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六書形聲研究

江舉謙

提 要

文字的構成要素有三，即：「形」「音」「義」。漢文字的「形」「音」「義」在構成要素中却更突出它的特色。即三者相互密切關聯。

漢文字的構成原理，傳統皆通過「六書」涵義去尋釋。由於「六書」是漢世研究小篆構形現象的歸納，它的內容先天就不可能周密。換言之它的涵蓋性自始就有不足。「形聲」就是一例。

純以小篆既成字例言，六書形聲涵義大致可從。所舉例字亦無不當。可惜時代已晚。未能溯其源流，觀其演化，即就內容言亦簡略狹窄。本文重心即欲補此闕漏。

本文共分五部份，除「前言」與「結語」外，主要內容落實於第一章「六書形聲理論考索」；第二章「形聲原理與衍化」，第三章「六書形聲內容分析」。「形聲」由「象聲」遞嬗，理論則為評慎所發明。由於「六書」稱名雖見於周禮，而內容則承漢書藝文志轉化。本文探原究委，考其實際論定得失。

據「形聲」造字雖「形」與「聲」並列。然自始即以「聲」為主體。故漢志原稱「象聲」。論其衍化原理可分為：「即聲為形」、「就形衍聲」、「聲與形聲遞出」、「本字轉增附注」。本文羅列契金古籀以明其淵源與演進徑途。

六書構形內容，許慎論說過於簡略。本文深入論析分為正例與變例兩種。前者為「半形半聲」，後者則分「複合形聲」、「省形省聲」、「兩體皆聲」三類。而形聲內容，略盡於此。

漢文字之制作，歷史悠久。演進徑途，則錯綜複雜。故本文以「引言」發其端。而「形聲」為造字大國，前此理論既有未備，後此發展更難兼顧，故本文「結語」特作不同徑途之提出，以見「形聲」涵義之可推而廣也。

引 言

漢文字淵源遼遠。今日所見的契金文，在文字進化的歷程上，已屬於十分成熟的階段。因為文字的原始，無論中外，最早都是圖繪。而契金文之構形已高度「文字化」。圖繪的痕跡已僵化而隱微，從「圖繪」到成熟的「文字」，不是可以一蹴而成，以埃及古圖繪綿延三千餘年仍未進入成熟文字之史實徵之，漢文字之起源，最保守估計也有六千五百年以上。許慎說文解字敘

「蒼頡之初作書，蓋依類象形。故謂之文。其後形聲相益，即謂之字。文者物象之本。字者言孳乳而浸多也」。

漢文字是否為蒼頡所作，並不重要。但文字演進之由「依類象形」進而「形聲相益」，則是完全正確的。

任何文字都包含三項要素，即：「形」、「音」、「義」。而在孕育過程則先有「義」，次有「音」，最後現形，才完成了文字條件。「日」、「月」、「山」、「水」、「上」、「下」、「本」、「末」，未有人類，它的意義即已存在。原始人類只能用語音表達它的意義。漢民族開化極早，六七千年前即用繪畫之法，表現客觀之形。而「文字」於焉誕生。

原始的文字實際是簡單的圖畫。其演進徑途真是蜿蜒曲折。變化萬千。除了「書寫形式」由圖繪演化為象徵性符號外，結構原理更是精妙繁複。一般言之，漢文字的衍進，大致如下：

文—依類象形。源出圖繪。包括客觀物形與主觀意象

(甲)客觀物形 如「日」「月」「山」「水」「木」「虫」「魚」等。

(乙)主觀意象 如「上」「下」「一」「二」「七」「八」「入」「厶」等。

字—形聲相益。原始為複合圖繪，演進為形聲繁衍。

(甲)形與形益 (1)實形相益 如「珏」「林」「相」「休」

(2)虛形相益 如「土」「公」「鼎」「珪」

(3)虛實相益 如「古」「束」「赤」「直」

(乙)形與聲益 (1)實形益聲 如「江」「河」「燈」「峰」

(2)虛形益聲 如「固」「固」「圃」「圃」

(3)複形益聲 如「越」「黨」「遠」「藻」

(丙)聲意益形 (1)聲意益實形 如「汨」「杈」「汨」「杈」

(2)聲意益虛形 如「彩」「彫」「彰」「影」

(丁)段聲託形 (1)即聲託形 如「離」「雖」「難」「然」；「象」「帝」「佳」「者」

(2)疊聲託形 如「嘏」「舒」「靜」「閱」

根據以上衍進現象，可以看出漢文字的構成，聲「音」佔十分重要地位。傳統六書的「形聲」，只是將它的重要性突出頭現而已！嚴格言之，「象形」、「指事」、「會意」三者的構成，也間接淵源於「音」。而「轉注」與「段借」，其與「音」的關係雖有層次上的差異，但無疑都是直接關聯。所以評慎界說「轉注」，例字「考」「老」之構成，一為「會意」；一為「形聲」。造成千載困惑，而說文解字據古文籀篆所收之「形聲」，契金文原始頗多為「段借」。

因此，傳統六書之「形聲」，許書「界說」與「例字」，都合理而明達。但深度與廣度皆有未備。換言之，既未溯其源流，觀其演進，亦未析其內容，察其變化。至於形與聲取配之方，聲與聲疊出之實，前修雖有論述，惜未全面綜貫。若夫拼切成音，省變易讀，雖為數無多，然既為漢文字「形聲」構成之一環。本文亦將附及。

第一章 六書形聲理論考察

許慎說文解字敘云：

「形聲者，以事為名，取譬相成。江河是也。」

段玉裁注云：

「事兼指事之事象形之物言。物亦事也。名即古曰名今日字之名。譬者諭也。諭者告也。以事為名謂半義也。取譬相成謂半聲也。江河之字以水為名。譬其聲如工可，因取工可成其名。其別於指事象形者，指事象形獨體，形聲合體。其別於會意者，會意合體主義。形聲合體主聲。聲或在左，或在右。或在上，或在下。或在中，或在外。亦有一字二聲者，有亦聲者

，會意而兼形聲也。有省聲者，既非會意又不得其聲。則知其省某字爲之聲也」。

徐紹楨六書辨申論形聲之淵源，云：

「天下之物，同類者實繁。即以水之類言之，江河淮漢無非水也。制此字者將畫江河淮漢之形乎？抑畫其水而別加隄岸之屬以指之乎？或推其意之所在而會之乎？此皆有不能之勢也。則非形聲何以屬之。許君之言曰形聲者以事爲名，取譬相成。蓋未有文字，先有聲音。江河淮漢之名，本爲古昔所先定。制此字者，卽因其名而取譬於聲與義以成之。於是取水而加工於其旁可知爲江。加可於其旁可知爲河。加佳於其旁卽可知爲淮。加莫於其旁，則可知爲漢所取之義，水是也。所譬之聲王可佳漢是也。自中古以來，事物名義日出不窮。凡象形指事會意之所不能達者，施之於聲，卽無不可成之字。其道亦云廣矣」。

段徐兩氏的理論，都是根據許慎形聲所下界說「以事爲名，取譬相成」，及例字「江河是也」而加以闡釋。在這基礎上，兩氏所論，大致可以信從。但若探其原而究其委，則許慎蓋有未及。兩氏更有未備。這是因爲「六書」本義頗有曲折。據以爲理論基礎者，又大致局限於小篆一書，它的涵蓋性先天就很狹窄。就小篆構成言，許慎對「形聲」所下界說與所舉例字，並沒有錯。但溯其淵源，段徐兩氏之未備，應很顯然。

「六書」名稱雖見周禮，但周禮的成書時代，並非在春秋以前，這是後世學者考證定案。所以春秋諸子都沒有提到「六書」。連孔子聖人，一生作育施教也不見「六書」稱名。直到周禮才出現。按周禮地官保氏：

「掌養國子以道，教之六藝，五曰六書」。

可知「六書」只是六藝之一，其他五藝爲「禮」「樂」「射」「禦」「數」，皆爲教育初階基本生活技藝。六「書」自亦不應例外。歷經戰國西漢之世，從無人討論文字構形之理，更無人肯定「六書」是文字六種構成法則。直到東漢班固漢書藝文志，才有突破性的論見。按漢書藝文志：

「古者八歲入小學，故周官保氏掌養國子，教之六書，謂象形、象事、象意、象聲、轉注、假借。造字之本也。漢興蕭何草律，亦著其法，曰太史試學童能誦書九千字以上乃得爲史，又以六體試之」。

呂思勉云：

「『謂象形象事象意象聲轉注假借，造字之本也』十六字，皆後人竄入。此節文意一綫相承。教之六書，又以六體試之之六體，事蓋相類。故云『亦著亦法』。夾入謂象形云云十八字，則六書六體絕不相蒙，不可云亦矣」。

呂氏的理論，基本上可以信從。但這十八字的竄入，必有具背景，且距漢志之著成不會太久。因爲許慎說文解字接着出現。對「六書」稱名除了作部份修正，進一步，還給每一書建立精闢的界說，同時提示最富代表性的字例。可見許慎顯然直接承受這十八字的啓示，確定了文字構形理論基礎。

許慎的理論根據是說文解字所收的古籀篆文。落實說，應該是小篆。因爲小篆者，「皆取史籀大篆，或頗省改」。所以大篆小篆相貫，基本上是一體。至於壁中「古文」，與籀篆異者爲數無多。終西漢之世，實際並不十分受人重視。王莽好古，才特別提高它的地位。兩漢文字學家所研究的對象，實際是以小篆爲主體。

原始文字只是獨體圖繪。由實形而虛象，由獨體而合體。筆劃則由繁而簡，由具象而抽象。

鐘鼎甲骨文字大致已擺脫原始圖繪，演為十分成熟文字。但直至大篆與壁中書，仍沒有統一的標準形構。舊體與新形雜陳。如果以許慎所建立的「六書」理論衡量，便顯然有許多字沒有辦法涵蓋。換言之，在這種文字構形背景下，不可能有「造字之本也」的六書理論出現。

秦始皇統一六國，開創了空前大一統的政治體制。基於貫徹法令的必需，統一文字形構必然是當務之急。小篆的董理制作，便是在這背景下完成。將前此文字，省其繁複，改其怪奇。取其合理，新其內容。於是中華民族才出現真正標準統一文字。也才奠定了後世據以尋繹造字之理的可能。

而與此同時，趨約取易，完全着眼於實用便利的隸書，也在「官獄職務繁」的背景下風行。其範圍與趨勢，迅速凌駕小篆。終秦之世可以肯定：除了高階層官府文書及民間隆重典冊使用小篆外，廣大實用領域，都是隸書的天下。

漢代秦興，隸書便正式成為通行文字。這可從兩方面得到有力證明：第一是秦火後整理紀錄的群經，都是用隸書傳述的所謂「今文」。第二是漢代碑版文字，今日所見，大致也都是隸書。

但，隸書的出現，筆劃結構完全着眼於便捷。在內容涵義上幾乎完全忽視圖形之本與取形之理。這是中國文字發展史上最大一次突變。所以許慎在說文解字序中，對隸書深以為憾！認為它純為「趣約易，而古文由此絕矣！」許慎的評斷，也許不完全合乎事實。但隸書構形的破壞原理，則大致可信。所以後世研究「文字學」，絕不可能根據隸書！

西漢鑑秦之失，力求安定進步。學術研究工作開始了新的局面。語文教育之重視，更著於法律。許慎說文解字敘云：

「尉律：學僮十七以上始試。諷籀書九千字乃得為史。又以八體試之。郡移太史并課，最者以為尚書史。吏民上書，書或不正，輒舉劾之」。

由此可知西漢建國，十分重視語文教育。因而考試制度與刑罰制度，都包含文字。前者以識字與書法為中心。後者則以正譌為對象。

然而，困難也就由此發生。因為隸書構形本無統一標準。參差出入乃事勢之必然。推原究委，訂譌正失，必然又回到「小篆」天地！所以說文敘又云：

「孝宣皇帝時，召通倉頡讀者，張敞從受之。涼州刺史杜業，沛人爰禮，講學大夫秦近，亦能言之。孝平皇帝時，徵禮等百餘人，令說文字未央廷中，以禮為小學元士。黃門侍郎揚雄採以作訓纂篇，凡倉頡以下十四篇，五千三百四十字。群書所載，略存之矣」。

這一段長時期的董理小篆的工作，在文字學史上，嚴格說，應該比秦始皇時三蒼的董理更重要。孝宣皇帝時期，從張敞到杜業、爰禮、秦近，大致還只偏重認字，換言之，即分析小篆筆劃結構。到了孝平皇帝之世，以爰禮為首，徵召前來未央廷中的百餘小篆大師，却是有深度的說解「文字」。我們有理由相信這是文字結構原理的分析歸納。由於對象是小篆，「造字之本」的理論，遂夤緣附會周禮六藝中的「六書」而生。

而「形」「事」「意」「聲」本是文字構成基礎。所以前四書一律以象合稱，因此班志所竄入即為「象形」「象事」「象意」「象聲」。

說文解字繼之著成，許慎前有所承，加上數十年功力的累積，必然後來居上。根據其本人所示的例字，除「象形」相同外，作「指事」「會意」「形聲」，似較明晰。然其次序，轉不若漢志之當理也。許慎排其次序為「指事」「象形」「形聲」「會意」。古人多有辨正。就常理言，「指事」為虛象，不應早於實象之「象形」。「形聲」可據「會意」為名取譬，「會意」絕無取「

形聲」比類合誼。則其先後，應不辨而明。

漢世文字學家在文字學研究上屬於創始時期，材料的主要依據又局限於小篆。造字原理的分析雖依附於「六書」，但內容並不完備。許慎集其大成，但每一書的界說與例字，都只是顯而易見的表層。以「形聲」言，其淵源既未探溯，內容更嫌淺略。這是時代環境條件使然。但在今天，我們却有責任作進一步研究。

許慎對「形聲」的界說與例字已如前述。而所據以尋繹其理的則是後世的小篆，自不足以明其本始。根據契金文所顯示，「江」「河」二字的本始，極可能只是「象聲」的「工」「可」。「以事爲名，取譬相成」，乃是後起的構形方式。過渡時期，則是「取譬爲名」，然後「以事相成」。如契金文之「禘」、「歷」、「諸」、「邶」，都先經過相當時期的「帝」、「麻」、「者」、「北」的應用，才增附「示」、「止」、「言」、「邑」而成。說文解字「邑」部和「水」部之字，爲例頗多。

許慎於「轉注」一書之例字，舉「考」「老」是也。而「考」下云：「老也。从老省，丂聲。則「轉注」之精神，實際也是「形聲」的一脈。至於「𠂔」「閱」等字，「午」「門」皆不應強爲取義。林義光據以爲二重形聲，衡以音理，可以信從。他如「省形省聲」、「複合形聲」，說文解字中都羅列其例，而許君皆未建立系統理論。本文均將分別論述，深入探討。

第二章 形聲原始與衍化

「以事爲名，取譬相成」是歸納小篆的「形聲」界說。也是「形聲」字成熟時期的標準結構。但溯其原始，則由「象形」「象事」「象意」以「象聲」濫觴。根據契金文所用，其演化之跡十分顯然。即在說文中古籀篆文亦不乏其例。分述如下：

第一節 卽聲爲形

我國文字創作艱難。原始數量必然無多。而語音表義爲用無窮。所以卽聲爲形以表義，自然而而利便，現就契金文習見，略舉其例：契金文例皆據李孝定甲骨文字集釋及周法高金文詁林。字多習見，遂不注明出處，以省篇幅。

- 「丕」 大也。从一，不聲。
按契金文本卽作「不」。
- 「神」 天神引出萬物者也。从示，申聲。
按契金文本卽作「申」。
- 「祿」 福也。从示，象聲。
按契金文本卽作「象」。
- 「禘」 諦祭也。从示，帝聲。
按契金文本卽作「帝」。
- 「璜」 半璧也。从玉，黃聲。
按契金文本卽作「黃」。
- 「璋」 刻上爲圭，半圭爲璋。从玉，章聲。
按契金文本卽作「章」。

- 「芮」 芮芮，艸生貌。从艸，內聲。
按契金文本即作「內」。
- 「蓋」 店也。从艸，盍聲。
按契金文本即作「盍」。
- 「蕙」 菜也。从艸，隱聲。
按契金文本即作「隱」。
- 「犗」 易曰犗牛乘馬。从牛，葡聲。
按契金文本即作「葡」。
- 「彼」 往有所加也。从彳，皮聲。
按契金文本即作「皮」。
- 「謂」 報也。从言，胃聲。
按契金文本即作「胃」。
- 「諾」 應也。从言，若聲。
按契金文本即作「若」。
- 「識」 常也。一曰，知也。从言，戠聲。
按契金文本即作「戠」。
- 「敷」 馘也。从支，專聲。
按契金文本即作「專」。
- 「膳」 具食也。从肉，善聲。
按契金本作「善」，即「善」之古文也。
- 「簪」 曾也。从日，旡聲。
按契金文本即作「旡」。
- 「嘉」 美也。从壹，加聲。
按契金本即作「加」。
- 「盛」 黍稷在器中以祀者也。从皿，成聲。
按契金文本即作「成」。
- 「盥」 根盥，負載器也。从皿，須聲。
按契金文本即作「須」。
- 「甗」 瓦器也。从缶，彖聲。
按契金文本即作「彖」。
- 「槃」 承槃也。从木，般聲。「鑿」古文从金。「盤」籀文从皿。
按契金文本即作「般」。
- 「鄙」 五鄙爲鄙。从邑，畝聲。
按契金文本即作「畝」。
- 「鄆」 周文王所都，在京兆杜陵西南。从邑，豐聲。
按契金文本即作「豐」。
- 「鄭」 京兆縣。周厲王子友所封。从邑，奠聲。
按契金文本即作「奠」。

六 書 形 聲 研 究

- 「無」 炎帝太岳之胤甫戾所封。在潁川。从邑，無聲。
按契金文本即作「無」。
- 「鄧」 曼姓之國，今屬南陽。从邑，登聲。
按契金文本即作「登」。
- 「鄧」 姒姓國，在東海。从邑，曾聲。
按契金文本即作「曾」。
- 「親」 至也。从宀，親聲。
按契金文本即作「親」。
- 「伯」 長也。从人，白聲。
按契金文本即作「白」。
- 「俾」 益也。从人卑聲。
按契金文本即作「卑」。
- 「欒」 欒木，似欄。从木，^𠄎聲。
- 「變」 慕也。从女，^𠄎聲。
- 「鑾」 人君乘車。四馬（四）鑾八鑾。鈴象鸞鳥之聲。聲和則敬也。从金，鸞省。
按契金文本並即作「^𠄎」。許君說「鑾」「變」「欒」非其溯也。

此外，如：一

- 「橫」 契金文本即取「黃」聲爲之。
- 「儼」 契金文本即取「嚴」聲爲之。
- 「廟」 契金文本即取「朝」聲爲之。
- 「𠄎」 契金文本即取「異」聲爲之。
- 「恃」 契金文本即取「寺」聲爲之。
- 「愉」 契金文本即取「俞」聲爲之。
- 「沮」 契金文本即取「且」聲爲之。
- 「涇」 契金文本即取「巫」聲爲之。
- 「嬌」 契金文本即取「爲」聲爲之。
- 「妣」 契金文本即取「比」（古作匕）聲爲之。
- 「媯」 契金文本即取「轟」聲爲之。
- 「肇」 契金文本即取「𠄎」聲爲之。
- 「純」 契金文本即取「屯」聲爲之。
- 「紀」 契金文本即取「己」聲爲之。
- 「納」 契金文本即取「內」聲爲之。
- 「綱」 契金文本即取「同」聲爲之。
- 「纁」 契金文本即取「熏」聲爲之。
- 「勤」 契金文本即取「董」聲爲之。
- 「錫」 契金文本即取「易」聲爲之。
- 「鑿」 契金文本即取「攸」聲爲之。
- 「鈞」 契金文本即取「勻」聲爲之。

「鎗」 契金文本即取「倉」聲爲之。

「較」 契金文本即取「交」聲爲之。

第二節 就形衍聲

原始形意字，勢易時移，筆劃結構逐漸晦澀。而聲讀固已存在。爲期以「聲」補「形」之不足，遂增附音標。於是遂有「象形」「指事」「會意」三者「兼聲」之構體。更有甚者，則徑以「形聲」別構新體。例如：

「齒」 口齶骨也。象口齒之形，止聲。𠂔古文齒字。

按契金文本象口中露齒之形。古文構形略存其意。後演爲「𠂔」，象形之迹隱晦。小篆增附「止」聲。傳統皆以「齒」字爲象形兼諧聲，而不以入「形聲」，正所以溯其本也。

「星」 萬物之精，上爲列星。从晶生聲。星，𠂔或省徐灝云：「晶卽星之象形文。古文作𠂔。𠂔二形。因其形略，故又从生聲」。

王筠云：「晶當作𠂔，且當爲星之古文」。

按「晶」之爲「星」之初文，徐王二氏發明其理，至確可信。意者原始應繁星點點形。其數不拘。後簡化爲三作𠂔。𠂔，契金文已增附生聲。許慎歧「晶」「星」爲二字，而以「星」爲一般形聲字。本其溯也。

「旁」 溥也。从二，闕，方聲。𠂔，籀文。

按小篆「旁」之構體，象自上而下，旁達四方三形。金文旁鼎作𠂔，正取此意。因形義欠明。契文已增附「方」爲聲。小篆之增附「方」聲。其理正同。與一般之形聲字有別。籀文作「𠂔」，爲純粹形聲。非其溯也。

「寶」 珍也。从宀从玉从貝，缶聲。𠂔，古文寶省貝。

按契金文多作「𠂔」聲則或有或無。後世簡作「室」，與契文之作「𠂔」者，取義正同。小篆與古文皆加「缶」聲。一般皆作會意兼諧聲與形聲異。然古形意字衍化爲形聲之理。則可尋繹也。

「歸」 女嫁也。从止从婦省。自聲。歸，籀文。

按金文齊侯壺作「𠂔」，與籀文「歸」義同。加「自」爲聲，契金文亦見，卽小篆之所本也。雖異於「形聲」，然亦可以迹形聲之源。此與「處」加「虍」爲聲作「處」之理正同。

而衍化層次最明顯的，則爲：

「雞」 知時畜也。从隹，奚聲。鷄，籀文雞从鳥。

按契文有三作。一象高冠修尾之雞形，一象高冠修尾之雞形而加增奚聲。一爲从鳥（隹）奚聲。其演進行化之迹，層次瞭然。

第三節 聲與形聲遞出

如前所述，「以事爲名取譬相成」的形聲字，是歸納小篆的既成事實，並未精析其演進過程。許慎生於漢世，這種疎略完全所以理解。因爲說文敘雖提到「郡國亦往往於山川得鼎彝，其銘即前代之古文，皆自相似。雖互復見遠流，其詳可得略說也」。但吳大澂說文古籀補自敘已考定

郡國山川所得鼎彝。許君實際並未一見。所論皆推想之辭。貞卜契文乃近時所出，更無論矣。根據契金文所用，多有「以聲爲形」與「形聲」並出。則「形」乃後加，其事至明。舉例如下：

- 「瑾」 瑾瑜，美玉也。从玉，堇聲。
按契金文本即以「堇」爲之。後乃增附玉作「瑾」，許君據小篆云从玉堇聲，非其溯也。
- 「環」 璧肉好若一謂之環。从玉，龠聲。
按契金文兩作。初即以「龠」爲之。後乃附加「玉」作「環」。許君乃以爲从玉龠聲，非其溯也。
- 「唯」 諾也。从口，隹聲。
按契金文兩作，初即以「隹」爲之。後或增附口作「唯」。許君據小篆構體，徑以爲「从口隹聲」，非其溯也。
- 「台」 說也。从口，目聲。
按契金文初即以「目」爲之。後乃增附口作「台」，許君據小篆構形，徑以爲「从口目聲」，非其溯也。
- 「歷」 過也。傳也。从止，厯聲。
按契金文本即以「厯」爲之。後乃增附「止」作「歷」。初非从止，厯聲也。
- 「穌」 調也。从龠，禾聲。
按契金文本即以「禾」爲之。後乃增附「龠」作「穌」。初非从龠，禾聲也。
- 「諸」 辯也。从言，者聲。
按契金文本即以「者」爲之。後乃增附「言」作「諸」。初非从言，者聲也。
- 「誓」 約束也。从言，折聲。
按契金文本即以「折」（折）爲之。後乃增附「言」作「誓」，初非从言，折聲也。
- 「評」 召也。从言，乎聲。
按契金文本即以「乎」爲之。後乃增附「言」作「評」。初非从言，乎聲也。今作「呼」，則遞嬗爲从口乎聲矣。
- 「誕」 詞誕也。从言，延聲。
按契金文本即以延爲之，後乃增附「言」作「誕」。初非从言，延聲也。
- 「書」 箸也。从聿，者聲。
按契金文本即以「者」爲之。後乃增附「聿」作「書」。初非从聿，者聲也。今隸又省者爲聲作「書」，更非其溯矣。
- 「故」 使爲之也。从支，古聲。
按契金文本即以「古」爲之。後乃增附「支」作「故」，初非从支，古聲也。
- 「敵」 禁也。从支，吾聲。
按契金文本即以「吾」爲之。後乃增附「支」作「敵」。初非从支，吾聲也。
- 「贖」 物相增加也。从貝，朕聲。

