，巖壑幽勝；又跨舊城，取濠外池作景龍江、芙蓉城、蓬壺閣、擷芳園、曲江池，各有復道，以通宮禁；又為鹿砦鶴莊，文禽孔雀諸欄，多聚遠方珍怪蹄尾動數千實之。又效江浙為白屋村居野店、酒肆、青帘、其間景龍門。冬十二月，張燈至上元，名曰預賞。又寶籙宮中山地皆包平地，環以嘉木清流，列諸館舍臺閣，多以美材為楹棟，不施五采，有自然之勝，上下並立亭宇，不可勝數，若江南陳後主三品石，姑蘇白樂天手植檜，太湖靈壁，慈谿武康諸石，二浙花竹、雜木、海錯，福建荔枝，龍眼、橄欖，海南椰實，湖湘大竹，江南諸果，登萊淄沂文石，二廣四川異花、奇果，率人其中，總名曰艮嶽。後又曰壽岳，門號華陽，自華陽門入，兩旁有丹荔枝八十株，大石曰神運、昭功者立其中。旁有兩檜：一夭矯者，名曰升龍之檜；一偃蹇者，名曰臥雲伏龍之檜，皆以玉牌填金字書之。巖曰玉京獨秀太平巖，峯曰卿雲萬態奇峯。又有絳霄樓，金碧相間，勢極高峻在雲表，盡工藝之巧，無以出此。貫又引朱 取江浙花石，皆隸貫主之。凡士庶之家，有一花一木之美，悉以黃帕覆之，名曰：御前之物。不問墳墓之間，盡皆發掘，所載動數百舟，號花石綱。所過州縣，莫敢誰何。諸路大騷，以至於亂。宣和間，都下秋風夜靜，禽獸之音四徹，宛若深山大澤，陂野之間，識者以為不祥也。七年，北方寒盟，朝廷戒嚴，取山禽水鳥十餘萬，盡放諸汴渠，聽其所之。靖康初，虜騎既犯闕，又取大鹿數千百頭，殺以 衛士。及圍城，取諸石為礮云。」（卷五十二、五）

(2)御筆手詔：朕祗詔丕圖，撫臨萬幾，願德弗類，永惟宗社，付託之重，靡遑寧居，維予兆民，是為邦本。比年以來，寬大之詔數下，裁省之令屢行，然奸吏玩法，而衆聽未孚，有司便文，而實惠不至，蓋緣任用非人，過聽妄議，興作事端，蠹耗邦財，假享上之名，濟營私之欲，漁奪百姓，無所不至，使朕軫念元元，若保赤子之意，何以取信於萬方，夙夜痛悼，念有以拊循慰安之，應茶鹽立額結絕，應奉司江浙諸路，置局及花石綱等諸路，採斫木植置造局所諸路，非泛土供拋降物色，延福宮西城租課，內外修造並罷。更有似此有害於百姓者，三省樞密院條具以聞。（卷二十五、十一）

(3)梁師成字守道始以小楷親文墨得侍上師成能任數且謹密主傳道上旨，遂親信。初佐賈諱為書藝局。詳死故師成專以奇巧始得君。久之。為睿思殿文字外庫，益用事矣。政和間迺盛起艮嶽建明入改作宣德門，時已陰主上文書。遂行宰相事。俾王輔在外表裏之。內務關決上微宿于外則師成入處殿中。因于文字外庫，擇能文筆吏隸其下。凡御筆號令批答率命其徒以自代。後來宰相執政至于侍從多其門生，王黼父事焉。亦有望風而不獲進者。其平居害政敗國，首為宗主，嘗自目為蘇軾諸子敘拜為兄弟行。數巧上曰先臣何罪。大抵不揆凡若此。其後淵聖皇帝即位，太上皇南幸，群姦懼為正人所圖。乃留師成宮中，以防其內。外則托李彥相與固天子意然師成卒得罪，縊殺之。但以其自縊聞詔贈太師。或謂坐太上嘗諭大臣始內禪時師成獨沮繼又以表裏王黼云。（卷三十二、十三）

政治敗壞是北宋積弱的主因，宋徽宗此一窮奢極慾的園林構築，無疑國家領導者腐化的一項重要案例。這件事不僅是耗用國財的問題，因為建議並推動此一計劃的，是當時極有影響力的蔡京、童貫、王黼、朱勳、梁師成等人，他們的目的在投帝王之好，包圍帝王，從而擴大自己之政治影響力，又這項工程進行之後，引起上行下效，許多大臣也在自己家中構築美麗庭園，並盜用公家的人力物力。所以這件事不僅牽涉財政的問題，也牽涉到整體政治風紀問題，可說是極嚴重的事，雖然後來下詔停止，但國本已大受傷害。

乙、招安

「水滸」在宋江上梁山落草之後，即不斷提到「等朝廷招安，為國家出力。」如五十八回宋江對呼延灼說：「……………權借水泊裏隨時避難，只待朝庭赦罪招安，與國家出力。……………」又五十九回宋江對宿太尉說：「……………為被官司所逼，不得已哨（嘯）聚山林，權借梁山水泊避難，專等朝廷招安，與國家出。……………」類似的話書中出現的頻率很高，可見「受朝庭招安」是梁山好漢們普遍的期望。而靖康前後嘯聚山林的匪徒也正是如此。「北盟」中紀錄招安的事很多，本文只撮要錄下數條。

(4)詔曰朕惟祖宗仁覆天下，生育休息，垂二百年。家有積聚，人知禮教，尊君親上，安業樂生，車書所通，煙火萬里。頃自姦臣誤國，邊隙既開，戒禍及於黎元。胡塵暗於京闕。兵以傷殘而潰，散民因侵軼而流亡。遂假勤王之名公為聚寇之患。肆朕嗣位，震懼於茲，遭時艱難。涉道寡昧。真畏恭儉，不敢怠逸，寬大公平庶宏共濟。闕日尚淺，群聽未孚。攻剽劫掠寇亂滋起，重矜州縣

之民，莫保田廬之安，生靈何辜，天意未悔。今朕駐蹕淮甸，冥奉廟社以來，遣使金人屢致父兄之請。念欲復沂郤還故都，而群盜猥多師，虞弗靖。膏腴截於大河之外。形勢削於累年之間。輿言及茲。痛憤良切。咨爾有衆共圖興邦。

(5)初徐聚徐文集衆，有舟船數百隻，與李彥先李進彥皆在東海縣。李彥先進彥請聚同謁廟神。聚不察之，爲彥先所殺。徐文聞之，開船下海，占據靈山。有河北忠義人護宗士幹至橫島，文刦之。士幹稱是漢恭懿王之孫，朝廷遣人招文，授武經大夫，兼闔門宣贊舍人。士幹送大理寺。俄刺面配廣南。後不知所終。

(6)孔彥舟在潭州屢敗於馬友，乃退去，欲向南行，因作口號有「卻被杜鵑喚醒、參差兵馬過衡陽」之句，遂寇岳州，官吏皆走，一城盡空。彥舟無所掠。遂寇鄂州。漢陽軍一帶下寨，時鄂州大飢，米一升三百五十文。民多餓死。彥舟括軍中米出糶於市。每升二百文。人得少蘇。皆翕然稱揚彥舟之惠。知鄂州李允文聞于朝廷，招彥舟彥舟聽命。(卷一四七)

(7)威方犯湖州安吉縣，上鄉侗里張俊以兵討之，至安吉，鄉導言：上鄉路窄不可行兵。俊乃遣王再興齋檄招之。會岳飛追襲其後，方無路進退，乃詣俊乞降，與其徒鄭某號爲三哥哥者同至安吉見俊，俊先見威方，諭之曰：國家多難，當以忠義報國家，不可負朝廷。方曰：不敢。俊曰：爾宜一心事主，不得有二。方拜謝。而見三哥哥者，俊曰：國家不負人，爾亦不可負國家。曰：不敢。俊曰：是何不敢？人言爾復欲反。乃呼證左而問曰：是人果欲反乎？曰：實欲復反。俊命推出斬之。上方兵馬簿，有馬六百匹，獻金玉珍珠不可計。自方到行在，日與中貴人蒲博，不勝，取黑漆如馬蹄者，用炭火去漆，乃黃金也，以償博負。每一博不下數枚，于是方已受正使矣。時人爲之語曰：要高官，受招安，欲得富，須胡做。

(8)朱勝非自罷知洪州，轉涉於湖湘間。建炎四年六月復觀文殿大學士，除江州路安撫大使知江州。勝非聚兵於吉州逗遛不進，以劉紹先楊勳傅樞爲統治。及李成陷江州爲張俊所敗，勝非乃以紹先兵屯江數月。勝非方至，然除命已一年矣。九江新遭李成所破禍最酷，凋殘甚於他郡。而帥府舊治豫章創移於九江。官府荒陋。且不可號令一路。方朝廷置鎮撫使移易諸路，帥臣經畫無節。於是勝非上疏論東南盜賊則欲招撫使降西北劇寇則命之以官，使流離北人各得其所。所次被虜者老弱者不願從軍者留。精銳使散處諸軍。如此當不爲患。至若江西大寇皆因朝廷號令無定。橫斂不一，名色既多，貧民不能堪。以故爲寇。且言臣被詔赴任來自桂嶺陸行一千七百餘里至臨江軍所，見道上居民及近路村落。自入衡州界有屋無人，入潭州界有屋無壁。入袁州界則人屋俱無。良民無辜，情實可憫，陛下幸降寬詔，深加哀憐。捐削苛擾俾知實惠。招降其首領與補降官收隸軍籍、而散遣其徒衆，各使還業。則江西之亂庶可指日平也。不然則爲盜者日益。衆勢必南軼湖湘……(卷一百四十七、六)

(9)初詔青以舟船入海也。其妻囑之曰：你豈不記作賊，事發禁在獄中，我剪頭髮與你送飯時。

今如此乃欲負朝廷耶。青既不受朝廷黃榜之招、其次單德忠知將士皆有歸朝廷意，且謂不殺閻在必不肯受招安，會諸將晨謁青，方圍坐以待聞德忠起身欠伸，即掣刀殺在於坐衆皆驚。德忠曰今部統治欲歸朝廷，惟閻在不從。今殺之、敢不歸朝廷者依此。衆默然或報邵青青使其妻出船見諸將。曰統治偶傷風不安不知何故如是德忠具言、閻在兇狠失將士之心，恐亂軍政，請統治出相見議事。青乃揮涕而出曰：單統治總當好好分付，不須如此德忠契土自明然後開諭道理，具說不可負違朝廷，宜納兵以贖罪，累數百言。青從之。德忠即命倒旗槍，通款狀於官軍，遂願受招安。（卷一四九、六）

(10)紹興三十一年九月二十九日三省樞密院同奉聖旨：金虜無厭背盟失信，軍馬已犯川界。今率精兵百萬躬行天討。有措置招諭事件如後：一中原百姓見爲簽軍，想未忘祖宗德澤，痛念二聖未還，豈肯從番反攻舊主，榜到各宜相率從便歸業。內有願立功來歸人，當議優加爵賞。一女真渤海奚契丹一應諸國人等暴露日久，豈不懷歸，見此文榜諸各散回本國，別事新君，可圖子孫長久之利。一中原諸路州縣官吏軍民有能以一路歸者，除安撫使；以一州歸者與知州；一縣歸者與知縣。餘見任官更不改易。一諸路忠義豪傑山寨首領能立功自效者，並依前項推賞。三中原并諸國良民見爲奴婢者，並放令逐便。內有能擒獲本主歸順者，即以本主官爵田宅推賞。一諸國官吏軍民不願歸本國者，當盡還官爵，雖見用事之人一例推賞，優卹與中國人一般更不分別。因而能立功効者不次擢用。一軍行秋毫無犯，並不殺人放火，亦不擄掠財物及婦女，一事平後放免稅租十年。一應于虜人殘虐科須等事如簽刷人夫水手工匠差科軍器糧草舟船牛車騾馬掠奪人家室女繡女一切非法騷擾并行除放。一淫酷之刑如滅族剝皮油煎鋸解釣脊之類深可痛心一切除去。右件中原官吏軍民及諸國人等各懷忠憤，改慮易圖，克建功名，共享安泰，故茲榜示各宜知悉。（卷二百三十二、一）

(11)三省樞密院同奉聖旨。朕念中原赤子及諸國人等久爲金虜暴虐，役使科斂，或爲奴婢，已無生意。又指吾舊疆百姓爲宋國殘民，蹂躪殺戮無所顧惜。朕聞之痛心疾首。是用分遣大軍，諸道並進以救爾於塗炭。想聞王師至必能相率歸順，朕不惜官爵金帛以爲激賞。若係有官之人，並依見今原帶職官，更不損滅其能。以土地來歸或能攻取城邑除爵賞外，凡府庫所有盡以給賜。朝廷所留惟器甲文書糧草而已。如女真渤海奚契丹漢兒一應諸國人能歸順本朝，其官爵賞賜並與中國人一般，更不分別。內燕北昨被發歸國者，蓋爲權臣所誤，追悔無及。今雖用事並許來歸，當優加官爵，勿復疑慮。朕言不食。有如織日。（卷二三二、二）

以上「北盟」的記錄都是南宗的事，但這並不表示北宋就沒有招安，像宋江使受知海州張叔夜的招安。「北盟」關於宋江有兩條，雖然文中沒有顯明提到招安，但若把兩條合併來談，則宋江受招安殆無可疑。（見下文宋江之節）又「北盟」中有許多「義勝軍」之稱，都是招安來歸者組成的軍團，「秉義郎」即歸附之軍校。一般而言，北宋時招安制度未見有官方正式的規定；南宋則有朝廷正式的文書規定，如前引第(10)(11)兩條，其中關於招安的對象，以及受招安之後的待遇等等都明文規定。「水滸」這部小說之發展成型在南宋以後，雖然宋江的事是北宋徽宗年間，但由於故事成型較晚，所以南宋的許多社會、政治狀況都被吸收進入小說之中，像「一文青」是南

宋人，也被收進小說中。這一點，下文條有詳論。

丙、方臘

一百二十回本「水滸」，七十四回之後梁山好漢受朝廷招安，並奉詔征討叛逆，也就是前面不斷提到的「專為朝廷招安，為國出力」的實現。一百零八條好漢先後征討了王慶、田虎，遼國及方臘，前三次出征一〇八人都能竟功而全身。最後征方臘，雖生擒方臘而回，但一〇八人喪亡殆盡。關於方臘的叛變，「北盟」僅見於卷五二童貫傳下，文見下文第（28）條引文，茲略。

此役以童貫為主帥，參與征討的除宋江之外，有劉延慶、劉光世、辛企宗均為當時勳跡卓著的戰將。小說一味描寫一〇八人之英勇，其他人一概不提，這樣的作法為小說常有，不足以為怪。

二、民風與社會狀況

小說會寫出小說時代的特殊社會狀況與民情風俗，乃是自然之事，「北盟」中多次提到「打毬」，「人肉包子」、「山寨」。這些事物亦正是「水滸」中出現的事物。茲分別加以檢討。

甲、打毬

打毬，在「水滸」中只在第二回出現，該回說：高球原是東京城的地痞無賴，人稱為高二，因他踢得一脚好毬，也叫他「高毬」。當時的端王，亦後來之徽宗，亦好此道。某次湊巧高毬之毬技被端王發現，遂被招入府中為侍從，高毬發跡之後，覺以「毬」字為名不雅，因改以豎人旁之「毬」字、「北盟」之中多有打毬之紀錄，如下：

(12)二十二日壬子駕在青城。御批付徐秉哲打毬畢，便還金銀，並限來日交納軍前盡絕。

（卷七七、二）

(13)是日又取畫工百人、醫官二百人、諸般百，戲一百人，教坊四百人、木匠五十人、竹瓦、泥匠各三十人，走馬打毬弟子七人、鞍作十人、玉匠一百人、內臣五十人街市弟子五十人、學士院待詔五人築毬供奉五人、金銀匠八十人、吏人五十人、八作務五十人、後苑作五十人、司天臺官吏五十人、弟子簾前小唱二十人。雜戲一百五十人。舞旋弟子五十人。金輅御蓋法物法駕儀仗駕頭皇后玉車宰相子弟車諸王法服宰相百官朝服皇后衣服御駕御鞍御塵拂子御馬二十匹、珊瑚鞭兩條。（卷七八、三）

(14)宣和錄。是日二酋傳令請皇帝赴打毬會。上在青城齋宮乘馬至毬場。二帥令悉屏騎從止何臬馮澥曹輔郭仲荀從分庭設兩位，上東面西向，粘罕西面東向。酒七行。粘罕不繡衣打毬為樂，以獻。上曰。今日得觀盛禮豈敢重勞元帥。粘罕不打毬罷，就令諸番打毬。復酒二行，上起身謝曰。某久留軍前，都人願望，欲乞早歸。粘罕云：待那裏去。上失色，更不復言罷歸。粘罕不與上同上馬送至行宮。曰天命如此，無可奈何。上至幕次，群臣迎拜，上悵然不怡。何臬色甚憂。問吳并等；策將安出？蓋粘罕不策馬送上已有天命之言故也。竟夕憂惶不知所出。聞軍前已擊毬。車駕

有選期。都人大悅。至未時傳言駕回接者不知幾千萬皆不能行。至晚云來日入城。

(卷七八、八)

(15)午間請太上看打毬，自二太子以下皆入毬場。太上與皇后左廳上座。打毬罷、行酒、少頃侍中劉彥宗傳太子意云：久聞上皇聖學甚高，欲覓一打毬詩，其請頗恭。太上曰自遜位以來未嘗近筆硯，勉作一詩以答台意。乃寫付彥宗曰：錦袍駿馬曉棚分，一點星馳百騎奔。奪得頭籌須正過。無令綽撥入斜門。彥宗捧誦稱贊，即與太子，又番語似講解其意。太子起謝。太上亦謝其恭也。(卷之九十八、八)

(16)二聖之北狩也，道君由滑滄至燕山。淵聖由淮陽至雲中。道君五月十八日丁未到燕山，離門三里，太子邀請觀看射柳枝、打毬、飲宴至暮。次日入門于延壽寺駐蹕。貴妃親王帝姬隨馬聖眷同處，日侍道君之側。金人恭奉甚厚。六月初二日請道君聖眷毬場宴會。二太子捧卮跪勸道君。時躬親打毬，迎待之禮至重至厚。(卷九八、九)

(17)秀水間居錄曰：元祐末，哲宗方擇后，京師里巷作打毬戲。以一人擊入窠者為勝。謂之孟入。於是孟在女應入宮之選。至詔聖間宮掖造禁縵有匠者姓孟，獻新樣兩大蝴蝶。民間競服之。未幾后廢，處瑤華宮號華陽教主玉清妙靜仙師。議者，皆以為讖縵者禪也。出家之兆也。(卷一四六、七)

「水滸」第二回所謂打毬，從故事的敘述來看，無疑就是現在的踢毬子，而上面的紀錄，除第(17)條可能是踢毬子外，都是一種大型的運動，這種運動需要大片的場地，也需要騎馬，由上引第(15)條「打毬詩」的內容可證；又這五條紀錄都與徽宗有關，也可見徽宗如何熱愛此種運動。由於打馬球與踢毬子，都有一個「毬」字，因此小說的作者便據此附會一段高俅出身的故事。又高俅之弟叫高伸、高傑均見於「北盟」名字都有人字旁，則高俅之「俅」字應該是本名才對。

乙、人肉包子

「水滸」故事中賣人肉包子有兩處：其一，在十字坡孫二娘開的酒店其二，揭陽鎮李立開的酒店。他們找過往客商包裹沉重者下手，先以蒙汗藥摻酒把他迷倒，奪取金銀，然後開剝人體做成肉餡子，再作包子出售。「北盟」吃人肉的紀錄非常之多，本文只抄下面三條。

(18)自城破後物價大貴，米升三百，豬肉一斤八貫，牛馬肉至二萬亦無得者。街巷有病，氣未絕者，俄頃已被剝剝雜諸牛馬肉賣之。(卷九六、十一)