- 按契金文本即以「朕」爲之。後乃增附「貝」作「贖」，初非从貝，朕聲也。
- 「贖」 質也。从貝，賣聲。
- 按契金文本即以「賣」爲之。後乃增附貝作「贖」，初非从貝，賣聲也。
- 「賣」 行賣也。从貝，商省聲。
- 按契金文本即以「商」爲之。後乃增附貝旁，而「商」則省作。初非从貝，商省聲也。
- 「邶」 故商邑。自河內朝歌以北是也。从邑，北聲。
- 按契金文本即以「北」爲之，後乃增附「邑」作「邶」，初非从邑，北聲也。
- 「邢」 周公子所封。从邑，开聲。
- 按契金文本即以「北」爲之。後乃增附「邑」作「邢」。初非从邑，开聲也。
- 「郛」 附庸國。从邑，寺聲。
- 按契金文本即以「寺」（攴）爲之。後乃增附「邑」作「郛」。初非从邑，寺聲也。
- 「會」 祝融之後。皁姓所封滎滎之間。鄭滅之。从邑，會聲。
- 按契金文本即以「會」爲之。後乃增附「邑」作「郕」。初非从邑，會聲也。
- 「郕」 魯下邑。孔子之鄉。从邑，取聲。
- 按契金文本即以「取」爲之。後乃增附「邑」作「郕」，初非从邑，取聲也。

此外，如——

- 「佗」 契金文即作「它」，或又增附「人」作「佗」。許書徑作「从人它聲」，自非其溯。
- 「作」 契金文本即作「乍」，或又增附人作「作」。許書以爲「从人乍聲」。未述其本也。
- 「償」 還也。从人，賞也。不知契金文本即作「賞」。或作「償」，乃增附「人」爲之。初非「从人賞聲」也。
- 「裏」 契金文本即作「里」。或又增附「衣」作「裏」。許書以爲「从衣里聲」，自非其溯。
- 「厭」 契金文本即以「𩇛」爲之。或又增附「尸」作「厭」，小篆因之。許君據以爲「从𩇛聲」，非其溯也。
- 「肆」 小篆作「从長，肆聲」。按契金文初即以「肆」爲之。「長」乃後來增附也。
- 「狐」 小篆作「从犬，瓜聲」。契金文本即以「瓜」爲之。从「犬」乃後來增附也。
- 「應」 當也。小篆作「从心，鹿聲」。契金文本即以「鹿」爲之。从「心」乃後來增附也。
- 「惟」 凡思也。小篆作「从心，隹聲」。契金文本即以「隹」爲之。「心」乃後來所增附。
- 「揚」 飛舉也。小篆以爲「从手，易聲」。契金文本即以「易」爲之。从「手」乃後來增附。
- 「綏」 車中鞞也。小篆作「从系，妥聲」。契金文本即以「妥」爲之。从「系」乃後來增附。

「在」 存也。小篆以爲「从土，才聲」。契金文本即以「才」爲之。从「土」乃後來增附。
 「鈴」 令丁也。小篆作「从金，令聲」。契金文本即以「令」爲之。後或增附「金」旁。小篆之構體非其初也。

「鏐」 弩眉也。小篆作「从金，麥聲」。契金文本即以麥爲之。「金」旁乃後來增附。

按契金文資料所輯，並非完備。據前引諸字例推之，則小篆以爲「从某，某聲」之形聲字。其原始可能或以「某聲」爲之。義旁之「从某」乃後來增附。如「易」「曷」依聲，應不止僅爲「錫」「揚」二字。「黃」「佳」依聲，應不止僅爲「璜」「橫」及「唯」「惟」二字。以「爨」段聲，應不止僅有「爨」「爨」「爨」三字。蓋說文解字之「形聲」構體，本局限於篆書。推本溯源，實有未備。說文以後，情形亦同。新附數百字中，可略見其演化之迹。例如：

「蔬」 菜也。从艸，疏聲。

惠棟讀說文記「淮南主術篇云秋畜蔬食。高注云菜蔬曰蔬，穀食曰食。然則蔬不从艸」。

按論語：「飯蔬食飲水」，「飯蔬食，沒齒無怨言」。皆即以「蔬」爲之。故說文無「蔬」字。後乃增附「艸」，說文新附始作「从艸，疏聲」。

「蟋」 蟋蟀也。从虫，悉聲。

鈕樹玉說文新附考：「按說文蟋訓悉，知悉古無虫旁。然隸釋載石經魯詩殘碑已作蟋蟀」。

按「蟋」原始本即以「悉」爲之。故說文無「蟋」字。後乃增附虫旁。新附出此，作「从虫，悉聲」，自非其溯。

「螳」 螳螂也。从虫，堂聲。

鈕樹玉云：「按說文螳訓堂，螳訓蟲，堂娘子。是古通作堂」。

按原始本即以「堂」爲之。後乃增附「虫」旁。說文未收，新附作「从虫，堂聲」，非其溯也。

「瀘」 水名。从水，盧聲。

鈕樹玉說文新附考：「按水經注瀘水下云：水黑曰盧，不流曰奴。則凡黑水古通名盧矣。夏方米云漢書地理志牂柯郡句町本注云，又有盧唯水。其字本無水「旁」。按原始本即以「盧」爲之。故說文未收。後乃增附水旁。新附作「从水，盧聲」，非其溯也。

此外如「瀘」、「港」、「瀘」、「蠹」等，說文俱未收。以理度之，原始皆即以「瀘」、「巷」、「豬」、「惠」爲之。說文新附並作「从某，某聲」，係就後世形聲構形之理爲說也。

至於複詞構體之演變，增附義旁亦所在多見。遽據後出習見之新字，斷爲「从某，某聲」，非其溯也。例如：

「芙」 芙蓉也。从艸，夫聲。

「蓉」 芙蓉也。从艸，容聲。

錢大照說文新補新附考證：「案漢書司馬相如列傳作夫容。應劭曰蓮華也。又揚雄傳被夫容之朱裳」。

鄭珍說文新附考「按說文闔字荷字注止作夫容。漢書凡夫容字皆不从艸，魏晉後俗

加」。

按如此例，疑「茉莉」、「鞦韆」等字原始亦止作「秋千」。增附「艸」旁「革」旁，正後出俗體。

「崑」 崑崙，山名。从山，昆聲。

「崙」 崑崙也。从山，侖聲。

王玉樹說文拈字：「漢書揚雄文通用昆侖。墨卿曰漢書郊祀歌，揚雄甘泉賦、張騫傳皆作昆侖。鄭司農注周禮司饒引爾雅釋邱，三成爲昆侖邱，亦不加山。則山本以「昆侖」名。增附「山」旁作「崑崙」。而以「从山，某聲說之，自非其溯。」

按如此例，知「蝌蚪」由「科斗」演進，「嚕噓」由「魯蘇」衍成。「丁嚕」由「丁寧」增附「口」旁。則形聲字之淵源可以推而得矣。

第四節 本字轉增附注

文字初製，原始只有一「本義」。漢文字制作維艱。於本本義逐漸引申，擴大應用以切合實際需要。而其結果，在實際應用上常病訓義混淆紛歧。甚至本義晦澀，或爲新義所奪。補救之方爲轉增附注。一方面使義有專屬；一方面使本義顯明或恢復。例如「采」之本義爲採取花果，引申爲凡折攀之名。而花果色繁，引申又有众色之稱。爲使義有專屬，遂分別以「手」與「夕」增附作「採」與「彩」。而「文」之增附「系」作「紋」。「疍」「須」之增附「彡」作「髻鬚」。「益」「淵」「原」之增附「水」作「溢」「淵」「源」，皆所以應實際之需要。此在六書應屬於「轉注」。由於許慎標舉其例字「考」，以爲从老（省），丂聲。遂與「形聲」完全混淆。說文解字中其例頗多。世人不察，亦多不別。迹其淵源，不可不別也。例如：

「祖」 始廟也。从示，且聲。

按契金文大都以「且」爲之。「且」象神主形。即「祖」之初文。後因形義漸晦，乃增「示」旁。初非「从示，且聲」也。

「葉」 艸木之葉也。从艸，葉聲。

按契金文本象木上有葉片形。後譌作「葉」，實即「葉」之初文。因形義漸晦，乃增「艸」旁。初非「从艸葉聲也」。

「識」 常也段玉裁注以常乃意之譌。从言，戠聲。

按契金文本即作「識」。「言」與「音」本亦同字。「戠」即「識」之初文。从「言」乃後世增附。初非「从言，戠聲」也。

「儀」 度也。从人，義聲。

按契金文本即作「義」。蓋本爲「儀」之初文。因本義被奪，乃增附「人」旁以復之。許君以爲「从人，義聲」，非其溯也。

「鑑」 大盆也。从金，監聲。

按契金文本即作「監」。象人俯首張目就皿以照視。即鏡鑑之初文。說文訓「監」爲「臨下也」。義已歧變。後世改以銅器爲鏡。遂增附「金」旁以復之。許君以爲「从金，監聲」，未溯其源也。

此外如：

「傑」 執也。材過萬人也。从人，桀聲。

「怡」 蘇也。从心，台聲。

「傲」 倨也。从人，敖聲。

迹其造字之本，「桀」、「台」、「敖」皆爲初文，非从之爲聲也。許君生於漢也。距離古文字時期已遠，雖有疎誤乃事勢所難免。如「銜」、「雲」、「衰」等字，不曰从某，某聲，其功力已難能矣。

此外，許書又出「亦聲」之例。自來皆歸之於六書中「會意兼聲」。尋繹制字之本，實亦本字轉增附注，例如：

「仲」 中也。从人从中，中亦聲。

「阱」 陷也。从阜从井，井亦聲。

「隙」 壁際孔也。从阜从兪，兪亦聲。

「化」 教行也。从匕从人，匕亦聲。

「從」 隨行也。从辵从，从亦聲。

「詔」 告也。从言从召，召亦聲。

「鼻」 以鼻就臭也。从鼻从臭，臭亦聲。

「頃」 仄也。从人从頃，頃亦聲。

「像」 象也。从人从象，象亦聲。

「愍」 敬也。从心从敬，敬亦聲。

「警」 戒也。从言从敬，敬亦聲。

根據契金文及古籍用例，初文原卽爲「中」、「井」、「兪」、「匕」、「从」、「召」、「臭」、「頃」、「象」、「敬」。其偏旁乃後來增附。與一般會意兼「聲」之字如「字」「敗」等等有別。可惜許書說解形構，在此等字內涵精神上，並沒有深入辨析。以至「形聲」一書的實際，令人頗多困惑。以今隸爲例，如：

「暮」 本字卽「莫」，此非「从日，莫聲」也。

「趾」 本字卽「止」，此非「从足，止聲」也。

「腰」 本字卽「要」，此非「从肉，要聲」也。

「然」 本字卽「然」，此非「从火，然聲」也。

「胸」 本字卽「匈」，此非「从肉，匈聲」也。

「揀」 本字卽「柬」，此非「从手，柬聲」也。

「蜎」 本字卽「易」，此非「从虫，易聲」也。

「洲」 本字卽「州」，此非「从水，州聲」也。

「萑」 本字卽「萑」，此非「从艸，萑聲」也。

「菓」 本字卽「果」，自非「从艸，果聲」也。

此外如「曝」、「溢」、「源」、「熟」、「豈」、「熨」、「筐」、「篚」、「佐」、「佑」等等，悉爲本字轉增附注，與一般形聲字之構成，精神淵源迥然不同，研究「形聲」內涵，就必需明辨。

第三章 六書形聲內容分析

文字源於圖繪，這是原始民族制作通例。圖繪本身由實形而虛形，由單體而複體，也是必然趨

勢。經過漫長時間的演化，在傳統六書便是「象形」「指事」和「會意」。上古人民生活簡單，少量文字即敷需要。但社會進步，生活內容逐漸複雜，應用文字機會日多，文字的需求量日大。原始以「形」為主的造字法，必然面臨困難，因為在事物的大類下，光憑「象形」「指事」「會意」，絕難隨意分辨小類。「魚」為水蟲之大類。而魚之小類至繁。「木」為大類，而木之類屬更多。「日」「月」「山」「水」、「口」「爻」「夕」「冫」、「彡」「見」「邑」「走」，原始雖然義有專屬，但推衍相關事物，直接間接，虛虛實實，就無窮無盡。因應之道，濟窮之方，唯有借助語音。因人類語音早文字而存在。西方古老民族遂發明字母，直接拼切語音成為「拼音文字」。中華民族初期則即音假借，進而就形衍聲。最後則就事物大類下分別標音。而六書「形聲」之理，於焉確立。漢文字之制作亦步入坦途，直接取資於語音，不復有任何困難。加上大類先定，比起拼音文字，「形」「音」「義」三者關係更為密切融貫。在並世文字中便成為最獨特優異的制作。

六書「形聲」原理，許慎的界說是：—

「以事為名，取譬相成。江河是也」。

由此界說，所謂「形聲」內容，可以得五項結論：

- (1)以事物大類為取義基礎，配以譬況音讀制作新字。
- (2)所取為音讀之字，其功用只在讀音本身。
- (3)作為取義基礎的「形」旁，一般比較客觀穩定。譬況音讀的「聲」旁，則主觀而多變化。
- (4)形聲字正常構體為半形半聲。且「聲」「形」旁皆取其整體。外此即屬變例。
- (5)形聲字的認定，係據小篆事實與內涵。不溯本始。

以下即就構體內容分兩方面論述：

第一節 形聲正例—半形半聲

形聲的構體即「形」與「聲」的配合。所以「半形半聲」應是標準體構。但配合方式則錯綜多變。大別之有一

- | | |
|---------|---------|
| (1)左形右聲 | (2)右形左聲 |
| (3)上形下聲 | (4)下形上聲 |
| (5)內形外聲 | (6)外形內聲 |

嚴格言之，「形」與「聲」的配合不必有固定方式。原始亦無一定方式，秦始皇「書同文」，李斯、趙高、胡毋敬董理小篆，連帶才定型了形聲字的「形」「聲」位置，然隸楷以下，變易仍多。除了少數字的位置不可移易如「忙忘」、「江汞」、「排悲」、「襪褻」等，一般情形移易位置並不影響實質內容。本文加以區分，只是循例擴大認識形聲字結構層面。真正精神是所舉字例皆淵源有自，藉以見漢文字之源遠流長，及其遞嬗演變之徑途。例字以小篆為準，即是此意。

第一類 左形右聲

「福」 祐也。从示，畠聲。

考契金文作兩手奉酉（酒）於示前之形；或从示从酉；或即以酉為之。羅振玉據契文以為福字原始「从兩手奉尊於示前，或省奴，或並省示。許君謂福 畠聲，非也」

。

按羅說至確。許君據小篆說之亦無不當，然非其溯矣。

- 「牡」 畜父也。从牛，土聲。
段玉裁云：「按土聲求之疊韻雙聲皆非是」。
按「牡」字，許君據小篆以爲土聲。段玉裁謂於雙聲疊韻皆不可求，信然。據契金文當爲以「土」，象雄性器。因以爲男子之稱。凡走獸从之卽以示其性別。牡本爲雄牛。「畜父」乃引申泛稱。「土」聲則有誤矣。
- 「諄」 亂也。从言，尗聲。尗，諄或或从心。
按《說文》作二「或」相背。段玉裁云：「兩國相違，舉戈相向。亂之意也。」
李孝定據契文爲說：「契文正从二或相向。應是諄之古文。兩國相向，亂之意也。篆文作諄作尗，均後起形聲字」。
- 「卽」 卽食也。从卽，卽聲。
林義光云：「按卽卽人字。卽，就也。卽，薦熟物器。象人就食之形」。
按契金文凡「卽」字，皆象人跪於地之形。「卽」象人跪就向食器之形。古文乃象意字。許君說从「卽」聲，係據小篆爲言，非其溯也。
- 「沫」 洒面也。从水，未聲。頰，古文沫从頁。
吳大澂據金文爲說：「古沫字从頁从泉从皿注水。許氏說沫，洒面也。古文沫从頁作頰。又頁部頰，沫前也。疑亦沫之古文。許云沫，濯髮也。疑古沫沫爲一字」。
按契文象人散髮就皿洒面之狀。則原始並象披髮就皿濯洗形。後世遞變爲形聲字。「木」「未」雙聲，古用不別也。

第二類 右形左聲

- 「隹」 鳥肥大堆堆也。从隹，工聲。鳩，隹或从鳥。
羅振玉云：「疑此字與鴻雁之鴻古爲一字」。
按契金文作「鳩」，與說文或體同。羅振玉疑爲卽「鴻」字，可信，从隹从鳥古本無別。「江」聲木从「工」也。
- 「劓」 絕也。从刀，月聲。
段玉裁云：「凡絕皆稱劓，故劓下云劓鼻也」。
按慧琳音義「劓」引說文，注云：「絕也。截手足也」。則「劓」之本義應爲截手足。引申爲凡斷絕之稱。又說文以爲从刀月聲。契文作从刀从肉。疑「月」乃「肉」之譌。
- 「劓」 刑鼻也。从刀，鼻聲。易曰天且劓，鼻或从鼻。
桂馥云：「釋文劓，截鼻也。虞云割鼻爲劓」。
按金文與小篆同。契文作从刀从自，自卽鼻之象形文。則原始乃象意字。與說文或體同。小篆源於金文，乃後起形聲字。
- 「癸」 周禮侍臣執戣立於東。垂兵也。从戈，癸聲。
朱駿聲云「按卽癸之後製字」。
按契金文本象三鋒之矛。孫詒讓羅振玉並確認卽古之「癸」字亦卽「癸」也。後「癸」借爲干支字。遂增附「戈」旁以復之。許君據小篆作「从戈癸聲」，成爲形聲

字。然非其溯矣。

「戍」 斧也。从戈，丩聲。司馬法曰夏執玄戍。殷執白戍。周左杖黃戍，右秉白髮。

羅振玉據契文爲說：「案戍字象形。非形聲」。

按契金文並象斧形。非从「丩」聲。小篆譌變致有此誤。許君據以爲「从戈，丩聲」，非其溯也。說文又出「鉞」字。應爲「戍」之後出字。許君訓義爲段借。「从金成聲」，亦非其本也。

第三類 上形下聲

「瘞」 瘞也。从疒，狸聲。

桂馥云：「本書瘞幽狸也。釋天祭地曰瘞狸。周禮大宗伯以醴沈祭山林川澤。俗作理」。按契金文掘地成坑，實牛羊或犬於其中，即所以祭山林鬼神之意。小篆乃後出形聲字。俗作「埋」，从土里聲。視篆之从艸較當於理。

「箛」 弩矢箛也。从竹，服聲。周禮仲秋獻矢箛。

殷玉裁云：「司弓矢曰中秋獻矢箛。注曰箛盛矢器也。以獸爲之。按本以竹木爲之，故字从竹」。

羅振玉據契文爲說：「卜辭諸字象盛矢在器中形。或一矢或二矢。古金文略同。且有中盛三矢者」。

按「箛」爲盛矢之器。契金即繪置矢於器之形。譌變爲「葡」。形義並莫明矣。後乃更造「箛」。从竹，服聲也。

「罕」 網也。从网，干聲。

段玉裁云「謂網之一也。吳都賦注曰畢罕皆鳥網也」。

唐蘭據契文以爲「罕」乃古捕鳥獸之網。按就契文構形言，當爲長柄捕鳥之器，浸變而爲「禽」字也。許君據小篆以爲从网，干聲，又其變也。

「育」 養子使作善也。从女，肉聲。

徐灝云：「爾雅釋詁曰育長也。育之本義但爲長養。許因書有教育子之文，故以作善爲說耳」。

按契金文並象產子之形。从女从女在臀後，產子之意如繪。契金又有作子在女陰上出者，疑小篆从肉之所由昉也。許君說形義，自非其溯。

第四類。下形上聲

「攴」 小擊也。从手，卜聲。

徐灝云：「从攴之字多非擊義。攴訓小擊，理有難通！疑本象手有所執持之形。故凡舉手作事之義皆从之。因用爲扑擊字耳」。

按契金文正象手有所執持。部屬中字如「啓」、「敏」、「故」等亦未見「小擊」之義。徐氏之說是也。許君說「从手，卜聲」，乃就後出小篆言也。

「盞」 器中空也。从皿，夷聲。

羅振玉據契文爲說：「从又持木，从皿，象滌器形。食盞，器斯滌矣。故有終盞之意。說文解云从皿，夷聲。殆不然矣」。

按小篆乃後出形聲字。許君據之爲說，並無不當。然非其溯矣。

「饔」 孰食也。从食，雝聲。

段玉裁云：「已孰可食者也。小雅毛傳曰孰食曰饔」。

按契金文原始本象兩手進奉食物之形。孰食乃可進也。金文又有演爲形聲者，卽小篆所出也。

「盡」 火餘也。从火，聿聲。

徐鉉云：「聿非聲。疑从聿省。今俗別作燼，非是」。

羅振玉據契文爲說云：「此从又持丨以發火，象形。非形聲也」。

按許君係據小篆構形爲說，自非其溯。

第五類 內形外聲

「問」 訊也。从口，門聲。

段玉裁云：「言部訊問也。引申爲禮之聘問」。

按契金文與小篆同。「問」以口爲義，故可訓訊，訓言、訓命、訓告。許君說解僅取其一義也。

「讎」 猶應也。从言，雝聲。

段玉裁云：「心部曰應，當也。讎者以言對之。詩云無言不讎，是也」。

按金文與小篆同。惟兩「佳」作相對向。疑原始兼應對義，非徒从之爲聲也。

「聞」 和說而諱也。从言，門聲。

段玉裁云：「論語鄉黨孔注，侃侃和樂貌。聞聞中正貌。按聞聞爲中正者，謂和悅而諱，柔剛得中也。言居門中，亦有中正之意」。

按此字構形，許說應無誤。惜後世談「語巾切」，則以「言」爲聲矣。豈本从門言聲歟！

「鳳」 神鳥也。从鳥，凡聲。

按「鳳」字原始本象神鳥形。契文或加凡聲。此猶「雞」之原始本象高冠修尾之知時畜。後形稍晦乃加奚爲聲。終而从佳爲義，从奚爲聲，成爲純粹之形聲字。此小篆「鳳」之演進正同也。

第六類 外形內聲

「匡」 飯器，筥也。从匚，隹聲。筐，匡或从竹。

段玉裁云：「匡不專於盛飯。故詩采卷耳以頃匡，求桑以懿匡。匡之引申段借爲匡正。蓋正其不正爲匡」。按契金文並見此字，唯契文从「羊」爲聲。因引申段借爲匡正匡救。後世乃加「竹」旁以復之作「筐」。明非从竹，匡聲也。

「銜」 迹也。从行，彡聲。

羅振玉云：「許書銜銜並訓迹，乃一字。踐雖訓履，然與銜亦一字。是一字而析爲三矣」。

按古文義旁字凡同類多可通。从「行」、「彡」、「辵」、「彳」、「止」、「足」、「走」等，義實無別。「口」「言」、「衣」「巾」亦然。故「咏」「詠」、「

「裙」 「幘」並同字也。

「園」 苑有垣也。从口，有聲。𠄎，籀文園。

段玉裁云：「高誘注淮南曰有牆曰苑，無牆曰園。與許互異，蓋有無互譌耳。周禮注曰園今之苑。按古今異名，許析言之，鄭渾言之也。」

按契文象垣內畫界，或植木，或植屮，與籀文同。又或省口，金文已演變為从口，有聲。即小篆之所由出也。

「圃」 種菜曰圃。从口，甫聲。

段玉裁云：「齊風毛傳曰圃菜園也。馬融論語注曰樹菜蔬曰圃。元應引蒼頡解詁云種樹曰園，種菜曰圃」。吳大澂據金文，云：「古圃字从𠄎在田，从口。象圃種菜形。」

按契文象田中有蔬菜之形。金文外加口，於形似複。小篆徑作「圃」，从口，甫聲。遂純粹為形聲字矣。

第二節 形聲變例

形聲字之構體，正常方式為「半形半聲」已如前述。然亦有少數變例。這是文字制作的必然現象。許慎在說文解字中屢有提出。研究「形聲」，自應深入論析。

第一類 複合形聲

「𠄎」 誰也。从口，𠄎又聲。

段玉裁云：「按此篆疑有誤。白部曰𠄎詞也。从白𠄎聲。引書帝曰𠄎咨，與此音義大同。但其字从口𠄎聲足矣。不當兼从又聲。又在一部非聲也」。

按段說可信。說文又出「𠄎」、「𠄎」、「𠄎」等九字皆以「𠄎」為聲，不見有「𠄎」字。金文象伯敦作「𠄎」，正从口，𠄎聲也。

「𠄎」 墜也。从非，次席皆聲。齋，或以齊。

段玉裁云：「周禮注凡酸醬所和細切為齋。王氏念孫曰經者細碎之名。莊子言擗粉是也。按艸部曰菹酢菜也。酢菜之細切者曰擗。通俗文曰淹非曰擗。淹菹曰墜。蓋其名起於淹非」。

按許說段注皆以此字為一形二聲。然非正常造字之方。故或體作「齋」，改為从非，齊聲。

「𠄎」 扶渠根。从艸水，𠄎聲。

嚴章福云：「此三合成文。以水艸為義，以𠄎為聲」。

按「形聲」之構體為「以事為名」，則義旁似不應出兩體致與「會意兼聲」混。或「水艸」為大類而無專字，故出此例。「𠄎」、「𠄎」、「𠄎」等皆然。

「塗」 塗也。从水从土，尪聲。

段玉裁云：「通俗文曰泥塗謂之塗瀕」。

按此形聲字構體亦可疑，故說文重見於土部，云：「从土，尪聲」。「泥塗」為水土，如水艸之例，故作兩形一聲以入水部。

「竊」 盜自中出曰竊。从穴从米，萬廿皆聲。廿古文疾。萬古文僕。
 徐鍇云：「按春秋左傳曰在外爲姦，在內爲宄。宄从宀，竊从穴彌小。所謂鼠竊狗盜也。此形聲字」。
 徐灝云：「此一字而兼用萬廿二聲，六書所少。戴氏侗云从宀，橫聲。萬之首譌廿。似是也」。
 按此字之構體，許君據小篆爲二形二聲。然歷來衆說紛紜，莫有確解。以意度之，或从穴从萬从米會意，廿聲。

按以上諸字或一形二聲；或二形一聲；或二形二聲。與形聲界說原理皆不合。總爲複合形聲。迹其本始，多有可疑，故爲「變例」。

第二類 省形省聲

「橐」 囊也。从橐省，石聲。
 段玉裁云：「按許云橐囊也，囊橐也。渾言之也。大雅毛傳曰小曰橐大曰囊，高誘注戰國策曰無底曰囊，有底曰橐，皆析言之也。
 按「橐」、「囊」、「囊」三字，皆以束收物之具爲義。以契文「橐」之形徵之，原始應並象兩端可以收括之袋，因方不同而分爲三字。或大或小，有底無底，乃後世強爲分別，故歷來衆說紛紜也。小篆「橐」云「从束，囙聲」，而「橐」與「囊」等則从之省形，徵之原始蓋無當也。「囊」、「橐」之構體亦然。

「寐」 臥也。从寤省，未聲。
 徐鍇云：「寐之言，迷也。不明之意也」。
 按「寤」之構體爲「从宀从疒、夢聲」，則「寐」云：「从宀从疒，未聲」，足矣。「寤」、「寤」、「寤」等然。而皆曰「从寤省」，迂曲不可從也。契文「寐」作穴下女木聲，或宀下人木聲。女與人無別，皆示在宀下憩息即臥之意也。至於「寤」、「寤」、「寤」諸字，則可謂从「寤」省也。

「考」 老也。从老省，丂聲。
 段玉裁云：「凡言壽考者，此字之本義也。引申之爲成也」。
 按此係據小篆爲說。小篆「老」下云：「从人毛匕，言須髮變白也」。據契金文實非其誼。商承祚以爲「象老者倚杖之形」。葉玉森以爲「象老人戴髮偃僕扶杖形」。金文稍爲譌變，「杖」誤肖匕，即小篆之所由出也。嚴格言之，應即从「老」，非「从老省也」。
 又「考」字古皆以「丂」爲之，爲別其義有專屬故增附老以明之，此於六書應爲轉注。故許君以爲例字。而說解則與形聲構體攙矣。

「齋」 戒潔也。从示，齊省聲。
 徐鍇云：「洗心曰齋。齋，戒潔也」。
 段玉裁云：「謂減齊之二畫，使其字不繁重也」。
 按「齋」之契金文象禾麥吐穗上平，下本無二畫。徐鍇說文繫傳作从齊聲，不云省，較近於古。然不可以說小篆矣。

「羔」 羊子也。从羊，照省聲。

徐灝云：「照省聲，似未確。疑羔之本義爲羊炙。故从火。小羊味美，爲炙尤宜，因之羊子謂之羔」。

按契金文並从羊在火上。許君云从照省聲，不可信也。徐灝以爲本義爲羊炙，然既斷小羊宜炙，字取炙羊，則本義即可爲羊子也。

「家」 居也。从宀，豕省聲。

段玉裁云：「按此字爲一大疑案。豕省聲讀家；學者但見从豕而已！从豕之字多矣，安見其爲豕省耶！何以不云段聲而紆回至此耶。竊謂本義乃豕之居也。引申段借以爲人之居。字義之轉移多如此」。

按「家」字形義，聚訟至多。許君據小篆以爲从「豕省聲」必不可信也。契金文並作宀下豕。段氏以爲家本豕之居，引申段借以屬人，雖未審諦，而視从豕省之說形爲長。聞西南鄉間多有傍山築室，人架木以居，其下則養牲畜。契金文之形構可以推矣。豕爲家畜中之最常見者，故从宀从豕以會意。許君未溯其本，遂誤以爲形聲。聲無所蒙，乃又設爲「豕」省，真紆曲而無當矣。

「量」 稱輕重也。从重省，鼎省聲。重，古丈量。

徐灝云：「許云稱輕重者，以篆體从重也。重之古義不專言斤兩。故重疊亦謂之重。今人又謂度量長短爲量。此緣度量連文，久之遂單稱量以爲度矣。曰鼎省聲可疑，據古文則非鼎省明矣。⊖△蓋象量器之形。以其形略，故又从重也」。

按此「量」字構形可疑，省「鼎」爲聲，於古文無可徵，林義光以爲从良省聲。良古象形作𠂔，存參。金文量侯敦與克鼎並見此字。於形亦難說。

按以上六字或省形或省聲，或形聲並聲，以「融」「襲」諸字大篆不省證之。則「省聲」之理似較可信。許君生於漢世，資料不備，「省形」之理據小篆說之，似無不可，然不足以徵古矣，而研究「形聲」則不可或缺也。

第三類 兩體皆聲（按此即林義光所謂二重）
形聲此篇字例皆取林說

「遐」 大遠也。从古，段聲。

徐鍇云：「按詩曰錫爾純嘏，大遠之福也」。

林義光云：「按嘏訓爲福爲大，遠古之義經籍無嘏者。古段皆聲也，

按「古」、「段」、「遐」，古音並在魚部。

「靜」 審也。从青，爭聲。

徐鍇曰：「丹青明審也」。

段玉裁云：「采色詳審得其宜謂之靜。考工記言畫績之事是也。五布五色疏密有章，則雖絢爛之極而無渙不鮮是曰靜。人心審度得宜，一言一事必求理義之必然，則雖繁勞之極而無紛亂，亦曰靜」。

林義光云：「按从青非義。青爭皆聲也。」

「𧸛」 物數紛𧸛亂也。从員，云聲。

段玉裁云：「紛𧸛謂多，多則亂也。古段芸爲𧸛」。

林義光云：「按員爲物數，未可據。員云皆聲。員，古音云」。

「閔」 弔者在門也。从門，文聲。

段玉裁云：「引申爲凡痛惜之辭。俗作憫」。

林義光云：「按閱痛惜也。从門非義。門文皆聲也。門文古同音」。

「閱」 有文章也。从有，咸聲。

段玉裁云：「閱，古多段或字爲之。或者咸之隸變。今本論語郁郁乎文哉，古多作或或。小雅黍稷或或。傳云或或茂盛貌。即有文章之引申義也」。

林義光云：「有文章不可从有，有咸皆聲也」。有與咸古同音。

「崩」 翌也。从明，亡聲。

段玉裁云：「崩即今之忙字。亦作茫。崩人晝夜作，無日用月，無月用火。常思明，故从明。或云崩人思天曉，故字从明」。

林義光云：「按崩訓爲翌，無所考。廣雅崩遽也。實忙之本字。亡明皆聲也。明古音音同亡」。

「箕」 長踞也。从己，其聲，讀若杞。

段玉裁云：「長踞謂箕其股而坐。許云箕居者，即他書之箕踞也」。

林義光云：「按从己非義。己其皆聲」。

「釐」 家福也。从里，聲。

林義光云：「家福不得从里。釐訓爲福，家福之義亦未聞。里聲皆聲也」。

按「形聲」造字，淵源既遠，徑途亦繁。許慎綜合兩漢研究小篆成說，至改漢書藝文志之「象聲」爲「形聲」，自不能包容「兩體皆聲」之體例。然文字本由全民智慧集體創製。原無一定法則。小篆係奉時因應需要，根據大篆董理而成。漢世研究小篆，據之而出之「六書」。自始即不能涵蓋全部文字制作原理。漢志之「象聲」較「形聲」之涵蓋性猶廣，「兩體皆聲」在漢志固自自然而合理也。

結語

漢文字之制作，源於圖繪。演進衍化而爲「象形」、「象事」、「象意」三書。然必待與語音結合，其生機始確立，境界才恢宏，制作才無碍。六書之「形聲」。只是以語音造作文字諸種方式之一——以事爲名，取譬相成。較諸「象聲」，其範圍又窄。

「象聲」範圍實際可以涵蓋「擬聲」，及所謂「兩體皆聲」。而「六書」又出「段借」，漢志沒有爲每書闡明其「界說」，標舉其「例字」。許慎繼之，初不知「兩體皆聲」可能存在之理，向以爲「段借」不局限於「本義引申」。遂誤將「擬音」作「段借」界說，所舉例字則爲「本義引申」。於是「形聲」代替「象聲」，同時，「以事爲名，取譬相成。江河是也」。這「界說」與「例字」更確立了權威。只是「段借」的「界說」與「例字」自始不能融貫，千餘年來一直令人困惑，難解！

其實，應用語音制作文字，仍有其他形式。說文解字有拼切成聲之字。可惜許慎未察而已。例如：

「舒」 伸也。从舍从予，予亦聲。一曰舒緩也。

段玉裁云：「物予人得申其意」。

王筠云：「案予舍皆聲也。凡兩體皆義皆聲者，許君不言聲。此當云从予从舍，而刪予亦聲。如云舍字義委曲，則依小徐从舍予聲而改爲从予舍聲」。

林義光云：「按舍予皆聲也」。

按此字形義，自來難解。許說不能一貫應極顯然。

段玉裁亦不過曲爲之疏而已。王林並以爲「舍」「予」皆聲。似矣。以音理求之，應爲「舒予」拼切成聲也。

「𠄎」(𠄎) 況詞也。从矢，引省聲。从矢，取詞之所之如矢也。

按許君說「从矢」之義，真曲盡離奇之事矣。以「式忍」反語推之，此正「矢引」拼切成聲也。

後世又有變形爲聲之字。例如：

「刁」 變「刀」爲之，讀如「凋」，聲由「刀」音出。訓義實與「刀」無關聯。

「勾」 變「句」爲之。讀如「鉤」，聲亦由古「句」音出，訓義與「句」實無直接關聯。

今俗更有拆形爲聲之字，例如：

兵 拆去「兵」字右撇，聲讀實由「兵」出。訓義與「兵」無關。

兵 拆去「兵」字左撇。聲讀亦由「兵」變。訓義亦與「兵」無關。

此外投石入井，造作「井」字以表其「聲」。造作「𠄎」字，取其「聲」以見竹鞭人體之義。真曲盡造字之理趣矣。而「形聲」之淵源演變亦略可以推也。

T. S. ELIOT'S MYTHICAL CONCERN

Anjan K. Nath*

[Abstract]

T. S. Eliot urges his readers to believe that the best of his literary criticism consists of essays on poets and poetic dramatists who had influenced him and describes his criticism as a "by-product" of his creative activity and clearly marks out his affinities with the tradition he was seeking to create for himself. Characteristic of Eliot, such a process is conceived as a dual operation involving the readjustment of the old order for the accommodation of the new as much as the unification of the new with the established tradition.

For the major part of his earlier criticism, Eliot is searching and inconclusive despite the authoritative tone he employs in his essays: he mastered the art of passing off critical polemic in the disguise of objective, disinterested criticism. In his essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," which some consider to have fallen into distinguished obsolescence, Eliot appears convinced that it is "part of the business of the critic to preserve tradition - where good tradition exists." He uses the concept of tradition as a mask to hide his essentially individualistic qualities. Eliot's concern to fuse "the most ancient and the most civilized" and return to "the most primitive and forgotten" was not isolated. He identifies the artistic method with the mythical method, which is supposed to reduce chaos into order, confusion into significance.

The present study re-examines Eliot's idea of tradition and suggests that the idea had its germinal roots in the concept of myth and attempts to fill in some of the necessary background. It, however, does not enter into a "defense" of those ideas for, 1) Eliot's version of literary history is mythic, which assumption in itself precludes any kind of argument and 2) the tradition to which Eliot is linked constitutes a defence in itself. Eliot is not a critic with whom one can agree all the time; nevertheless, it has been my purpose to show that the sense of myth is an essential part of Eliot's criticism in that we cannot see the shape of the whole without it.

While it is true that the casual and the occasional statements of an author of importance need not formulate themselves into a systematic doctrine, the fact too cannot be ignored that there are important views, attitudes, and value-judgements which occurring frequently in his total body of work suggest the presence of a systematically reasoned structure of thought. For the major part of his earlier criticism, T. S. Eliot is searching and inconclusive despite the authoritative tone he employs in his essays and

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as Northrop Frye observes, Eliot mastered the art of passing off critical polemic in the disguise of objective, disinterested criticism.¹ In his celebrated essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," which Balachandra Rajan now considers has fallen into "distinguished obsolescence,"² Eliot appears convinced that it is "part of the business of the critic to preserve tradition - where good tradition exists." He uses the concept of tradition as a mask to hide his essentially individualistic qualities. In his later writings Eliot expands upon his concept of tradition against a backdrop of Christian orthodoxy where his primary concern is with the Church, theology, culture, and society. He is in search here for a universal critical standard which may be applicable in every sphere of intellectual activity, and, hence, "characterized by a persistent tension between vestiges of his earlier critical theories and the overriding demands of his social and religious beliefs."³

As a poet and critic, Eliot brought into consciousness, and into confrontation with one another the two opposing factors of the spiritually negative character of the contemporary world and the spiritually positive character of the past tradition, where he viewed the past not as a nostalgic means of escape from the present, but as a living force surviving within the present. And, in order to achieve a composite world view, "he required not only to be a poet but also to be a penetrating-analytic critic both of the past and of the present . . . guarding the integrity of the past tradition [and seeing] modern literature as making those past values new within contemporary life."⁴ On this account Eliot has been accused of identifying tradition with heresy. In Eliot's own words, heresy may be "partly right," and perhaps we can substantiate this by arguing that the basic tenets of his achievement as a major critic lies in his combination of myth and dogma as a world view and which in turn, show the relatedness of his religious and literary ideals. One of the major considerations which runs through Eliot's criticism and poetry, Stephen Spender observes,

is that of escaping from the subjective self into a world of objective values. In all his work there is the search for the merging of individual consciousness within some wider objective truth - at first the tradition, next the idea of the supernatural, and finally the dogmas of the Catholic Church . . . His search for the authority first found within the tradition and, later, in the dogmas of the church provides the connection between the different stages of his development.⁵

It is our purpose here to show that that connection, which is both objective and subjective exists, and is provided by Eliot's keen awareness of the concept of myth.

I.

Eliot's attitude to life in general may, perhaps, be best described by the word "ritualistic." He has a vision of the continuity of the present with the past and sees the contemporaneous as an extension of the historical through a matrix of rituals which

were to be seen as extensions into the modern world of dogmas that remain unaltered from the past. The background to his early poetry "is a secular temporal world in which religious belief has become impossible. All that remains is the tradition: the life and values of a society in which there was true ritual crystallised in certain monuments of art; and to which it was possible for the modern artist or reader, by incessant study of these works, to relate his work, in his new art."⁶ The rituals of living which Eliot yearned for come within the medieval Catholic tradition, though they have roots in ancient Rome and classical Greece. To him these ancient civilizations provided the chief sources of mythology, and as the roots of English and other European literature. He had based his idea of Europe on a past and antiquity emerges in his poems from the obscurities of myth into the tangible.

As in Matthew Arnold's polemics on culture, Eliot, who is seen to labour under an anxiety of influence, sees religion as a cultural product, but with a distinction:

In Eliot religion forms a third level above human society. Its presence there guarantees Burke's distinction between a higher order of human and a lower order of physical nature. "If this 'supernatural' is suppressed . . . the dualism of man and nature collapses at once. Man is man because he can recognise supernatural realities, not because he can invent them." Hence human culture is aligned with a spiritual reality which is superior to it and yet within it, the kind of relationship represented in Christianity by the Incarnation. Eliot stresses the importance of this conception when he speaks of culture metaphorically as the "incarnation" of a religion, the human manifestation of a superhuman reality . . . In *After Strange Gods* Eliot uses "orthodoxy" to mean a conscious and voluntary commitment to the religious aspect of tradition.⁷

Metaphorical thinking about culture, religion, traditionalism and the classics may help provide models for a secular temporal world of art, but in the world of actuality, mere symbols, like those arranged in a poem and projected as a creative-critical theory could prove to be disastrous. Eliot realized that politics was not simply a battleground of symbols and abstract principles, but that real people were involved, and therefore, his symbols are imprecise in order to avoid any definite dogmatic categories not present in experience or in religious feeling itself.

Eliot does not wish to mislead his audience with the imprecision of his symbolism, but on the contrary, hopes to impart a religious experience. He also does not try to question how much one can know from the Incarnation alone. "We can only *experience* the numinous: we can feel, sense, the religious, but we cannot define it rationally. Thus we cannot know or understand religious feeling, only religious dogma."⁸ Eliot's own writings reveal that the time sequences in "Journey of the Magi" and in *The Waste Land*, show that he believed, following Frazer's *The Golden Bough* and Jessie Weston's *From Ritual to Romance*, "that the Christian Church grew out of older Oriental religious and fertility cults and that all such cults, including Christianity, are

successive mythic incarnations of the same basic religious truths, one of which is the Incarnation, the perpetual possibility of religious feeling inherent in the material world."⁹

A recent critic of Eliot's suggests the possibility that Eliot could have been influenced by the Higher Criticism.¹⁰ Besides being anti-myth, there appears to be no evidence in Eliot's essays or poetry that the issues examined by the Higher Criticism were of much concern to him. Moreover, by the time Eliot began to express his own struggles with literal belief, the Higher Criticism had been surpassed by the neo-orthodox theology of Barth. Following F.H. Bradley, Eliot believed that objective historical fact was impossible on philosophical grounds. Bradley's philosophy attracted Eliot because it is concerned with the relationship of the subjective consciousness with the objective world. In his thesis, *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley*, Eliot dealt with Bradley's attempt to answer the questions of consciousness and the external world and their relationship to the private self. Eliot clearly felt, like Bradley, the need to reject a negative or solipsistic answer to them, and it is this that leads him to an ultimate commitment to a religious belief. However,

in his acceptance of religion and the idea of a transcendent God, Eliot departed from Bradley's philosophy. For to Bradley the division between God and the world, a Creator and His Creation, represented an abstraction false like, though not so false as, any other abstraction. Nevertheless, even when Eliot added a belief in God, he retained the Bradlean conviction that individual consciousness as it is ordinarily conceived is not an ultimate fact of reality: and for this conviction he retained the Bradlean argument that you cannot arrive at truth or reality by simply adding up individual consciousness - for your starting point is rooted in abstraction, and therefore in error.¹¹

Eliot, hence, would have regarded the Higher Criticism's beliefs based on empirical values as misguided and irrelevant.

We can safely assume then, that for Eliot, myth and dogma are the important elements of religion:

Myth involves the feelings in the meaning, whereas dogma alone cannot. Eliot wants to integrate both the intellect and the emotions in religious experience in order to maintain a unified spiritual sensibility. . . . Eliot's repeated emphasis on Original Sin and the Incarnation demonstrates that he has no "distrust of dogma": he criticizes the Catholic Church only for what he perceives to be false interpretations of dogma and myth. Dogma encapsulates one's beliefs so the intellect can grasp them. Likewise, Eliot does not . . . Oppose "Matthew's mythologizing"; this "historical-mythological pageant" is also crucial to religious experience.¹²

It is the world of "Gerontion," where there is not merely a loss of faith in the myths and virtues on which the civilization originally flourished, but where it becomes

impossible to believe in them except vicariously through remembering the past. "Gerontion" is an important stage in Eliot's development, more so, since it leads towards *The Waste Land* - Eliot's controversial, and most successful, poem where there is a true synthesis of all that is Eliot, i.e., myth, dogma, and tradition.

II.

For Eliot, as for his generation, the idea of "tradition" had a profound impact. It showed the way to a new understanding of the relationship between the poet and his world and made a distinction between the Classical and the Romantic which was in gravity as much as the distinction of the Copernician from the Ptolemaic systems of the study of the universe. The poet was displaced from the centre of his universe and had to re-vamp his creative consciousness according to those famous words that were the order of the day; "Poetry is not the turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion" ¹³

Balachandra Rajan, in his opening remarks in *The Overwhelming Question*, says that to read "Tradition and the Individual Talent" today is to become aware of its distinguished obsolescence. He feels that the essay has taken its place among those monuments, the ideal order of which it once sought to alter by the injection of the radically new. "Literary judgement," he comments, "moves onward though not necessarily forward," and, "the expanding worlds of the collective and the anonymous, the growth of mass communications and the increasing difficulty of communicating the authentic, have given to words like 'personality' and 'identity' a rallying power they once did not possess." ¹⁴ Perhaps Mr Rajan is right in considering the controversial essay obsolete, but we must at the same time remind ourselves that for Eliot, continuity and change are both basic to tradition. Once a tradition is formed, it is expected to move, "onward though not necessarily forward," toward an order of more inclusive unity through the assimilation and participation of new parts. Rajan himself admits that Eliot's criticism "has always been enmeshed in a given literary situation and has found its strength because it has usually been charged with the forces needed to make that situation creative. Since part of the milieu which the criticism illuminates and moves forward is formed by Eliot's own poetry, it is reasonable that motifs predominant in the criticism should find their substantiation in the creative work." ¹⁵

Eliot's concept of tradition admits experiment and originality, yet it is a somewhat destined movement. "By tradition," he says, "I do not mean its vainglories, its conceit of itself in its past; but the fact it has grown in one way and not in another, and that its future growth is determined in certain directions, if any, by its having grown in that way through the past." ¹⁶

Eliot's interest in the work of the early anthropologists is well known, but what is somewhat less known or rather understood, is the extent of influence the concept of myth had on the formative ideas of Eliot, and Eliot's indebtedness to the work of

scholars like J.G. Frazer, Gilbert Murray, Jane Harrison, and F.M. Cornford. Eliot shared their knowledge as did all the major thinkers of the day. Freud, Jung, Frazer, Bergson, Murray, had as their common stock Ovid, Homer, Virgil, Sophocles. Novel though their systems were, it was equally disturbing, as C.B. Cox writes about Frazer in the "Introduction" to *The Twentieth Century Mind*: "with his touching faith in reason and good sense he proved to the twentieth century how powerful are the irrational and savage elements in human civilizations."¹⁷ Frazer and others had a profound influence on the thinking of the "positive" age notably on the artistic imagination of Eliot: "If we are to digest the heavy food of historical and scientific knowledge that we have eaten," he wrote, "we must be prepared for much greater exertions. We need a digestion which can assimilate both Homer and Flaubert."¹⁸

Eliot's early impressions of these ideas were from Gilbert Murray. Using the investigations of the anthropologists, like Frazer, as his starting point Murray weaved an inter-relationship between pre-Hellenic Society and Greek myth, religion and philosophy, law and literature, arguing that the *Iliad* was a traditional book "dependent on a living saga or tradition," and thereby advanced a new interpretation of the *Homeridae* - that the relationship of the many anonymous poets contributing to the master epic was such where the individual poet was content to subordinate himself entirely to the tradition.

But now comes a curious observation. We who are accustomed to modern literature always associate this sort of imaginative intensity with something personal. We connect it with an artist's individuality, or with originality in the sense of "newness." It seems as though, under modern conditions, an artist usually did not feel or imagine intensely unless he was producing some work which was definitely his own and not another's, work which must bear his personal name and be marked by his personal character . . . I do very greatly wish to point out that the artistic feeling in this matter has not always been the same. Artists have not always wished to stamp their work with their personal characteristics or even their personal name. Artists have sometimes been, as it were, Protestant or Iconoclast, unable to worship without asserting themselves against the established ritual of their religion: sometimes, in happier circumstances, they have accepted and loved the ritual as part of the religion, and wrought out their own new works of poetry, not as protests, not as personal outbursts, but as glad and nameless offerings, made in prescribed form to enhance the glory of the spirit whom they served . . . Each successive poet did not assert himself up to the tradition, and added to its greatness and beauty all that was in him.¹⁹

It has been necessary to quote Murray at length here for, reading Eliot along with the above, the point being emphasized will be better understood.