(19)先是王善降於金人，徒黨皆散。金人屯六合也。有邱虔者在滁州境內，俄復渡淮北去。祝友在滁州界皆善之餘黨。友下寨於翼家城。復欲往巢縣，李防禦者為王縣尉所殺。王縣尉者鄉兵首領也。聞探得李防禦寨中人皆出外虜掠糧食，乘其虛而劫之。遂殺李防禦。衆遂推友為首。復還翼家城下寨。專殺人為糧食。(卷一四三、三)

(20)

張榮在羅潭爲金人破其麥城，遂率舟船至通州。過捍海堰欲出海，復歸京東。爲水濤所阻。亦得去，遂據通州糧且盡，取人爲肴，斷其首，斫其兩臂兩脛，以鹽掩曝乾，用充糧食。得脫者無幾。(卷一四四、五)

戰亂中食物缺乏，而必須以人肉充當糧食，這無疑是人類歷史上最悲慘的時代。這樣的時代人肉都可當糧食，單是殺人取命，就不足爲怪了。「北盟」的紀錄裏強盜屠城殺人可說是舉不勝舉，其血腥與殘酷絕不遜「水滸」中的描寫。「水滸」這部小說全書充滿殺人放火，不把人命當一回事，把殺人當做英雄的表現，甚至當成樂趣，如五十回，李逵誤殺扈家莊一家老小，受責於宋江，他却說：「雖然沒有功勞，也喫我殺得快活。」這種小說若不是靖康前後的時代怎麼可能出現？

丙、山寨

寨是軍隊禦敵的營壘或構築物。山寨，則取其具有天然之險，易守難攻。中國歷代都有據山寨爲盜，與官兵相抗者，不僅靖康前後而然。但盜匪愈多，山寨愈多，靖康前後，是中國史上盜匪最多的時代，所以「北盟」之中處處可見「山寨」之字。惟山寨除了有天然之險外，也需要加以人工的經營始能具有禦敵之效。關於經營山寨的紀錄「北盟」只見一條。即：

(21) 維忠率衆棄隄山寨歸於招信縣劉位。位令維忠爲左軍統領官，隄山寨壘石爲城。周圍四里，又作大寨七里環繞之，戰禦之具稍備。民之願來依者凡萬餘人，維忠選強壯充兵。隄山之勢巍然而立。外百餘群山統之。山有泉湧出，泉下有洞，泉水悉歸焉。洞雖不大，然不論水之多寡。或連雨會群山之水湊於其中，而洞能容之，俗呼爲歸水洞。倘無此洞則山泉與雨水皆爲群山所壅不得泄。寨在山之頂，萬人居焉，常苦無水以給食。維忠患之，乃視歸水洞而謀曰若塞此洞，不惟能得水以給食，且水勢縈迴於山曲，亦可恃以爲險也。然此洞雖小能容無涯之水，豈非有神佛以主之乎，萬人皆待水而食所係不輕，吾將盡誠心禱之於神，議塞此洞借水以給衆，若神而有靈，必陰祐於我。乃與進士戴德夫謀禱塞洞之方，德夫以維忠之意朱書鐵爲板以清酌祭神擲板於洞，遂實之以土石。聞之者皆相視而笑，以謂兒戲也，既而數人之力告勞而洞已塞矣。人皆大駭及維忠既去歸水洞復陷如故。(卷一三八、七)

強盜經營山寨是很自然之事，但這種事情多半不會進入史家之筆，幸而有上面一條，雖內容極詭異，但由此資料，則可見梁山好漢不斷經營山寨自有其淵源。

三、人 物

「水滸」的人物中見於「北盟」者，如：蔡京、高俅、童貫、一丈青、孫立等，其中蔡京、童貫在故事中角色不明顯。孫立在「北盟」中見過一次，並未說明他做何事。此孫立是否即「水滸」的「病尉遲孫立」尙無法確定。茲將高俅、宋江、一丈青分別討論如下。

甲、高俅—邪惡官僚的代表

小說中的高俅出身東京的無賴漢，善踢毬，後寅緣攀附成爲徽宗皇帝的內侍，又成爲統領東京八十萬禁軍的太尉，從他成太尉之日使陷害禁軍教頭王進，而使王進攜母亡命西安。又其子高衙內欲逼佔林冲之妻，林冲亦爲禁軍教頭，被逼而上梁山落草。又小說中，他的從兄弟高廉爲惡高唐州，與梁山結怨，被殺。總之，小說中的高俅是個做惡多端的官僚，而歷史的紀錄中他又是何種面目，下面是「北盟」的紀載。

(22)

又曰時白、時中張邦昌皆欲邀翠華以幸襄陽。上問，宗社何如？時中輒對曰：招募英雄以圖克復。自藝祖都汴垂二百年，金湯之固器甲之利，在所不言。禁旅雲屯自昔號爲驍勇。比年以來，外則童貫失陷，內則高俅不招刺，軍政不修。然比之勤王之師，強弱自不相侔。（卷二十七、十三）

(23)

京師傳聞太上皇到泗州，蔡京童貫等建議留高俅以待衛兵扼泗州，太上皇南去，人心不安。陳東乃詣登聞檢院上書曰：臣于去年十二月二十七日，曾同本學諸生等伏闕下上書，言蔡京王黼童貫梁師成李彥朱勛等六賊罪惡，乞行誅戮。又于今月初六日，獨詣登聞檢院上書，言京勛父子，及貫等挾太上皇南去，恐迤邐渡江，假藉威勢，遂生變亂之端，乞追數賊復還闕下，各正典刑，別遣忠信可委之人，往侍上皇。前後二書，至今未蒙盡賜施行。雖聞王黼李彛已曾施行；然罪大謫輕未厭公論，京勛父子釋而不問，縱之南去，師成尙在親密之地，中外疑惑。臣竊謂朝廷方有夷狄之難，未暇議此，以故未敢再有申陳；然今日事勢之急，殆有甚於夷狄。夷狄之兵皆由群賊誤上皇所致，今又挾上皇于危急之地，臣豈敢尙爾默默？臣昨日聞道路之言曰：高傑近收其兄侂伸等書報，言上皇初至南京，不欲前邁，復爲數賊挾之而前，沿路劫持，無所不至，上皇飲食起居，不得自如，數賊阻隔甚嚴，除其黨與之外，不容他人輒得進見；雖高俅被宣欲進，亦復難之。行至泗州，又詐傳皇上御筆割付高俅，只令在本州守禦浮橋，不得南來，挾上皇度橋而南，以趨江浙，其隨駕兵士，盡爲群賊斥之而回。聞方過橋之時，衛士攀望上皇車駕，失聲號慟，童貫遂令勝捷親兵以弔射之，衛士中矢，自橋墜者凡百餘人。高俅兄弟在道傍徨，得以望見上皇君臣，相顧泣下，意若有所欲言者；而群賊在其側，上皇氣塞聲咽，不敢輒發一語，道路之人，莫不扼腕流涕。（卷二十二、七）

(24)

昨蒙聖旨根括權貴之家金銀段匹據南壁根括官陳著押到高俅使女劉梅壽先將金銀令幹當人劉

均兩次押往兄高傑家收藏。本府差人勾劉均出頭，其高伸卻與兄弟高傑等就親來府廷下。高傑係金吾衛大將軍，高伸延康殿大學士，日前受國厚恩不可勝計，今來倚恃官高庇護，幹當人卻各乃親自出頭抵靠。實恐難以集事，伏望特賜指揮施行奉聖旨，高伸輒至公廷有虧事體。仰落職，傑降充左衛率府軍率。

(25)

先是籍譚穰家約白米二千石，豆粟亦如之。至是委官發糶以濟小民，又毀折高傑楊戩第宅出賣充薪。(卷七八、四)

由上面的引文，雖然我們仍無法看出高傑生平之輪廓，但歷史上高傑顯然不是罪大惡極，他與蔡京童貫等不同黨，他在職務上不十分盡力，也利用權勢聚斂私財，援引兄弟成爲高官。所以，東京被金人圍困時，家財被抄，房屋被折。一般來看，他雖不至於罪大惡極，但仍不免是個小人，加上他是內侍出身，便容易讓人產生不良的印象，因爲當時人總認爲內侍與惡臣相爲表裏，朋比爲惡，下面「北盟」的文字可爲明證。

(26)

凡內侍送御封文字至其家，無不解帶促席深相結納。臣頃侍班上殿，親見恪與內侍妮妮耳語，久之而不已。自昔宰相爲姦，必先結宦官刺密旨，以中人君之欲，又使之延譽稱美，以固寵位。唐之李林甫，近世蔡京，王黼用此術。正人端士肯若是乎。(卷六五、四)

高傑既是內侍，加上他仗勢聚財，其弟高伸、高傑仗其援引成爲高官，如此一來「水滸」把一切罪惡歸他一人，而成爲邪惡官僚的代表者，想來也是自然的事。

乙、宋江—正義的化身

小說中的宋江是個重義輕財的人，他肯爲朋友擔負天大的干係，又他是「真丈夫，對朋友有頭有尾，有始有終。」(二十三回武松的話)他的心胸正如江州潯陽酒樓上顯壁的「西江月」所云：「自幼曾攻經史，長成亦有權謀，恰如猛虎臥荒丘，潛伏爪牙忍受。」功夫微不足道，但憑其智慧與手腕成爲一〇八人領袖。「北盟」紀錄則如下：

(27)

張叔夜字耜仲開封人。侍中徐國公薨之後也。通經史善屬文，習兵法，長於詩詠，有文武大材。初爲武職內侍。馮浩高其材，每薦之。叔夜亦上兵策及宮詞百篇。上喜之，換文資，累遷太常少卿，賜同進士出身。擢中書舍人禮部侍郎。宣和初浩以諫賜死。臣僚又言叔夜乃親黨也。降三官罷之。後起知海州，破群盜宋江有功。宣和末京東大盜四起，擢叔夜知濟南府。與京東制置使梁方平協謀，屢平巨寇。靖康初召赴闕，除南道大總管兼知。

(28)

宣和二年方臘反睦州，陷溫台婺處杭秀等州，東南震動。以貫爲江浙宣撫使，領劉延慶劉光世、辛企宗宋江等軍二十餘萬往討之。貫行兵事急，上微出城東以餞貫，握貫之手親送之。曰：東南事盡

付太傅，必有緊急不得已可徑作御筆行下。貫至浙率諸將擒臘，獻於京師。加太師。(卷五五、二)

從上面二條，除知道宋江爲宣和年間被招安的捍盜之外，實無法進一步的瞭解他的爲人。再據「宋史」「徽宗本紀」：「淮南盜宋江犯淮陽。遣將討捕、又犯京東、江北，入楚州界。命知州張叔夜招降之。」(卷二十三)又「侯蒙傳」：「宋江寇京東，侯蒙上書言：“宋江以三十六人橫行 魏，官軍數萬，無敢抗者，其才必過人。……不若赦江，使討方臘以自贖。”」(卷三百五十一)綜合上面的史料，宋江也不過是一個才能過人的匪徒，與小說中的宋江相去尚遠，小說中宋江輕財重義的性格、急人之急的處世態度及令人傾服的領袖特質在這些史料中完全看不到。小說中宋江的性格特質，當然有可能出於作者自創，也有可能作者別人身上移轉而附會於宋江身上。「北盟」使有兩條紀錄當時兩個強盜的善良秉性。即：

(29)

先是建炎間山東兵火，有滄州人李齊，聚衆據沙門島。密州板橋人徐文據靈山寺，范溫萊州農家人，聚衆據徐福島。溫無他長惟待人以至誠，故能得其衆心。(卷一五五、二)

(30)

同引文第(8)條

第(29) 條的范溫代表以義服人，而不以力服人。(30)條的孔彥舟則是仁愛爲懷替天行道。此性格已隱然「水滸」之理想，尤其像宋江之心胸，雖然尚不能確定小說中宋江文性格即由此轉而來，但可確定當時群盜之中有小部份秉性善良者。大亂之中，民衆普遍對官方失望，一旦類似前引范、孔之類的盜寇，極容易引起民衆之向心。凡從民間逐漸演化成功的小說必定與當時普遍民衆心理有很大的關係，而「水滸」便在民衆對盜寇的期待心理之下產生的。又宋江是「水滸」故事的代表者，就無怪乎小說的撰者要使他集正義於一身了。

丙、一丈青

一丈青，爲一〇八人中三名女盜之一，「水滸」中稱爲「一丈青扈三娘」，「一丈青」爲諱號無疑。一丈青爲扈家莊太公之女，已許配鄰莊一祝家莊之才第三子祝彪。祝家莊恃強與梁山爲敵，一丈青往祝家助陣，敗陣被俘，宋太公(宋江之父)收她爲義女，後祝家被破屠莊，扈家莊亦遭波及而滅莊。後一丈青由宋江做主嫁給矮脚虎王英。(事見第四十八回)「北盟」中一丈青的資料有兩條，即：

(31)

甲寅周太師入自西門，康民出兵迎戰大敗而回，太師已自北門入執勅而去。是役也，康民幾死，趙宏救之得免。次日，康民議追金人奪勅，聞康民渡過口矣。宏相州湯陰縣弓手也，時人謂之趙之翦。初勅迎奉神御起離西京也。於岳飛處借使臣十人，而宏其一也。循蔡河而下，至濠州，遇張，勅說用歸朝廷，以馬皐之妻一丈青嫁用爲妻。初皐爲郭仲荀所誅，勅周恤之以爲義女。既嫁用，遂爲中軍統領；有二認旂在馬前題曰：關西貞烈女，護國馬夫人。劉舜臣者，用之參議官，

用俾隨勅以行，故舜臣在勅軍勅在南京，金人欲降之，不可，欲以爲京東撫使，不可，乃被害。
(卷一三八、十二)

(32)

張用已受鄂州招安，曹成以馬老爹事捉拿，中軍人多被殺戮者。用之妻一丈青奪身出，招中軍人隸麾下，中軍人皆歸之，有衆二萬餘人，皆訴無糧食。一丈青曰：待我措置，猶未知用投鄂州受招安，俄有人報用已受措置司招安，一丈青乃率衆趨鄂州避馬友不由漢陽，取間道出漢陽之後，自下流渡江，復與用合。(卷一四一、十)

史料中的「一丈青」是真名抑是諱號無法確定，但由引文(31)條的紀錄，一丈青的婚姻與「水滸」的敘述，除關係人物不同之外，事情的骨架如出一轍，顯然是「水滸」故事的原型，同一個怪異的名字，加上同一故事結構，那末，小說與歷史兩者的一丈青是同一個人，應無問題。可是「水滸」故事在北宋宣和二年宋江征方臘之後結束；一丈青的史實則見於南宋紹興年間，相去約二十年，不可能成爲梁山一〇八好漢之一員，相信這又是小說的撰者拿後代的人物並其故事附會進去的。又由(31)條的內容與小說的情節有關這一點來看，我們相信小說中還有其他情節是由歷史事實轉化附會而來，只是經過一些處理或潤飾或渲染的手法之後已失其原來的面貌。

四、結 話

「水滸」是在中國由北宋末期至元代末年之間逐漸演化而完成的。(註四)這部小說在其演化的過程中，正是中國陷於內外交迫的時期，當時官方不僅不能給民衆安定的生活，甚至由於官吏本身之腐化，而多方侵擾百姓，社會公義蕩然無存，只有強權才是公義。如此情況下，自然使部份強悍者聚衆爲盜與官方抗衡。官盜相抗之下，無辜的百姓痛苦又加深，於是更多的人又成爲盜寇，如此惡性循環之下，誰爲正義誰爲邪惡，已漸無法分辨。本來強盜是邪惡的，但這時却有人同情強盜，甚至欣賞強盜的行爲。甚至南宋高宗亦如此，「北盟」，便有如此的紀錄。即：

(33)

先是杜充守建康。時有秉義卽趙祥有監水門。金人渡江。郡青聚衆，而祥爲青所得。青受招安。祥始得脫身歸乃依於內侍綱。綱善小說。上喜聽之。綱思得新事編小說。乃令祥其說青自聚衆已後蹤跡，并其徒黨忠詐及強弱之將，本末甚詳，編綴次序，侍上則說之。故上知青可用，而喜單德忠之忠義。(卷一四九、十一)

身爲一國之君，身繫國家的安危者，竟會去欣賞強盜的做爲，則一般民衆的心理就不問可知了。這是價值觀念的混淆，如此價值觀念之混淆，無疑成爲「水滸」這部強盜小說，得以落地生根而茁壯之沃土。強盜在正常的社會觀念中，是屬於邪惡的一方，但「水滸」却把強盜變成善良的一方，於是小說的寫作上必須盡可能去醜化、矮化官方，說他們是如何貪贓妄法，殘害忠良。反過來，也要盡力去美化綠林人物，說他們如何善良、如何忠義，如何無辜受害而落草爲寇。而在這樣的處理之下，「官逼民反」的觀念已自然呈現出來。

又在史料之中頻頻以「忠義」稱山寨豪傑，如：「豪傑忠義之士能據一縣迎降者，即與知縣。」（北盟卷二三二、一）又引文第(10)條中「諸路山寨豪傑忠義首領，能立功自效者，並依前項推賞。」諸如此類的「忠義」不過是招降盜寇時，懷柔的稱呼，猶如現今稱大陸駕機來歸者為「義士」一般。因此，我們無必要費心去深究「忠義」二字的內在函義。至於「水滸」成書之後，書中表現何種「忠義」觀念，那是另外的事，已非本文討論的範圍。

註一：「水滸」有百回本、百十回本、百十五回本、百二十二回本、金聖嘆又截去招安之後情節為七十回。

註二：參閱鄭振鐸「水滸傳的演化」。文見「中國文學論集」。

註三：文見四康提要為八十。

註四：「水滸」故事進入明代以後還是有些改動，但改動的都屬於枝節的部份。可參關河洛出版社「水滸傳研究」

參改書籍

- 一、水滸（七十一回）華正書局
- 二、水滸傳（百二十回）世界書局
- 三、三朝北盟會編 藝文
- 四、四康總目提要 藝文
- 五、中國文學論集（西諦）
- 六、水滸傳研究 河洛
- 七、宋史 藝文

**Christian Sacraments and World-view
— in term of revised pattern of “rites of passage”**

Hwa-San Kwan

Abstract

In order to test the hypothesis that, proposed by Rappaport, the central thought, truth, “Logos” of any religion or culture is likely to be expressed in its rituals or liturgical order as a whole, this thesis utilized a reformulated pattern of “rites of passage” as a conceptual tool to analyze two major Christian Sacraments, i.e., baptism and The Lord’s Supper.

It is found that the hypothesis is supported. The two Sacraments do present the Christian world-view in which the “logos”, i.e., the Incarnate Words, Jesus Christ, is their major theme. In addition to that, the Christian world-view in terms of several different facets and the two sacraments all can be analyzed by the revised pattern of the rites of passage.

Rappaport has proposed (1984) that the central thought, truth, or “Logos” of any religion or culture is likely to be expressed in its rituals or liturgical order as a whole. The present study aims to test the hypothesis by looking into two major Christian sacraments, i.e., baptism and The Lord’s Supper, following the ordinance of the Baptist Church. According to Ingel’s historical investigation (1908), ever since John first referred to Jesus as the “Logos” in his Gospel, the term in Christianity has had a different meaning from that developed in Greek thought from Heraclitus to the Stoics (Kahn, 1979; Kirk, 1954). To avoid unnecessary confusion, this paper will use another, and more general term, that is, “world-view.”

More specifically, I shall use Van Gennep’s conception of rites of passage (1906) as reformulated by Terence Turner (1977) in her particular analysis. Turner argued that rites of passage not only effect changes in social status or physiological growth through tri-phasic sequences (separation, liminality and reincorporation,) but also are involved in transformations at a “higher level.” In terms of what messages a liturgical order can communicate, the so-called “high-level principles of transformation,” which is more invariant, I think, is equivalent to the canonical message defined by Rappaport (1979). As to the lower level, it communicates here-and-now information about relevant people, objects, and matters, which is more indexical. That is why Rappaport (1979: 207) said that liturgy also has a hierarchical dimension. “The ‘ultimate’ or ‘absolute’ components of liturgical orders are the cosmic

or spiritual entities to which they make references, while the contingent elements are their social referents and the liturgical performances associated with them." In the higher level, I propose, we may also distinguish a hierarchy which may be shown by different levels of paradigm of creation.