One of the facts that might come to light in this process is our tendency to insist, when we praise a poet, upon those aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else. In these aspects or parts of his work we pretend to find what is individual, what is the peculiar

essence of the man. We dwell with satisfaction upon the poet's difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors . . . whereas if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his works may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously.²⁰

More compelling is the famous metaphor which demonstrates the relation of the new work of art to the past monuments where Eliot says that no poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone, but that his significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists.²¹ In the same strain Eliot further elaborates that what is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or acquire the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career. By this process the artist surrenders his individuality to his art thereby leading to an extinction of personality.

The above examples go to show that Eliot was merely repeating Murray. To suggest, however, that Eliot was wholly indebted to Murray would indeed be a fallacy, but nevertheless, much of "Tradition and the Individual Talent" can be seen as a direct influence of ideas impressed upon Eliot's young mind. Writing on Eliot's sense of tradition Frye comments that "an essential part of creative power is in past literature. Every poet inherits a literary continuum which has come down from Homer to our own day, and feels that this continuum 'has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.'"²² And Rajan: "The implicit criterion is one of continuity, sometimes expressed in, but not necessarily identified with, the presence of a literary 'personality'. The important thing is that the continuity should possess the power of development, that it should be capable of creating and sustaining a significant process or a meaningful world."²³ Eliot's concern to fuse "the most ancient and the most civilized" and return to "the most primitive and forgotten" was not isolated, and as if in anticipation of criticism like the above, in "Ulysses, Order, and Myth," Eliot identifies the artistic method with the mythical method, which is supposed to reduce chaos into order, confusion into significance: "In using the myth," he says,

Mr. Joyce is pursuing a method which others must pursue after him. They will not be imitators, any more than the scientist who uses the discoveries of an Einstein in pursuing his own, independent, further investigations. It is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history. It is a method already adumbrated by Mr Yeats, and of the need for which I believe Mr. Yeats to have been the first contemporary to be conscious. It is a method for which the horoscope is auspicious. Psychology (such as it is, and whether our reaction to it be comic or serious), ethnology, and *The Golden Bough* have concurred to make possible what was impossible even a few years ago. Instead of narrative method, we may now use the mythical method. It is, I seriously believe, a step toward making the modern world possible for art.²⁴

And, "a myth," Eliot defines, "is a point of view raised to importance by imagination."²⁵

III.

Eliot did not use myth as a means of seeking insight into his own unconscious mind, nor is myth developed in his poetry into a vehicle for approaching the untraversed paths of inner and external reality. Eliot's *mythical method* is essentially a mode to provide "an escape from emotion . . . an escape from personality." Commenting on Arnold's famous definition: "Poetry is at bottom a criticism of life," Eliot, in his essay on Mathew Arnold, says: "At the bottom of the abyss is what few ever see, and what those cannot bear to look at for long; and it is not a 'criticism of life' . . . *We bring back very little from our rare descents*, and that is not criticism."²⁶ Myth did offer a path to the "bottom of the abyss" for Eliot, but it was only to unfold itself as an impersonal means of expression—a means by which individual talent could reshape traditional literature.

A. G. George believes that "Eliot uses the ancient myths as objective correlatives and not to institute a comparison between the present life and the past as is commonly understood."²⁷ Eliot explains the objective correlative as:

The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.²⁸

And George concludes: "What Eliot finds in the myths is a large number of situations, a chain of incidents which act as objective correlatives, to express his emotions in the form of art, especially his religious emotions. The study of social anthropology by Frazer and Miss Weston has revealed the enormous wealth of mythical customs and rituals which can, for a modern poet, act as adequate symbols for his religious ideas and emotions."²⁹ George disagrees with critics like F.O. Matthiessen and Helen Gardner, who, in spite of their detailed study of Eliot's technique, fail to relate "the use of the objective correlative to the mythical element."³⁰

The terms may differ, but whether one derives ethical ideas from myths or studies them as evidence of traits in the artist's mind, the process essentially remains that of translating the objective into the subjective, and vice versa, or one might, perhaps, assume at the outset a dualism, without giving much weightage to what relevance such a scheme could possibly have in Eliot's world—the world of the "invisible poet" where the boundary between subject and object is obscure, indefinite, and mainly speculative. It is in just such a world that the myth-maker and myth-critic finds himself comfortable, for his theory serves handily as a peg on which to hang a number of pertinent truths. This theory need not be as confining as Northrop Frye's system as adumbrated in the *Anatomy of Criticism* which is confined within the limits of literature, but

rather, a more general, more inclusive theory which Frye has in mind and elaborates after the *Anatomy*.

If at this juncture we are to assume that the concepts of conscious thought are drawn from and gain prominence within the artist's world view, it should follow that in order to understand these concepts we must look beyond them to the images that define this view. The further we advance, in this fashion, into subjectivity, the more objective it turns out to be. Frye refers to this method by the terms "centrifugal" and "centripetal". He says:

Whenever we read anything, we find our attention moving in two directions at once. One direction is outward or centrifugal, in which we keep going outside our reading, from the individual words to the things they mean, or, in practice, to our memory of the conventional association between them. The other direction is inward or centripetal, in which we try to develop from the words a sense of the larger verbal pattern they make. In both cases we deal with symbols, but when we attach an external meaning to a word we have, in addition to the verbal symbol, the thing represented or symbolized by it. Actually we have a series of such representations.³¹

"The thing represented" is an archetype and the archetypes, as a group, constitute the vision through which the individual perceives the world. These archetypes are traditional, maybe even universal, and therefore logically prior to anything in a person's thoughts that could be called unique and regarded as his own. It is precisely in such circumstances, in attempting to explain the nature of this vision that one refers to the "historical sense". In Eliot's schema "the 'historical sense' is the instrument of self-discovery, for it is an instrument for the discovery of the whole. When the whole pattern of artistic activity is perceived, the past and the present fall into proper places, their significances [sic] are revealed."³² Eliot it may be recalled, is concerned with history primarily as a manifestation of temporal existence—a challenge in his conquest of time. Time, however, which is a major construct, becomes subjective as it enters into one's historical reconstructions, since here it is not time in isolation, but a temporal system. The opening lines of "Burnt Norton" expresses such a view. It is as if Eliot were introspecting into the nature and methods of his technique:

Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been

Point to one end, which is always present.
 Footfalls echo in the memory
 Down the passage which we did not take
 Towards the door we never opened
 Into the rose-garden. My words echo
 Thus, in your mind.

Literary meaning, to be sure, is not exclusively in our subjective responses to a particular work or references from it to the outside world of reality, but rather, meaning exists as a circulatory process—both mental, as the path of our thinking takes us (centrifugal), and objective, as the actual system of relations between the text, regarded as a thing in itself (centripetal) and the whole of reality.

Perhaps, the best practical example of such an interpretation we can take is of Eliot's use of myth in *The Waste Land*. F.R. Leavis observes:

It was *The Waste Land* that compelled recognition for the achievement. . . . The title, we know, comes from Miss J.L. Westons's book, *From Ritual to Romance*, the theme of which is anthropological; the Waste Land there has a significance in terms of Fertility Ritual. . . . The seeming disjointedness [of the poem] is intimately related to the erudition that has annoyed so many readers and to the wealth of literary borrowings and allusions. These characteristics reflect the present state of civilization. The traditions and cultures have mingled, and the historical imagination makes the past contemporary; no one tradition can digest so great a variety of materials, and the result is a breakdown of forms and the irrevocable loss of that sense of absoluteness which seems necessary to a robust culture.³³

Leavis further comments that "the anthropological background has positive functions. It plays an obvious part in evoking that particular sense of the unity of life which is essential to the poem."³⁴

Eliot, in *The Waste Land*, develops an integrated theme of regaining the emotional, intellectual, and spiritual vitality by drawing upon related modes in myth, anthropology, theology, and ancient literature. The reading of the poem makes one aware of a sequence of metaphorical identifications which leads to an awareness of an organizing structural pattern or conceptualized myth. And as Northrop Frye points out: "When a work of fiction is written or interpreted thematically, it becomes a parable or illustrative fable."³⁵

The parable here, obviously, is Eliot's "preoccupation with birth, copulation and death."³⁶ In the Christian myth man's original sin is an offence against God the father, and Christ, in order to allay this sense of guilt, sacrificed his own life and thereby redeemed mankind from primal sin. The reconciliation with the father is complete because along with this sacrifice there follows the complete renunciation of woman, for whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. In the crucifixion of Christ we see an extension of the hanged fertility god, and can trace an identity with

the "theanthropic" human sacrifice and the Christian eucharist; in these rites we recognise "the after effects of that crime which so oppressed men, but of which they must have been so proud."³⁷ Eliot projects this irony, and if we accept Frye's contention that "each mode of literature develops its own existential projection,"³⁸ embodying a myth and an archetype, then,

the archetype of the inevitably ironic is Adam, human nature under sentence of death. At the other pole is the incongruous irony of human life, in which all attempts to transfer guilt to a victim give that victim something of the dignity of innocence. The archetype of the incongruously ironic is Christ, the perfectly innocent victim excluded from human society.³⁹

Mythology projects itself as theology here; that is, the poet accepts certain myths and shapes his poetic structure accordingly. Tiresias, the bi-sexual protagonist of the poem, embodies all experience and hence is projected as the archetypal man. An extension of the theme of bi-sexuality is seen in the Grail Legend where the lance is interpreted as a phallic symbol and the cup as the female sexual symbol. Christ too can be interpreted as the archetypal man. And, on a more personal level, Eliot, perhaps, also sees himself as an archetypal man setting up his own tradition.

Eliot, therefore, not only combines traditional and religious myths, but in doing so creates his own personal myth corroborating his theory that the whole of European literature from Homer has a simultaneous existence. Eliot's later poems too, take on a mythico-religious strain. We can speak, therefore, of Eliot's mythical method as the product of an existentialist-Christian orientation towards life, and also draw an identity between his use of myth and his philosophy of life.

The dualism of the subjective and the objective, which we assumed in the beginning thus converge on the concept of the archetype, whose reversibility, as both prior to and following from personal experience, reveals a circularity essential alike to Eliot's spiritualized effects and to the phenomenological attitude underlying myth criticism. To argue against such circularity is to mistake for solipsism what is really a kind of relativism. The theory does not destroy the objective world in favour of an all-inclusive subjectivity, but defines subject and object as immanent ideals, somewhat like Frye's cycle of the seasons—though in time, it is not a moment of time. And so, with respect to the subjectivity and objectivity, we cannot rest content in either of them, but should seek to trace the dialectic of their relationship where the centrifugal-centripetal, subject-object dichotomy is in a state of flux. As the archetypes help to constitute a person's thought, but, are archetypal by virtue of their being mental constructs, we may generally accept that the subjective and objective are interdependent and, often, the same thing.

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歐立德的神話觀

那 安 杰

儘管歐立德在他的文字中，流露出一種權威性的語調，但他早期的主要文學批評，却還在摸索且未定當中。他擅長用客觀公正的批評作為幌子，而進行爭銳的爭論。在被很多人認為已成為“著名的過時作品”一文“傳統和個人才賦”中，歐立德似乎相信“批評家的責任之一是保存傳統—如果好的傳統存在的話”。他利用傳統這一傳統觀念來隱藏自己原本為個人主義的特質。歐立德欲融合“最古典與最文明”而回到“最原始與最被人遺忘”的考慮，並沒有受到孤立。他揉合美學於神話，被認為有助於改混亂為秩序，去困惑增意味。

本文目的在重新探討歐立德對傳統的看法。本文作者除了提出新的看法；認為歐立德的傳統觀，源始於他的神話觀之外，也嘗試著去補充一些必要的背景資料。然而，本文旨並不在為歐立德的傳統觀辯護。因為(1)歐立德的文學歷程，本身就富神話色彩，因此已排除了任何可能的爭論。(2)貫串歐立德的傳統，本身就已組成了一種防禦。歐立德並不是一個可以令人完全心服的批評家，本文作者著眼於指出，神話感是歐立德評論中很重要的一部分，除去它，就很難了解歐立德了。

歷史主義的教育制度與中國知識份子

—國聯中國教育考察團報告書的社會思想及其影響—

胡 昌 智

德國的歷史主義思潮是針對十八世紀以法國為中心的啓蒙思想方式的一種反動。歷史主義強調世界上的各種現象——尤其是各民族的活動——各具有其不易的特質，而且這些特質都是時間過程中逐漸發展形成的。這個思潮與近代歐洲民族國家形成過程亦步亦趨相互配合；而且也與知識階層政治參與活動積極展開之過程相表裡。歷史主義的思想方式及價值觀念滲透到十九世紀德國的各種制度及學術活動中。教育制度也毫不例外受到歷史主義思想的影響，而且有特殊的社會組織上的意義及民族國家發展上的意義。十九世紀後期出生，而在 1927 ~ 1931 擔任普魯士文化部長之 C.H. Becker，成長於歷史主義的思潮中，執行的是歷史主義價值觀下的教育政策。他帶領國聯中國教育考察團 1931 年來中國，替中國教育制度提出其建議，象徵的是歷史主義思想方式——它世界觀及社會觀——的外傳。這個考察團在中國面對的教育制度，却正是法國啓蒙思想的繼續者——美國——教育制度的翻版。也就是說，它面對的是一個強調人性相同，人人平等，強調功利幸福價值觀，世界公民為精神的教育制度。從一個比較大的觀點來觀察這考察團，我們可以說，它是十八世紀末以來歷史主義與啓蒙思想不斷相折衝過程中，兩者在歐美以外地區的一次重要相遇。它們相遇在中國土地上，更正確的說，是交會在關心教育的中國知識份子的心中。

五四以後，中國教育思潮表現出的是平民主義世界公民的精神與科學訓練。在追求的新教育者的內心底部，無疑還潛存著以士大夫為社會中堅的傳統式社會觀念，以及潛存著無法以世界公民理想可能取代的民族認同感。這是他們潛存的價值矛盾。這矛盾在他們接觸了國聯中國教育考察團及其報告發表以後，浮現到了意識之中。他們必須在蘊含兩種不同精神及價值的教育制度之間做一抉擇。胡適、蔣夢麟等人從發揚平民教育追求世界公民理想，一轉而肯定以民族文化特殊性與主張知識份子為社會核心的教育制度。他們對國聯教育考察團的反應，顯示出他們離傳統舊社會組織仍然不遠，雖然樂於追求啓蒙式的平等社會，但是又無法擺脫知識份子對社會責任的自我期許。

下文將首先說明(一)C.H. Becker 教育政策的思想背景——歷史主義；其次(二)將敘述 Becker 在國聯中國教育考察團報告書中對當時中國中學教育制度改革建議。(三)將分析 Becker 改革建議

的社會意義與世界觀，最後將討論當時關心教育的知識份子對 Becker 建議的反應，藉以說明新興知識份子社會思想與傳統儒家社會觀念之契合。

(一) C. H. Becker 教育政策的思想背景—歷史主義

歷史主義像一隻看不見的手，伸入到十九世紀生活中的每一個部份；它不是一時流行的思潮或突發的趨向；它是人們生活中的一項基本因素。像 Karl Mannheim 所說，它是中古時代的宗教世界觀逐漸消失，以及啓蒙時代現世化世界觀，信仰超時空理性精神逐漸被揚棄之後繼之而起，觀察社會、文化現象的一基本方式。相對於中古以及啓蒙式的思想，歷史主義代表“動力性的思維活動”（“ein dynamisches Denken”），Ernst Troeltsch 在 Mannheim 之先，對歷史主義這個當時相當新，而且具有負面意義的名詞已經有了相當的澄清（1922, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*），歷史主義異於啓蒙思想以及一切其它自然法下的倫理觀念的是“把我們的本質及思想活動澈底地歷史化”；歷史主義所代表的轉變可以說是不再把人們致知的對象視為有超乎時空的特質，相反的，致知的對象——舉凡一切人們之所作所為以及人們本身——它的歷史特性被強調出來。Troeltsch 的看法：歐洲近代對人事諸現象瞭解時，歷史主義開始將它們放在永恒變化之流中加以觀察。獻畢生精神研究歷史主義現象的曼乃克 Friedrich Meinecke 稱歷史主義為歐洲近代思想上最大的一項革命，他繼承的基本上是 Troeltsch 與 Mannheim 的說法。曼乃克在處理歷史主義時，提出十九世紀思考方式中有兩項基本原則。特殊性（Individualität）以及發展性（Entwicklung）：每個致知的對象都是具有特殊性的異於其它個體的個性，而這個有內在特殊性的個體是在時間發展中形成；因此也只有藉著掌握它形成過程才得以瞭解它。相對於啓蒙時代自然法視入性皆同，事理也有一定絕對軌道，歷史主義採取對世界完全不同觀察方法；啓蒙時代相信人的理性足以使人類由野蠻而文明，文明程度在各地區高低之異也將因理性之使用與絕對事理的認知而趨向一致。相反的，歷史主義肯定每個個體有它獨特內在的性質，每項制度有它与其它制度相異的精神，每個家庭、教會、以及國家都自成一一個有特殊性的個體；它們的運行不臣屬於任何絕對的事理，所遵照的是其已身內在獨特的發展原則。世界史不是一個由野蠻而文明的單一過程，每個文化、每個時代都自成一一個整體，有它的價值，如蘭克所說“每個時代皆直接與神相接”，世界是由各種不同歷史性的個體組成，由多元價值構成，繼承啓蒙時代的樂觀思想，歷史主義對價值之間的互異及可能造成的衝突，都因對神的信仰，相信在神意旨之下和諧是終極是可能的。

歷史主義這種特殊性原則（Individualität）的認知，尤其是把世界上各個國家視為是有身生命的個體，可以回溯到十世紀馬基章歷（Machiavelli）與羅韓（Rohan）提出的治國技巧說（Lehre von Staatsräson）：政治思想家在形上的層面上討論理想的國家該如何之際，實際政治的運作却早已從國家對自我瞭解出發，決定自己應該怎麼做；一個國家運作之內在規則必須藉著它的歷史去掌握；同時也要瞭解其它國家之內在精神，以便與其交往。十九世紀蘭克（Ranke）的史學論教皇，論歐洲列國都是把國家視為不同精神及特質個別體（Individuum）的典型作品。同樣的，歷史主義中發展性原則（Entwicklungsprinzip）——把一切事物均置於演變之流中加以觀察——也早在十八世紀中期的 Edmund Burke 的保守思想中有了充份的開展。Burke 要整理及傳遞過去遺留下的制度，因為整理與傳遞這些制度，Burke 認為正是維護與滋養該制度中潛存著的心靈生命。

有關歷史主義思想的先驅，在曼乃克的著作“歷史主義之起源”指出有：德國的虔誠主義（Pietismus）；除了Burke以外，其它的浪漫主義前驅思想家；以及文藝復興時期的新柏拉圖主義等等。歷史主義之淵源潛存在啓蒙主流自然法思想之側，然而歷史主義成爲一個基本的思想方式，深入到社會制度及生活轉折中的每一個部份，這種發展却發生在十九世紀的“德國”。當時德國知識份子面臨的國際關係以及身處的社會結構，是促成歷史主義思想在德國能持續發展下去的原因。要瞭解及說明十九世紀受歷史主義影響的學術及制度，因此也必須指出歷史主義興起時之社會及國際性因素。

拿破崙向外的戰爭以及宣揚法國大革命的理想，對德語知識份子造成很大的衝擊；他們面臨的問題，而且在內心必須立刻決定的是：該不該接受法國的統治？該不該接受它的法律、它的價值觀？北德的法學家在1798年以一千七百八十頁的“奧斯那不列克史”提出了堅決的負面答案；他以維護小邦的歷史傳統爲理由，拒絕接受專制王權式的大國組織；他接引英國思想家Burke以歷史延續性爲一項制度必備的深度，反對法國理性主義要求衆人接受一個放之四海的制度。他的“奧斯那不列克史”是以一個民族——德意志民族——爲對象的史書。這樣的民族史學在當時是劃時代的寫作方式。他雖然沒有啓用“歷史的個體特質”（historische Individualität）這種十九世紀典型歷史主義的概念來說明一個民族；但是却已反覆強調一個民族有它的“地區性的理性”（Lokal Vernunft）。他所用的詞——理性（Vernunft）——顯然還受啓蒙思想的影響；但是自覺到啓蒙思想中人性同一的理性觀，是他所不能接受的；他在“理性”之前加上了“地區性”（“Lokal”）一詞，意指每個地區中成長的民族都有它由歷史中發展出的處事原則與最高的價值。莫賽是以內在的價值觀說明民族的特性，他是以文化的觀點說明民族可以能自成一箇個體的原因。在拿破崙武力代表的啓蒙思想壓力之下，歌德（1749-1832）承續了長他五歲的赫德（Herder）“一種人性發展史之哲學”（1774）揭櫫的思想是：各民族各有其無法仿效的文化創造力，而這些不同的文化精神正是世界史發展之動力所在。歌德在法國大革命發展成對外戰爭以後，從對革命中追求自由的同情，明顯的走向由民族主義出發的對法國大革命的批判。他對民族特質的說明也是從文化的觀點出發的。

當時的德國民族主義思想，如Meinecke所說是以文化民族（Kulturnation）的思想表達出來的。“文化民族”這種概念異於啓蒙思想，代表多元價值的世界觀，同時它具有特殊的社會意義，它代表由知識階層推展開的民族主義活動。就像“救贖”（Erlösung）這個概念在宗教發展中有它社會意義一樣——有“救贖”概念的宗教起源於社會中低下受苦階層；藉著對死後得救能獲其真正永生之信仰，解釋現世受到的不平——“文化民族”是起源於知識階層的概念。異於法國第二階級——資產階級——在大革命前夕宣稱“我們才是民族”；在德國是知識階層宣稱他們代表民族。知識階層以他們對文化掌握的特殊能力，一方面進行與貴族階層間參政的鬥爭；另一方面以文化爲凝聚德意志人民的向心力量。德國民族國家在1871年已完成統一前的發展史，以社會階層的觀點，可以視爲是知識階層參政及建國的發展史。

1815年以後普魯士進行政治改革，官僚制度逐步建立時，它不斷的需要新的官僚人員。知識階層在爭取行政權過程中，明顯的擊敗貴族階層；如柯則雷（R. Koselleck）指出（1962），文化的訓練及內心逐漸變成了通行的公務官僚人員資格檢定的標準。到了1830年左右，甚至百分之七十以上的政府公務人員是受過大學入學預備性質的菁英式中學（Gymnasium）以上教育的人。農人、貴族以及一般市民的社會功能，都由知識階級加以定位及協調；國家的政策也

以知識階層爲其它社會各階層之利益代言人制定。在一八〇〇年至一九〇〇年之間德國史中，知識階層對各階層利益之代表性有很大的變化。不論其代表性如何，以知識階層爲社會核心的民族主義思想毫無疑問貫穿了整個世紀；而且以文化肩負人知識階層爲民族核心的社會思想也在十九世紀中逐步的貫徹在各項制度中。美國史家 F. Ringer 在“德國士大夫之沒落”(The Decline of German Mandarin) 書中指出，1890 年開始，士大夫階層在工業化過程中開始逐漸失去其優越的社會地位。Ringer 教授使用的材料是教育制度、學校種類、學生人數、以及其出身背景。事實上，知識階層爲了維持本身社會核心的地位，他們必須發展出一套與其利益相配合的教育制度。而教育制度的變遷也最容易顯示知識階層社會地位的變化。

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C. H. Becker (1876 - 1933) 成長在歷史主義後期，德國統一之初，是回教及東方社會 (Orientalistik) 教授，1925 年至 1930 年擔任普魯士文化部長，他任內不斷想維持的教育政制，還是典型歷史主義社會組織下的教育政策；1931 年他以卸任文化部長的身份帶領國聯中國教育考察團，來到中國；下文將以國聯中國教育考察報告建議，分析其改革建議中的社會思想及世界觀，作爲我們瞭解中國知識份子接觸該報告書反應之憑藉。

(二) Becker 在報告書中對當時中國中學教育制度改革之建議

中國與國聯之間的合作始於 1929 年，開始合作的範圍限於衛生、醫療制度，到了 1931 年，擴及到陸路、內河航道的建設；1931 年以後，甚至有了更廣泛的合作工作。在這樣合作經驗之下，國聯與國內專家都發現專業訓練的科學及技術人員，應該及早開始培養。當時訓練機構顯然不足，因此建議擴大科技人員訓練所。國民教育有鑑於專業人才需求，必須從整個教育制度的改變來解決，因此在 1931 年 4 月，向國聯提出要求國聯協助中國發展教育。

申請提出才兩個月，1931 年 6 月在國聯組織及支持下，成立了一個四人爲主的教育考察團：Carl H. Becker，柏林大學教授，剛卸任的普魯士文化部長，擔任團長，他的任務除了處理行政及對外發言之外，還負責分析中學教育以及中國教育制度中一般性問題；法國大學 (Collège de France) 的 P. Langevin 教授，處理中國自然科學與技術教育的問題；波蘭教育部私立學校督導，M. Fal'ski 處理一般職業教育問題；英國倫敦大學經濟學教授，陶芮 (R. H. Tawney)，分析我國高等教育制度。^①

國聯教育考察團一九三一年九月到達中國，在沿海城市停留一百零七天，於十二月離開。報告書首先以英法文於一九三二年九月發表，同年十二月國立編譯館出版中譯本。報告書除導論及附錄以外，共分十二章，第一至第十一章是第一部份，共五十七頁，佔正文之三分之一左右，討論教育行政缺失，教育財政問題，以及外國力量在中國教育政策上之影響^②；最後四章屬於第二部份，佔一百二十一頁。其中 Becker 撰述及討論的部份，據德國學者 E. Neugebauer 研究，包括前言，結論，國家教育與外來影響，語言、文字問題，教育行政原則，財政組織以及中等教育各章，所佔篇幅將近全書之半。^③

Becker 對中國教育改進的建議不是枝節的教學與行政建議；它具有文化政策及社會政策的意義，而且是十九世紀德國社會及文化政策理想的表達。

Becker 對中國教育制度的建議與他在普魯士文化部任期時的教育改革有相類似之處；中國當時有六年的小學教育，德國則爲四年，從小學教育的基礎上，兩種既有的制度並不一致，

Becker 的建議，事實上也並非希望中國教育從外在制度上根本有所改變，他建議所針對的勿學是藉著既有的制度以及小規模的改變，使它的功能轉變過來。他建議一九二二年以降中國各地實施的美式中學制度，能有所改變，既有的師範教育制度也必須重新規劃。

一九二二年被我國教育部所採行的美國式中學制，是在六年小學之上分設三年初級中學及三年高級中學；初級中學及高級中學中，職業教育與一般教育沒有清晰的界線，當時中國普通、科、農、工、商、師範、家事等科中學，雖然大致有其區分；但皆以 150 學分爲修業完畢之標準，而且，有 67 個共同的學分，其餘的 83 個學分中，只有 24 個是專業學分，其餘的 59 個爲選修學分，在這樣的學分制中學制度下，各科的中學共通性非常大，專業之區分不強，普通科的訓練不夠集中^④。小學六年，初中三年，高中三年，這樣水平式的教育制度是 Becker 批評的主要對象。他認爲受普通科教育中學生數目之龐大，以及職業教育與普通科中學教育水準之低落，主要的原因，除了師資不足以外，就在於職業教育與一般教育沒有清楚的劃分開來，都屬於“中學”。他建議政府立即採取三項措施：一、不准再繼續立普通科中學，二、儀器、設備及教員不足的學校該撤銷，三、集中財力與人力於職業學校。他的目的明顯的在於縮小普通科中學的人數，以及提高有專業訓練的人力以應付現代化之需要。^⑤

職業教育與普通科中學的區分，是 Becker 文化政策中的一項基本原則；這項原則的目的，一方面是應付近代化中所要專業人力，另一方面是真正建立菁英式的文化傳遞機構——菁英普通科中學^⑥。爲了強化普通科教育與職業教育之間的差距，他建議三年的初、高級中學必須連爲一氣；也就是說，普通科教育的中學必須連續不間斷的進行六年。小學生如果稟賦不足，或無足夠的“財力”可以繼續讀完六年的中學，一律進入職業學校；他建議國民政府必須使職業學校的大門替一切小學畢業生開敞開來^⑦。而稟賦高、財力足的，將被允許進入文化菁英養成所——普通科中學——他們將是國家公務人員之主要來源以及大學之預備生。社會中文化菁英階層的培養是 Becker 所見教育之社會及民族責任。六年一貫的一般中學，因此是邏輯上應行的教育制度，在這樣的看法下，Becker 也明確的答覆國民政府的疑問——是否可以在三年一般性初級中學之上另設一年職業教育——Becker 認爲這種雜湊的方案，將會既得不到專業的技術人才，也將失去中學教育文化菁英培養的功能。^⑧

Becker 在他的建議中並沒有企圖把現有的中學取消。他嘗試去做的是：把水平式中學制度的功能調轉爲垂直式的各類學校制；以期能替社會訓練出不同性質及階層的成員，而非美國中學教育以訓練相同的平等的公民爲理想。^⑨

Becker 從歷史主義多元化的價值觀出發，希望中國在世界各不同文化體中也能延續自己民族的文化特色，同時將文化中籠罩性的價值貫注於各種制度中。一個民族能認識自己的文化價值，不是靠普遍而分科不細的教育所能達成；它需要一批文化貴族肩負著這種認識，反省及傳遞的工作。回顧他在普魯士文化部長整個任期中，不斷的與小學教員聯盟的統一學校運動（Einheitsschul Bewegung）相抗擯；小學教員聯盟追求的是不分科、一致性的中學教育；而 Becker 堅持的不是一致性的教育制度，而是全民族有一致的文化；全民族一致的文化，他認爲絕對不是不分科的、齊一的中等學校所能達成的。終其任期，他沒有改變菁英中學與職業學校分離的舊制；也就是說，沒有把它們融合在一起。

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有關師範教育，Becker 也以一致性的民族文化之保持爲改制建議之著眼點。當時我國六年

的小學教育區分為高小兩年及初小四年；教員之養成也分為兩級：初小的教員（也包括鄉下高小的教員）是由高小畢業生在接受一至四年不等的師範教育之後產生的。高小的教員是由中學畢業生接受三年的師範教育後產生的。^⑪

Becker 認為高小教員的產生方式勉強可以接受，因為高小教員畢竟還進入過文化傳遞機構——普通科中學；高小教員因此可以把普通科中學中所學得的轉輸入於高小，使那些即使不再進入中學的高小畢業生，也可以間接地接受到籠罩於普通科中學內的民族文化。但是對高小教員，他還是建議應該讀完六年菁英中學，再加上一年以上師範教育，使小學畢業生與民族文化上有更多的關連。

必須大力改革的是初小的教員養成制度；由小學畢業生接受與普通科中學無關的一至四年師範教育，又回到小學中去任教，這樣的一種知識文化循環圈，Becker 認為太小，而且與文化傳遞機構——普通科中學——脫節；造自己的一個次文化圈；不入一股菁英中學的小學畢業生，數量極為龐大，更足以造成一個國家內兩個文化民族。

他的建議是：凡是進入初小任教的教員，都必須經初級中學畢業，然後接受至少一年的師範教育，以防止封閉性的次文化圈的產生。

民族文化的齊一性可以經教育制度得到保障，Becker 在文化部長任內，設立師範學院（*pädagogische Akademie*）目的就在此。H. Kittel (1965) 分析 1920 至 1932 年師範學院的成立與發展時，指出 Becker 創立師範學院制度，以及短短五年（至 1930）中設立了十四個師範學院，所要做到的正是使小學教員必須修完菁英中學的課，並上完兩年師範學院，然後方得回到小學去^⑫；把教員討論會（*Lehrerseminar*）廢除，使它不再是小學教員養成機構。師範學院的創立及推廣，要針對的也正是一個國家中可能產生兩個文化民族的危險性。^⑬

中國的財力與人力，當時皆無法與當時普魯士相提並論，小學教員雖無法修完六年高中與二年師範學院的課，但是 Becker 的建議中，却要求小學教員不得在菁英中學以外的訓練養成所中培養；即使財力不允許，他們也必須修完三年的普通科初級中學課程。

(三)分析 Becker 建議的社會意義與世界觀

德國史家文德（E. Wende）在其研究中指出，Becker 終其文化部長任職，所最致力的是德國人民對自己文化的一致看法。一致性的文化意識（*Kulturelles Einheitsbewusstsein*）。Becker 這樣的努力，我們可以再進一步瞭解他是在替德國的民族認同奮鬥。1926 年他認識的德國是一個缺乏向心力的德國，“皇冠的象徵已經打破了”，這是他在一個師範學院演講時，感嘆威瑪共和國取代帝制德國皇室所代表的民族中心不再存在，人民在威瑪共和國失去了具體認同的對象。

在那段共和國時期（1919 - 1930），不但國慶假日無法訂出來，不知道該讓大家一起慶祝及紀念什麼共同的往事；同時也沒有大家都同時能接受的國旗及國歌。Becker 當文化部長的五年中，一以貫之的口號是“回到菲希特時代”。菲希特是拿破崙向外擴展擊敗普魯士時，以文化號召德意志人民團結的民族國家統一之先驅者。Becker “回到菲希特時代”的口號代表希望德國人民有一致性的文化意識來鞏固德國民族的團結。

然而 Becker 所處的時代畢竟還是有一個統一政府的威瑪共和國存在，大異於 1810 年菲希特活動時德國未統一成國家的局面；他這樣呼籲“回到菲希特時代”及希望以文化來團結德國民

族，很明顯的代表他對民主形式的威瑪共和國沒有一絲認同存在，也不鼓勵人民與這個共和國認同，雖然他當的是共和國普魯士邦的文化部長。不要以民主平等的方式來團結人民，而要用一致性的文化意識團結人民；這事實表現Becker對民主制度的懷疑，以及他不能接受民主制度下，衆人不分社會階層高低一律平等的精神。

從今日的自由主義民主觀點出發，認同的建立，來自團體中每個份子都有同等的表達意見的機會，以及來自每個份子共同能夠接受的議事規則；不論每個份子文化意識、經濟背景以及政治立場如何殊異，只要接受共同的議事規則以及具有表達意見的均等機會，都已經具備一致的團結感的基礎。以一致性的文化意識作為團結整個社會份子的方法，是知識階層以自己利益立場的社會整合工作。畢竟文化遺產的解釋是傳統知識份子的工作；他們本身即是文化意義之賦予者。以文化為認同的對象，換言之，即是以知識份子為認同對象之社會團結方式。這種社會認同方式，壓抑著知識階層觀點以外可能的文化解釋，以及更確切的說，壓抑著知識階層以外社會階層意見表達的權利。^⑭

Becker 分享世紀末期史家 Jakob Burckhardt 對隨工業革命而來的庶民力量的恐懼，以及對舊有知識貴族創造出的文化沒落的悲觀，他在文化部長任期內，致力於以教育制度鞏固知識階層在社會中的中心地位的工作，希望藉著菁英文化階層的存在，使隨工業化而起的庶民文化：廣播、報章文學不致泛濫太甚，以及失去一個民族的特質。他的教育政策正是嘗試往這個方向努力。對中國教育制度改進之建議，也是從這個觀點出發。

Becker 在中國中學教育制度中，希望能改變的是不明顯分科，只分年級的美國式、水平式的中學教育；代之而行的應該是六年一貫的普通科中學以及純粹的職業學校教育。他希望中國有一個人文訓練深厚的文化肩負性的社會階層，以及工業、技術、商業階層。他對國民政府的建議中，重複強調“我們希望建議縮減普通中學的學生人數，並讓精選的少數人享有中等教育”^⑮，他最終希望抗拒的是美式社會在中國的翻版。

社會中他認為應該有一個人文訓練堅強的知識階層，擔任大、中、小學教職，研究工作，以及社會中行政與立法之公職；其餘的則為從事工商技術及農業的階層。同時 Becker 心目中的理想政府還是十九世紀七十年代以後之威廉皇帝政府：各種社會保險、福利制度均來自知識階層在政府中對“下民”之關懷及設計；工業化積極進行中，舊的文化仍不斷在詮釋並走入哲學的深處，相對於法國 1789 年由下而上的革命，Becker 與十九世紀的歷史主義思想家一樣，認為德國的革命是自上而下的革命（Revolution von oben）。

社會中區分成有深厚人文訓練的知識階層，以及技術性為主的農工商階層；這樣的區分可能造成的危險是社會在思想上、文化上分裂為二。Becker 執行及設計的教育制度，一方面在追求上述的社會理想，一方面在避免這項分裂的危險。在文化部長任期中，他刻意維護職業學校中的“雙重制”（Dual - System），職業學校中不只學專業性的職業知識與技術，同時，團隊的觀念及人文教育也應該是同時並進的。“雙重制”原創者克新斯坦（E. Kercheustainer）強調職業教育中必須有“德國青年之公民教育”深入 Becker 教育理念中。

同時 Becker 創立的教育學院，也正是為了避免職業技術階層份子所受的教育中缺乏人文思想之因素；Becker 較克新斯坦更進一步。從小學老師之養成上，把菁英中學中之人文思想注入小學教育中；用以預防進入職業學校之小學生，自成一個與知識階層異質的文化團體。

Becker 認為“……（真正人文教育）的目標必須具有貴族性”，這不是單指教育內容而言

，它真正指涉的是社會組織的方式。深厚人文教育培養出的文化貴族是社會必要，而且有中柱性的階層。Becker 對中國中等教育的建議，對中國之知識階層吸引力正在於，它對知識階層自我要求及其社會責任感，貫徹到教育政策具體辦法中，建構在一個與科技工商相契合的社會組織形成，在此組織形式中，知識階層的利益得到根本之保障，以及得到在現代社會中生存之根據。

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Becker 對中國中等學校教育制度的建議，最終的目的是希望維持一個民族文化的特質。個體的特質在歷史主義思想中，不但被認為是人事中存在的基本現象，而且具有積極正面的現象。世界的和諧與運行，在歷史主義觀念之下是由性質各異的個體，展現其潛能而造成的。世界大同之前題在於各民族肯定各民族之文化價值。英文版的報告書中，Becker 強調“*The Unification of Mankind will not be brought out except upon the basis of diversity*”^⑩。一個民族如果失去自己的特質，不但是民族之病態，同時也是全人類和諧的損失。

他在報告書第二章論“國家教育與外來之影響”中，屢次批評中國過去盲目的接受美國文化；不但不加深思的接受了美式的學分中學制，而且在中學及大學中竟然也大量使用美國教科書，甚至有些大學以英語為教學語言。他的批評出自他的歷史主義的世界觀，他指出中國人錯把美國化與近代化同等，其結果將會是新喪真正近代化的泉源——一個民族潛在的能力。近代化對歷史主義者 Becker 而言，一方面是價值的抉擇，另一方面才是制度的合理化（*rationalization*），合理化的制度其目的在於完成所抉擇的價值理想。

Becker 所謂的價值並不是自然法觀點下人性均同靜態的價值觀。一個民族抉擇自己價值方向時，它必須藉自己民族發展過程認識自己、批判自己；“除非它（中國）的學校提供歷史批判的方法”，否則中國無法在近代過程中找到自己的發展方向^⑪。中國面對已近代化的歐美國家，真正應該學習的不是它們既有的制度及價值觀；面對它們成功的經驗，中國真正該知道的是，它們的近代文明到底是如何從古代中古文明中蛻化出來，以及歐美民族是如何“利用古代文明以發現其本身之力量”。

歷史主義的世界觀是與知識階層的社會中堅地位相互依賴的，前者是後者理論的根據；而後者是貫徹前者合理的手段。知識階層的社會中堅地位，及政治上的監護地位，又靠一定的教育制度得其保障。Becker 在他對中國教育制度改進報告中，用第二篇第二章的三十六頁篇幅替中國規劃出歷史主義觀點下的教育制度；同時在第一篇第二章，國家教育與外來影響，及第三章，論中國之語言及文字兩部份，闡明其歷史主義的文化觀與世界觀，作為其具體建議之理論基礎。他的建議前後有其一貫性；此一貫性中代表的精神，是中國關心教育的知識份子接觸國聯中國教育考察團及其建議時，深切瞭解到了的。對該考察團建議的反應，亦即是對歷史主義式世界觀，社會組織形式的反應。

四國聯中國教育考察團建議在中國之反應

中國駐聯國代表團之 C. L. 夏在 1932 年“*Pacific Affairs*”發表了對國聯中國教育考察團報告的評述。這是有關報告書的第一份評論，也是具有官方性質的一份評論^⑫。在這篇“*Comments on the League Missions Report*”中，C. L. 夏以國民政府的名義，首先向國聯考察團“崇高的成就”表示感佩。同時他也肯定 Becker 的建議，認為中等教育的根本，

目的在培養一個有人文精神的知識階層作為“每個社會之骨幹”(Backbone of every Community)^{①⑩}。這個國民政府成立以來，官方正式以知識階層之培養作為普通中等教育目標之宣言。在C.L.夏的評論中，有許多對國內教育缺失的解釋與說明。如E. Neugebauer分析C.L.夏的評論所說，夏氏“替國內教育制度中一堆缺失強作辯解”；在辯解的同時，我們可以輕易的見到，夏氏代表著根本上願意接受及實現Becker的具體建議。

國聯教育考察團的報告得到國民政府的讚賞，這是無庸疑慮的。部份也因該報告——特別是Becker論教育行政的部份——提供的不只是一個教育行政重組的辦法，而且重組教育行政最後是要提高中央的教育權力；它提出的是一個中央化的教育行政改革方案。在報告的附錄中，清楚的顯示教育部的力量在改革方案中，被大大的提高。中央政策對小學教育負有財政上支持的義務，同時，中央政府的力量也得藉以伸入基層。

官方對國聯教育考察團的感謝也見於國立編譯館中譯本“中國教育之改進”的序。教育部長朱家驊在序文中稱讚其“於吾國教育情狀，察及纖悉。指摘利病，洞中綦要，用力之勤，與其識見之深，信足令人景異者也。”考試院長戴傳賢對Becker建議中之精神尤為讚佩，稱“國際聯合會(即國聯，作者)實已具有博愛大同之精神，而此精神已能影響於其一切工作團體人員，使之對一切會員國之國家民族文化發生真正之敬愛。”戴氏於其將近兩千字的序文中，對考察團報告書中歷史主義式思想非常推崇；戴氏肯定Becker以歷史批評作為自我認識及近代化基礎這個論點。^{①⑪}

事實上，國民政府的教育改革在1932年這年進行的特別快速。1932年12月24日，考察團報告書的中文本出版的兩個星期後，就已經有十四條新的“中學法”條文生效^{①⑫}。其中，如Becker所建議，職業學校以及師範教育完全與普通中學分開了，三種學校各自獨立，它們不再是水平式的美式中學，並且各得其分開的預算；普通科中學最高可得百分之四十，而師範教育最多可得百分之二十五之中等教育預算，職業教育最低需佔百分之三十五之預算。美式中學的學制分在考察團離開中國一年之後——一九三二年十一月初——也被新擬出的“中學課程表”取代了，作為與“中學法”平行之補充規定。^{①⑬}

除了C.L.夏的評論透露出國民政府1932年教育改革的原因以外，我們只見到上述朱家驊及戴傳賢的序文。這兩篇序文都沒直接論及中國中等教育改革應該改革的具體原因。在1932年以後的各種官方評論及該年教育改革的報告中，Becker建議書的名稱一次也沒有出現過。這點德國史家E. Neugebauer也在討論該考察團時提出過，他說“朱家驊與王世杰在1929年至1935年中一樣，沒有在任何(教育政策，作者)報告中提及國聯專家對中國教育近代化之建議”。“年鑑”中教育部份，Becker調查建議書之名稱及事實，也都闕如。教育當局所以在其所有公報中絲毫不提Becker建議的原因，也許與其完全的接受了該報告書建議有關。接受的太徹底，反而不願提及該報告書。

這項推測可以在1935年朱家驊一篇文章“1932年中國教育之改革”(The Reform of Chinese Education in 1932)得到印證^{①⑭}。雖然他在該文中也沒有提及Becker的名字及建議，但是他對1932年教育制度終於拋棄了實行十年美式中學，走向新式中學教育的說明中，我們可以看到，他的話完全是Becker教育思想的翻版：他說1932年教育改革的目的一——特別是中等教育制度改革的目的，在於強化“一個民族的骨幹”。一個民族需要它的骨幹，而這個骨幹是知識階層，這是Becker教育改革思想的基點。朱家驊與C.L.夏說法一致，說“普通中等教

育有其特定之目標”²⁴，1932年中等教育改革之目標即在於使知識階層能成為社會的中堅。他批評改革前在中國實施的美式中學制度“擾亂了中等教育之目的”(Confuse the purpose of secondary education)²⁵。垂直式的，各種學校分別獨立的中學制度，才是與目標相配合的教育制度；他回溯三年前教育部長任職時的教育改革，認為追求那樣的目標，“必須把職業學校與師範學校從普通中學中分離出來”(To eliminate vocational education and teacher-training from middle school)²⁶。1935年朱家驊對改革原因之回溯，充滿了Becker的語氣，再明顯不過。

1932年並沒有執行的中學改革，而1935年朱家驊却認為本來應該做到的是：六年一貫的普通中學。“to link up closely junior and senior middle school”²⁷是一個完整的普通科中學教育最後必須要達成的教育改革；這更明顯的顯示出他對能提供人文精神長期培養機會的德式菁英中學的憧憬。對Becker建議中“教育學院”設立的概念，他也表現出了全然的領會與接受：為了使小學老師也一定經過文化菁英培育所的訓練，他建議“所有師範學院的入學生，都必須有初級中學的畢業資格”。²⁸

很明顯的，Becker對社會的組織，對各階層的劃分與關聯，對知識階層社會地位的肯定，這些都在教育制度改革建議中，被朱家驊等深切的掌握住並深得其心。一個特殊的社會組織及秩序的認識及肯定，是國民政府1932年教育改革接受Becker建議的原因。

1932年的教育改革拋棄了十年前採用的美國水平式中學制，但是小學六年，普通科初中三年，高中三年的舊制仍然存在。普通科分為初中及高中兩部份，在訓練培育文化菁英這個方面，朱家驊在任職時，這點沒來得及改，絕非他沒有見到其中的差別，以及可能造成社會組織上的影響。

當時北大校長，以及前任的教育部長(1928年10月至1930年12月)蔣夢麟，對Becker教育制度改革中的社會意義也完全掌握住。他有感於Becker的建議，寫成“國聯中國教育制度研究報告中一些原則的討論”(1933年5月)²⁹；蔣夢麟為美國訓練出的教育家，他深知美式教育及其精神。在該文中，他也承認1932年以前中國教育制度的極端美國化。他說那是一種機械式的模仿，使中國教育制度與自己的本質疏離開來的模仿。他指出美國教育制度與歐洲教育制度根本不同：“歐洲的中學是為特殊的社會階層設立的”，接著他說，“中國的普通科中學應該以歐洲中學為榜樣。”蔣夢麟在教育制度改革中，強調的也是特殊社會階層的建構。³⁰

發表了那篇文章的第二年，蔣夢麟與胡適，聯名在教育雜誌上發表了他們對中學教育改革的建議——“修正中小學教育制度”。他們提出：①小學六年可以縮短兩年，成為四年小學。全國小學至十歲時，即開始分科，資質中等以下的皆提早兩年進入職業學校。②在四年小學之基礎上設立不同的職業學校，高級職業學校，菁英中學。(各種不同學校事實上在他們建議時已分開，只是不是建立在四年小學之上，而是建立在六年小學之上)。③設立八年一貫的菁英中學。④設立國家獎學金，提供財力不足而資質高的小學生入菁英中學。³¹

蔣夢麟與胡適1934年的建議，基本上是要進一步強化菁英中學的教育，或者說，強化社會階層之間的差異。八年一貫的人文法理訓練自然要較六年一貫的訓練要強；較之於當時實施的三三初高中制，學生可以中斷其中學課程，八年一貫的菁英中學更是具有完全不同的力量。蔣、胡二人，當時以聯結初高中之教育改革已勢在必行，不如在一次的改革中，達成比六年一貫更強的普通科中學。

1919年以民主爲大纛的五四運動，以及致力於民主的胡適，在1930年代有了相當大的變化^②；當時教育雜誌中，一般的討論文章對蔣夢麟與胡適的建議，顯示相當的瞭解與讚同^③。普魯士文化部長教育改革的建議，提供了一種社會組織方面新的可能性。關心教育問題的知識份子似乎見到經濟技術之發展與民族文化特質之持續可以並存。而且，知識階層在近代化的社會中，仍然可以有其積極的角色與中堅性的社會地位。

如果我們同時注意1938年通過的選舉法案、省議會及市議會議員競選資格，規定高中以上教育程度方得參加競選^④；我們可以進一步瞭解，八年一貫菁英中學如果貫徹下去，造成的社會及政治權力分配的影響。菁英中學培養出的知識階層，將不但會成爲官僚行政人員的唯一來源，而且，立法及民意機構中人員，亦將由知識階層所單獨承擔。

1930年代社會思想從教育、法律、實際政治活動等方面來觀察，我們都可以說，它的發展也許是比較接近傳統儒家社會組織形式，以及訓政政治運作形式。對日戰爭的展開，使得國民政府未得餘力，實現蔣夢麟、胡適以及朱家驊等教育文化界領導人之建議，以及三十年代所期望的社會組織方式；而這種社會組織的理想在中共的大陸，無以繼續；在中華民國台灣，因經濟與政治的緊密結合，也沒有再獲得展開的機會。像德國歷史主義，以德國士大夫（German Mandarin）爲核心的社會組織，逐漸轉移成新的社會組織與權力分配；五十年代以來在中華民國，歷史主義式的各種思想，也以各種不同的步調逐漸淡去。