According to Bateson (1972, 23ff.), many myths of creation do not take creation to be simply, or even at all, the production of matter *ex nihilo*, but more significantly of giving form to inchoate matter already in existence, and reciprocally, of giving substance to some primordial form. Rappaport proposes (1979) that in ritual there seems to be a reunion of this primordial union of form and substance. Here, I propose that adding a "new form" onto the "old substance" may be conceived as "an incomplete creation." The generation of new form and, possibly, new substance as well may be thought as "complete creation." In as much as liturgical orders include what are construed to be absolute or ultimate meanings among their constituents they most represent "complete creation," against which the incomplete creations can be assessed. And the latter generally serves as a one-way procedure appeared in a spiritual realm which is generally more affiliated with "this world"

So, this study utilizes such a synthesized conceptual tool formed by several sources mentioned above to analyze the meanings and structures of the baptism and The Lord's Supper. On the other hand, it serves as an initial support of my proposition regarding the hierarchy of paradigm of creation. In the following discussion, I will focus first on the sacrament of baptism, and then on The Lord's Supper. Interestingly, I find that the conceptual tool is very powerful. It fits the two sacraments as well as the Christian world-view. In conclusion, a tentative explanation is given of why it is so successful.

1. Individual Baptism

Obviously, the pattern of rites of passage discovered by Van Gennep fits Christian baptism (1909, pp. 93-94). Before his baptism, a person is a "sinner" in the secular world. After baptism, he is reborn and becomes a member of the local church. The change from a "non-member" to a "member" can be seen as a change in the social level. That a "sinner" becomes a "child of God" is a transformation of a higher order.

Before baptism, a person needs to repent inwardly, and to be willing to accept the ritual externally. After he publicly confesses his faith: "I am a sinner. I want Jesus Christ to be my personal savior", the pastor then baptizes him" in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." The believer is immersed in water. This act symbolizes that he is separated from the secular world, and his old nature which is under the control of the old order, i.e., evil powers, has died or is washed out. This constitutes the rite of separation. The believer then rises from the water, which symbolizes the giving of a "new nature" by the grace of God. The apostle

Paul confirmed this by writing: “... you stripped off the old nature with its practices and put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator” (Col. 3: 9b, 10).

At the deepest point of immersing and rising, between the stripping off and the putting on, a naked one is present. The breathless flash could be considered a very good example of the transitional period. It also seems to be the dramatic moment that unexpected “Holy Spirit” generates its full power to meet one’s faith. The contact is immediately resolved into a union, i.e., rising up, a rite of incorporation begins. Finally with joy, the baptized returns to the world (Fig.1).

If we do not follow the Christian rationale to explain the rejoicing, we may account for it by considering the interaction between the baptized and the ritual. When an individual concentrates his mind, and asks honestly for a solution for all his troubles, he may finally be willing to accept baptism. The baptism, as an icon which integrates abundant Christian canonical messages, becomes a powerful stimulus. Through the process, the believer’s urgent mentality is filled with the messages, which suddenly resolves his problems by way of “once for all”. At this moment, the so-called “flow”, “communitas”, or “numinous” is experienced (James, 1902, Turner, 1977; Rappaport, 1979). On the other hand, the canonical message, i.e., the sacred, is testified to again as being alive. Of course, such a state of mind need not necessarily appear during a ritual. It could be experienced whenever one’s psychological condition and accumulated outside stimuli reach their highest plane. It corresponds to also the moment when a person decides to convert, which may be symbolized by his baptism later.

All the actions, utterances, and efficacy of baptism are valid due to the transformative principles of the high level, i.e., the rationale of Christianity. Let us look at these principles closely. First, we will look into several references of baptism in Scripture which illuminate the various meanings of baptism. In Genesis, the great Flood destroyed the corrupt world and all the sinners on earth. It represented a kind of separation. After it, God made a covenant with Noah and his sons, who were saved because of their obedience, a covenant which may be seen as a kind of incorporation. Another reference is when Israel fled from the Egyptian army, they crossed the Red Sea on foot. Again, the event was a separation. During the forty years in the Desert of Sinai, God gave them the Law through Moses. But because of their impatience and rebellion, the forty years could be seen as a transitional period [1]. When Joshua led a new generation of Israel crossing the Jordan and entering into the land of the Cananites, an incorporation took place. All of these events have the common imagery of water as a boundary between life and death, a deliverance bringing life (a new relationship with God) and leaving death (previous sinful world) behind.

The New Testament records that baptism was a command from Jesus (Matt. 28: 19), it is also the Apostles who were the initial encoders of the ritual (Acts

2:41, 10:47). There are at least three other important references. The first is the baptism of Jesus by John the baptist. According to Matthew's record (Matt. 3: 16). "As soon as Jesus was baptized, he went up out of the water, at that moment heaven was opened, and he saw the spirit of God descending like a dove and lighting on him." This is the best picture of the "Holy Spirit" descending during a baptism.

The second reference is Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection. Paul had pointed out the relation of this biblical event and believer baptisms afterwards. His statement also speaks of the "transformative principles" behind the ritual. "...Don't you know that all of us who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life" (Romans 6:3, 4). Jesus himself also declared: "...but I have a baptism to undergo and how distressed I am until it is completed" (Luke 12: 50). Here, he meant that he would be crucified by man and then raised up by God. This special baptism differs from that of the believers (Fig. 2).

Let us look at a believer's baptism first. It is described as a "rebirth". However, the baptized receives only a "new nature", his physical body still being the same. As a Christian, he is expected by the church and by himself to live a new life according to the new order. The apostle Peter had clarified this point too: "... and this water symbolizes baptism that saves you also – not the removal of dirt from the body, but the pledge of a good conscience toward God" (1 Peter 3: 21). Taking Bateson's paradigm of creation into account, Christian baptism is exactly such a kind of "creation", symbolically, maybe psychologically and physically upon the believer. A "new form", i.e., "new nature" in this case has been added on to the old body of the baptized. It is but an incomplete creation as I define in the first section of this paper.

However, the resurrection of Jesus is another "creation". Before his death on the cross, his body existed in this world, but without sin, that is, a "new form" was already there. This earthly body with its new form passed through death without any harm save some scars. Although no scriptures mention that his body was transfigured when he ascended to heaven, but before the eyes of Peter, John and James, he did transfigure once (Mark 9: 2). In contrast, all the reborn believers are waiting for such a "complete creation". When Christ Jesus comes again, the dead believers will be "resurrected", and those alive will be "transfigured" (1 Thes. 4: 17; Rev. 20: 4). To answer the question how the dead are to be raised and with what kind of body they will come, Paul declared: "When you sow, you do not plant the body that will be, but just a seed. ... But God gives it a body as he has determined, and to each kind of seed he gives its own body,..." (1 Cor. 15: 37b, 38). At that future time, the new form (nature) and the new substance (body) will be united. A complete creation will be achieved. This is the third reference




FIG. 1.




FIG. 2.

to baptism in the New Testament, but a prophetic and ultimate one. No wonder, Beasley (1962, pp.262) points out that "baptism is thus an entry into the eschatological order of the new creation."

2. The Lord's Supper

Van Gennep did not discuss The Lord's Supper in his book, but he did say that "the ritual of the Mass also constitutes a sequence of rites of separation, transition, and incorporation. The only theoretical distinction between initiation and the Mass is that the latter is an initiation which is periodically renewed" (1906, pp. 96). Chapple and Coon (1942) went further and distinguished individual rites of passage and rites of intensification of a group of people. The latter are associated with seasons and other regular occurrences which bring about changes in human activity. Obviously, The Lord's Supper belongs to this classification. But we find that Van Gennep's comment on the Mass is also true for The Lord's Supper.

By self-examination and reverence, the believers separate themselves from the secular world and are ready for accepting the transformative principles of high level. When the pastor breaks the bread and addresses the utterance as Jesus did in the Last Supper, giving meaning to the action: "This is my body given for you". Since the action of "breaking" emphasizes Jesus' death, it can be seen as a rite of separation. Then the bread is distributed among the believers. They eat it together. Again, the pastor takes a cup of wine and says that it represents Jesus' blood of the New Covenant. This time, Jesus' death is emphasized by "shedding blood" which may be also seen as a rite of separation. But in the meanwhile, both utterances also introduce the following distribution among the believers. The distribution can be regarded as a rite of transition. To eat and drink could be thought as a rite of incorporation. To put them another way, we may say that breaking bread, since it especially emphasizes Christ's death, is a rite of separation. In contrast, the pouring wine, because its purpose is to establish a new covenant, is a rite of incorporation (Fig. 3).

In regard to the relationships of bread and wine, Christ's body and blood and New Covenant, we can find many other references in the Bible, which will illuminate its high-level transformative principles. A direct prototype of The Lord's Supper in the Old Testament is the Passover. Exodus: Ch. 12 records its origin and meaning in detail. Sheep were slaughtered. The blood was painted on the frame of each family's doorway in order to avoid God's Wrath, for God struck down all the firstborn in Egypt. This last plague led Pharaoh to agree to let the Israelites leave. In the meantime, since the Israelites had eaten the meat of lambs, they had strength to fled right away. Later on, the Lord made an agreement with Israel that they had to consecrate to Him every firstborn male, whether man or animal. Similar to the Passover, the sin offering also required the blood of a young bull or a goat. The blood was sprinkled and poured out on certain spots. Then the body of the




FIG. 3.

FIG. 3.




FIG. 4

FIG. 4.

animal was burnt (Levi. Ch.4).

According to the Gospels, on the night that Jesus was betrayed, he established the communion as well as the New Covenant at the Passover meal. He asked his believers to do it in remembrance of him and told them that he will drink the wine anew with them in his father's kingdom (Matt. 26: 29). The prophetic event is also described as a feast or the wedding Supper of the Lamb in the Kingdom of God (Luke 13: 29; Rev. 19: 9). The relation between Jesus' death, his outpoured blood, and the New Covenant have detailed explanation in the Book of Hebrews (Ch. 9, 10). But as to the relation of bread and wine, and The Words, we shall do a further investigation.

Earlier in the Gospels, we see Jesus saying to Satan: "Man does not live on bread alone, but on every word that comes from the mouth of God" (Matt. 4: 4). He also declared: "I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty" (John 6: 35). Moreover, he gave a hard analogy: "Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day" (John 6: 54). Then he explained to the disciples: "The words I have spoken to you are spirit and they are life" (John 6: 63ff). God's words in the Old Testament might be passed onto the Israelites through the prophets, but were primarily embodied in the Law. However, the Law and the various prophecies were just preludes of God's redemptive plan. Since the Law was written on the rock and prophecies were delivered by prophets, both are thought external and unable to touch man's interior directly. At most, what they can do is to let man know they all have sinned (Gal. 3: 22; Romans 7: 7). But Jeremiah prophesied: "This is the covenant I will make with the house of Israel after that time, declares the Lord, I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts..." (Jeremiah 31: 33). The way to "put my law in their minds" was "The Word became flesh and lived for a while among us" (John 1: 14ff). The Word is Jesus Christ. For cleansing man's sin and paying the price of it, he was nailed on the cross, but resurrected by God. Anyone listens to the Gospel and feels God's grace, finally, believes the message. This is exactly to let God "write the law, i.e., the words on his mind and heart", according to the Christian interpretation. Moreover, a promise has been given by Jesus Christ that whoever believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life. This is the New Covenant [2].

If we list key elements of the references mentioned above, we may see more clearly the analogies among them.

Old Covenant / God's words (the Law and prophecies) – obey, follow – life

New Covenant / Jesus' words – obey, follow – eternal life

/ Incarnate Word's death and resurrection (Jesus body & blood) –
believe (inwardly) – eternal life

Last Supper / bread and wine – eat, drink (inwardly) – physical life

or increased with the addition of new members. Such changes create a need for this spiritual body (the local church) to be reannounced again and again. That means observing the Communion repeatedly in order to re-establish a new equilibrium based upon this changed situation (Chapple & Coon, 1942). In terms of Turner's two-level proposition, the ritual, at least, is served to reannounce such a community as one group in its social milieu, i.e., the lower level.

Another reason for repeating ritual is related to the higher level, that the church consists of believers who have a new nature but old bodies. In other words, Satan can still exercise his power through believers' and un-believers' minds and behavior, and bring chaos to the world or even a church. To be a little more precise, the arena in which Satan draws his influence most dramatically are the moments when individuals make their decisions. Decision-making sums up one's thoughts and feelings, and on the other hand, motivates one's action. Therefore, the process of making a decision also constitutes three stages, viz. inner process, the decision-making itself, and external behavior (Fig. 5).

As a matter of fact, the existential circumstance of mankind characterizes its sequences of choices or decision-making (Culmman, 1962). Under the changing subjective and objective conditions, a person receives a variety of messages which keep his mind running and motivate him to take action. Usually, there are many decisions to be made before an action is taken. Although a choice may mean freedom and hope, it also may mean uncertainty, anxiety, and fear. Nevertheless, in Christian belief, the decisions made by anyone himself are thought always wrong in some senses, since he/she possesses a corrupt nature (Eph. 2: 3). Because the first man and woman failed to obey God's command when they fell to the temptation of the serpent. They ate a fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil [4].

If we look closely at the situation that Adam and Eve were in, we find it also consists of three stages (Fig. 6). Previously, they were with God in the Garden of Eden. Then they were driven out of the Garden. Between these two durations is the Fall. They made a wrong decision and offended God's order. The event could be considered as a paradigm of destruction, a reversal of creation, because it led to death. Although the man and woman might live a life in "this world", finally would return to the earth, since from it they were taken (Genesis Ch. 2 & 3). Moreover, according to the principle of representation in Christianity, their offspring therefore also sin on many occasions of decision-making, which will lead to their own death as well.

Only conversion and believing in Christ is thought to be able to change this destiny. After learning God's words, a person may reach a decision whether to believe or not to believe. He or she makes a first "leap of faith", named by Kierkegaard. In fact, to believe means not to make a decision, but simply to follow the Words. That is why Jesus said: "You did not choose me, but I chose you"




FIG. 5.




FIG. 6.

(John 15: 16ff). Then the believer is expected "to go and bear fruit — fruit that will last," i.e., to obey God's words accordingly. However, in addition to being confined by his old body, he is still living in this sinful world. Reaching points to make decisions in a Christian life is as frequent as it is for an un-believer. In case of no knowing God's words regarding the given situations, Christians are advised to listen to what the Holy Spirit instructs him to do. Otherwise, the decision itself will become irrelevant, because whatever a Christian does he should be in faith. Nevertheless, he should be in a precautious manner in order to "test everything", as Paul suggested (1 The. 5: 21), so that the good may be hold on to, every kind of evil may be avoided. This is the way of "sanctification". Therefore, practicing The Lord's Supper is not only to "remind" the believers that such a faith is valid in gaining eternal life all the time, but also because of a same pattern which underlies the decision-making and The Lord's Supper, it may suggest a way of "sanctification" to the believers giving efficacy to their daily life.

Through such processes, each individual Christian and the Church as a whole fight against Satan in spirit, until Time is up. So, the baptism given by Jesus to this world, that He created the Church, is an incomplete creation. At most, it points to a complete one. That is during the Last Day, when the final war between angels and demons will elicit a new heaven and earth. At there, God's children not only have the privilege to join the Wedding Feast of Lamb, but also will rule the new kingdom with Christ (Rev. Ch. 19, 20). It is the final and perfect imagery of the Church who has endured and won victory in "the past age".

Considering the whole spectrum of time, we will find again that the ultimate authority, God, performs an absolute and complete creation upon the universe (Fig. 7). Before human history, God created earth and heavens from nothing, then gave forms to the primordial matter and all the creatures. After human history, the kingdom of God with its absolute order will descend, as John prophesied: "... I saw a new heaven and a new earth... He who seated on the throne said; 'I am making everything new!'" (Rev. 21: 1, 5). Human history locates itself in such an eternal coordinate. It is an interval between two eternities. One has no beginning the other has no end. Fitting to Van Gennep's pattern, human history in Christian idea is but a period of transition. From another point of view, the interval, may be described as Abrahams' statement (1973) given to a ritual: "The vitality of ritual springs from the confrontations of order and disorder for which it provides an arena." However, it has a definite direction approaching an absolute order. This is what Rappaport (1979, pp.291) said, that the confrontation of order and disorder appears only in certain lower levels, and always under control of an absolute order. In history, the battles of order and anti-order are dramatic and real. Being symbolized as a baptism, the period of the Old Covenant could be regarded as the immersion in water, and that of the New Covenant could be seen as the rising from water. Between the immersion and rising was the deepest and breathless point,




FIG. 7.

The Word incarnated. The Word's event, including his crucifixion and resurrection, again could be represented by the three stages of rites of passage, just like the origin and fate of the Christian world could be.

3. Conclusion

According to the above investigation, we find that although baptism is a ritual for individual conversion, and The Lord's Supper is a remembrance of God's grace in the Church as a whole, both present the Christian world-view in which the "Logos", i.e., the Incarnate Words, Jesus Christ, is their major theme. The result supports Rappaport's hypothesis: the invariant elements of major rituals of a religion or culture express its highest truth — the Logos. In addition, we find that these two sacraments express the Christian world-view not only in terms of analogical relationships of meanings, but also of structural pattern. In other words, the Christian world-view and the two sacraments can be analyzed by the pattern of the rites of passage. Furthermore, we have seen that many biblical events to which the sacraments are referred can also be fitted into the pattern. Why does this happen? One answer may be that, from the Christian point of view, time appears linearly (Culmann, 1962). The pattern of rites of passage proceeds as well in linear form.

Of course, the rite of passage is but a fragment on the temporal coordinate. It may be fitted into a cyclic as well as a linear world-view. For example, the Buddhists also have various rites of passage, but meditation as a ritual cannot be analyzed completely by the simple pattern of rites of passage (Gomez, 1985). Somehow, in the Christian world-view, time is thought naively linear, and it lacks the concept of timeless or time beyond. Therefore, in dividing larger time spans, the pattern may be applied perfectly. As such mankind and the universe are the initiates, and God has been giving them a rite of passage.

Moreover, we find this pattern similar to the process of person's decision-making. At least in Western culture, especially existentialism, human life is thought to be characterized in its sequence of choices. The resemblance of these two patterns makes the sacraments not only carry the Christian world-view and Logos, but also allows the world-view and Logos to have the possibility of giving "positive" efficacy to the lives of the believers, through their practice of the sacraments and daily decision making. No matter how, individual believers and the Church still fall into the trap of time and space limits. Their decision-making and rituals differ greatly from God's plan and the rite He has been doing upon the world and mankind. That is, the latter must contain a paradigm of perfect creation, whereas in the former cases or when we look at partial human history there may only be present some incomplete creation. However, all these cases hold a momentum which promotes their approach to an end of perfect creation in form of Christian ideology [5]. The above accounts may suggest that Turner's high-level transformative principles can be divided into two levels, or even three levels. Borrowing Bateson's term, one may be called "a paradigm of incomplete creation", another called "a complete creation". The third one, which is the reversal of the former two, may be named as "a paradigm of destruction".

For the same reason, the linear time concept in Christianity makes its Logos differ from that described by Heraclitus. The latter, though thought to have a dynamic nature is basically static. There are only two kinds of relationships man may have with it (Kirk 1954). To be more precise, in a segregative relationship, a person utilizes an analytic view to see the phenomena of the world, whereas in the other relationship, a synthetic view is taken, which is considered to be the only way to understand fully this Logos. Such a concept of "Logos" resembles "Tao" in Chinese Taoism. The Logos in Christianity, however, has been personified. "He" can act in time. "He" influence human history and the universe. Moreover, it is considered to be active in ways of giving human revelations. What humans can do is to accept. Such revelations in a sense, have been once and for all. But in other sense, they are revealed progressively. Although His actions in the period of the Old Covenant are different from that of the New Covenant, both are thought to be consistent. Therefore, Heraclitus' Logos and the Tao of Chinese Taoism still remain in the realm of philosophy and metaphysics, but cannot be seen as the Logos in Chris-

tianty which is accepted by the believers as a beam of brilliant hope of a religion.