附 註：

①一九三一年五月國際聯盟(League of Nations)應中國政府之邀派遣一考察團到中國，協助中國教育制度之改進。考察團組成人員為(Carl H. Becker 柏林大學教授及前普魯士文化部長；M. Falski 波蘭教育部初等教育司長；倫敦大學政經學院R. H. Tawney教授；以及國聯秘書長F. P. Walters。在中國加入此團的另外有國際文化合作處處長M. H. Bonnet；以及國際教育電影處之B. A. Sardi氏。該團於一九三一年九月卅日抵華，訪問上海、南京中央政府教育部、天津、北平定縣、杭州、無錫等地歷時三個月。訪問期間與基層教育工作人員及中央經濟會議委員、國民教育委員會委員均有接觸。於次年九月完成考察報告書，書名為“The Reorganization of Education in China”，英、法兩種版本，同年底國立編譯館譯為中文“中國教育之改進”。本文使用民國五十二年之兩版本以及一九三一年之英文本，凡到中文處引自中文版，引用英文原文的，則係出自一九三一年之英文版。

馬力整理這段甚清晰，參見，馬力，一九三〇年代中國與國聯的技術合作，刊於中研院近史所集刊，民國七十五年十二月，第十五期下冊，第281至314。

- ②中文版第一篇通論，討論「中國教育之情形」、「國家教育與外來之影響」、「教學之精神，尤其關於科學方面」、「語言與文字」、「行政原則」、「財政之組織」、「教職員」、「全國學校之分布」、「學校之合理的利用」、「學童與學生之社會選擇」、「學制」。
- ③Neugebauer, N. 著 *Anfänge pädagogischer Entwicklungshilfe unter dem Völkerbund in China 1931 bis 1935*. 1971, 漢堡(1931至1935國聯之下的教學發展計劃之開始)。該書處理國聯日內瓦方面的資料頗有成績，但是對該國訪華以及國人反映之部份則闕如。稱該團為教學方面的捐助計劃，也顯示出該書並未掌握該團涉及社會改革這個核心問題。
- ④參見陳青之，中國教育史，民五七年台三版；第六篇，第三節有關民國十一年以後的中小學課程標準。
- ⑤中國教育之改進，第115—117頁。
- ⑥同上書，第122，123頁。Becker在建議書中提出五點，將縣立中學——非精英性的中學——聽教設備充實，改為職校或鄉村師範；也是區分菁英式中學與職業性中學之方法之一。
- ⑦英文稱Materials中文譯為財力，見第124頁；意指非中上以上的人家，不應考慮將子弟送入菁英、一貫性的普通中學。
- ⑧英文本第116頁，中文版第123頁。指教育部提出之問題。
- ⑨建議書(或稱報告書)中諸作者屢次提醒中國教育制度抄襲美國制度之不當；該考察團團員由歐洲各國成員組成，明顯的顯現出反對美國化為近代化的看法。對中國教育制度美國化之批評，引起的爭論——特別是有關美國人在定縣的實驗——參見上引Neugebauer書。
- ⑩有關Becker的教育政策，以及其與一致性的學校整合運動相擱抗，參見Wende, E., C.H. Becker, *Mensch und Politiker. Ein biographischer Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte der Weimarer Republik*, stuttgart, 1959年；第164頁起。
- ⑪參見上引陳青之書，第714，715頁以及第722頁。

- ⑫參見Kittel 編著Die Pädagogischen Hochschulen, Dokumenteiner Entwicklung (I) 1920 - 1932 (教育學院發展資料第一冊 1920-1932) Weinheim 1965. 見Kittel導論。
- ⑬Becker, C.H., Die Pädagogische Akademie im Aufbau unsers nationalen Bildungswesens. (我國教育制度建設中的教育學院) 刊於上引Kittel 編書第 98 - 140 頁。
- ⑭現代社會之認同問題, Habermas 在“ Können Komplexe Gesellschaften eine vernunftige Identität ausbilden? ” (複雜社會中能建立一個合理的認同嗎?) 文中之建議應該可以接受, 該文刊於“ Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus ” 1976 年法蘭克福; 第 92 - 128 頁。
- ⑮上引“ The Reorganization…… ” 書第 14 頁。
- ⑯同上書, 第 131 頁。
- ⑰同上書, 第 27 頁。
- ⑱Hsia, C.L., The Reorganization of Education in China. Comments on the League of Nations report 刊於: Pacific Affairs, 1932, Vol. 5, nr. 12, 第 1027 - 1037 頁。
- ⑲上引文, 第 1035 頁。
- ⑳上引“ 中國教育之改進 ”, 序。
- ㉑參見丁致聘, 中國近幾十年來教育記事, 1934 年上海, 第 273 頁提及中學法及其內容。有關中學法, 見民國 23 年教育部編“ 教育法令續篇 ” 第 102 - 111 頁。
- ㉒上引“ 教育法令續編 ” 第 278 頁。
- ㉓朱家驊, The Reform of Chinese Education in 1932, 刊於: The People's Tribune, 天津 1935 年號, 第 393 - 419 頁。
- ㉔上引文第 397 頁。
- ㉕同上, 第 396 頁。
- ㉖同上, 第 398 頁。
- ㉗同上, 第 397 頁。
- ㉘同上, 第 398 頁。
- ㉙蔣夢麟, 國聯中國教育考察團報告書幾個原則的討論: 刊於, 獨立評論 1933 年 5 月第 40 期, 第 16 - 19 頁。
- ㉚同上, 第 16 頁。他承認中國中學的水準即使學習歐式教育制度也無法與其相等; 重要的不是在國與國間中學水準是否相同; 而是在於一國之內社會結構的影響。
- ㉛蔣夢麟、胡適著, 修正中小學教育制度; 刊於, 教育雜誌, 上海 1934, 24 卷第 2 期, 第 12 - 17 頁。
- ㉜不同的解釋, 見張忠棟, 在動亂中堅持民主的胡適, 升於, 中研院近史所集刊, 民國七十五年十二月, 第十五期下冊。第 109 - 162 頁。
- ㉝見教育雜誌 24 卷第 2 期, 同時刊出 (但顯然先讀過蔣胡共撰之文) 及 25 卷第 1 期等諸文, 作者為吳志江、羅廷廣、張毅及楊梁坤。

④關於民國 27 年省議員市議員競選資格可參閱平心著，中華民族憲政運動史，上海民三十五年（原版民三十年）第 352—357 頁。

**CRISIS IN CONSCIENCE:
WILLIAM WARHAM, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY AND THE
DIVORCE OF HENRY VIII.**

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In January of 1533 Henry Tudor, King of England, and Anne Boleyn were secretly married. In the spring of that same year the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, the man who had recently replaced William Warham, pronounced the marriage of Queen Catherine and Henry null from the beginning. Five days later the pregnant successor to Catherine was declared the lawful wife of Henry and on June 1, Whit Sunday, Anne Boleyn, fat with child, was crowned Queen of England.

So ended one of the most exciting periods of English history.

The theme of this paper is the divorce of Henry and Catherine. The vehicle for the theme is William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, an historical figure of great importance in the social, political and religious life of England and yet a man who has been relegated to a footnote in history. This paper will attempt to redress this historical oversight and give Warham the credit that he rightfully deserves as one of the pivotal personalities in English studies and early reformation history.

William Warham was probably born in the year 1450 in Hampshire. His family was of good standing and soon after his birth moved to Malshanger in the parish of Oakley.¹ Warham's education was a good one for the times beginning at Wykehams School. He then passed to New College, Oxford, where he became a fellow in 1475, and thence left New College in 1488 after taking, at Oxford, the degree of LL.D. In 1500 this degree was conferred upon him by Cambridge also.²

These early days saw Warham involved with many aspects of English political and educational life. He traveled widely, probably to Rome in one instance as one of the proctors of Alcock, Bishop of Ely, under a commission dated 26 February, 1490. In 1493 he was made sub-deacon by William Smith at Lichfield and in February of 1492 Warham was appointed master of the rolls, and was one of the officials who attended

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at Westminster the creation of Prince Henry Tudor as Duke of York.³ King Henry VII was in attendance at this auspicious occasion of his sons elevation to the title of prince as was Arthur, the oldest child of Henry VII and heir-apparent to the throne of England. It is an irony to note that William Warham was one of the men who helped preside over the marriage of Henry's older brother, Arthur, to Catherine of Aragon at St. Paul's Cathedral.⁴

In these years of Henry VII all indications are that Warham was a trusted civil servant to the Crown who traveled widely and affected numerous economically judicious treaties i.e. a wool treaty for the export of wool to Flanders⁵. Warham was also an effective diplomat, especially when dealing with the Roman King, Maximilian.⁶ In 1502 Warham was elected Bishop of London.⁷ One can assume that this position, like most he received, was given to him as a reward for his loyal service to the realm and Crown. While Bishop of London, he was made keeper of the great seal, a title which he exchanged for that of Lord Chancellor in 1504. In that year he became Archbishop Elect of Canterbury having been granted a bull (an official papal decree) from Pope Julius II, and later took his oath to the Pope at Westminster in January, 1504. It is said that he was enthroned with great magnificents on 9 March.⁷

We can assume that the rapid rise of Warham was due to a number of qualities, qualities that are seen throughout most of his life. First, he was a compliant servant to the King. He was at all times willing to kneel at the altar of his sovereign, even if it caused him inconvenience. Secondly, Warham was an intelligent man who could quickly grasp the meaning of the situation at hand. His correspondence with Erasmus suggests a keen mind. Thirdly, it appears, and this is purely assumption, that Warham was not one of those men who seemed to threaten other people's position in society. Nowhere in the research done did Warham purposely challenge the status quo in the political or theological sense. This is also a criticism of the man, for indeed Thomas Wolsey was able to overshadow Warham at each junction. Lastly, we can say that Warham's indefatigable energy allowed him to continue his duties when others would often falter. The man, throughout his whole life, was articulate and wise, a great reader, and as Professor Gordon Zeeveld shows, a patron of the arts and universities of England.⁸

William Warham as Archbishop was not allowed to rest as simply the head of Canterbury province but was constantly thrown into the politics of the day. Further, evidence indicates that he was desirous of curbing the ever present abuses of the clergy. His speeches, sermons, and letters show a desire for economy and honesty: they also show a very articulate man.

One of the interesting aspects of Warham's eventful life are the oxymoronic situations with which he was faced. On 24 June, 1509, he presided over the joint crowning and wedding of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon at Westminster, a marriage as shall be shown, he felt was illegal.⁹

Into these early years of Warham's life came a man who was to overshadow him - Thomas Wolsey. It is interesting to note that it was with Warham's persuasion that

Wolsey was made Cardinal. In fact, it was from Warham that Wolsey received his Cardinal's hat at Westminster. (10) To do justice to the relationship that developed between these two men would be to write a book on the subject. One can say only that Warham was constantly overshadowed by the aggressive, opportunistic Cardinal. A book that discusses the complex relationship between the two is Professor A. F. Pollard's excellent biography *Wolsey*.

As power coalesced in the hands of Wolsey, the traditional rights of Warham were removed from him and subsequently fell to the new Cardinal. The first of these powers to leave was the surrendering of the great seal, and hence Wolsey was made Lord Chancellor in Warham's place. ¹¹ Warham in these early years unlike Wolsey was not one of those theologians fearful of the invasion of Protestantism and yet he was a witness to the burning of numerous volumes of Luther's book in the mid-1520's. ¹²

Wolsey and Warham had different temperaments. Thomas Wolsey was harsh and direct, as illustrated by his censuring of Warham for having dared to call a council of suffragans about reforms in the Church without his consent. Another rebuke came when a convocation was called by Warham to meet at St. Paul's. In this instance Wolsey overruled him and called the clergy to meet at Westminster, where his authority would be greater. ¹³ Yet the men did not hate each other. Their correspondence shows a figurative master-servant relationship. This is best illustrated in the fact, that in 1523 Wolsey sent numerous letters warning Warham to care for his health. ¹⁴ Warham throughout his life was a vigorous money raiser for the church and state. One example of this is in 1524, while still suffering from the 'old disease in his head' (probably migraines or sinus trouble), an ailment he was to complain about to his dying day, he was able to gather the large sum demanded for his church activities. ¹⁵

William Warham's life would have probably been rather untrying if events in England had not changed in the mid 1520's. The Cardinal probably would have stayed in the shadow of Wolsey and possibly have been replaced by the Archbishop of York if a certain Anne Boleyn, a desire for a male heir, and a guilty conscience had not all come into the King's life at approximately the same time.

Uncertainty as to the lawfulness of the marriage of Henry and Catherine seems to have existed in a number of people's minds including the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury. ¹⁶ Warham, though he solemnized the marriage, doubted the legality of the act as early as 1511. ¹⁷ The main contention that Warham posed at the time of the union was the fact that Catherine had been the wife of Henry's brother, Arthur. Many years later Bishop Fox recalled that Warham had strongly disapproved of this union, apparently doubting the validity of the bull of dispensation handed down by Pope Julius II. ¹⁸ It could not be found on what grounds he disagreed but as we shall see. Warham's qualms were to be of importance nearly two decades later when the question of the lawfulness of the marriage became a matter of debate throughout Christendom. Possibly Warham's concern was based on the fact that the bull was slow in coming: Its delivery had been postponed from time to time and when it finally

arrived its wording left some doubt.¹⁹ Yet the marriage was made and Catherine gave birth to a child. Mary Tudor, who would in the future become a successful ruler of England.

At this time, the Roman Catholic Church in England was suffering from aggravated ecclesiastic disorders. Numerous reasons evidence this but to discuss them here would be to write a large volume. This writer would suggest Gilbert Child's *Church and State Under the Tudors* as a primer on this era of Church history.²⁰ Many men attempted to reform the Church: Fisher, Erasmus, Colet, and Thomas More were some of the more outspoken and even Henry VIII himself can be considered a Church reformer in that he wrote and published his famous *The Defense of the Seven Sacraments*, a work that J. J. Scarisbrick says is 'not a piece of theology of the highest order.' Yet it did present a simplified protest against Lutheranism which was in full bloom in continental Europe. The book was greatly effective and was, in fact, one of the most successful pieces of Catholic polemics produced by the this earliest generation of anti-Lutheran events.²¹ Whether Henry personally wrote the book is an academic question, though he certainly agreed in full with its contents. For his attempt at preventing a further eroding of the Catholic Church. The Pope granted him the title of 'Defender of the Faith.'²² Thus we can see from the various efforts at reform made in England that a theological crisis was at hand. Into this scene came Anne Boleyn. Anne was certainly not the most beautiful woman in the kingdom. Her strongest points were her wonderful dark hair and 'fine eyes.' She also is said to have had a long neck, a firm mouth and an air of authority and grace.²³ The various reports that depict her as extremely ugly or as extremely beautiful seem highly prejudiced. Henry now had two reasons to seek a divorce from his aging wife. First was the fact that Catherine had given him no male heir to carry on the Tudor name. Secondly, Henry seems to have fallen in love with this girl of his court, Anne Boleyn. The best work on Anne and her love affair and marriage is Paul Friedmann's *Anne Boleyn*. Yet one should note that Henry and Catherine had lived together contently, if not happily, for many years.²⁴ It also seems that at this time Henry's conscience came into play -- not to condemn his own infidelities, many of which he obviously had, but to convince him that his marriage to Catherine was really no marriage at all. Theology had always been a favorite study of Henry's²⁵ and in the mid-1520's he seems to have discovered that for years he had been living in sin and for this reason he rationalized he had no male offspring. The exact Biblical reference he came upon was Leviticus which states that: "If a man shall take his brother's wife. it is an impurity, he shall remain childless."²⁶ Deuteronomy disagrees with this interpretation of God's word, suggesting that it is proper for a brother to marry his siblings widow but this does not seem to have been overly important to Henry once he became convinced of his sinful cohabitation.

Cardinal Wolsey, as the leading representative of the Pope in England, had the task of the divorce that Henry VIII was seeking fall upon him and, as can be imagined, he did not relish it. Professor George Cavendish says that Wolsey, in these early days,

even tried to persuade Henry from pursuing such a course. Wolsey was against the divorce from the first. But as Wolsey says, 'I could never bring to pass to dissuade him thence from.'²⁷ What Wolsey seems to have desired was for Henry to have his illicit affair with Anne while maintaining the status quo with Catherine.²⁸ Men oftentimes have the ability to see a problem before they can articulate it. Wolsey probably saw his doom in the Boleyn affair and realized that he must affect the divorce that Henry desired or he and the Roman Church would be ruined in England. The first step in bringing about the divorce was taken by Wolsey in May, 1527. Archbishop William Warham assisted Wolsey in this endeavor. A hearing was instituted in great secrecy at the Cardinal's house in Westminster.²⁹

Present at this secret meeting were Stéphen Gardiner, Wolsey's secretary, William Clayborough, as registrar of the court, and three doctors of letters. As has been mentioned, Archbishop Warham was also present. Warham appears to have been there willingly and in full support of the secret inquisition. One must remember that he had always doubted the legality of the marriage.³⁰

Henry was cited for having lived for eighteen years in incestuous intercourse with the widow of his late brother.' Warham believed sincerely that Henry was desirous of finding the truth of the matter rather than using the court as an escape from his predicament and he was subsequently persuaded to be part of this clandestine act, out of honesty rather than his wishes to help Henry in his desire to marry Anne.³¹ Warham here seems naive. He should have realized that the secretness of the proceedings indicated that Wolsey's and Henry's actions were of less than honorable intent.

As a footnote to these early years, one can say with some certainty that Henry did love the not so beautiful Anne. As King of England he could have had any available woman in Europe. He chose Anne. Further, his long, rather beautiful love letters to her indicate a deep feeling rather than simple lust. An example of such a letter that shows Henry's emotional state is this one.

I and my heart put ourselves in your hands. Let not absence lessen your affection; for it causes us more pain than I should ever have thought, reminding us of a point of astronomy that the longer the days are, the further off is the sun, and yet the heat is all the greater. So it is with our love, which keeps its fervour in absence, at least on our side. Prolonged absence would be intolerable but for my firm hope in your indissoluble but for my firm hope in your indissoluble affection. As I cannot be with you in person. I send you my picture set in brachlets.³²

Warham was apparently unaware of the seriousness of the affair Henry was having with Anne and the fact that he desired to marry this girl young enough to be his daughter.

The King was summoned to the secret court on May 11 under his own summons delivered by his trusted Cardinal Wolsey. Henry obediently came to the court to answer the questions put to him.³³ 'Wolsey,' says Friedmann, 'lent himself to a most

odious attempt to cheat Catherine out of good right,' The main point of contention was not so much that Arthur and Catherine had been married per se but rather that they had consummated their marriage with intercourse. If this be the case, according to his advisors, he was living incestuously. ³⁴ Wolsey, as legate, it was felt could annul the marriage and it seemed Warham was wanted at the court to help formalize the break. Warham was a good man to have as one who would agree with the King's thesis. First, he seemed rather naively convinced of Henry's troubled conscience and secondly, the Archbishop, as a close friend to numerous theologians in Europe, including Erasmus, ³⁵ would be of value if all did not go as anticipated.

A note in the *Letters and Papers* of 31 May tells of the judicial proceedings attended by Warham. The Archbishop was appointed assessor for examination of the case, a position granted him by the King at the beginning of the trial. From secondary sources (the original are in Latin) we know that Henry, interviewed jointly by Warham and Wolsey, was examined as to his knowledge of the sin the supposedly committed. ³⁶

The secret proceedings were not as secret as the attenders had hoped. In a few weeks the Queen got wind of what was afoot.

Wolsey states:

The first night of this my said journey I lodged at Sir John Wilton's house where met me my Lord of Cauntourbury; with whom after communication had of your secrete matier, and such other thinges as have been hitherto doon therin, I shewed him howe the knowlege therof is cumme to to Queenes Grace, and howe displeasently she takith it, and what Your Highnes hath doon for the staying and pacification of her: declaring unto he, that Your Grace hath hitherto nothing intended, he doon, but only for the serching and trying out of the trowth, proceding upon occasion geven by the French partie, and doubtles moved therin by the Biship of Tarbe. Which facion and maner liked my said Lorde of Cauntourbury very wel. And noting his countenance, gesture, and manour, although he sumwhat merved, howe the Quene shld cumme to the knowlege therof, and by whom; thinking that Your Grace might constraune and cause her to shewe that discoverers therof unto Your Highnes: Yet, as I perceyve, He is not moch altered or turned from his first facion; expressely affermyng that, howesoever displeasently the Quene toke this matier, yet the trowth and jugement of the lawe must have place, and be folowed. (Sic) ³⁷

Futher sessions were held on 20, 23, and 31 May and generally Henry agreed that he was acting in sin to have lived with Catherine. The case was also brought against the 1509 bull of Pope Julius II who allowed the marriage in the first place. ³⁸ It was hoped that this quasi-legal court could settle the matter and that Warham would sanction Wolsey's annulment of the marriage. He could do this as the Pope's legate and thence Pope Clement would confirm the matter. The second part of this equation was quite certain for Clement was a man of low scruples, no conscience, and exemplary of opportunism. "Of the many odious characters which meet us in the history of the

sixteenth century," states Gilbert Child, "that of Pope Clement VII is the most despicable." ³⁹ With this type of man in the Vatican, it was little doubted that the divorce would be granted expeditiously.

But history does not always prove to be so logical, for events far from England were to work as an impasse to Henry and Wolsey. Catherine, as already mentioned, heard about the secret court and contacted her nephew, Emperor Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, whose garrisons were stationed in Rome and requested that he press the Pope to revoke Wolsey's power as legate. Henry's ultimate wishes to divorce Catherine and marry Anne were common knowledge throughout the Empire. ⁴⁰ Further, Scarisbrick suggests that Henry himself might have lost his nerve and may have desired other theologians to help him rationalize his behavior. ⁴¹ Hence, the initial drive for the divorce was soon stymied.

To go into the diplomacy of England, Rome, and the Empire would be impossible. Yet we must say that Clement was now unable to release Henry from his marriage because of the pressure placed on him by emperor Charles. To facilitate the cause of the King, alliances were proposed and tried and a special commission of Doctors Knight, Gardiner, and Fox was sent to Rome. The Pope was unable to allow Henry his wish and in his frustration Pope Clement, the leader of the Christian world, suggested a divorce from (not annulment) Catherine or to settle the problems in English Church courts. ⁴² Warham was not compelled to take part in the diplomacy of the times nor was he to become overly involved with the unpleasant business for which Campeggio representing the Pope came to England. In the spring a bull had been dispatched at Rome empowering Wolsey, with Campeggio as assessor (a position Warham had had), to investigate the affair of the King and his desired divorce. ⁴³ Warham was undoubtedly knowledgeable about the happenings but his letters seem to indicate a rather blasé attitude toward the whole thing. He continued to correspond with Erasmus and kept up with business in the Province.

At the start of the trial before Wolsey and Campeggio, Warham was made Chief Counsel of the Queen. Campeggio notes this in his letter to Salviati. Du Bellay in his letter to Montmorency states on 1 November, 1528:

The divorce is at present in this state. After the Queen's answer to the Cardinals, of which I told you, and some remonstrances which they may have made to her on the part of the Pope to enter into religion. it was found that she was determined to stick to her opinion. She has been given the choice of the whole counsel of England, that is, of my lords of Canterbury, Bath, Rochester, Ely, Exeter, and the Cordelier (Standish), the dean of the Chapel, and others, with liberty to call an advocate from Flanders, a procureur and a counsellor, but she is not to be at liberty to summon any from Spain, on the ground that they are at war with Spain. Already a safe-conduct has been sent into Flanders for the said counsellor and advocate. This is the way the matter stands, but it must be kept perfectly quiet. Rochester and London, I understand, are of the Queen's opinion, and also the dean of the Chapel; but I think they will lose

their cause, for I hold the same opinion as when I wrote last. All things considered, I hold what even if all the Cardinals had, both in the past time and the present, approved the marriage, that they could not have [made it valid], it being proved, as they say it is, that the late King and she have lain together, for God has long ago himself passed sentence on it. ⁴⁴

After being appointed counsel, Warham and the others waited upon the Queen and interrogated her on two points which they said had been put forward by Henry. First, they asked whether she had made an attempt on the King's life to secure the throne for her daughter. She firmly denied this and stated that 'she pryed his life more than her own.' Secondly, she was asked whether she was in correspondence with Charles in Rome. She said she was not. ⁴⁵ The inquiry was to settle nothing. Whether Catherine had been legally married to Arthur or whether she had been in his bed only as a companion was of major importance. Yet only Catherine, and possibly Henry, knew this for sure.