Notes

1. In reviewing this paper, Prof. Rappaport found that “forty” may be a number of “transition” in Christianity. Noah and his sons stayed in the Ark in order to escape from the “forty days and forty nights” Flood. Israel wandered in the Desert of Sinai for “forty years”. Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert also for “forty days and forty nights”. Even the interval between Old Testament and New Testament is “four hundred” years.
2. Interestingly, the basic principle behind God’s redemption plan is somewhat similar to the argument that Rappaport (1979) gives to the relationship of evolution of language and that of ritual. That is, language or the Law are free of referents, unless they are fulfilled by actions, such as rituals and incarnation of the Word.
3. To this point, we may recall that the baptized gains only a new nature, but still possesses his previous physical body. But in another sense, he becomes a member of one body, i.e., the Church.
4. Interestingly, having eaten the fruit, Adam and Eve were able to identify good and evil, but it also put them always into positions of having to make decisions. Nevertheless, by the same act, they have already disobeyed God.
5. The Buddhist cosmology does not contain a paradigm of perfect creation, but one of re-incarnation and a realm beyond time and space, i.e., nirvana.

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基督教聖禮與世界觀

——以修改過之“rites of passage”模型分析

關華山

摘要

拉勃波曾提出：任何宗教或文化的中心思想、真理、“Logos”似乎相當程度地表達在它各類儀式或整體儀節的序列裡。本論文即在利用修改過的“rites of passage”模型，做為概念工具，分析基督教主要的兩項聖禮：洗禮與聖餐，以檢驗上述之假設。

經過解析，本假設被肯定、支持。兩項聖禮的確展現了基督教的世界觀，於其中“Logos”，即“成肉身的道”，基督耶穌是中心意旨。除此之外，基督教世界觀的數個面相以及兩項聖禮，均可被修改過之rites of passage 模型分析得大致完盡。

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Concerning the Evolution and Use of the Concept of 天 (T'ien)
in Pre-Imperial China

Paul Harwood

Introduction

T'ien (天) is one of the most important concepts in classical Chinese culture and philosophy. Despite this it has not, at least in Western works on Chinese philosophy, received the attention which it deserves. It is true that the early form of T'ien attracted the attention of nineteenth century sinologists, but the more developed forms of the Warring States Period (戰國時代) have been comparatively neglected. For example, the concept as it is used in the *Chuang Tzu* (莊子) has received little attention, although it is at least as important and prominent as the concept of Tao (道).¹

A major problem in the study of T'ien is the diversity of its meanings. Fung Yu-lan lists five different meanings: ...²

1. A material or physical T'ien or sky.
2. A ruling or presiding T'ien.
3. A fatalistic T'ien.
4. A naturalistic T'ien.
5. An ethical T'ien.

The result of this diversity of meanings is that it is used in different contexts with a variety of different implications ... religious, political, philosophical and ethical. This frequently makes it extremely difficult to define the term in a given context, a fact which can be gauged by the long debate which ensued in Chinese philosophical literature on what the early philosophers meant by T'ien. A good illustration of this is to be found in H.G. Lamont's article, *An Early Ninth Century Debate on Heaven*.³ That is a millenium after the period with which this paper is concerned.

The confusion, which arose over the concept of T'ien in Chinese philosophical circles, has been reflected in Western sinology and in Western translations of Chinese literature and has, moreover, been compounded by the need to find adequate equivalents in Western languages. Thus, not only has there been disagreement among Western scholars on the meaning of T'ien in Chinese philosophy, but there has also been disagreement on its translation. Even where the same term is used to translate it, it does not necessarily follow that the same meaning is implied. For instance, a fairly common equivalent for T'ien in the translation of texts of the Warring States Period is *Nature* or *nature*, but the use of this word does not necess-

arily imply that different translators mean the same thing. As Cornford points out, "No philosophical term is more dangerously ambiguous."⁴

Furthermore Western scholars have not infrequently been guilty of translating and discussing Chinese philosophical works in the light of Western modes of thought, thus imposing alien concepts on Chinese philosophy. This is particularly striking in the case of pioneer sinologists of the nineteenth century, some of whom (often missionaries) were at pains to find monotheistic tendencies in Chinese philosophy in order to facilitate the introduction of Christian doctrines into China. This tendency was taken to the extent of reading into the Confucian Classics a primitive form of Christianity towards which the Chinese were struggling without the benefit of revelation. This attitude can be seen in James Legge's *The Religions of China*. We owe much to these early sinologists, but well-meaning though their attempts were, in striving to find a base on which to establish Christian doctrines, they served only to obscure the real meaning of concepts such as T'ien, which should be examined only against the background of Chinese culture, history and philosophy.

The object of this paper is to describe the main lines of development of the concept of T'ien from the beginning of the Chou (周) dynasty to the end of the Warring States Period. In tracing this development it is hoped also to indicate the remarkable changes that took place in the Chinese world-view.

Chronologically speaking the study of T'ien may be divided roughly into three periods, which form if not distinct at least distinguishable phases. These are:

1. The nature of T'ien in the Early Chou Period.
2. The transition in the Spring and Autumn Period (春秋時代) from a concept with implications of deity to a secular idea.
3. The use made of this modified form of T'ien by the various schools of thought of the Warring States Period.

This chronological framework will be used for the chapters which follow. The various texts of the Warring States Period, which are to be used, will be accorded separate chapters as far as possible in chronological sequence.

The Concept of T'ien in the Western Chou Period

The traditional though disputed date for the foundation of the Chou dynasty is 1122 B.C.* For present purposes this date will be taken as a starting point. The evidence which we possess concerning the nature of T'ien in the Western Chou period is to be found in the *Book of Documents* (書經) and the *Book of Poetry* (詩經). Another source of evidence is to be found in bronze inscriptions, but since this is a field of highly specialized study, the evidence which will be adduced here will be confined to the *Book of Documents* and the *Book of Poetry*.

Before examining the *Book of Documents* attention should be drawn to an

* On the problems concerning this date see H.G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, P. 486-92.

important conclusion concerning T'ien, which has emerged from the work of Creel. In the *Origins of Statecraft in China* Creel seems to have established beyond any reasonable doubt that the concept, T'ien, was not known to the Shang (商) before the Chou conquest. He bases this conclusion on a rigorous examination of all extant literary sources including oracle bones and bronze inscriptions.⁵ According to Creel, "In all of our Western Chou sources, if the meaning of the character is disregarded, T'ien occurs 383 times. (Book of changes, 8, Poetry 162, Documents 122, Bronze inscriptions 91.) This stands in sharp contrast to the fact that in all of the known Shang inscriptions this character never seems to occur at all."⁶ This fact has an important bearing on the study of T'ien, which will become apparent below.

In the *Book of Documents* there are thirty documents which purport to be of the Chou dynasty. Modern scholars, however do not accept the authenticity of all these. Creel in the *Origins of Statecraft in China* accepts only twelve.⁷ On the basis of linguistic evidence Dobson substantiates the authenticity of all but one of these.⁸ The evidence presented here will be confined to these eleven documents, a list of which can be found in Section A of the bibliography.

The first point to be made concerning T'ien in this period is that it was seen as a presiding deity, guiding and controlling the affairs of men. Since this aspect of T'ien is apparent in almost all that follows, perhaps one example will be sufficient here. In the document entitled *Numerous Regions* (多方) we find the words, "Heaven thereupon instructed them, and increased their excellence, made choice of them, and gave them the decree of Yin, to rule over your many regions."

天惟式教我用休，簡界殷尹爾多方。 q

There are three important outgrowths of T'ien in the *Book of Documents* based upon this conception of it as a presiding deity. They are clearly interconnected so that it is not possible to separate them completely. However, for the sake of clarity it will be preferable to treat them separately notwithstanding an inevitable degree of overlap. The first of these is the political use, which the Chou made of T'ien, the second is what may be termed an incipient ethical aspect of T'ien and the third concerns T'ien's being part of an organic whole involving both Man and Earth.

Looking at the first of these, the political aspect, there can be no doubt that the Chou rulers used the idea of T'ien to impose their authority on the Shang people and to strengthen their hold over that area of the Yellow River (黃河) basin formerly ruled by the Shang dynasty. This is a recurrent theme in the *Book of Documents*. For example, in the document called the *Numerous Officers* (多士) the Duke of Chou (周公) addresses former Shang officials:

Great ruin came down on Yin from the want of pity in compassionate Heaven, and we, the princes of Chou received its favouring decree. We accordingly felt charged with its bright terrors, carried out the punishments which Kings inflict, rightly disposed of the appointment of Yin.

昊天大降喪于殷，我有周佑命，將天命致王爵殷命。¹⁰

In the same document we read:

Heaven then sought among your many regions making a great impression by its terrors, to stir up one who might look (reverently) to it; but in all your regions there was not one deserving of its regard. There were, however, our Kings of Chou, who treated well the multitudes of the people, and were able to sustain the burden of virtuous [government], and to preside over all services to spirits and to Heaven.

天惟求爾多方，大動以威開厥顧天，惟爾多方，罔堪顧之，惟我周王靈承于旅克堪用德，惟典神天。¹¹

From these two passages it is immediately apparent that the Chou rulers introduced the idea of the Mandate of Heaven (天命) to justify their usurpation of Shang rule. The Duke of Chou says that the Shang lost the mandate because of their failure to rule wisely. Heaven, therefore, withdrew its mandate, and transferred it to the Chou rulers, who were virtuous and fulfilled their duties to Heaven.

This account of T'ien Ming was accepted by the Chinese and also by Western scholars until the present century. It has only been with the discovery of the Shang oracle bones, and the realization that the Shang seem to have had no knowledge of T'ien before the Chou conquest, that the deception of the Chou has been brought to light.* It is on this issue that Creel's evidence quoted above (P. 3) seems to be conclusive.

The Chou rulers used the idea of T'ien not only to justify their overthrow of the Shang, but also as a means of political control. In the document entitled *Numerous Regions* (多方) the Duke of Chou, speaking on behalf of the King, uses the idea of the Mandate of Heaven to try to persuade the Shang to co-operate with the Chou.

* 'Deception' may be too strong a term. The Chou may simply have been striving to impose their deity on the Shang.

Why do you not aid and co-operate with us the Kings of Chou to secure the enjoyment of Heaven's favouring decree? You now still dwell in your dwellings, and cultivate your fields, ... why do you not obey our Kings and consolidate the decree of Heaven.

爾曷不夾介入我周王享天之命，今爾尚宅爾宅，町爾田爾曷不
惠王熙天之命。 ¹²

Later in the same document the Duke of Chou says that if the Shang do not submit obediently to Chou rule, then the Chou will act as the instrument of Heaven in order to chastize them.

Throughout your many regions, you will bring on yourselves the terrors of Heaven, and I also will inflict its punishments, removing you far from your country.

則惟爾多方探天之威，我則致天罰離逃爾土。 ¹³

Finally T'ien and the related idea of T'ien Ming are used to impress upon the Chou rulers and officials, the awesome responsibility which they have assumed and which they must faithfully fulfil. This is brought out very clearly in the *Great Announcement* (大誥). The young King, Ch'eng Wang (成王) says,

Oh! the clearly intimated will of Heaven is to be feared: ... it is to help my great inheritance.

嗚呼，天命畏，弼我不丕基。 ¹⁴

And again,

Heaven moreover is thus toiling and distressing my people, so that it is as if they were suffering from disease; how dare I allow the appointment which the Tranquillizer, my predecessor, received, to be without its happy fulfilment.

天亦惟用勤恚我民，若有疾，子曷敢不于前寧人條受休畢。 ¹⁵

The use of T'ien for practical political purposes, which has been outlined here, was one of the great innovations of the early Chou rulers and was to have far-reaching effects on Chinese history.

The second point at issue, what was referred to as the incipient ethical aspect

of T'ien, is a rather complex question. This period belonged to the pre-moral phase of society. Waley calls it "auguristic-sacrificial", for its tendency is to make thought centre largely round the twin occupations of augury and sacrifice. These, however, are means towards a further end, the maintenance of communication between Heaven and Earth."¹⁶ There can be no doubt that sacrifices were considered to be important. This can be seen in the words,

You (the Shang) kept reckoning on some decree of Heaven and did not keep with perpetual awe before your thoughts the preservation of your sacrifices.

洪惟圖天之命，弗永寅念于祀。¹⁷

Nor can there be any doubt that the ruler was responsible for knowing Heaven's will. This he does through various divination practices, in the following instance through the use of a tortoise shell.

I dare not preclude the possibility of Heaven's sending down retribution, so I have used the very precious tortoise shell bequeathed to me by the blessed (i.e. departed) Kings to make clear what is Heaven's will.

子不敢閉于天降威用，寧王遺我大寶龜，紹天命。¹⁸

In addition to these practices, however, Heaven's approval must be sought through the cultivation of "te" (德). This aspect is very prominent in the document, *Prince Shih*, (君奭). The Duke of Chou speaking to Prince Shih says,

Heaven is not to be trusted. Our course is simply to seek the prolongation of the virtue of the Tranquillizing King and Heaven will not find occasion to remove its favouring decree which King Wan received.

天不可信，我道寧王德延，天不用于文王受命。¹⁹

The same attitude is expressed very forcefully in the words,

Let the king now sedulously cultivate the virtue of reverence. When he is all devoted to this virtue, he may pray to Heaven, for a long-abiding decree in his favour.

肆惟王其疾敬德，王其德之用祈天永命。²⁰

Legge, as can be seen, translated 德 as "virtue." Waley on the other hand considers it to mean "power" gained by the correct practice of ritual and securing favourable omens. It seems likely that Waley is nearer the mark than Legge. Nevertheless, whether or not there is implicit in 德 any element of what we understand by "virtue" today, it is clear from other passages in the *Book of Documents* already quoted that the ruler and his officials should adopt a standard of conduct which, if we are to dispense with the term "virtuous," we may call "correct." When they fall short of this standard, T'ien shows its displeasure and ultimately the mandate is withdrawn.

The reason for this is that there is in T'ien the idea of order, which must be reflected by an ordered state of human affairs. The Shang King was

greatly abandoned to extraordinary lewdness and dissipation, for pleasures sake he abandoned all his majesty, the people were all sorely grieved and wounded in heart, but he gave himself wildly to spirits, not thinking of ceasing, but continuing his excess, till his mind was frenzied, and he had no fear of death ... so that Heaven sent down ruin on Yin and showed no love for Yin.

誕惟厥縱淫洗于非彝用燕喪威儀，民罔不盡傷心，惟荒腆于酒。
不惟自息仍逸厥心疾狠，不克畏死，……天降喪于殷，罔愛于殷

。 21

A similar passage states,

(Indeed), it was the case that the last sovereign of your Shang was luxurious to the extreme while his schemes of government showed neither purity nor progress, so that Heaven sent down such ruin on him.

乃惟爾商後王，逸厥逸，圖厥政，不益黜，天惟降時喪。 22

Many other passages of a similar nature could be quoted, all showing T'ien's disapproval of licence, debauchery and disorder.

Hence the ruler must observe the rites and sacrifices, cultivate virtue, ensure order in the state and orderly conduct in himself and his people. All this to ensure T'ien's approval and the continuation of the mandate. There is here, at the very least, the seeds of what was later to become the ethical aspect of T'ien, an aspect which was to be developed by the Confucianists. At this stage it is rather crudely put, not as a matter of human morality, but simply as a means to an end.

The third and final aspect of T'ien in the *Book of Documents* is also concerned

with the idea of harmony and order. The ruler's talk as T'ien's representative on Earth, was to establish order so that it would reflect the order of T'ien and thus create a harmonious whole. It is thought that the character 王 (Wang) may be a representation of this function. The three horizontal lines represent Heaven and Earth with the people in the centre and the vertical line stands for the ruler, who unites and harmonizes the whole through the conduct described above.²³ In this regard it should be noted that the cult of Heaven was essentially restricted to a royal cult of Heaven, carried out by the ruler on behalf of his people. This formulation of an interconnected system, each part affecting the whole, was to become a central concept of Chinese philosophy, culminating in the highly developed theory of correspondences in Han Confucianism.

The dominant impression one has of T'ien from the *Book of Documents* is of a religious concept, a presiding deity, being exhaustively used as an instrument of political propaganda, to justify the Chou conquest, to hold the Shang in submission, and to exhort the Chou rulers to govern wisely. The order implicit in T'ien tends also to promote a standard of orderly behaviour, which is the first step towards an ethical principle in T'ien and ultimately in Man himself. Finally, this same order implicit in T'ien and T'ien's wish that this order should be extended over the Earth and into human affairs was the basis of what was later to become a highly developed theory of the organic unity of the universe.

The Transition in the Spring and Autumn Period

One of the most intriguing questions concerning the concept of T'ien in pre-imperial China is its transition from the idea of a presiding deity to a secular idea, which was used by the various schools of thought of the Warring States Period (戰國時代) This transition took place during the Spring and Autumn Period (春秋時代), 772-481 B.C., though it may have begun even before this. The major source of evidence for this transition is to be found in the *Book of Poetry*. Fung Yu-lan also quotes some interesting passages from the *Tso Chuan* (左傳).²⁴ Confucius' attitude as it is set forth in the *Analects* (論語) is also adduced as evidence to support various points of view. Before examining this evidence, however, it would be well to mention briefly the various theories, which have been advanced to explain this shift in meaning of T'ien.

Firstly, it is suggested that it paralleled the loss of power by the Chou rulers over the Chou hegemony. That is to say as the authority and control of the Chou rulers weakened so the authority of that supernatural force, upon which they based so much of their own authority, also became weaker. It is interesting to note that with the unification of the empire and after the short-lived experiment of the Ch'in (秦) with Legalism, the state cult of T'ien was again resurrected as a symbol and basis of Han (漢) authority. This cult continued in a more or less attenuated

form until the fall of the empire in 1911.

A second reason, which is advanced, is the rise of rationalism and speculation. It was observed that the prosperity or otherwise of a state was a direct consequence of the proper functioning of government or lack of it. Thus the emphasis in human affairs shifted from the idea of supernatural control to the primacy of men's own ability and conduct, particularly the ruler's and his ministers' concern for the people and their ability to organize the government in the interests of the people.

It has been noted that in the Early Chou period the need to practice virtue in order to secure and preserve the mandate of Heaven was already present. To an extent, therefore, the onus already lay upon the ruler and his ministers. This idea was extended, emphasizing the more practical aspects of government and excluding the divine sanction of T'ien. The move towards a more speculative attitude probably owed something also to increasing contact with other cultures, especially to the south of the Chou Kingdom. It seems likely that the state of Ch'u (楚) played a significant role in this respect.

Thirdly the cult of T'ien was an aristocratic one remote from the common people, who practised various animistic cults, whose significance in terms of weather, growth of crops and harvesting was of much more vital concern to them. Finally, T'ien had never developed a distinctive personality and became as Lamont says, "a *deus otiosus* while his place is taken by other divinities."^{2 5}

There is no doubt that a comprehensive answer to the question of the transition in the meaning and significance of T'ien would be much more complex, but the reasons given above go some way towards describing the basis of the change. We must now turn to the evidence which is to be found principally in the *Book of Poetry*. The value of the *Book of Poetry* with regard to the idea of T'ien lies firstly in the fact that the poems were composed from the beginning of the Chou dynasty down to the seventh Century B.C. Secondly, due largely to the linguistic research of Dobson it is possible to give an approximate chronology for the composition of the poems. They are divided into four groups: the *Sung* (頌) or Hymns, the *Ta Ya* (大雅) or Greater Odes, the *Hsiao Ya* (小雅) or Lesser Odes and the *Kuo Feng* (國風) or Airs of the States.

The traditional dating of these groups, confirmed by linguistic evidence is that the *Sung* were composed in the eleventh and tenth Centuries, the *Ta Ya* in the tenth and ninth centuries, the *Hsiao Ya* in the ninth and eighth centuries and the *Kuo Feng* in the eighth and seventh centuries.^{2 6} Our ability to date the four groups even so approximately as this allows us to examine the development of the idea of T'ien on a reasonably sound chronological basis.

A striking feature of the *Book of Poetry* is the marked decrease in occurrences of T'ien in the two later groups, the *Hsiao Ya* and the *Kuo Feng*. Of the 40 poems of the *Sung* group, that is of the earliest period, T'ien occurs in 16. In the 31 poems of the *Ta Ya* it occurs in 19. But in the *Hsiao Ya* it occurs in only 7 of the

74 poems, and in the *Kuo Feng* it is present in only 22 out of 160.

It would be convenient to be able to say that this decrease indicates a waning of interest in T'ien as a ruling deity. Unfortunately two problems arise, which must be considered before any such conclusion can be contemplated. First, there is a marked divergence in themes between the earlier and later songs and secondly there is a degree of difference in authorship. Unless these differences can be satisfactorily accounted for there are no grounds for the conclusion mentioned above.

The *Sung*, according to Dobson, are the liturgy of the Chou court ceremonial. He points out that the language of these songs is consonant with that of the early Western Chou bronze inscriptions,

The language, frequently the phrasing, and occasionally a rhyme scheme of the inscriptions are in fact so close to the *Sung* hymns that it is possible they are of common authorship.²⁷

The inscriptions are often signed by the "recorders" or Tso-ts'e (作册), who may, therefore, also have composed the hymns. The earliest of the *Ta Ya* songs appear to be of the same authorship, but the later ones are of a more personal nature, and the theme of protest, which characterizes certain of them (Mao 253-258, 264 and 265) suggest that they were written by courtiers or ministers.

With the *Hsiao Ya* we have a broader range of authorship, which embraces not only courtiers but court ladies and soldiers. There is too a broader range of themes with an increased accent on songs of protest and of complaint, many of them of a more personal nature than the protest songs of the *Ta Ya*, which are directed at bad government in a general sense. Dobson lists four categories of songs of complaint in the *Hsiao Ya*:²⁸ of conditions generally (Mao 183, 191-198, 224), of particular people (Mao 184-185, 223), of personal anxieties (Mao 163, 200, 202, 203 and 219) and of unhappy women (Mao 187-189, 199, 201, 218, 225, 226 and 229).

The songs of the *Kuo Feng* are mainly love songs and preponderantly written by ladies of the courts. On this point Dobson is most insistent,

These *Kuo Feng* songs are certainly not folk songs originating in the countryside, but the songs of court ladies, courtly both in theme and language, patterning and echoing earlier court songs of nobles and their prowess.²⁹

From Dobson's studies two important facts emerge. First, the songs were predominantly if not exclusively composed by people of the courts. Second the whole anthology belongs to a unified and developing tradition. On this point Dobson writes,

A further inference is that the unity of the anthology, suggested by the homogeneity of its language, points to a central and common poetic tradition. The authors of the latest pieces are the self-conscious heirs of the earlier pieces.³⁰

And again Dobson states that,

Echoes abound in cliché and theme, in citation and adaptation from the earlier songs. The *Kuo Feng* authors were obviously familiar with, and built upon the songs of the earlier tradition.³¹

Now, bearing in mind these two conclusions of Dobson's research, in particular the adaptation and reworking of earlier themes, as for instance the adaptation of the theme and language of the relationship between lord and vassal to represent the relationship between lord and lady, we may be allowed to wonder if it is not strange that the idea T'ien, is so infrequent in the *Hsiao Ya* and *Kuo Feng*. It did not disappear altogether. There are instances of T'ien being invoked in love songs. In Mao 45 for example,

Oh Mother, oh Heaven
That a man could be so false

母也天只³²
不諒人只

The idea was still present, but was not called upon, despite the familiarity of the later authors with the theme and language of the earlier songs and the extensive adaptation of those earlier themes and language. Can the infrequency of T'ien in the later songs be ascribed to the difference in authorship and the change in actual themes? Certainly to a degree this must be the case, but it would seem that the discrepancy in use is too great to be entirely explained away by these considerations. One or more of the following conclusions would seem to be indicated.

First, that it indicates a reaction against or decline in interest in the idea of T'ien. Second, that there had been a shift of meaning in the idea of T'ien, which made it no longer suitable within this poetic tradition. Third, that the concept, T'ien, may not have been so deeply rooted in Chou culture as has been assumed. In support of this third point it must be noted, and cannot be sufficiently stressed that the cult of T'ien was an aristocratic cult, and that even within court circles it may have been restricted to the King and to his closest ministers and nobles. In his admirable work *The Religion of the Chinese People* Granet writes,

In feudal religion the cult of Heaven was only a dynastic and quite official cult, superimposed on the agrarian cults and the cults of Ancestors.³³

Although of some importance, the frequency with which T'ien occurs cannot be said to be in any way conclusive. For further evidence we must now turn our attention to the nature of T'ien as it appears in the songs. We shall deal only superficially with the *Sung* and *Ta Ya* since they serve only to confirm the impression of T'ien which emerged from the *Book of Documents*.

Dobson's conclusion, as already noted, is that the *Sung* represent the liturgy of the Chou court ceremonies. They are,

hymns of invocation and confession addressed to the royal ancestors and recitals of deeds of valor, present and past. Other pieces celebrate the presence of vassals and feudatories at the ceremonies.³⁴

A few quotations typical of T'ien in the *Sung* will demonstrate its affinity with the *Book of Documents*

The charge that Heaven gave
was solemn was for ever.³⁵

維天之命
於穆不已 b

Now let us day and night
Fear Heaven's wrath
And thus be shielded³⁶

我其夙夜
畏天之威 c
于時保之

Reverence, reverence
By Heaven all is seen
It's charge is not easy to hold³⁷

敬之敬之
天維顯思 d
命不易哉

Here we see again, as in the Book of Documents, the idea of the Heavenly mandate, the presiding role of Heaven, the need to observe Heaven's will, and, by implication, the need to practice virtue, because Heaven's "charge is not easy to hold."

The view of T'ien which emerges in the *Ta Ya* is not radically different, but the emphasis has changed, because circumstances have changed. The self-confidence and vitality of Chou rule in its earliest period, which so marks the Sung songs is not so evident here. There are instances of outcry against misrule and the self-indulgence of rulers. In such cases T'ien is referred to in its retributive sense, some examples of which are given below.

But those that rule today have brought disorder into the government

.....
Therefore mighty Heaven is displeased
Beware lest headlong as spring waters
you should be swept to ruin.³⁸

興迷亂于政
.....
肆皇天弗尚
如彼泉流
無論胥以亡。 e

High Heaven's charge is hard to keep
Consider what Heaven did to the Yin³⁹

宜鑒于殷
駿命不易。 f

Heaven cannot be trusted
Kingship is easily lost.⁴⁰

天難忱斯
不易維王。 g

There are indications here of weakness and complacency in Chou rule, but the attitude to T'ien has not changed. The Chou house still retained the appearance of unity. T'ien is still seen as a presiding deity, but its negative, retributive role is stressed as a warning to rulers.

The few references to T'ien in the *Hsiao Ya* are for the most part rather indeterminate. Some clearly indicate the sky as in Mao 224,

There is a bird flies high
Yes soars to Heaven⁴¹

有鳥高飛
亦傳于天 h

Others indicate the benevolent aspect of T'ien,

May Heaven guard and keep you
In great security.⁴²

天保定爾
亦孔之固 i

One at least implies impending doom,

Heaven is verging towards calamity⁴³

天步艱難 j

But in the main it is a curiously neutral Heaven that is indicated. As for example in Mao 207,

Oh bright Heaven high above
Shining down on the earth below
Our march to the west
Has led us to the desert wilds.⁴⁴

明明上天
照臨下土
我征徂西
至于芝野 k

This is apparently a song of complaint composed by a soldier far from home. It may be the sky that is signified here. If not it is a strangely passive T'ien.

There is one interesting exception in Mao 202. The author bemoans his inability to care for his parents,

Their good deeds I would requite,
It is Heaven not I that is bad⁴⁵

欲報之德
昊天罔極 l

Waley's translation in this last poem is, perhaps, a little extreme. Karlgren translates it, "I wished to requite your goodness, but great Heaven goes to excess."⁴⁶ Within the context of the song, however, the significance of the line is clear, T'ien is held responsible for the author's misery, and the author can see no justification for this. He goes on to say,

Other people all prosper
Why am I alone destroyed⁴⁷

民莫不穀
我獨不卒 m

This is not, it would seem, the benevolent T'ien (benevolent in response to virtue that is) that we have encountered thus far. The implication is that it is a blind, amoral force.

This is but one isolated case in the whole of the *Hsiao Ya* group. However, there are similar instances in the *Kuo Feng*. In Mao 40 the poet is complaining of his misfortunes and poverty. At the end of each verse there is the refrain

No doubt it was Heaven's doing
So what's the good of talking about it?⁴⁸

天實爲之
謂之何哉 n

There is a suggestion of fatalism in the refrain, but more important is the negative attitude which is expressed towards T'ien. There is a sense of muted protest at Heaven's injustice. The poet clearly feels that he has done nothing to justify such misery.

In Mao 121 there is a curiously ambivalent reference to T'ien. This too is a song of complaint and again T'ien occurs in a refrain,

O blue Heaven so far away
When will all this be settled.⁴⁹

悠悠蒼天
曷其有所 o

Here again there is a mood of resignation verging on fatalism, in which T'ien seems somehow to be implicated. There is neither accusation of Heaven's having caused the poet's misery, nor is there any suggestion that Heaven should correct the

situation. This too is a strangely neutral T'ien. Is it simply the sky which is referred to? It would seem not, but if this assumption is correct, then it is a T'ien which is devoid of any suggestion of influence or power.

The third and most remarkable instance of T'ien in the *Kuo Feng* songs occurs in Mao 131. Here too T'ien appears in a refrain,

That blue one, Heaven, takes all our good men
 Could we but ransom him
 There are a hundred would give their lives.⁵⁰

彼蒼者天，殲我良人，
 如何贖兮
 人百其身 p

Each repetition refers by name to a particular man, "who went with Duke Mu to the grave;" that is, was buried alive with the deceased Duke. It is known that Duke Mu of Ch'in () died in 621 B.C., so that we have an exact date for this particular song, which must have been one of the very latest to have been composed. This song contains a feeling of real bitterness all the more forceful for the restraint with which it is expressed. The attitude to T'ien comes out in the contrast, which is made between it and "our good men" (我良人). The malevolent influence of Heaven is suggested by this juxtaposition.

Other references to T'ien in the *Kuo Feng* are simply to the sky or to the Earth, T'ien hsia (天下). Although few in number the occasional references to T'ien cited above, which demonstrate such a significant reversal of the attitude to T'ien in the earliest period of Chou rule, constitute the most remarkable fact to emerge from the *Kuo Feng*. They are all the more remarkable when set against the absence of references to the T'ien of the earlier type.

Reference has already been made to the connection between the dissolution of the unity of Chou rule and the decline in influence of T'ien. It seems likely that this was the single most potent factor in the decline of T'ien as a presiding deity. As the Chou hegemony weakened and the courts of the various states gained in power, it would have been increasingly difficult to maintain the supremacy of T'ien, when its cult was being fragmented among the powerful and contending courts of the feudal states. The Chou hegemon represented the unity of earthly power and was the representative on Earth of the unity of heavenly power. When the earthly unity dissolved, so too would the unity and influence of that superior power. In short the idea of T'ien was too closely allied to that of kingship. Only with the unification of the empire under the Han could it be resurrected in its former guise.

In addition T'ien did not include the idea of a personal god in the western sense.

It did not carry with it the idea of individual worship and a personal relationship in the western sense. Had it done so it is unlikely that it could so easily have lost its hold over men's minds.

This decline together with the use of T'ien to mean "sky" was to give rise to an important development in the concept. T'ien as sky carried the idea of order from the regular movement of heavenly bodies and from the regular succession of the seasons. These considerations may indeed have been behind the formulation of the Early Chou concept, in which, as we have seen, the idea of order in a quasi-ethical sense, was already present. This idea of harmony and order, especially as represented in natural celestial phenomena, was to give rise to the gradual development of the conception of T'ien as "Nature".

The Problem of Confucius' Attitude to T'ien

Confucius (孔子) lived at the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, his traditional dates being 551-479 B.C. The only evidence of any reliability, which we possess as to the views of Confucius towards T'ien is contained in the *Analects* (論語), a collection of sayings of Confucius set down by his disciples. This is barely sufficient to justify any positive assertion of what Confucius' views were.

In the *Analects* there are 49 instances of the character 天. If we omit those occurring in the Son of Heaven (天子), in the Earth or Kingdom (天下), those of a purposive character... Heaven's will (天命), and others of an indeterminate nature such as, "There is no greatness like the greatness of Heaven"⁵¹. (唯天爲大), we are left with less than a dozen instances of 天 which can be regarded as in any way significant.

Perhaps the most important of these is the one which alludes to Confucius' reluctance to discuss Heaven. His disciple Tzu-kung (子貢) is reported as saying,

Our Master's views concerning culture and the outward insignia of goodness we are permitted to hear; but about Man's nature and the ways of Heaven he will not tell us anything at all.⁵²

夫子之文章，可得而聞也，
夫子之言性與天道不可得而
聞也。 r

Dubs' explanation of this in an essay, in which he tries to demonstrate the belief of Confucius in a single supreme God, is that, "Confucius evidently knew of no way to combat the religious skepticism abroad in his time and kept his religious views to himself."⁵³ This is a possible explanation, but by no means the only one. As is so often the case with early Chinese philosophical questions, the evidence available to us is so slight and so indeterminate if not indeed ambiguous, that it is

possible to defend widely divergent views from the same body of evidence.

Nonetheless, Confucius' reticence on the subject of T'ien is an important fact that cannot simply be ignored. It cannot be interpreted in isolation, but should be seen in the cultural and philosophical context of the time, which Dubs refers to as "the religious skepticism abroad in his time." Let us examine the position of Confucius.

Chinese philosophy may be said to have begun with Confucius, but he did not begin with a *tabula rasa*. It is known from the *Analects* that he venerated the early Chou rulers, especially the Duke of Chou. Not unnaturally, therefore, he adopted Early Chou concepts, amongst which the idea of T'ien was the central and underpinning force of government. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say with any degree of certainty whether or not he accepted it in the same sense. His attitude was equivocal hence his reticence.

Confucius could not afford, for the sake of political expediency, to reject the idea of T'ien, nor, probably, because of cultural ties would he have wished to do so. But living, as he did, some five centuries after the Early Chou rulers, and in a changed and changing society, he perhaps felt a certain tension in this position. His cultural links with the Early Chou were very strong, but the prevailing trend of thought in his own time was, as we have seen, away from the idea of T'ien at any rate as a ruling deity. He could not reject the idea, nor perhaps could he wholeheartedly accept it. He made the best use of it that he could, therefore, for his own purposes, and at the same time he moderated those aspects of it, which did not suit the tenor of the times. His reticence on the subject may have been due to the fact that he did not wish to become embroiled in futile controversy over a concept, which was in a state of transition.

What then can be said concerning the idea of T'ien in the *Analects*. Firstly it is clear that it is regarded as an ethical principle. This is implicit in almost all those references to T'ien, which have been referred to as "significant." Two examples are given here.

The Master said, 'Not so, He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.

子曰，不然，獲罪於天，無所禱也。

The Master said, Heaven produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan t'ui-what can he do?

子曰，天生德於子，桓魋其如子何。

Secondly, it would seem to be seen as a transcendent force or power, as in the following examples,

At fifty I knew the decrees of Heaven.⁵⁶

五十而知天命。

The kingdom has long been without the principles of (truth and right). Heaven is going to use your master as a bell with its wooden tongue.⁵⁷

天下之無道也久矣，
天將以夫子爲木鐸。

If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause, while Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me.⁵⁸

天之將喪斯文也，後死者，不得於與斯文也，
天之未喪其文也，匡人其如子何。

The T'ien which appears in these quotations is certainly akin to the Early Chou concept of a presiding deity, but more muted and restrained. This fact together with the small number of references to T'ien in the *Analects* make it impossible to say in exactly what sense Confucius conceived it. There is, however, a further reference, which is highly significant.

The Master said, 'Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses and all things are (continually) being produced (but) does Heaven say anything.'⁵⁹

子曰，天何言哉四時行焉，百物生焉。

It would be wrong to draw any definite conclusion on the basis of this one example. Yet, given Confucius' reticence on the subject, together with the rather restrained appearance of T'ien in the *Analects* this final example, in which T'ien appears in a more naturalistic light, suggests that Confucius' attitude to T'ien was in line with the developments we saw emerging in the *Hsiao Ya* and *Kuo Feng* groups of the *Book of Poetry*. Benjamin Schwarz has an interesting discussion of this particular reference in his recent work, *The World of Thought in Ancient China*. (P 123-26)

Before we leave Confucius something should be said on the general nature of his thought, which, although not directly connected with T'ien in the *Analects*, will have a bearing on later chapters. This can be introduced by a quotation from Book 4.

The Master said, where gentlemen set their hearts on moral force, the commoners set theirs upon the soil.

子曰，君子懷德，小人懷土。

This illustrates an attitude towards man himself, which is quite different from anything that had gone before. The idea of self-cultivation, of striving for moral ideas runs right through the *Analects*. Confucius did not discard ritual, on the contrary he considered it important as can easily be demonstrated from the *Analects*, but at the same time he took a decisive step in postulating the ideal of the moral responsibility of the individual. This attitude underlies everything he says with regard to the Chün tzu (君子), who in the *Analects* becomes the morally superior man, as opposed to the pre-Confucian ideal of the socially superior man.

The Mohist Reaction

The Mohist philosophy which flourished during the Warring States Period (403–221 B.C.) is a rather curious phenomenon; curious because, although it seems to have had a considerable following during the Warring States Period, from the time of the Ch'in dynasty it was completely eclipsed and received no further attention of any serious nature until the nineteenth century. The reasons for this reversal in fortunes need not detain us here.

Mohism is curious for a second reason, which is of more importance in the present context, namely the Mohist attitude to T'ien. Mo Tzu (墨子), the founder of Mohism, lived after the death of Confucius in 479 B.C. His exact dates are not known, but have been established within the period 479–381 B.C. But, whereas the attitude of Confucius, or at least of Confucius' immediate followers, to the idea of T'ien was a developing one, which we may assume to have been in harmony with and perhaps even to have directed the general intellectual trends of the time, Mo Tzu's attitude was a reversion to something much more akin to the Early Chou concept.

He envisaged a hierarchy of spirits ruled over by a supreme deity to which he refers either as Shang Ti (上帝) or more usually as T'ien. For example he writes,

Heaven and the spirits rewarded them by setting them up as the sons of Heaven⁶¹.

是故天鬼賞之立爲天子。 s

The importance of this deity for Mo Tzu can be gauged by the fact that three chapters of the *Mo Tzu* are entitled *The Will of Heaven* (天志上). There is every indication that he thinks of this deity as a personal god and as the ultimate standard of good.

Heaven desires righteousness and hates unrighteousness⁶²

天欲義而惡不義。 t

Heaven also surveys the world and punishes and rewards according to the conduct of the individual. Thus,

He who obeys the will of Heaven loving all men universally and working for their benefit will surely win reward. But he who disobeys the will of Heaven, showing partiality and hatred and working to injure others, will surely incur punishment.⁶³

順天意者，兼相愛，交相利，必得賞，反天意者，
別相惡交相賊必得罰。

This is essentially the T'ien of the Early Chou, but developed in order to support a complete system of morality based upon 'universal love' (兼愛). The presiding deity, T'ien, does not merely influence the ruler, but has been extended to include all mankind.

Mo Tzu proceeds step by step endeavouring, not always very successfully, to demonstrate the existence and reality of the spirits (鬼), and to establish his view of Heaven as an omniscient, personal god, which desires righteousness and rewards and punishes according to individual conduct. His emphatic assertion of these ideas gives rise to two interesting conclusions.

The first of these must be seen against the background of Mo Tzu's philosophy, which is remarkable for its utilitarian nature. Mo Tzu was nothing if not practical. For instance, like the Confucianists, he condemned warfare, but he was not content merely to preach universal love. He and his followers took steps to make warfare unprofitable by developing defensive techniques, which would render aggression futile. He was not concerned with metaphysical questions for their own sake. His sole concerns were the means to establish sound government in the interests of the people at large and to propound a system of morality based on the idea of universal love. He rejected as irrelevant anything which did not have a direct bearing on these central objectives. He denounced music, ritual, long periods of mourning, elaborate funerals and luxury goods, because they served no useful purpose. This practical orientation of his philosophy may be judged by the prominence in his writings of the two ideas of profit or advantage (利 li) and of accomplishment or effect (I Kung).