The formal court to decide the fate of Catherine opened at Blackfriars in the Spring of 1529. Dr. Sampson cited Henry and Catherine to appear. When Catherine found that Wolsey was to judge her, she refused to take part and was pronounced contumacious. Warham continued to act, theoretically at least, as Catherine's Chief Counsel. ⁴⁶

Testimony was given by many and this testimony further convinced the King that he was at fault and needed the separation 'owing to his scruples of conscience.' ⁴⁷ The fact was brought out at this time that the Archbishop of Canterbury had been somewhat recalcitrant in marrying the two. Further, it was noted that Prince Arthur had confessed to having carnal knowledge of Catherine. He is said to have said:

that he had been in Spayne that nyght, whych was a hot country, meaning that he had carnally used her. (Sic)

Further, for a time Catherine had thought she was pregnant by Arthur. ⁴⁸ Warham was of little help as Chief counsel. Even the Queen noted this. In 1531 she was to say of Warham:

Pretty counsel he is, for I ask Canterbury's advice he answers me that he will have nothing to do with such affairs, and keeps repeating to me the words, *ira principis more est!* ⁴⁹

All of the other councillors were equally useless, so she sent to Flanders for assistance. Warham apparently did not want to become involved in the affair. The reason cannot be known for certain but we can assume his age, general health (he had the sweating sickness at this time), and his basic fear of Henry and Wolsey made him overly cautious. The court at Blackfriars came to no avail.

Warham next appears on the scene when Chapuys makes the remarkable statement:

Thursday and Friday the Estates met, and elected at first the Archbishop of Canterbury to be their speaker (prolocuteur); but being a churchman he was not agreeable to the King, who rejected him on the plea that he was too old. After which another one was elected to the King's taste (à l'appetit du Roy), they say that he is a man of learning (scavant homme).⁵⁰

The idea that Warham was elected speaker is near unimaginable. It would have been an act of defiance against the King. Probably Chapuys "had mistaken a report that Warham had been considered for the chancellorship after Wolsey's fall".⁵¹

Events abroad changed the scene in England. Pope Clement now brought the final judgment to Rome and forbade the English clergy from forming a solution. If a decision had been made in England, it would have been unfair to Catherine. A decision made in Rome would be equally unfair to Henry. Because of the failure of Blackfriars and because of the Pope's unwillingness, Wolsey, the man hated by all but Henry, became expendable. He was no longer of any value in the King's 'great folly.'⁵² Soon after the Cardinal's fall from grace, he died. The relationship between Warham as Archbishop and Wolsey as Cardinal had been a unique one effective in using them against Wolsey than one would imagine.⁵³

effective in using them against Wolsey than one would imagine.⁵³

On 15 and 28 March, 1530 Warham, Chancellor of the University, wrote two letters to Oxford divines stating that they had failed him because they had made no contributions to the divorce case.⁵⁴ Also in that part of the year on 13 July, Warham signed a letter to the Pope. The letter stated:

The Spiritual and temporal Lords of England to Pope Clement VII praying him to consent to the King's desires, and point out the evils which arise from delaying the divorce.⁵⁵

Warham was strongly pressured to put his signature to this document. He, as has already been indicated, was a conservative man in Church matters and for him to appeal to the Pope directly, as he did in this letter, for a cause the Pope was not desirous of delivering was most likely done under pressure. Or was the sickness in his head that he constantly complained about becoming too great for him to think realistically about such a decision?

In January pressure was applied to the Archbishop.
Chapuys states:

The Queen has informed me (through a confidential messenger) that the King had lately written, or was about to do so, to the archbishop of Canterbury, as chief archbishop, primate, and legate of this kingdom, to give him warning that, unless the Pope con-

sented to the accomplishment of the marriage, his own and other ecclesiastical authority would be at an end here in England, and that he himself (the King), the nobles, and the people, provoked and hurt at the advocacy of the suit to Rome, had already shewn great animosity against the Church.⁵⁶

This can be perceived as nothing but a blatant threat that the powers that be had best either make a decision or force the Pope to make a decision favoring the divorce. The king was stating simply that if the Pope did not comply with his wishes, his authority and that of all Church men in England would be destroyed. With Parliament showing its anti-papal feeling, as it was in this era, the king had something to back up his threat.⁵⁷

What the King desired was one of three things: (1) that the case should be submitted to the Archbishop of Canterbury; (2) or that it be submitted to him (Warham) and the clergy; (3) or that if the King should do anything himself, the Pope should not fulminate censures against him.⁵⁸ These requests to Clement had no effect.

In this year of 1530 Henry's desire was clear. He wanted the aged Warham to judge the case. The Boleyn family (a powerful family of nobility) and Duke of Norfolk were also eager for Warham to decide favorably the case and Warham seems willing to have favored the King's wish for in December he called the irreconcilable Bishop Fisher before him and attempted to make the Bishop retract his pro-Catherine statements of the past.

The Bishop replied with much prudence and moderation that the matter was in itself so clear that no arguments upon it were needed, and that besides, the Pope being the sole judge and arbiter, the case could only be properly argued before him, certainly not before the Bishop [of London], or anyone else. Upon which the Bishop and the others, seeing that they could neither convince nor draw him into controversy, accused him of being self-willed and obstinate, and said that he would, in spite of all he could say, be compelled to argue the question, as the King had determined to appoint six doctors on his side, and six more on the Queen's, to debate the case, and also two impartial judges who, after hearing what each side had to say, should decide the question one way or the other.⁵⁹

Warham's willingness to plead the case of the King caused him to be censured by the people of his own Province. "Defamatory libels were stuck at the door of the Cathedral against the Archbishop and others."⁶⁰ The placards were immediately removed and destroyed so that the people could not read them. This event occurred in late December, 1530.⁶¹

At this point, it is necessary to note that Parliament was passing various acts that would eventually place the English clergy under that auspices of the King. The upper house and not the lower was the leader in this reform movement that was to be a revolution in the fullest sense of the word. The clergy was indicated as a body in December, 1530. for breach of the Statutes of Præmunire for having acknowledged

the authority of Wolsey as legate. At the time they had been forced to do this by Henry. The convocation to receive the King's pardon paid 118,000 pounds, not without some objection.⁶² Further, and more frustrating to Warham, as we shall see, the King ordered the clergy to acknowledge him as "The Protector and Supreme Head of the Church of England."⁶³ Ultimately, Warham, as the leading Churchman, put the Supreme Head clause, with minor additions, to the convocation. He stated:

of which the Church and clergy of England will acknowledge his majesty to be chief protector, only and supreme lord insofar as the law of Christ allows, supreme head.

Warham's motion was followed by a disturbing silence. At length he said, 'Qui tacet consentire videtur' and an unknown clergyman answered. 'Then we are all silent.'⁶⁴ In this manner the Church in England became the Church of England consented to by Parliament and promoted, it would seem, by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

So in the early part of January, 1531, Warham, the successor of Becket, gave in to the King. He could have faced martyrdom as did Becket but he, at eighty-one, chose to do what he saw as inevitable.

Chapuys saw the truth in the Supreme Head title. He saw that the clause 'and as far as was permitted by the law of Christ' was not limiting, as no one would do anything contrary to the laws of Christ. He even saw that the title made Henry "Pope in England."⁶⁵

Why did Warham fall under Henry's spell and lead the convocation in declaring the King Supreme Head? Chapuys, in a letter to Charles, says that:

The Nuncio went today, at my request, to the Archbishop of Canterbury to exhort him to have regard to God, his conscience, and the Pope's authority. The Archbishop would only say that the King had come in person to his house to urge him to comply with his wishes.⁶⁸

It was also hinted at that Warham was being carefully watched by John Leland, Bishop of London, who was the King's confessor and who was in constant contact with the King.⁶⁷ Warham's only utterance as to the affair and his weakness in it was 'Ira Principis more est.'⁶⁸

Henry continued his efforts to have Warham try the case. Yet he was hesitant to use too much pressure. He probably remembered Henry II and Becket. Parliament continued to pass anti-clerical legislation until the complete submission of the clergy was realized. The convocations gave all of their rights to the King and many clerics were excluded from the Church because of previous oaths to the Pope.⁶⁹

But still the stubborn Warham would not consent to making the divorce part of his business. Chapuys states:

The affair is being secretly promoted as I hear especially by the Duke of Norfolk and the father of the lady both of whom are incessantly at work to suborn the Archbishop of Canterbury whom they now regard as Pope in England. ⁷⁰

Yet Warham refused to be moved and the more pressure put upon him, the less he would react to their wishes. At this point, the eighty-two year old Warham seems to have had a change in heart, or did his conscience bother him? He saw the systematic attempts being made at destroying the clergy and on 24 February, 1532 he made a formal protest of all acts passed by Parliament since Blackfriars of 3 November, 1529 to the present time. ⁷¹ Henry, upon hearing the old Warham's statement, charged him with Praemunire because he had consecrated the Bishop of Asaph before the Bishop's temporalities had been restored. ⁷² Warham replied that he did nothing illegal, but the writ was put into effect. ⁷³

In August of 1532, Archbishop Warham prepared his last written document. It was a speech he apparently intended to deliver in the House of Lords. The speech is a good one. It shows a great deal about the man in his last months. This writer has taken the liberty to quote a large portion of the draft. (errors in this quote are found in original text)

Protests he means to say nothing to the King's prejudice. As to the praemunire, he is charged with consecrating the bishop of St. Asaph before he had exhibited his bulls to the King. Urges in reply: - - (1) that archbishops are not bound to know, and have never been accustomed to examine bishops requiring consecration, whether they have exhibited their bulls or not; and that it would be a serious burden on them to be obliged to ascertain. (2) Many bishops have been consecrated before they sued out their temporalities during the last 299 years, as Thos. Bredwarden, archbishop of Canterbury, Wm. Wittelsey, and others, who sued for their temporalities a long time after. (3) If archbishops had been bound in times past to ascertain if a bishop [to be consecrated had exhibited his] bulls to the Kings, the fact that they had so ascertained would have appeared on record by certificates to that effect. (4) Moreover, the wise princes in times past would have punished cases of neglect (5) If the archbishop cannot give the spiritualities to one who is pronounced a bishop at Rome till the King has granted him his temporalities, the spiritual power of the archbishops will depend on the temporal power of the prince, and thus would be of little or no effect, - - which is against God's law. (6) The archbishop has no right to keep the spiritualities in his hands after an elect is pronounced a bishop. (7) If he were to wait till the King granted the temporalities, there have been kings who would keep these in their hands many years, as king Henry [11], and so the elect would be deprived of both. This argument Warham uses against his own profit, for the longer the King kept the temporalities, the more profit would the archbishop have of the spiritualities, if he could have them with good conscience. (8) The King is not injured by the consecration of a bishop before he has exhibited his bulls and done homage, for he can still keep the temporalities in his hand. There have been many archbishops and bishops, like bishop Pekham, who have had

their temporalities detained a long time. (9) A man is not made bishop by consecration, but is pronounced so at Rome in Consistory; and he has no jurisdiction given him by consecrations to only the rights of his order, viz., consecrating of children, c. If the King by detaining temporalities could cause consecrations to be deferred, the Church might have no bishops at all, and consequently no priests, and sacraments would cease. (19) By the same reasoning, the Pope should not be consecrated or crowned till he had sued out his temporalities of the Emperor which Constantine gave to the see of Rome; so that there would be no Pope but at the Emperor's pleasure. (11) Apart from law, a spiritual man ought first to seek what is necessary for his spiritual functions, and not temporal things; (12) and give his oath of obedience to the Pope before his temporal prince. (13) In consecrating the bishop of St. Asaph, Warham was but the Pope's commissary, and the act was the Pope's commissary, and he was bound by oath to do. Proceeds further to show that the point for which the King contends was one of the articles which Henry II sought to extort at Clarendon, which St. Thomas died a martyr to oppose, and which Henry II himself afterwards gave up. Warham would be sorry to do anything prejudicial to the King's authority, especially as it was he who anointed him King, and put the Crown upon his head; but if no damage can be done to the Crown even by an ill act, such as killing a man in the King's presence, much less can it be by the consecration of a bishop, which is a good deed. The liberties of the Church are guaranteed by Magna Charta, and several kings who violated them, as Henry II, Edward III, Richard II, and Henry IV, came to an ill end. Refers to a brief of Pope Martin to Henry IV touching a praemunire against the liberties of the Church, and warns the Lords (in answer to a threat held over that they would defend the matter by the sword) of what befell the knights who drew their swords against St. Thomas, -- whose punishment remains to this day in their blood and generation. Would rather be hewn in pieces than confess this article, for which St. Thomas died, to be a praemunire. If this Act be a law of the land it was drawn up at Clarendon 400 save 31 years ago, and it was never put in execution against any archbishop, though many have infringed it.

Will not refuse the lay counsel offered him, though he expects little from it, for two reasons: -- 1. Because laymen advance their own laws, rather than those of the Church. 'And in their behalf I understand that such temporal learned men as have been assigned of counsel with spiritual men lately in cases of praemunire (as it was surmised) for the advancing of their temporal laws, and for the derogation of the laws of the Church, have counselled them and induced them to confess and grant a praemunire whereto peradventure they would advise me in likewise; which, if I were so minded to confess, I needed not to have their counsel.' 2. Because he understands that temporal men defending their clients, when they have spoken anything against the minds of the King's council, have been called, fools and put to silence; and he would be sorry that they should be so rebuked in defending him. As the matter is spiritual, desires spiritual counsel.

Declines also to give sureties, citing St. Thomas's authority. Sureties are for persons whose flight is feared, but if he had been disposed to flee, he might have done so before. St. Anselm, St. Edmund, and other archbishops of Canterbury were never compelled to give sureties: And whoever lays violent hands on a bishop and imprisons him is

accused, and can only be assailed by the Pope, except in mortis articulo; and the place where a bishop taken is kept is interdicted, and the two dioceses next adjoining. ⁷⁴

(Sic)

In this speech we can see that he referred to the case of St. Thomas Becket and hinted at the fact that Henry VIII was going the same way as Henry II had gone. He compares his anti-clerical policy with the Consitution of Clarendon. Hence one might assume, as Professor Geoffrey Elton does, that Warham in these last months casts himself in St. Thomas' position. Further, it suggests that what had befallen Becket and subsequently Henry II might happen to Henry VIII and him. But Warham was not Becket. He appealed to the Magna Charta; Becket gave his life. The situation he found himself in the summer of 1532 and his old age finally caught up with him. His body was unable to take the strain any longer and on 23 August he died. ⁷⁵

Howard Hall states:

In this summer season last past, died Willyam Warham, Archebishoppe of Cantorbury, and to that Bishopysch was named Doctor Thomas Cranmer, a man of learning. ⁷⁶

Warham was to die with little honor and with thirty pounds in savings, remarking 'Sat est niaticu' (enough for a funeral). ⁷⁷

In conclusion, we can say that Warham was a man whose temperament was not suited for the world of real politick. He was best when caring for the business of the Province, when patronizing the arts and scholarship of England and Europe, and when performing the duties of a cleric. He was unable to function as a Wolsey, a Norfolk, or a Cromwell. His temperament did not allow it nor, it seems, did his conscience. He was willing to let the King have his way on all matters, probably because he saw the King as the inevitable winner, yet before his death he was to deliver an eloquent protest to the King -- a protest of a historian and theologian rather than a politician.

The ironies that filled his life must have haunted him. still he was able to cope with his day-to-day activities. Yet there is that 'sickness in the head' that he so often complained about in his later years.

Warham's life can best be summed up in something he is quoted as saying numerous times -- 'Ira principis mors est.'

The best portrait of William Warham was done by Hans Holbein and is part of the Royal Collection at Windsor. The work can be found in J. J. Scarisbrick's book *Henry VIII*. It represents an aged man with a grave yet gentle face. His eyes seem gray, his face is covered with wrinkles, and he seems to be of a rotund nature. His cheek bones are high. There is a pleasantness about the face, a softness that seems to indicate a mellow temperament. ⁷⁸

In reflecting on William Warham a quote from William Shakespeare's play *Henry VIII* comes to mind:

There's nothing I have done yet, my conscience deserve a corner. Would all men, could speake this with as free a soul as I do.

Postscript

William Warham has generally been overlooked by historians of English history who prefer to write about such giant figures as Henry VIII, Ann Boleyn, Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cramner. For the eager scholar of the reformation period who enjoys biographical research Warham would be an excellent candidate for a full length monograph. His life is a study in oxymoronicalisms and as such becomes a metaphore for the English reformation and early sixteenth century court intrigue and self-servingness.

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唐代京兆尹的遷轉途徑

張榮芳

一、前言

就唐代職官體系而言，唐人頗有「重內官，輕外職」的觀念；(1)然而，在職官遷轉運作過程中，內外官的歷練大都是每一個官僚所不可或缺的。自職官體系的下層逐步往上爬升，經歷各種不同性質的官職，以諳習政治事務，而在長期的過程中，幸運者不但憑藉本身的條件、能力，還須種種因緣機會的配合，才能登上宰相之位。宋代洪邁嘗謂：「唐楊綰、崔祐甫、杜黃裳、李藩、裴垍皆稱英宰，然考其履歷，皆未嘗為刺史、縣令」，(2)上述諸人在有唐三百六十位左右的宰相中，(3)究屬少數；對大多數宰相而言，內外遷轉仍是不可避免的資歷。

在大多數官僚的職官遷轉中，既無法免除任職地方官，京師所在的京兆尹便成為最佳的選擇，如此既有牧民的經歷，又得常與中央保持密切關係。因而京兆尹雖屬地方官，却兼有中央官的雙重角色。

唐代京兆府原名雍州，高祖武德初年，「因隋置牧，以親王為之。或不出閤，長史知府事」，(4)京兆牧只是親王的虛銜，並不治事。京兆尹一員，唐初名為雍州別駕，至太宗貞觀二十三年(649)七月三日改別駕為長史，玄宗開元元年(713)十二月三日改雍州為京兆府，遂以長史為京兆尹，總府事，(5)沿至唐亡不改。其品秩為從三品，職掌「清肅邦畿，考覈官吏，宣布德化，撫和齊人，勸課農桑，敦敷五教」。(6)

本文主要依〔唐代京兆尹年表暨輯考〕，(7)分析京兆尹的遷入官、遷出官、兼官職，以及任期等問題，探討唐代京兆尹遷轉途徑的演變，說明唐代地方制度首揆的實際運作。在時代區分上，分成初唐(高祖至玄宗先天革命，618—712)、中唐(玄宗開元元年至順宗，713—

805)、晚唐(憲宗至唐亡, 806—907)等三階段, 每一階段殆約百年左右。(8)

二、遷入官

首先, 觀察京兆尹的遷入官。在可考的一九九任京兆尹中, 已知其遷入官爲一五四任, 占總數77.38%, 幾達五分之四, 列表說明如下:

機 構	職官名	初唐	中唐	晚唐	小計	合計
中書門下	宰相	2	1	0	3	3
門下省	散騎常侍	0	3	3	6	15
	諫議大夫	0	0	2	2	
	給事中	0	0	7	7	
中書省	中書侍郎	1	0	0	1	3
	中書舍人	0	0	2	2	
尚書省	尚書左右丞	1	1	4	6	44
	六部尚書	1	2	3	6	
	六部侍郎	6	10	16	32	
御史臺	御史大夫	0	2	0	2	6
	御史中丞	0	0	4	4	
九寺	卿	4	9	10	23	27
	少卿	2	0	2	4	
秘書省	秘書監	0	0	1	1	1
殿中省	殿中監	1	0	0	1	1
國子監	國子祭酒	1	1	0	2	2
將作監	將作大匠	0	1	0	1	1
中央武官屬	右金吾將軍	1	1	2	4	4
東宮官屬	太子庶子	0	2	0	2	4
	太子賓客	0	2	0	2	
節度官屬	節度使	0	2	5	7	

唐代京兆尹的遷轉途徑

	觀察使	0	2	7	9	18
	制置使	0	0	1	1	
	團練使	0	0	1	1	
地方官屬	京兆少尹	2	5	4	11	24
	河南尹	0	3	0	3	
	州刺史	3	6	1	10	
鹽鐵官屬	鹽鐵判官	0	0	1	1	1
合 計		25	53	76	154	154

自上表可以觀察幾個現象：

第一，京兆尹主要的遷入官機構依序為尚書省、九寺、地方官屬、節度官屬與門下省，其比例分別是 28.51 %、17.53 %、15.58 %、11.69 %、9.74 %，五者合計占 83.05 %，已超過五分之四，當是遷入官的主要機構。

第二，就尚書省遷入官而言，初唐時占同期 32 %，中唐略降為 24.53 %，至晚唐再回升至 30.26 %，其升降幅度不大，顯示整個唐代自尚書省左右丞、六部尚書、侍郎遷入京兆尹，乃是一穩定的遷轉途徑，而就中又以六部侍郎遷入為主流。

第三，就九寺遷入官而言，初唐為 24 %，中唐降為 16.98 %，晚唐再降至 15.7 %，說明自九寺卿、少卿遷入京兆尹的比例持續下降；就中遷入多屬卿為主。

第四，在地方官屬方面，初唐比例為 20 %，中唐升至 26.42 %，晚唐驟降至 6.58 %。其中自京兆少尹升京兆尹，或以京兆少尹領尹事，以及自州刺史遷京兆尹，乃是兩個最主要的途徑，亦即循地方行政職官系統遷轉。

第五，自節度官屬觀察，初唐時原無節度等設置，中唐時其比例僅占同期 7.55 %，至晚唐升至 18.42 %，上升幅度達二倍以上，顯然節度官屬遷入京兆尹，於晚唐時已成爲一主要途徑。

第六，自門下省來說，初唐時無人自此遷入，中唐時為 6.66 %，晚唐升至 15.79 %，亦與節度官屬一樣以晚唐時期居於主流，就中又以給事中最爲突出。

第七，從前五個主要遷入機構的比例整體來看，初唐以尚書省、九寺與地方官屬爲主要遷入官機構；至中唐時期尚書省與九寺略爲下降，地方官屬微升，而新增入的門下省與節度官屬，填補了尚書省與九寺下降的空幅；至晚唐尚書省亦較回升，但九寺與地方官屬大幅降低，而由節度官屬與門下省取而代之。

第八，就中央官與地方官二者而言，整個唐代自中央官遷入京兆尹達一一一任，地方官僅四三任，比例為 72.08 %與 27.92 %；就時代區分看，初唐時為 80 %比 20 %，中唐為 66.04 % 比 33.96 %，晚唐為 73.68 % 比 26.32 %，以中唐較爲突出。

第九，從遷入官的途徑觀察，初唐時為十二種職官，中唐增至十七種，晚唐更達十九種，顯示遷入京兆尹的途徑愈來愈寬廣。

第十，自遷入官的職官性質來看，各種不同性質者皆有，比例最低者雖為諸監與東宮官屬，說明

遷入京兆尹並無特殊限制。

就尚書省遷入京兆尹部份，尚書左右丞負責行政規程的監察，〔唐六典〕卷一「左右丞」條云：「左右兩丞掌管轄省事，糾舉憲章，以辨六官之儀制而正百僚之文法」；侍郎則為尚書副貳，唐初因尚書地位崇重，或兼相職，或充留守，侍郎遂多以副貳負責省務，武周時期對侍郎委任愈重，安史亂後，尚書八座常用以酬庸，侍郎乃負責實際省務，地位日漸尊高，雖然晚唐略有日趨閒散之感，但仍多充翰林學士或兼使職，地位亦甚清貴。(9)孫國棟氏曾分析唐代丞郎遷出官，指出其主要途徑是中書侍郎、門下侍郎、六部尚書、御史大夫與八丞郎互轉；(10)然而，孫氏據兩唐書「列傳」的成功官僚分析，亦不免略有小誤。(11)但無疑地，說明了丞郎的主要遷出途徑。

上文自京兆尹的觀察，說明自丞郎遷入，實為一重要途徑，且丞郎常與京兆尹互轉，如韓迴與鮑防。〔舊唐書〕卷十二「德宗紀上」載貞元二年（786）正月丁未，「以禮部侍郎鮑防為京兆尹，京兆尹韓迴為刑部侍郎」，即二人互轉。而且自侍郎遷京兆尹並非意味貶官，如韓迴任兵部侍郎數月即遷京兆尹，是時「三輔難理，穀下尤甚，賊泚之後，旱蝗相乘，連師十餘萬屯於蒲坂，戎裝兵馬，仰給京師，內安罷毗，外贍軍食，師克濟而人不困，公之力焉。轉刑部侍郎」；(12)韓迴自兵部侍郎而京兆尹，再轉刑部侍郎，顯然並非左遷，而是藉其才以治京師，供給軍食。又如鮑防自禮部侍郎遷入京兆尹，主因為「京師仍歲蝗旱，務設人耗」之故，而其治無績，遂拜為右武衛上將軍的閒職尊崇。(13)另如韓臯，〔舊唐書〕卷一百二十九「韓滉附韓臯傳」載其經歷云：「遷中書舍人、御史中丞、尚書右丞、兵部侍郎，皆稱職，改京兆尹。」很清楚地指出韓臯因稱職而遷入；甚至文宗時以工部侍郎崔綰為京兆尹，而京兆尹王璠則遷尚書左丞，半年後崔綰即改尚書右丞。(14)