In the light of this it seems strange that he should be concerned with the idea of a ruling deity, especially at a time when the prevailing tide of thought seemed to be moving away from that idea. The reason probably lies in Mo Tzu's belief that the kind of conduct he wanted to encourage could not be brought about without the

aid of supernatural forces. Hence the emphasis which he places on the omniscience of Heaven, which is to be seen in the following passage,

If you commit a crime in the broad day-light where will you run and hide? There is no place to run and hide, for Heaven will spy you out clearly even in the forest, the valley or the dark and distant place where no one lives.⁶⁴

焉而晏日焉而得罪，將惡避逃之，日無所避逃之，
夫天不可爲林谷幽門無人。 v

He goes to considerable lengths to show that he is not speaking of his own fanciful imaginings but of established fact. He sets forth reasons in order to try to convince people of his beliefs. The following sequence will illustrate his general approach,

Moreover I know for the following reason that Heaven loves the people generously.⁶⁵

且吾所以知天之愛民之厚者有矣。 w

Yet this is not the only reason that I know that Heaven loves the people generously.⁶⁶

且吾所以知天之愛民之厚者，不止此而足矣。 x

Yet there is another reason that I know that Heaven loves the people generously.⁶⁷

且吾所以知天之愛民之厚者，不止此而已矣。 y

Unlike the Confucianists, who placed their faith in human nature and the power of education, Mo Tzu apparently was unable to believe that order and prosperity could be established by man alone. Here again we see the use of T'ien for practical purposes; to bolster a system of morality and to establish order and good government. The opinion of Tseu is that Mo Tzu's,

theism is not a religion, but strictly a philosophical system. The will of Heaven, which is concerned with humanity's welfare is to be determined by reason.⁶⁸

The second conclusion to be drawn from Mo Tzu's assertion of T'ien as a ruling deity is to be seen in the emphasis which he places upon it. He goes to great lengths to establish the reality of T'ien. It would seem that he felt the need to assert his ideas as forcibly as he could, because he realized that he was in this respect running counter to the main trend of thought of the time.

Mencius' Attitude to T'ien

Mencius (孟子) was born in 371 and died in 289 B.C. He was the first person to systematize Confucian thought. He saw himself as Confucius' successor and like Confucius drew inspiration from the Early Chou, but again like Confucius he was not content merely to accept Chou doctrines, he adapted them to his own purpose. Like Confucius, but to an even greater degree, he was obliged to take account of new developments in thought and even more radical changes in society. Fung Yulan states that,

Mencius' Heaven at times seems to be a ruling or personal one as when he says that 'Yao presented Shun to Heaven.' At times he seems to designate a fatalistic Heaven... And at still other times it is an ethical Heaven.⁶⁹

Of these three interpretations Of T'ien in *Mencius* by far the most dominant is the ethical one. We will turn our attention first to the two other aspects mentioned by Fung.

Expressions of fatalistic T'ien are few but isolated examples are to be found, for example at the end of Book 1,

All a gentleman can do in starting an enterprise is to leave behind a tradition which can be carried on. Heaven alone can grant success.⁷⁰

君子創業垂統，爲可繼也，若夫成功，則天也。 z

And in the same Book,

It is due to Heaven that I failed to meet the Marquis of Lu.⁷¹

吾之不遇魯侯，天也。 ab

The question of fatalism in *Mencius* and in Confucianism generally before the time of Hsün Tzu (荀子) is a difficult one. Mo Tzu certainly attacked the fatalism of Confucianists, but his accusations may well have been based on a misunderstanding. Certainly in *Mencius*, despite the occasional instance of T'ien, which seems to indicate fatalism, the general tenor of the work clearly shows man to be a free agent. He has within him the seeds of goodness, which he can cultivate with the aim of achieving sagehood. In the *Analects* it is stated,

Death and life are the decree of Heaven, wealth and rank depend upon the will of Heaven⁷²

死生有命，富貴在天。 ac

Commenting on this Lau writes,

This is to get men to see that it is futile to pursue such ends, ends that most people devote most of their time and energy to. If these things depend on fate, then there is no point in pursuing them. What we ought to pursue is morality which is our proper end⁷³.

It is this aspect of inherent moral cultivation which Mencius stresses.

The ruling or personal T'ien referred to by Fung in the quotation above forms the basis of Mencius' political thought. Mencius frequently quotes the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents in support of his arguments. T'ien appears in many of these quotations, and so it may be assumed that Mencius is in general accord with the attitude to T'ien, which is expressed in them. It is possible, however, to quote directly from Mencius himself in support of the presiding T'ien. Speaking of good and bad government he says,

Both are due to Heaven. Those who are obedient to Heaven are preserved; those who are against Heaven are annihilated.⁷⁴

其二者天也，順天者存，逆天者亡。 ad

And in Book 3 he states,

It must be that Heaven does not as yet wish to bring peace to the Empire⁷⁵

夫天未欲平治天下也。 ae

One of the great achievements of Mencius was to identify the "will of Heaven" with the people's response to the ruler. If the ruler governed well then the people would be content. This was to be seen as an expression of Heaven's own content. An illustration of this is to be found in Book 5,

When he (Shun) was put in charge of affairs, they were kept in order and the people were content. This showed that the people accepted him. Heaven gave it to him and the people gave it to him.⁷⁶

使之主事，而事治，百姓安之，是民受之也，天與之，人與之。

If the ruler governed badly, then the converse would apply.

In the above quotation there is an implicit belief in the ethical aspect of T'ien made manifest through the response of the people to the ruler. This is reminiscent of occasional references to T'ien in the *Book of Documents*. In the Document entitled *The Announcement of Shao* (召誥) we find the statement.

the poor made their moan to Heaven⁷⁷

以哀籲天。

In *Mencius* however the ethical aspect is much more highly developed.

It is at this point that the philosophy of Mencius appears to have been influenced by Taoist thought. Mencius spent some time in the state of Ch'i (齊), where there was a famous centre for scholars at Chi-hsia (稷下). King Hsuan of Ch'i (齊宣王), who reigned during the period 319–301 B.C., had assembled a large number of scholars there, representing many different schools of thought. It seems likely that it was through contact with scholars at Chi-hsia that Mencius learnt something of Taoism.

The Taoist influence in Mencius is connected with the theory of Ch'i (氣) meaning breath or spirit. There were according to this theory two sorts of Ch'i. As Lau puts it,

The grosser ch'i, being heavy, settled to become the earth, while the refined ch'i being light, rose to become the sky. Man, being half-way between the two, is a harmonious mixture of the two kinds of ch'i. His body consists of a grosser ch'i, while his heart is the seat of the refined ch'i. This refined ch'i can be increased by being nurtured through the constant practice of what is right.⁷⁸ Mencius said: 'Nourish it with integrity and place no obstacle in its path and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth. It is a ch'i which unites rightness and the way.'⁷⁹

以直養而無害，則塞于天地之間，其爲氣也，配養與道。 ag

The "way" in this quotation means the "way of Heaven," so that the significance of ch'i in this context is that it associates man with Heaven.

The basis of Mencius' ethics is the heart (心), which is conferred upon men by Heaven, and which contains the seeds of goodness,

The organ of the heart can think. But it will find the answer only if it does think; Otherwise it will not find the answer. This is what Heaven has given me.⁸⁰

心之官則思，思則得之，不思不得也，此天之所與我者。 ah

The heart is part of a man's nature. Indeed it is what is proper to him as a human being. Mencius says that what distinguishes us from animals is small,

Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it.⁸¹

人之所以異於禽獸者幾希，庶民去之，君子存之。

In most respects men, like animals, are subject to their senses and their desires. The distinguishing feature is the heart, which is the true nature of man conferred upon him by T'ien. The seeds of goodness contained in the heart would, if cultivated, lead to moral consciousness. Mencius said,

Men of antiquity bent their efforts towards acquiring honours bestowed by Heaven, and honours bestowed by man followed as a matter of course. Men of today bend their efforts towards acquiring honours bestowed by Heaven in order to win honours bestowed by man, and once the latter is won they discard the former. Such men are deluded to the extreme and in the end are only sure to perish.⁸²

古之人，修其天爵，而人爵從之。今之人修其天爵，以要人爵，
既得人爵，而棄其天爵則惑之甚也，終亦心亡而已矣。

a j

There is a very Taoist ring to this. A number of similar passages occur in *Chuangtzu* (莊子). The difference lies in Mencius' understanding of "honours bestowed by Heaven," which are explained as follows,

Benevolence, dutifulness, conscientiousness, truthfulness to one's word, unflagging delight in what is good... these are honours bestowed by Heaven.⁸³

仁、義、忠、信樂善不倦，此天爵也。

These are all moral values, which are summed up in Mencius' thought in the sentence,

Hence, being true is the Way of Heaven.⁸⁴

是故誠者，天之道也。

For Chuangtzu on the other hand the Way of Heaven is,

To rest in inaction, and command respect... This is the Way of Heaven.⁸⁵

無爲而尊者，天道也。

In *Mencius* we see the first clear and unequivocal statement of the moral nature of man himself. The crudely ethical T'ien of the Early Chou and Mo Tzu had been appropriated and is, as it were, absorbed by man himself. As Waley puts it,

But in the period centring round 300 B.C. the question was asked, is not the conduct that we call "i" (義) merely the outward expression of a feeling about what is right and

wrong, and is it not this feeling, rather than the outward manifestation of it, what we ought to call morality?⁸⁶

The major contribution of Mencius was to make a clear exposition of the movement begun by Confucius towards a view of man as a morally conscious and morally responsible being, and to found upon it a complete system of ethics. In this development the idea of T'ien continued to play a significant role though in a more refined and subtle way, culminating in the realization of the inward source of moral behaviour.

Hsün Tzu's Attitude to T'ien

The exact dates of Hsün Tzu (荀子) are not known. Fung Yu-lan states that,

The critic Wang Chung (汪中 1744—94) in his chronological table places Hsün Tzu between 298 and 238 B.C., and although the dates of Hsün Tzu's life cannot be exactly determined, the active period of his life probably falls somewhere within this sixty year period.⁸⁷

Hsün Tzu was the second of the great formulators of the Confucian system of thought. In direct contradiction of his predecessor, Mencius, Hsün Tzu founded his moral philosophy on the premise that human nature is basically evil.

Nevertheless the difference between Hsün Tzu and Mencius is really one of emphasis. While admitting the inferior side of human nature, Mencius stresses the seeds of goodness in man and man's potential for moral development. Hsün Tzu, on the other hand, stresses the basically evil side of man's nature, but asserts that man has the capacity to overcome this aspect of his nature through the intellect. Both views lead to the same conclusion... moral development through learning and self-cultivation. Hsün Tzu says,

Learning continues until death and only then does it cease. Therefore we may speak of an end to the program of learning, but the object of learning must never for an instant be given up. To pursue it is to be a man, to give it up is to become a beast.⁸⁸

學至於沒而後止也，故學妻有終，若其義則不可須臾舍也，
爲之人也，舍之禽獸也。 am

In addition to study, Mencius as we have seen, also stresses the realization of one's inborn (Heaven-conferred) nature through the constant practice of good. For Hsün Tzu this would not have been possible.

Living as he did at a rather later period than Mencius, Hsün Tzu was able to

profit from later philosophical developments. Consequently his thought is more eclectic than that of Mencius, revealing not only Taoist but also Legalist influence. He had himself visited the state of Ch'in (秦) probably during the period 266—255 B.C. at a time when Legalist (法家) doctrines were being practised there.

The Taoist influence is revealed in Hsün Tzu's attitude to T'ien, which he clearly thinks of as Nature. This conception of T'ien probably accounts, to a considerable degree, for the difference in attitude between Hsün Tzu and Mencius to the question of human nature. In Hsün Tzu's system with the disappearance of T'ien as an ethical concept, the belief in the moral nature of man, which was implanted in him by an ethical T'ien, was no longer tenable.

That T'ien is impersonal, amoral and exercises no power over mankind is stressed in the opening of the chapter, *A Discussion of Heaven* (天論). Here Hsün Tzu says,

If you encourage agriculture and are frugal in expenditure, then Heaven cannot make you poor.⁸⁹

疆本而節用，則天不能貧。 an

and,

If you neglect agriculture and spend lavishly, then Heaven cannot make you rich.⁹⁰

本荒而用侈，則天不能使之富。 a o

These statements are paralleled by a number of others all emphasizing the same points. The sage does not dwell upon Heaven, but concentrates on what man can do.

Therefore the gentleman cherishes what is within his power and does not long for what is within the power of Heaven alone.⁹¹

故君子敬其在己者，而不慕其在天者。 a p

Every thing depends on man himself.

Heaven has its seasons, earth has its riches; man has his government.⁹²

天有其時，地有其財，人有其治。 a q

It is the duty of the sage to act in such a way as to ensure that the bounty of Heaven and earth is properly used, and thus to ensure the harmonious functioning of the whole,

Therefore Heaven and earth produce the gentleman and the gentleman brings order to Heaven and earth.⁹³

故天地生君子，君子理天地。 ar

He accomplishes this not through any esoteric knowledge, but simply through understanding the regular processes of Nature, and so being able to use them.

When he turns his thoughts to Heaven, he seeks to understand only those phenomena, which can be regularly expected.⁹⁴

所志於天者，已其見象之，可以其者矣。 as

In an allusion to Taoism he says,

He who thinks only of Heaven will take the way to be wholly a matter of harmonizing with natural forces.⁹⁵

由天謂之道盡因矣。 at

But for Hsün Tzu,

the true way must embody constant principles and be capable of embracing all changes.⁹⁶

夫道者，體常而盡變。 au

He attacks the superstitions of the Mohists, when he says,

Order and disorder are not due to Heaven⁹⁷

治亂非天也。 av

Phenomena previously thought of as omens he explains as natural occurrences,

Such things occur once in a while with the changes of Heaven and earth and the mutations of the yin and yang.⁹⁸

是天地之變，陰陽之化，物之至者也，怪之，可也，
而畏之非也。 aw

They are not to be seen as a reason for alarm, nor are they to be thought of as having any special significance.

With Mencius he agrees that,

The basic nature of man is that which he receives from Heaven.⁹⁹

性者，天之就也。 ay

But, as noted above, he does not regard this as an ethical nature. For Hsün Tzu,

The emotions are the substance of the nature and the desires are the response of the emotions.¹⁰⁰

情者，性之質也，欲者，情之應也。 ay

Desires cannot be expelled, and if left uncontrolled will lead to evil. The sage, however, uses the mind to control desires.

Therefore, although a man's desires are excessive, his actions need not be so, because the mind will stop them short. If the dictates of the mind are in accord with just principles, then although the desires are manifold, what harm will this be to good government.¹⁰¹

故欲過之而動不及，心止之也，心之所可中理，
則欲雖多，傷於治。

Hsün Tzu's philosophy is very practical and clearly stated, for this reason he has been allowed here to speak largely for himself. He is in the Confucian tradition in placing the responsibility for human affairs on man himself. In his assertion of the need for self-cultivation through study and learning he is also in the Confucian tradition. However, perhaps because of Legalist influence, Hsün Tzu's philosophy is more rationalist and practical than that of Mencius. The difference between Mencius and Hsün Tzu as Munro puts it is in

Hsün Tzu's adopting an approach based more on actual human and social conditions and less on their ideal forms.¹⁰²

This approach in Hsün Tzu results from the complete demise of T'ien as an ethical principle.

Taoist Innovation in Lao Tzu

Chronologically speaking Chuang Tzu at least should have come before Hsün Tzu, but strict chronological sequence has been altered here in order to deal with the two Confucianists, Mencius and Hsün Tzu, successively and similarly in order to deal with the two Taoists together. Of Lao Tzu (老子) little or nothing is known, but from the language and the ideas of the *Tao Te Ching* (道德經) it seems most probable that it was not written much before 300 B.C. at the earliest and that it may well belong to the third century B.C.

Except in the *Hsiao Ya* and *Kuo Feng* of the *Book of Poetry*, in the texts so far considered T'ien has been a prominent idea. With the exception of the later songs it has been seen as a creator, usually as an ethical principle and sometimes as a ruling deity. In Taoist thought T'ien has none of these connotations. It continues to play a part in creation, but its role as the ultimate source of all life is taken by Tao. This is made clear from the first Chapter of the *Tao Te Ching*.

It was from the Nameless (i.e. Tao) that Heaven and Earth sprang the named (i.e. Heaven and Earth) is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures.¹⁰³

無名天地之始，有名萬物之母。 bc

Chapter 40 clarifies this distinction.

For though all creatures under Heaven are the products of Being (Heaven and Earth) Being itself is the product of not-being (Tao)¹⁰⁴

天下萬物生於有，有生於無。 bd

We have here a more sophisticated cosmogony than anything that had gone before, but is this the only role of T'ien in *Lao Tzu*. D.C. Lau states,

In the *Lao Tzu*, the tao is no longer 'the way of something' but a completely independent entity, and replaces heaven in all its functions.¹⁰⁵

How, then, are we to understand the score of references to T'ien? Lau suggests that T'ien in *Lao Tzu* is used to mean Tao, but he is troubled by the occurrence of the phrase T'ien Tao (天道).

Since in the *Lao Tzu* the term tao has to all intents and purposes replaced heaven, it is curious to note that the phrase, the 'way of heaven' occurs a number of times.¹⁰⁶

He notes that, apart from two instances in Chapters 9 and 47, the phrase is used only in the last ten chapters. He cites Chapters 73 and 74 and remarks,

In these passages heaven is conceived of as taking an active hand in redressing the iniquities of the world. It is always on the side of the good and the oppressed. This runs

contrary to the view of the tao generally to be found in the book as something non-personal and amoral.¹⁰⁷

The difficulty here arises from Lau's attempt to equate T'ien with Tao. But if the text is examined closely, it will be found difficult to maintain this equation.

Firstly T'ien and Tao are clearly distinguished in Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 40, as has already been mentioned. Secondly T'ien is mentioned on nine occasions with earth (地) and in these cases it clearly cannot be equated with Tao. Thirdly, in a number of cases it is mentioned in the same context as Tao and it would seem that in these cases a distinction is intended. (I do not include here instances of the 'way of Heaven' = 天道 or 天之道). When all these cases have been eliminated there remain eight instances where T'ien might conceivably be construed as an equivalent of Tao, but in none of these cases does the issue appear to be clear-cut.

Chapter 47. Without looking out of his window

He knows all the ways of heaven¹⁰⁸

不闕牖見天道。 be

59. You cannot rule men nor serve heaven unless you have laid up a store.¹⁰⁹

治人、事天、莫若畜。 bf

67. Heaven arms with pity those whom it would not see destroyed.¹¹⁰

天將救之，以慈衛之。 bg

68. The secret of being mated to heaven, to what was of old.¹¹¹

是謂配天古之極。 bh

73. For it is the way of Heaven not to strive, but none the less to conquer.¹¹²

天之道，不爭而善勝。 bi

Heaven is like one who says little, yet none the less has laid his plans¹¹³

坦然而善謀。 bj

Heaven's net is wide.¹¹⁴

天網恢恢。 br

81. For Heaven's way is to sharpen without cutting.¹¹⁵

天之道，利而不害。 be

In some of these cases the meaning is so indeterminate that T'ien could be construed as Tao, but in none of them is it impossible that T'ien be construed as Nature

in the sense of the underlying motive force of Nature. In order to explain the inconsistency which arises from his equation of T'ien with Tao, Lau suggests,

in some cases at least the use of this phrase (T'ien Tao) seems to indicate that the passage belongs to a somewhat different, and most probably earlier, tradition.¹¹⁶

But he gives no further evidence to support this idea. If, however, a distinction is maintained between T'ien and Tao, then the inconsistency is resolved, or rather the inconsistency was never there.

If we accept this distinction, we may say that T'ien in *Lao Tzu* has three roles. Firstly, in conjunction with earth (地) it represents the second stage of creation. Also in conjunction with earth it forms the boundaries of the natural world, as for example in,

Yet Heaven and Earth and all that lies between is like a bellows.¹¹⁷

天地之間，其猶囊籟乎。 bm

These are common in the earlier chapters, which deal with themes of creation and the physical world.

Thirdly T'ien alone and also in the phrase T'ien Tao denotes Nature. The sage takes T'ien as an example as for instance in Chapter 9

When your work is done, then withdraw

Such is Heaven's way.¹¹⁸ 功成名遂，身退，天之道。 bn

The sage should follow T'ien, because it acts spontaneously and naturally.

For it is the way of Heaven not to strive, but none the less to conquer¹¹⁹

天之道，不爭而善勝。 bo

and,

For Heaven's way is to sharpen without cutting
And the sage's way is to act without striving.¹²⁰

天之道，利而不害，
聖人之道，爲而不爭。 bp

T'ien in *Lao Tzu* does present a problem. Firstly, although it is not overall a particularly prominent idea, nor, if we are to take the text seriously, is it a negligible one. Secondly, the contexts in which it occurs are not particularly helpful in assisting us towards a definition of the term. Thirdly, its pattern of distribu-

tion in the text is puzzling. In the early chapters it occurs most commonly in the phrase heaven and earth (天 地). In the later Chapters T'ien Tao (天 道) is most prominent, and there is a long sequence of chapters in the middle of the text where it scarcely occurs at all. (Only three instances except in the phrase 天下 in chapters 26-67)

Lau is certainly correct in saying that Tao had assumed T'ien's role as creator or first principle. He is not correct, in the present writer's opinion, in assuming that T'ien had been completely assimilated by Tao. T'ien, as it had been used by all previous thinkers, simply had no relevance for the Taoists. It is not surprising, therefore, if its general role of first principle was taken by Tao. The importance of this change was that T'ien was free to be used in a new way. The Taoists recognized this and appropriated the term for their own purposes.

T'ien had an important part to play in *Lao Tzu* and in Taoist thought generally. It is my belief that only when T'ien is interpreted as Nature in the sense of the regulative or motive power of Nature, is it possible to understand those passages in which it occurs in *Lao Tzu* in any coherent form.

Taoist Innovation in Chuang Tzu

The exact dates of Chuang Tzu's (莊 子) life are not known, but he was roughly a contemporary of Mencius. Unlike the other philosophers of the Warring States Period, who have been discussed, Chuang Tzu was not concerned with the question of government. The philosophy of Chuang Tzu revolves around the search for what loosely may be termed personal freedom in its widest possible sense. By this is meant the freeing of the individual from what are commonly regarded as the cares and misery of human existence; these include those ills which are contingent upon the fact of existence, sickness and death, those ills such as hunger, cold and thirst which result from natural causes, and those ills brought about by men themselves ... war, oppression, harsh government and so forth.

His philosophy goes beyond this, however, in that the means used to transcend those ills also lead to a higher plane of existence, or rather to a realization of the true way of life. In this pursuit T'ien is of central importance. Hsün Tzu remarked that,

Chuang Tzu was obsessed by thoughts of Heaven and did not understand the importance of man.¹²¹

莊子蔽於天而不知人。 bq

Hsün Tzu probably had in mind the scant attention which Chuang Tzu pays to man in society. But Chuang Tzu cannot be said to ignore man, it is simply that he thinks of man in a cosmic context. With Chuang Tzu individual awareness had reached a

It (i.e. Tao) is its own source, its own root. Before Heaven and earth existed it was there, firm from ancient times. It gave spirituality to the spirits and to God. It gave birth to Heaven and earth.¹²³

自本自根，未有天地自古以固存，
神鬼神帝，生天生地。

br

Again as in *Lao Tzu* T'ien or in some cases T'ien ti (天地) is seen as the creator of manifest nature, as in the following quotation,

When Heaven gave me life, it saw to it that I would be one-footed.¹²⁴

天之生是使獨也。

bs

There are various references in *Chuang Tzu* to a long-lost state of primitive simplicity. At that time men lived in accord with Nature. They acted instinctively without thought of birth or death, gain or loss. Being without knowledge, without desire or ambition and unconscious of the self, they made no distinction between themselves and the world or Nature. This state is described at length at the beginning of Chapter 6 (大宗師). But with increasingly complex social organization and the introduction of hierarchical structures into society man's original nature became obscured. Knowledge set him apart from Nature. His ability to rationalize led to the awareness of distinctions. With the awareness of distinctions came the need to label them, which led to the formulation of ideas of good and evil. Terms such as these were extended to cover all things. There then followed the need to regulate the situation and to correct it, so laws were introduced and moral values such as benevolence and righteousness. Chuang Tzu endeavours to show the troubles and misery which result from rationalization, discrimination and striving to achieve goals. There is no end to the complexities which arise, as is described in Chapter 2: (齊物論)

With everything they (men) meet they become entangled. Day after day they use their minds in strife, sometimes grandiose, sometimes sly, sometimes petty.¹²⁵

與接爲構，日以心鬪，縵者，窘者，密者。

bt

The immediate cause of this complexity and chaos is man's view of himself as being separate from Nature. Much use is made of this idea in the 'inner chapters'. In Chapter 6 we find,

peak, although curiously enough it also seems to be nullified because it is subsumed into the greater totality of all existence or being.

The ramifications of T'ien in *Chuang Tzu* are extremely complex, but although the book is almost certainly the work of several different people, any differences in the idea of T'ien, which may be discerned, are for the most part differences in emphasis rather than qualitative differences. In general we may say that T'ien in *Chuang Tzu* means 'Nature' or 'nature'. The difficulty of the term 'Nature' in English was noted in the Introduction. In many cases the use of Nature to translate T'ien is likely to cause confusion, but in the case of *Chuang Tzu* we could scarcely have a more appropriate term, for its various shades of meaning coincide very closely with the use which *Chuang Tzu* makes of T'ien. Thus among the definitions of nature in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which correspond with *Chuang Tzu's* use of T'ien are:

1. The essential qualities of a thing.
2. The inherent, dominating power or impulse in men or animals, by which character is directed or controlled.
3. The creative and regulative physical power, which is conceived of as operating in the physical world and as the immediate cause of all its phenomena.
4. The material world as its collective objects or phenomena the features and products of the earth itself, as contrasted with those of human civilization.
5. The condition of man before the organization of society.

It is proposed first to deal with the idea of T'ien as it appears in the "inner chapters" (內篇). There are two reasons for this. First, as Watson remarks,

It is generally agreed that the seven 'inner chapters' constitute the heart of the *Chuang Tzu*. They contain all the important ideas, are written in a brilliant and distinctive ... though difficult... style, and are probably the earliest in date.¹²²

It may fairly be said that the essence of *Chuang Tzu's* philosophy is to be found in these seven "inner chapters." The second reason is that references to T'ien in *Chuang Tzu* are so numerous, that in a short dissertation such as this there is a danger of being swamped by the wealth of material. It is considered preferable, therefore, to deal in some detail with a small part of the work, a part which is also generally thought to be the most important.* Some comments will then be made on T'ien as it appears in the remaining chapters.

In the total scheme of things T'ien occupies the same position in *Chuang Tzu* as in *Lao Tzu*.

* The seven "inner chapters" constitute roughly one fifth of the whole work.

He who knows what it is that Heaven does and
Knows what it is that man does, has reached the Peak.¹²⁶

知天之所爲，知人之所爲者，至矣。 bu

The significance of this is that man must not use his power of rationalization to improve upon Nature. He must not interfere in the natural order of things, as the following quotation points out,

This is what I call not using the mind to repel the Way, not using man to help out Heaven.¹²⁷

是之謂不以心 道，不以人助天。 bv

If he can achieve this, then he can achieve sagehood,

When man and Heaven do not defeat each other, then we may be said to have the True Man.¹²⁸

天與人不相勝也，是之謂真人。 bw

Not only must man not interfere, he must turn away from the phenomenal world and the distractions to which the senses are subject. Not every one is able to do this.

There are those who cannot free themselves, because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven.¹²⁹

縣而不能自解者，物有結之且夫物不勝天久矣。 bx

Having freed oneself from the phenomenal world one must look inwards in order to discover one's true nature.

By being inwardly direct I can be the companion of Heaven.¹³⁰

內直者，與天爲徒。 by

The activity of the mind must be stilled by a process of meditation sometimes referred to as "sitting in forgetfulness" (坐忘). A good description of this practice is to be found in Chapter 4. (人間世)

Look into that closed room the empty chamber where brightness is born. Fortune and blessing gather where there is stillness. But if you do not keep still... this is what is called sitting but racing around. Let your eyes and ears communicate with what is inside, and put mind and knowledge on the outside.¹³¹

瞻彼闕者，虛室生白，吉祥止止，夫且不止是之爲謂坐馳，
夫徇耳目內通而外於心知。 bz

If a man succeeds in stilling his mind by shutting out the distractions which external objects exert on the mind through the senses, then he will become aware of the essential unity of all life.

Be content to go along and forget about change and then you can enter the mysterious oneness of Heaven.¹³²

安排而去，化乃入於天一。 cd

This is the unity which transcends all categories and distinctions as indicated in Chapter 2 (齊物論).

So the sage harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer.¹³³

是以聖人和之以是非，而體乎天鈞。 ce

An essential aspect of this unity or "mysterious oneness of Heaven" is the idea of transformation, which promotes an attitude of acceptance both of life and death. The idea is described in Chapter 6 (大宗師) and here it is necessary to quote at some length.

The Great Clod (the universe?) burdens me with form labors me with life, eases me in old age and rests me in death. So if I think well of my life, for the same reason I must think well of my death. When a skilled smith is casting metals, if the metal should leap up and say, "I insist upon being made into a Mo-yeh!" (a famous sword of King Hōlu of Wu reigned 514–496 B.C.) he would surely regard it as very inauspicious metal indeed. Now, having had the audacity to take on human form once, if I should say, "I don't want to be anything but a man! Nothing but a man!" the Creator would surely regard me as a very inauspicious sort of person. So now I think of Heaven and earth as a great furnace, and the Creator as a skilled smith. Where could he send me that would not be all right? I will go off to sleep peacefully, and then with a start I will wake up.¹³⁴

夫大塊載我以形，勞我以生，佚我以老，息我以死，古善吾生者，乃所以善吾死也，今大冶鑄金，金踴躍曰，我且必爲鈍鑊，大冶必以爲不祥之金，今一犯人之形而曰人耳人耳，大造化者，必以爲不祥之人，今一以天地爲大鑪，以造化爲大冶，惡乎往而不可哉，成然寐遽然覺。 cf

Matter, in this case the physical matter of the body disintegrates after death, is absorbed into the totality of the material world and re-emerges in a new form. In this sense there is, as it were, neither birth nor death, but simply constant transformation.

The ten thousand things all come from the same seed, and with their different forms, they give place to one another. Beginning and end are part of a single ring and no one can comprehend its principle. This is called Heaven the Equalizer, which is the same as the Heavenly Equality.¹³⁵

萬物皆種也，以不同形相禪如卒若環莫得其倫，是謂均，天均者，
天倪也。 cg

It is this which enables Chuang Tzu to say,

Heaven and earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me.¹³⁶

天地與我並生，而萬物與我爲一。 ch

In summary we may say that T'ien in the "inner chapters" represents the idea of Nature; that is Nature in the sense of the underlying motive force of all things. Man stands in a dual relationship to this concept of T'ien. The true Man or Sage realizes his own inner nature and so can harmonize with T'ien. When this state is achieved many of the so-called ills of human life are resolved, and others, though not resolved, are transcended. They are transcended through equanimity of spirit. When the human part has been put aside, what is left is simply of the natural order of things, neither benevolent nor malevolent. The sage realizes that he is part of the whole, part of the constant process of creation and transformation. Such men are said to

have joined with the Creator as men to wander in the single breath of heaven and earth.¹³⁷

彼方且與造物者爲人，而遊乎天地之一氣。 ci

When the rational side of man is allowed to dominate through the operation of the mind, however, then man represents what is artificial and contrived. In this sense man stands in opposition to T'ien, which represents the natural and the spontaneous, and also the ordered world, which results from all things fulfilling their inborn nature. When man interferes, then the naturally ordered spontaneity of the world is disturbed. Confusion, strife and misery are the result, and these

are nowhere more apparent than in man himself.

The ideas in the "inner chapters" are often expressed in poetic language of great imaginative power. Yet, it would be wrong to mistake the underlying meaning of these passages and to read into them anything of a more mystical nature than has been outlined above.

In examining the "inner chapters" one aspect of T'ien which was touched upon, though not by its technical name, was the idea of inaction or non-interference (無爲). Needham defines this as "letting things work out their destinies in accordance with their intrinsic principles."¹³⁸ That is action which is not contrary to Nature.

To act through inaction is called Heaven¹³⁹

無爲爲之之謂天。 c j

This is the model which man should emulate. The attitude to adopt is described in more detail in Chapter 15, (刻意)

But to attain loftiness without constraining the will; to achieve moral training without benevolence and righteousness, good order without accomplishments and fame, leisure without rivers and seas, long-life without Induction; to lose everything and yet possess everything, at ease in the illimitable, where all good things come to attend... this is the Way of Heaven and earth, the virtue of the Sage.¹⁴⁰

若夫不刻意而高，無仁無義而治，無功名而治，無江海而閑，不道引而壽
無不忘也，無不有也，澹然無極而衆美從之，此天地之道，聖人之德也。

c r

There is one other aspect of T'ien, which is implicit in the "inner chapters." but directly referred to only briefly in the statement

Massive and great he (the Sage) perfects his Heaven alone¹⁴¹

乎大哉，獨成其天。 c j

This is the question of the inborn nature of man. In later chapters the use of T'ien to mean the inborn nature of man is more frequent. This is certainly implied by a reference to T'ien in Chapter 17. (秋水)

Hence it is said the Heavenly is on the inside, the human is on the outside. Virtue resides in the Heavenly. Understand the actions of Heaven and man, base yourself on Heaven.¹⁴²

故曰，天在內，人在外，德在乎天，知天人之行，本乎天。 cm

But it is most apparent in Chapter 29 (盜跖)

So it is said, Do not be a petty man... return to and obey the Heaven within you; do not be a gentleman... follow the reason of Heaven. Crooked or straight follow to the limit the Heaven in you.¹⁴³

故曰，無爲小人，反殉而天，無爲君子，從天之理，若枉若直，
相爲天極。 cn

And again,

Do not race after riches, do not risk your life for success, or you will let slip the Heaven within you.¹⁴⁴

無赴而富，無徇而成，將 而天。 co

Watson points out that, "sections 28–31 have long been viewed with suspicion for reasons of both style and content."¹⁴⁵ He inclines to the view that they are of early Han date and Graham, who considers them to be of the Yangist school places them at roughly the same period. Be that as it may, the sense of the two quotations given above is in accord with the "inner chapters," and the use of T'ien echoes a precedent from the "inner chapters." It simply demonstrates the extraordinary versatility of the term. This usage also completes the circle. As was noted in respect of Mencius T'ien has been "internalized" and so forms a complete correspondence between the inner and outer concepts. The difference is that with Mencius it was a question of an ethical concept, here it is a question of the natural and amoral.

The Legalist Use of T'ien in the Philosophy of Han Fei-Tzu

Han Fei-tzu (韓非子), the most famous of the Legalist philosophers, was a prince of the state of Han (韓), who served as an official in the Ch'in state before he was put to death there in 233 B.C. T'ien is not a prominent idea in Han Fei-tzu's philosophy, but nonetheless it is of some importance. Although used by the Legalists for quite different purposes, it is essentially the Taoist concept of T'ien as Nature and spontaneity.

Léon Vandermeersch has an excellent chapter on the question of Legalist borrowings from Taoist thought in his work, *La Formation du Légisme*. The following account will be based largely on Vandermeersch's analysis. The practical aspects of Legalism (法家) centre round a system of rewards and punishments founded on a code of law, which was to have universal application. In the opinion of Vander-

meersch rewards and punishments were only a superficial aspect of the law as the Legalist theoreticians saw it.

The law had an interior aspect of spontaneity rooted in the nature of man. Man, according to the Legalists, has two basic instincts... self interest and fear or self-preservation. It is the natural tendency of people to work for their own benefit and to avoid what makes them afraid. Rewards and punishments are only external devices to stimulate these instincts. If a ruler encourages these natural instincts he is acting in a way which is consonant with the natural order of things. Vandermeersch quotes Shen Tao (慎到) an early Legalist,

La Voie Céleste, c'est qu'on fait de grandes choses quand on n'agit pas a contre-courant.¹⁴⁶
(The way of Heaven is to achieve great things by not going against the natural order.)*

天道因則大 (因百姓情遂自然性，則功高而道大) 。

Man, according to Han Fei-tzu, had become separated from Nature, by the increasing complexity of society and the appearance of sages. This separation from nature was manifested by the growth of the population beyond a level, which the land would support. Before this people had lived simple and ordered lives. The instinct of self-interest did not bring them into conflict because there was more than enough for everybody. The instinct of fear also kept them apart, so that they did not come into conflict.

Provided that they follow their basic instincts of self-interest and fear, there is to be found within the nature of the people a principle of order. The people wish to dispense with punishments, but it is in their interests that the ruler should use the negative instinct of fear as well as the positive one of self-interest, because this will promote order in the state.

The law, which is the external representation of order, should be simple and should be inculcated into the people, so that it becomes as a second nature founded on the original principle of order in the peoples original nature.

In this process,

Le souverain qui par sa loi crée cette Seconde nature est égal au Ciel, qui a crée la première.¹⁴⁷

(The ruler who uses law to create this second nature is the equivalent of Heaven which created the original nature)*

To support this statement Vandermeersch quotes Han Fei-tzu,

* Translations from the French are the present writer's.

Le souverain éclairé légifère comme le Ciel lui-même, et fait marcher les hommes Comme s'il était leur âme. Il est le Ciel car on ne lui désobéit pas et il est l'âme des hommes car on lui obéit dans une absolue spontanéité.¹⁴⁸

(The enlightened ruler legislates like Heaven itself, and he makes the people behave as if they were informed by his spirit. He like Heaven because they do not disobey him and he is their spirit, because they obey him with complete spontaneity.)

故明王之行制也天，其用人也鬼，天則不非，鬼則不因。 cu

This concept of the law approaches the pure spontaneity of T'ien and is in direct contradiction to Confucianist morality, which is based on self-cultivation. Vandermeersch writes,

Chez les légistes elle (la nature humaine) est entendue au sens que lui donnent les naturalistes, comme la nature dans l'homme, ce qui est l'acceptation taoïste, non plus morale mais ontologique.¹⁴⁹

(From the point of view of the legalists human nature is understood in the same sense that the naturalists understand it, as nature in man. This is the taoist concept of it, no longer moral but ontological.)

In this way the ruler by acting through law, which is the extension of the natural law, is himself acting in a natural and spontaneous way.

Pou Han Fei-zi le souverain est le Ciel même, puisqu'il agit par la spontanéité sans cause qui meut instinctivement les hommes, et c'est la loi de la conscience qui est artificielle, puisqu'elle ne s'accorde pas avec les penchants naturels.¹⁵⁰

(For Han Fei-tzu the ruler is Heaven itself since he acts with an undirected spontaneity which instinctively guides people. It is the law of conscience which is artificial, because it does not accord with natural inclinations.)

The Legalists believed that they had found an answer to the strife and disorder, which resulted from the increase in population, in a system of law. This law by extending the natural law, ensured the continuation of man's original instincts in a society, which had become too densely populated and too complex. The law itself was a technique of government and in this sense the Legalists were opposed to the Taoists, who rejected all question of techniques. The metaphysical principles, upon which the Legalists based their policies, however, were essentially in

accord with those of the Taoists. They eschewed all idea of man-made concepts of morality and based their system of law on the paradigm of the natural law represented in T'ien.

There is one other important respect in which the Legalists borrowed from Taoist thought, and that is in the concept of inaction or non-interference (無爲). The ruler at the level of society is the homologue of Heaven. He is the personification of social law as it is the embodiment of natural law. Natural processes go on of themselves. In the same way the government of the state functions without the direct intervention of the ruler, who in this sense models himself on the inactivity of Heaven. The ruler must remain impartial in the same way as Heaven is impartial. He must not dissipate his energies in the actual functions of government. To do so is to destroy the unity of power which he represents.

This brief summary of Vandermeersch's analysis of Taoist influence on Legalism demonstrates the use of T'ien in its Taoist aspect of Nature and spontaneity as a model and indeed as a justification of the Legalist attitude to man, society and the law. Whereas Chuang tzu used the same idea to help to effect man's liberation from the miseries of existence, Han Fei-tzu used it as a means to control the people of a state.

Conclusion

The object of this study was to describe the principal lines of development of the Early Chou concept of T'ien. Fung Yu-lan's brief guide to the major categories of T'ien, which was referred to in the Introduction, already gave an indication of the complexity and richness of the concept. The preceding pages have given a further indication of the extraordinary semantic versatility of the term.

The main points to emerge may be summed up as follows. The evolution of T'ien as a philosophical concept was able to take place as the result of the demise of T'ien as a presiding deity. From a royal and aristocratic cult with supernatural overtones we see a progressive secularization of the concept. This led to a gradual attenuation of its meaning, which must have come close to its being used solely in the sense of 'sky'. However, the shift in meaning to the idea of Nature gave the term new philosophical value.

From the original concept of a presiding deity with implications of order and harmony there occurred a dual development. The first of these was as an ethical principle. Stemming from the order and harmony of the Early Chou concept, and guided by Confucius and his followers, there developed a growing ethical consciousness, which culminated in the thought of Mencius, in the full realization of man's own moral nature. This was an enormous achievement of the human spirit, brought about in spite of the vigorous but reactionary campaign of the Mohist school.

The second development also born of the harmony and order of T'ien, but in this case with the emphasis being on the harmony and order of T'ien as 'sky', was the movement towards the idea of Nature, which was most prominent in the Taoist thinkers. This movement reached its apogée in the thought of Chuang Tzu, in whom we see a highly developed; metaphysical awareness of an order, which, it is interesting to note, is becoming increasingly relevant to the problems facing mankind in the late twentieth century. As Needham says.

All in all the Taoists had much to teach the world, and even though Taoism as a religion is dying or dead, perhaps the future belongs to their philosophy.¹⁵¹

In addition, we have seen the use of T'ien as presiding deity and as the spontaneity of Nature for political purposes of diverse complexions. Firstly, during the Early Chou period it was used as a means of political propaganda, as justification for the overthrow of the Shang dynasty, as a means of pacifying the Shang officials and people and as a way of exhorting their own Chou rulers to govern responsibly. This use of T'ien as a means of dynastic legitimation was to continue throughout the long history of imperial China as the doctrine of T'ien ming (天命).

Secondly the naturalistic aspect of T'ien, in particular the aspect of spontaneity developed by the Taoists, was appropriated by the Legalists as the basis of their theory of law and its application in the form of rewards and punishments. Here we see the use of T'ien to buttress one of the earliest examples of totalitarian government. Ironically this runs counter to the Mencian interpretation of the doctrine of T'ien ming, which, by invoking the people's response, represents, as it were, a democratization of the term.

Finally reference should be made to an extremely important aspect, which was present from the beginning, but which became gradually more sophisticated. This was the idea of an organic unity involving Heaven, earth and man. The notion that human action influences the orderly functioning of this organic whole took root in and has had a pervasive influence in Chinese thinking. This idea, or rather a whole complex of ideas based on this central principle, is another example of ancient Chinese thought, which may be relevant to modern problems.

The successive stages of development of the concept of T'ien illustrate in a way that perhaps no other concept could, the evolving political, social, ethical and metaphysical awareness of Chinese intelligentsia in pre-imperial China. These developments were to have profound implications for subsequent Chinese thought, and would have far-reaching effects on Chinese history and culture.

Lamont, in his paper, *An Early Ninth Century Debate on Heaven*, to which reference was made in the Introduction, writes,

In fact for a number of reasons Heaven never became as important a term in philosophical discussions as did such concepts as tao (道), 'the way', or hsing (性), 'human nature'. Heaven was basically a concept limited by its etymological evolution and by its political implications.¹⁵²

It is hoped that the preceding pages have gone some way towards refuting this statement. The importance of T'ien has been greatly underestimated.

NOTES

1. In his article *An Early Ninth Century Debate on Heaven, Asia Major*, Vols 18-19, 1973-74 H.G. Lamont gives a brief survey of the development of T'ien, but makes no mention of it as it appears in *Lao Tzu* (老子) or in *Chuang Tzu* (莊子).
2. Fung Yu-lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol 1, P. 31.
3. Lamont, op. cit.
4. Cornford, F.M. *From Religion to Philosophy*, P. 73.
5. For an account of Creel's corpus of bronze inscriptions see *Origins of Statecraft in China*, P. 464-75.
6. *Ibid.*, P. 454.
7. *Ibid.*, P. 447-63.
8. Dobson, W.A.C.H. *Early Archaic Chinese*, P. XV-XVI.
9. Legge, James. *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 3, P. 501 (In these quotations from Legge the translation is found on the same page as the Chinese text).
10. *Ibid.*, P. 454.
11. *Ibid.*, P. 501.
12. *Ibid.*, P. 502.
13. *Ibid.*, P. 507.
14. *Ibid.*, P. 369.
15. *Ibid.*, P. 371.
16. Waley, A. *The Way and its Power*, P. 21.
17. Legge, op. cit., P. 492.
18. *Ibid.*, P. 364-5.
19. *Ibid.*, P. 477.
20. *Ibid.*, P. 431.
21. *Ibid.*, P. 408-9.
22. *Ibid.*, P. 500.
23. Chang Hsuan, *The Etymologies of 3,000 Characters in Use* P. 506 1.
24. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., P. 35-38.
25. Lamont, op. cit., P. 183.
26. Dobson, W.A.C.H. *The Problem of the Book of Songs in the Light of Recent*

- Linguistic Research*, P. 42.
27. Ibid., P. 45.
28. Ibid., P. 50.
29. Ibid., P. 53-54.
30. Ibid., P. 42.
31. Ibid., P. 53.
32. Waley A. *Book of Songs*, P. 53 a. Karlgren, B. *Book of Odes*, P. 28
33. Granet, M. *The Religion of the Chinese People*, P. 72.
34. Dobson, W.A.C.H. *The Problem of the Book of Songs*, P. 43.
35. Waley, A. *Book of Songs*, P. 227. b. Karlgren, *Book of Odes*, P. 240.
36. Ibid., P. 229. c. Ibid., P. 242.
37. Ibid., P. 234. d. Ibid., P. 248.
38. Ibid., P. 300 e. Ibid., P. 217.
39. Ibid., P. 250 f. Ibid., P. 186-87.
40. Ibid., P. 262. g. Ibid., P. 187.
41. Ibid., P. 323. h. Ibid., P. 178.
42. Ibid., P. 175. J. Ibid., P. 181.
44. Ibid., P. 143. k. Ibid., P. 159.
45. Ibid., P. 316. l. Ibid., P. 151.
46. Karlgren, *Book of Odes* P. 151.
47. Waley, *Book of Songs* P. 316. m. Ibid., P. 154.
48. Ibid., P. 305. n. Ibid., P. 26.
49. Ibid., P. 516. o. Ibid., P. 77.
50. Ibid., P. 311. p. Ibid., P. 54.
51. Waley, *Analects of Confucius*, q. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol
P. 136. 1, P. 214.
52. Ibid., P. 110. r. Ibid., P. 177.
53. Dubs, H.H. *Theism and Naturalism in Ancient Chinese Philosophy*, *Philosophy East and West*, Vol 9, P. 167.
54. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 1, P. 159.
55. Ibid., P. 202.
56. Ibid., P. 146-7.
57. Ibid., P. 164.
58. Ibid., P. 218.
59. Ibid., P. 326.
60. Ibid., P. 168.
61. Watson, B. Mo Tzu, *Basic Writings*, s. 黃杰, 墨子批選, p. 54
P. 30.
62. Ibid., P. 79. t. Ibid., P. 178.
63. Ibid., P. 80-81. u. Ibid., P. 181.
64. Ibid., P. 79. v. Ibid., P. 178.

65. Ibid., P. 88. w. Ibid., P. 191.
 66. Ibid., P. 89. x. Ibid., P. 192.
 67. Ibid., P. 89. y. Ibid., P. 192.
 68. Tseu, A. *The Moral Philosophy of Mo Tzu*, P. 392.
 69. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., P. 129.
 70. Lau, D.C. *Mencius*, P. 71 z. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 2, P. 175.
 71. Ibid., P. 73. ab. Ibid., P. 179.
 72. Waley, *Analects*, P. 163 ac. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 1, P. 253.
 73. Lau, *Mencius*, P. 23
 74. Ibid., P. 120. ad. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 2, P. 296.
 75. Ibid., P. 94. ae. Ibid., P. 232.
 76. Ibid., P. 143. af. Ibid., P. 356.
 77. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol 3, P. 426.
 78. Lau, op. cit., P. 24
 79. Ibid., P. 77. ag. Ibid., P. 190.
 80. Ibid., P. 168. ah. Ibid., P. 418.
 81. Ibid., P. 131. al. Ibid., P. 325.
 82. Ibid., P. 169. aj. Ibid., P. 419.
 83. Ibid., P. 169. ak. Ibid., P. 418.
 84. Ibid., P. 123. al. Ibid., P. 303.
 85. Wieger, L. *Les Pères du Systeme Taoïste*, P. 292.
 86. Waley, A. *The Way and its Power*, P. 32-33.
 87. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., P. 280.
 88. Watson, B. *Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings*, P. 19. am. 梁啓雄, 荀子東釋, P. 7
 89. Ibid., P. 79. an. Ibid., P. 220.
 90. Ibid., P. 79. ao. Ibid., P. 220.
 91. Ibid., P. 83. ap. Ibid., P. 226.
 92. Ibid., P. 79. aq. Ibid., P. 222.
 93. Ibid., P. 44. ar. Ibid., P. 109.
 94. Ibid., P. 81. as. Ibid., P. 224.
 95. Ibid., P. 126. at. Ibid., P. 291.
 96. Ibid., P. 126. au. Ibid., P. 291.
 97. Ibid., P. 83. av. Ibid., P. 225.
 98. Ibid., P. 84. aw. Ibid., P. 227.
 99. Ibid., P. 151. ax. Ibid., P. 322.
 100. Ibid., P. 151. ay. Ibid., P. 322.
 101. Ibid., P. 151. az. Ibid., P. 322.

102. Munro, D.J. *The Concept of Man in Early China*, P. 81.
103. Waley, A. *The Way and its Power*. bc. Wieger, L. *Les Pères du Systeme Taoïste*, P. 18.
P.141.
104. Ibid., P. 192. bd. Ibid., P. 45.
105. Lau, D.C. *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching*, P. 23.
106. Ibid., P. 23.
107. Ibid., P. 24.
108. Waley, op. cit., P. 200. be. Wieger, op. cit., P. 47.
109. Ibid., P. 213. bf. Ibid., P. 53.
110. Ibid., P. 225. bg. Ibid., P. 57.
111. Ibid., P. 227. bh. Ibid., P. 57.
112. Ibid., P. 233. bi. Ibid., P. 59.
113. Ibid., P. 233. bj. Ibid., P. 59.
114. Ibid., P. 233. bk. Ibid., P. 59.
115. Ibid., P. 243. bl. Ibid., P. 63.
116. Lau, op. cit., P. 23.
117. Waley, op. cit., P. 147. bm. Ibid., P. 21.
118. Ibid., P. 152. bn. Ibid., P. 25.
119. Ibid., P. 233. bo. Ibid., P. 59.
120. Ibid., P. 243. bp. Ibid., P. 63.
121. Watson, B. *Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings*, P. 125. bq. 梁啓雄，荀子東釋，P291
122. Watson, B. *Chuang Tzu*, P. 13-14.
123. Ibid., P. 81. br. Wieger, *Les Pères du Systeme Taoïste*, P. 254.
124. Ibid., P. 52. bs. Ibid., P. 238.
125. Ibid., P. 37. bt. Ibid., P. 214.
126. Ibid., P. 77. bu. Ibid., P. 250.
127. Ibid., P. 78. bv. Ibid., P. 250.
128. Ibid., P. 80. bw. Ibid., P. 252.
129. Ibid., P. 85. br. Ibid., P. 256.
130. Ibid., P. 56. by. Ibid., P. 232.
131. Ibid., P. 58. bz. Ibid., P. 234.
132. Ibid., P. 89. cd. Ibid., P. 260.
133. Ibid., P. 41. ce. Ibid., P. 218.
134. Ibid., P. 85. cf. Ibid., P. 256.
135. Ibid., P. 304. cg. Ibid., P. 448.
136. Ibid., P. 43. ch. Ibid., P. 220.
137. Ibid., P. 89. ci. Ibid., P. 258.
138. Needham, J. *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol 2, P. 71.
139. Watson, *Chuang Tzu*, P. 127. cj. Ibid., P. 294.

140. Ibid., P. 168. ck. Ibid., P. 350.
 141. Ibid., P. 75. cl. Ibid., P. 248.
 142. Ibid., P. 182. cm. Ibid., P. 342.
 143. Ibid., P. 334. cn. Ibid., P. 474.
 144. Ibid., P. 334. co. Ibid., P. 474.
 145. Ibid., P. 15.
 146. Vandermeersch, L. 百子全書, 9, Sections 48–53, *La Formation du Legisme*, P. 244 慎子二 (No page numbers).
 147. Ibid., P. 245.
 148. Ibid., P. 245. cp. 陳啓天, 韓非子校釋, P150
 149. Ibid., P. 246.
 150. Ibid., P. 247.
 151. Needham, op. cit., P. 152.
 152. Lamont, op. cit.,

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大誥	Tao Kao	Great Announcement
康誥	K'ang Kao	Announcement to K'ang
酒誥	Chiu Kao	Announcement about Drunkenness
召誥	Shao Kao	Announcement of Shao
洛誥	Lo Kao	Announcement Concerning Lo
多士	To Shih	Numerous Officers
君奭	Chun Shih	Lord Shih
多方	To Fang	Numerous Regions
顧命	Ku Ming	The Testamentary Charge
文侯之命	Wen Hou chih Ming	The Charge to Prince Wen
費誓	Pi shih	The Speech at Pi
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THE PROBLEM OF TENSION IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MUSIC

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Abstract

The context of this article concerns the problem of the debilitating effect that tension produces in young performers of music. This tension is caused by many pressures and addresses ways in which it can be alleviated.

An age-old problem of performances of music, both formal and informal and both in the East and the West, has been that of "stage fright." To present one's skill before friends and strangers alike triggers a response in the performer that asks the question "Can I do it well?" This response appears whether the performer is well prepared or not. It also happens to many seasoned performers as well as to students, so we cannot attribute the feeling only to students or the unprepared.

One task (of the many) that the teacher is faced with is how to help the student deal with the feelings of stage fright — now more commonly referred to as "performance anxiety." The teacher must always take care, first of all, in deciding what music the student should learn. The pieces must be geared to the student's ability, giving him or her the confidence to know at once that the music is within reach. Knowing that something is "difficult" often causes tension to set in with a strong determination to be able to "do it." This aspect of suitability is too often ignored, particularly if there is a competition piece to be learned. Entering and winning the competition become priorities rather than the careful development of the student's talent. Often students subject themselves to this kind of tension when comparing their own level to that of another student's. No matter that the other student plays the more difficult piece badly, it is, nevertheless, more difficult.

Tension and anxiety are major factors in the general well-being of the student. A certain amount of anxiety is natural and even desirable, contributing to the excitement necessary for an interesting musical performance. However, too much anxiety can cause the student to do poorly, thereby destroying what self-confidence he/she may have had.

A series of mishaps can often be exaggerated by the performer, so much so that his/her feelings can cause a very well prepared performance to be less than their best. That this is a universal problem not confined to musicians is evidenced by a book written some years ago called "The Inner Game of Tennis" by Timothy Galwey. More recently this theme was transposed by Barry Green, a professional musician, into "The Inner Game of Music." Here Green discussed how to deal with self doubts as well as with outside influences when performing music. Allowing pressures to build into feelings of great tension can impede brain and muscle from functioning to the greatest capacity.

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Often students prepare well, but because of lack of experience, become upset at the thought of a public performance. In the U.S. and Europe, a mild drug used for high blood pressure is often given to people who need to have the manifestations of nervousness controlled, such as a pounding heart or sweaty hands. This preparation, taken in large doses for high blood pressure, is given in a very small amount one hour before performance time. Even surgeons who may be performing a complex operation have been known to use this. It has helped many a young performer get through a difficult program for perhaps two or three times, thereby building self-confidence to continue without it.

There are parents who are so obsessed with their children's ability to excel, whether in music or academics, that they tend to push a child beyond reasonable limits. Extra tutors are hired to "assist" the student to practice or study. If the teacher is competent, practice assistance is usually unnecessary. We are talking here of upper elementary children and older, not about the very young child who may well need supervision in the form of assistance. The older student does not need the additional pressure of having someone watch over him/her at every moment. Emotional and psychological damage can be caused by refusing to allow the child to develop in a more relaxed atmosphere. Child movie stars of America in the 1930's and 40's were often pushed by what was generally referred to as "stage mothers." We can also see them here in Taiwan with parents who feel that their own prestige (face?) depends upon their child's success. Academic pressure is a serious problem here in Taiwan. The system says that there is no place for a musically talented but academically less than average student. The only recourse is to send that talent abroad ... but this is not always within the means of middle class or poorer families.

I have worked in the field of music medicine for several years and have seen many instances of physical damage to muscles and tendons caused by overuse and misuse, both of which have tension as their source. Damage of this nature has affected both young people who are at the beginning of promising careers, and, most often, older musicians whose bad habits have finally put an end to their best playing and whose careers must be curtailed. While there are now many physicians and clinics in the U.S. which are especially set up to help performing artists (including dancers, sculptors, painters, etc.) prevention is the primary cure.

A student practising a piece that is too difficult for his technical ability (as well as musical understanding) is particularly vulnerable to physical harm. Many teachers are not sufficiently aware of the potential danger to the musculature by poor usage. When assigning a very difficult piece, especially with a deadline to meet, there is the very great possibility of damage through overuse. This damage can be caused in pianists by trying to stretch the hand too far, twisting the hand, hunching the shoulders or numerous other unnatural motions. In string and wind players who try to play too fast, there is created extreme tension in the muscles and tendons

of the arms, neck, shoulders, and back. Wind players are also susceptible to a condition known as "Temporal mandibular joint syndrome" (TMJ) which can be caused by excessive tightening and unnatural movement of the jaw.

Here in Taiwan I have seen several cases of both overuse and misuse. The latter is usually a lack of awareness of a relaxed technique as well as the desire to play too difficult music. Overuse is the result of too much pressure to achieve. Tension is the root of both overuse and misuse injuries.

There have been cases where the student plays "in pain" but never mentions it to either teacher or parent. When the teacher finally becomes aware of the problem, the damage may take some time to repair. There have been instances where students have had to change a performing major because of severe physical damage. Indeed, these problems are quite likely to be present practically, everywhere but most people do not want to speak about them.

What is the solution to the problem of tension? Committees that choose the music for competitions, as well as teachers who choose music for their students to study, must be aware of the dangers that are inherent in allowing students to try to play beyond their abilities. The teachers must be strong enough to resist parental demand to let the student "try." Correct and relaxed practise habits are crucial to careful development. Teachers should constantly monitor each student's playing style to be certain that nothing detrimental is being done. And, of course, teachers should frequently assess their teaching methods in order to reassure themselves that they are teaching well. Only then can many of these talented students fully realize their potential rather than to merely achieve a momentary success.

音樂演奏的緊張問題

摘 要

這篇文章的主題是有關緊張對於年青演奏者所造成的傷害，演奏的緊張來自於各種不同的壓力，本文即綜合性地探討演奏傷害及引起緊張的原因和解決的辦法。

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