上舉雖僅數例，皆可說明丞郎與京兆尹之間，雖然京兆尹品秩較高，但丞郎為中央重要文官，二者常呈互轉的現象，自此可以瞭解整個唐代自丞郎遷入京兆尹，得以維持一穩定比例，亦成一主要途徑的所由。

以九寺遷入京兆尹而言，不論是正三品的太常、宗正卿，抑從三品的光祿、衛尉、太僕、大理、鴻臚、司農、太府卿皆有。諸寺乃上承尚書六部政令，執行事務之機構，(15)而諸寺卿最主要遷出途徑為與地方官互相遷轉，(16)因之，遷出者以地方官之首京兆尹為要，這點與其平均 17.53% 的比例頗稱相當。

在地方官屬遷入京兆尹方面，初唐與中唐時期比例較高，一方面是自京兆少尹升為京兆尹，如德宗時盧憇因「宰相楊炎遇之頗厚，召入左司郎中、京兆少尹，遷大尹。」(17)這點毋庸置疑；另一方面為自州刺史擢升，如玄宗朝韓朝宗任洪州都督、蒲州刺史，「所履之官政皆尤異，黜陟使奏課第一，徵為京兆尹。」(18)或如魏少遊於肅宗朝原官陝州刺史，時「王師潰於鄴，河、洛震駭，少遊鎮守自若，擢京兆尹。」(19)大多數自州刺史遷入京兆尹，率以善政治績擢升，略同於上舉二者。較特殊者為劉晏自通州刺史遷京兆尹的情況，〔舊唐書〕卷一百二十三「本傳」載：

尋遷河南尹。時史朝義盜據東都，寄理長水。入為京兆尹，頃之，加戶部侍郎、兼御史中丞、判度支，委府事於司錄張群、杜亞，綜大體，議論號為稱職。無幾，為酷吏敬羽所構，貶通州刺史。復入為京兆尹、戶部侍郎、判度支。

劉晏的遷轉升貶，實際上與當時的黨爭有密切關係，(20)因而代宗即位後，馬上自通州召回劉晏，復其原職。

自節度官屬遷入來說，中唐以後，節度使的設置愈來愈多，而由中央官出朝任節度、觀察使的比例亦日漸增多。(21)相形之下，當節度使於回朝欲任京官不成之餘，常以遷京兆尹為首望，如

肅宗朝李勉因受宦官李輔國所抑，不得入朝，至代宗大曆二年（767），「來朝，拜京兆尹、兼御史大夫，政尚簡肅。」⁽²⁾顯然李勉於李輔國勢盛時出為江西觀察使，而入朝後方得任京兆尹。或如黎幹自桂管觀察使遷京兆尹，〔舊唐書〕卷一百一十八「本傳」載：

魚朝恩伏誅，坐交通出為桂州刺史、本管觀察使。至江陵，丁母憂。久之，會京兆尹缺，人頗思幹，復拜京兆尹、兼御史大夫。幹自以得志，無心為理，貪暴益甚，徇於財色。

從黎幹遷京兆尹而「自以得志」看來，亦可說明京兆尹雖係地方官，但常與中央關係密切；如同憲宗朝鄒士美於元和二年（807）自黔中觀察使遷京兆尹後，憲宗「每別殿延問，必咨訪大政。」⁽³⁾或如元義方任尹事跡：

歷虢、商二州刺史、福建觀察使。中官吐突承璀，閩人也，義方用其親屬為右職。李吉甫再當國，陰欲承璀之助，即召義方為京兆尹。李絳惡其黨，出為鄜坊觀察使。⁽⁴⁾

雖然元義方的任職京兆尹與其時黨爭息息相關，但不可否認，其自福建觀察使遷京兆尹，再遷鄜坊觀察使的過程，足以充分說明京兆尹與中央的密切關係。

至於從門下省遷入觀察，門下省於唐初極其清貴，甚至有謂門下省乃代表門閥貴族意志的機構，⁽⁵⁾雖有略嫌過當之譏，⁽⁶⁾但從初唐時期並無門下省遷入京兆尹，或可說明地位清貴之一斑。中唐以後，門下省遷入有散騎常侍、諫議大夫與給事中。散騎常侍品秩雖於代宗廣德二年（764）以後自從三品升為正三品，較京兆尹為高，但已淪為閑散之官，而為四品以上迴翔之地；⁽⁷⁾諫議大夫原為正五品上，武宗會昌二年（842）升為正四品下，其任者多屬特殊人才，因資歷較低欲為天子所用而擢遷，其遷轉常逸出常軌；⁽⁸⁾至於給事中在中晚唐常以遷丞郎為主要途徑。⁽⁹⁾比較這三者，自諫議大夫與給事中遷入京兆尹，以晚唐尤甚，或可說明晚唐職官遷轉的突兀與無序，與初唐比較更呈現兩個極端現象。

在中央官與地方官的比例方面，「重京官，輕外官」的情形在中唐以後略有改善，⁽¹⁰⁾因而中唐時期自中央官遷入京兆尹比例較高亦可以想見；況且玄宗、代宗與德宗等對地方吏治較為重視，而官僚遷轉正常等因素均與之相關。至於晚唐時中央官遷入比例又略降，或與其時各方鎮呈獨立、半獨立狀態，由中央所任命的地方官能伺機返京任官自屬理所當然，然而在大多數官僚不能免除宦官、朋黨勢力的糾結下，部份地方官遷入中央官的可能性自然不高，此時出任介於二者之間的京兆尹適成一中介站。實際上，如自職官遷轉與仕途升遷看，中外歷練是不可或缺的，京兆尹不失是一地方官往上爬升的一過渡佳職。

其次，就京兆尹遷入官途徑愈來愈呈寬度而論，亦足以說明京兆尹一職乃唐人頗為重視的中介站。同時，京兆尹職司理民治地，與傳統「出將入相」、文武合一、治民理政的性質極為相近，不但是一地之長，可以展露理民御下的抱負，而且因其位居京畿，上承君主、宰相意旨機會極多，遂為各類職官所重，其遷入途徑亦呈現多門的現象。

最後，就遷入官的性質而言，自諸監與東宮官屬較少，如憲宗元和元年（806）董叔經自秘書監遷京兆尹，詳情不得而知；而李晉於先天二年（713）以殿中監兼雍州長史，與太平公主的勢盛有關。⁽¹¹⁾其餘如李峴、李晦分別自將作大匠與右金吾將軍遷入，二者乃宗室；而吳濬自右金吾將軍遷入京兆尹，乃因其為外戚之故；⁽¹²⁾另如崔縱自太子右庶子遷入，顯係一過渡階段。⁽¹³⁾亦即大多數自諸監、武官屬與東宮官屬遷入京兆尹者，不但比例極低，且自有其特殊因素。

三、兼官職

唐代京兆尹因治京畿，不但與中央各機構關係密切，也常兼各種臨時差遣性的使職。(3)此處僅對兼任定制的職官加以分析；至於京兆尹兼其他官職，則不論其時間先後，略如下表：

機 構	職官名	初唐	中唐	晚唐	小計	合計
中書門下	宰相	1	0	0	1	1
中書省	中書侍郎	2	0	0	2	2
尚書省	尚書左右丞	1	0	0	1	21
	六部尚書	2	3	7	12	
	六部侍郎	2	5	1	8	
御史臺	御史大夫	2	18	13	33	41
	御史中丞	0	7	1	8	
九寺	卿	3	1	0	4	4
殿中省	殿中監	1	1	0	2	2
中央武官屬	右金吾將軍	1	0	0	1	1
節度官屬	節度使	0	1	3	4	6
	行營副使	0	0	2	2	
尚書職屬	鹽鐵使	0	3	1	4	7
	判度支	0	0	2	2	
	知貢舉	0	0	1	1	
合 計		15	39	31	85	85

就已知一五四任京兆尹中，可考兼官職者為八五任，約占二分之一強。自上表可以觀察五個現象：

第一，整個唐代京兆尹兼官職以御史臺四一任與尚書省（包括尚書職屬）二八任二機構為主，其比例分別是 48.24% 與 32.94%，合計達 81.18%，已超過五分之四以上，當是兼官職的主流。

第二，在御史臺方面，又以兼御史大夫為主，達本身四分之三以上；自時代區分看，兼御史大夫於初唐時期僅及 13.33%，中唐驟升為 64.1%，晚唐時稱降至 45.16%。

第三，京兆尹兼尚書省尚書、丞郎遠比尚書職屬多，又以六部尚書、侍郎為主；而其比例三個時期分別是 33.33%、28.21% 與 38.71%，中唐之降與晚唐回升，乃是御史臺中晚唐的對應，此升彼降的消長之勢。

第四，除御史臺與尚書省二機構外，以節度官屬與九寺居多，二者比例之多寡亦成對應，兼九寺

官職集中初唐時期，節度官屬則為晚唐，中唐恰為二者升降的過渡階段。

第五，就唐代三時期兼官職途徑而言，雖然大致相等，但很明顯地，初唐時期宰相、中書侍郎兼京兆尹的現象，在中晚唐時不復再見，取而代之的為節度官屬與尚書職屬。

論京兆尹兼官職的問題，實無法單獨抽離，而涉及唐代官僚制度的運作與演變。唐初，國家經常的重要職務，列入正式編制之內（除了宰相的同中書門下三品、同平章事、參知機務等），到了玄宗以後，使職逐漸多且重，由原本臨時差遣而成為經制，度支、鹽鐵的取代戶部職權，翰林學士的侵奪宰相權力，此外知制誥、知貢舉等以正官而擔任使職，晚唐時使職愈重而正官愈輕，不少正官漸成使職敘資歷的空銜。⁽³⁴⁾除正官與使職的變化，初唐的兼官或猶可謂臨時兼領，一俟得人即免去兼官；或可謂以兼官加重其職權，原已非官僚制度一人一官的常軌。愈至中晚唐不帶兼官職反成異象，就中的演變已非就職官體系所能單純瞭解，而必須自實際的政治運作與演變來分辨一人同時兼領官職、使務，究竟何者為實職，何者為加銜，或何者為主，何者為輔。

在京兆尹兼御史大夫方面，或以御史大夫並非實職，加銜的意味較為明顯。唐自玄宗以後，常以臨時性的使職兼御史大夫或御史中丞，出任採訪處置等使；等到安史亂後，御史大夫常不除人，御史中丞成為御史臺的首長。⁽³⁵⁾論者也指出唐代京兆尹兼御史大夫，乃安史亂後常有的現象，其原因是京兆尹治理京畿之地，豪強土霸甚多，故使其多兼御史職，以提高京兆尹的地位與聲望。⁽³⁶⁾大抵已經說明中唐以後京兆尹兼御史臺官的現象之一。

從京兆尹兼御史大夫、御史中丞的演變觀察，前云中唐以後京兆尹加銜乃打擊豪強的作用，然初唐時期亦非無此一兼官，只是比例稍低；更何況，如兼御史大夫純為加銜虛職，實無法發揮打擊豪強的作用。究其實際，恐非意在針對豪強，而係因京兆尹治理京畿，其地王公大臣、豪門貴戚之所輻輳，京兆尹論品秩、職掌，實無法管轄駕乎其上的大臣；同時以其地方官之身份，又須承受中央的指揮調度，遑論管轄京師，肅清畿內。但如其兼領職在糾舉憲章的御史臺官，便得以御史臺官的職責來糾舉百官王公，方能達到治理京畿的任務，亦即京兆尹兼御史臺官雖為加銜，但並非虛職，而有其實際作用存在。

然而，兼御史臺官畢竟無法與正式編制職官相提並論，故京兆尹仍須避御史臺官；⁽³⁷⁾京兆尹為主要職官，而兼官在特殊情況或需要時方能發揮其效用。唐代自玄宗迄德宗時期對京畿吏治較為重視，因而兼御史臺官的比例臻於最高點；晚唐時的略降，則與京畿已受制於方鎮節度使有相當關係。

事實上，京兆尹的兼御史臺官也因治民理政的良窳而除免，如嚴郢於大曆十四年（779）三月九日自河南尹遷京兆尹、兼御史中丞，至建中元年（780）三月即被削去兼官，〔新唐書〕卷一百四十五「本傳」云：

嚴明持法令，疾惡無窮，敢誅殺，盜賊一衰，滅隸官匠丁數百千人，號稱職尹。宰相楊炎請屯田豐州，發關輔民鑿陵陽渠，郢習朔邊病利，即奏……炎不許，渠卒不成，棄之。御史臺請天下斷獄一切待報，唯殺人許償死，論徒者得悉徙邊。郢曰……炎惡異己，陰諷御史張著劾郢匪發民浚渠，使怨歸上。繫金吾。長安中日數千人遮建福門訟郢冤，帝微知之，削兼御史中丞。人知郢得原，皆迎拜。

從上引嚴郢削兼官一事，可以發覺此事關鍵在於楊炎的黨同伐異，誅除異己，嚴郢之削兼御史中丞不但暫時中止即將熾盛的黨爭，也平息民怨，乃是一權宜之策；其次，當御史臺論刑獄時，嚴郢亦得參預意見，可知嚴郢兼御史中丞，亦有出席、議論的資格，足證此時的兼御史臺官並非僅

爲加銜虛職而已。

此外，另如崔元略因事削兼御史大夫事，亦可說明肇因於治績之善否。崔元略於長慶四年（824）七月二十四日自大理卿遷京兆尹，尋兼御史大夫；⁽³⁸⁾至敬宗寶曆元年（825）四月，因其「誤用詔條畿內放錢萬七千貫」，而爲侍御史蕭徹彈奏，遂詔削兼御史大夫。⁽³⁹⁾

還有另一種情況，即京兆尹自兼御史中丞改兼御史大夫，如柳公綽於長慶元年（821）三月十九日自兵部侍郎遷京兆尹、兼御史中丞，至同年十月二十一日復自京兆尹、兼御史大夫遷吏部侍郎，⁽⁴⁰⁾顯然在柳公綽任京兆尹期間，其兼官已有所改變。類似柳公綽的情形，可以劉栖楚的例子清楚地說明。劉栖楚於寶曆元年（825）十一月三日自刑部侍郎遷京兆尹，次年八月方加兼御史大夫，⁽⁴¹⁾李虞仲「加劉栖楚御史大夫制」指出

都輦之下，居百郡之首；尹正之重，俾四方承流。苟或袍鼓不驚，豪右自息；所宜增秩，以稱任能。朝議郎、守京兆尹、上柱國、賜紫金魚袋劉栖楚，長才挺生，利用能斷；徇公忘己，奉上絕私。居多急病之心，動著必聞之美；黃旆之姦不發，赭裾之盜靡載。勤檢馭之方，頗精風化之本。繫爾才術，副予簡求。朕所以惜其聲猷，難議遷擢；尙留劇任，更俟當官。就加青綬之秩，重委黃圖之理。宜崇望實，無替威名。可以本官兼御史大夫，餘如故。⁽⁴²⁾

另如孔戢於文宗大和二年（828）自右散騎常侍遷京兆尹，「時累月亢旱，深軫聖情。戢自禱雨於曲池，是夕大雨。文宗甚悅，詔兼御史大夫。」⁽⁴³⁾皆因善政，或爲君主所寵信而加銜，足見京兆尹之兼御史臺官，主要關係於其理政的良否，並非無迹可尋，或任意加兼。

其次，京兆尹兼官職以尙書省爲另一主要機構，而就尙書省尙書、丞郎兼京兆尹而觀，不外吏、戶、刑、工部，且多已就任方兼京兆尹；此中兼刑部尙書、侍郎，似有肅政京畿，以長於刑名者治理京畿之意，而兼戶部官職恐有掌握關中財政中心之用。同時這種兼官職，並未減低其中任一官職的權責，如初唐時期劉德威自大理卿遷刑部尙書、兼雍州別駕，貞觀十七年（643）曾「馳驛往齊州推齊王祐」。⁽⁴⁴⁾

至於京兆尹兼九寺卿者，多集於初唐，乃因其爲承辦中央政府庶務工作，兼京兆尹較易推動。這種情況表現在衛尉、司農、大理卿等之上，尤爲明顯，如張暉爲首任京兆尹，〔舊唐書〕卷一百六「本傳」載：

先天元年，……太平公主有異謀，廣樹朋黨，暉於僕射劉幽求請先爲備。太平聞之，白於睿宗，乃流暉於嶺南峯州。……及太平之敗，……暉爲大理卿，……逾月又加權兼雍州長史。其年十二月，改元開元，以雍州爲京兆府，長史爲尹。暉首遷京兆尹，入侍宴私，出主都政，以爲榮寵之極。

張暉顯然在政爭結束之後肅清政刑，並負責京畿治安，而有防範太平餘黨之意。或如李實兼司農卿、工部尙書，〔舊唐書〕卷一百三十五「本傳」云：

貞元十九年，爲京兆尹，（司農）卿及兼官（工部尙書）如故。尋封嗣道王。自爲京兆尹，恃寵強愎，不顧文法，人皆側目。二十年春夏旱，關中大歉，實爲政猛暴，方務聚斂進奉，以固恩顧，百姓所訴，一不介意。

不但以身兼數官表示備受寵信，而且這三職中又以京兆尹最爲天下所側目，於此可見。

四、遷出官

機 構	職官名	初唐	中唐	晚唐	小計	合計
中書門下	宰相	4	4	2	10	10
門下省	散騎常侍	0	4	6	10	11
	給事中	0	0	1	1	
中書省	中書侍郎	1	0	0	1	2
	中書舍人	0	0	1	1	
尚書省	尚書左右丞	3	0	3	6	41
	六部尚書	6	3	4	13	
	六部侍郎	2	8	12	22	
御史臺	御史大夫	0	2	0	2	2
九寺	卿	0	3	4	7	7
秘書省	秘書監	0	0	1	1	1
國子監	國子祭酒	0	0	1	1	1
中央武官屬	左武衛將軍	0	1	0	1	2
	左千牛將軍	0	1	0	1	
東宮官屬	太子太傅	0	1	0	1	9
	太子少師	0	0	1	1	
	太子庶子	0	1	1	2	
	太子詹事	0	2	0	2	
	太子賓客	0	3	0	3	
親王府	王傅	0	1	1	2	2
節度官屬	節度使	0	5	15	20	34
	觀察使	0	1	12	13	
	宣慰使	0	0	1	1	
地方官屬	尹	1	1	1	3	

	州都督	1	0	0	1	30
	州刺史	1	8	3	12	
	州長史	1	2	0	3	
	州司馬	1	3	3	7	
	州司戶	0	0	2	2	
	縣丞	0	1	0	1	
	縣尉	0	0	1	1	
被誅卒任丁憂		3	3	8	14	14
合 計		24	58	84	166	166

在全部可考一九九任京兆尹中，可知其遷出官者共一六六任，亦達全部的 83.42%。自上表得以觀察以下幾個較為明顯的現象：

第一，京兆尹主要遷出官機構為尚書省、節度官屬與地方官屬，三者的比例分別是 24.64%、20.48%、18.07%，合計 63.19%，約佔三分之二左右，當是以此為主。

第二，遷出尚書省者於唐代的比例，初唐時期高達 45.83%，中唐驟降為 18.97%，晚唐稍微回升至 22.62%；顯然京兆尹於初唐期的主要遷出途徑為尚書省職官。

第三，就節度官屬而言，遷出者於中唐時所佔比例並不高，僅及 10.34%，且集於玄宗晚年、肅宗與代宗階段，即安史之亂期間；但到晚唐已成常規，亦達 33.33%，成為最主要的遷出途徑。

第四，京兆尹遷出地方官屬，初唐時為 20.83%，中唐升至 25.86%，當與職官遷轉正常有關，而晚唐降至 11.86%，乃因地方權力盡為節度觀察使所奪，故遷出者如非任職中央，則多屬節度。

第五，就遷出途徑而言，初唐為十種，中、晚唐各為十九種，與初唐比較起來，差距頗大，亦較為寬廣。

第六，在遷出門下省與東宮官屬方面，初唐時殆無，顯見乃是中唐才形成的一新途徑，亦可說明門下省地位的轉變。

第七，自中央官與地方官比較，整個唐代節度、地方官比例為 38.55%，超過三分之一以上；但以三個時期的演變來看，初唐比例為 20.83%，中唐升為 36.21%，晚唐時高達 45.24%，幾占一半。從中央與地方官比例的愈趨接近，反映唐代「重內官、輕外職」的觀念隨時代改變而愈形減退，同時也可說明晚唐時期地方勢盛、中央力絀的一端。

第八，遷出拜相的比例雖不高，但不乏其人，且多處於政治極端變動時期，並非常軌的遷出途徑。

第九，被誅、卒任與丁憂罷京兆尹者也佔有相當比例，尤其是晚唐時期更高達八人，而有六人卒於任內，極為特殊。

第十，上述各個現象，除了第八、九點外，其餘約略和京兆尹的遷入官諸現象相近，說明了唐代

京兆尹的遷轉途徑是有迹可尋的常軌運作過程。

首先說明被誅、卒任的情形。除了三人於京兆尹任內丁憂罷職外，在初、中、晚唐三個時期各有一人於任內被誅，分別是初唐李晉、中唐王鉞與晚唐羅立言三人。李晉係睿宗時太平公主黨羽，於玄宗先天革命中被誅，⁽⁴⁵⁾乃參與政治革命所致；晚唐時期的羅立言亦因涉及文宗大和九年（835）的甘露之變，事敗為宦官所誅。⁽⁴⁶⁾玄宗時的王鉞，則因「玄宗以為鉞有富國之術，利於王用，益厚待之」，遂從戶部侍郎兼御史中丞，天寶九載（750）復兼京兆尹，帶二十餘使；其被誅經過，〔舊唐書〕卷一百五「本傳」載：

（天寶）十一載四月，（王）鉞與故鴻臚少卿邢璣子絳情密累年，絳潛構逆謀，引右龍武軍萬騎刻取十一月殺龍武將軍，因燒諸城門及市，分數百人殺楊國忠及右相李林甫、左相陳希烈等。先期二日事發，玄宗臨朝，召鉞，上於玉案前過狀於鉞。鉞好奕棋，絳善棋，鉞因鉞與之交故，至是意鉞在絳處金城坊，密召之，日晏，始令捕賊官捕之。……玄宗以鉞委任深，必不與之知情，鉞與鉞別生，嫉其富貴，故欲陷鉞耳，遂特原鉞不問，然意欲鉞請罪之。上密令（楊）國忠諷之，……及（十二）日暮，奏之。鉞決杖死於朝堂，賜鉞自盡於三衛廚。

此次王鉞與邢絳謀逆事，王鉞原可脫罪，但因涉及楊國忠與李林甫之爭，遂藉陳希烈而誅之。此三京兆尹被誅皆涉及激烈的政治衝突，無關其職。

至於卒於京兆尹任內八人，晚唐時有六人，就中憲宗元和初年連續三人，極為特殊。憲宗元和元年，自二月四日起至同年八月二十三日，短短六個半月左右，鄭雲逵、韋武與董叔經三人相繼卒任。此三人年齡不得而知，但從中唐時期任京兆尹者平均年齡五四歲，卒年六六歲左右（詳下節）推測，三人或許就任時均已稍長；而德宗末年與元和初年，政局變動較大，恐與為安定政局而以年長資深者任京兆尹有關。此一推測或可從韋武卒任見其一斑：

今上（憲宗）徵為兵部侍郎，……俄以豐陵復土之重，輟公嚴護，拜京兆尹、兼御史大夫，充山陵橋道等使，公哀敬盡瘁，殆忘寢食，凡七十日，遇暴疾薨于長安通化里之私第。⁽⁴⁷⁾

順宗豐陵於七月完成而葬，⁽⁴⁸⁾而這段修陵期間先後三京兆尹卒任，或因勞累過重所致。

至於京兆尹遷出為宰相者十人，分別是初唐劉祥道、楊再思、崔日用與張說四人，中唐源乾曜、裴耀卿、李峴與劉晏四人，晚唐賈餗與孫偃二人。此中原已拜相再兼京兆尹者為楊再思；已有兼領其他官職者為劉祥道兼司刑太常伯、崔日用兼兵部侍郎、張說兼中書侍郎、李峴與賈餗兼御史大夫、劉晏兼御史大夫、戶部侍郎、充鹽鐵使；純自京兆尹而拜相僅源乾曜、裴耀卿與孫偃三人。此外，自京兆尹拜相從代宗即位召回劉晏，至昭宗乾寧三年（896）孫偃止，一百三十年左右僅賈餗而已。賈餗的拜相，事涉牛李黨爭與甘露之變，〔舊唐書〕卷一百六十九「本傳」載：

尋以本官知制誥，遷庫部郎中，充職。（長慶）四年，為張又新所構，出為常州刺史。……（大和）七年五月，轉兵部侍郎。八年十一月，遷京兆尹、兼御史大夫。九年四月，檢校禮部尚書、潤州刺史、浙西觀察使。制出未行，拜中書侍郎、同平章事。……其年十一月，李訓事發，……與王涯等皆族誅。

賈餗於穆宗時遭牛黨所排擠，至文宗初年投入李黨陣營，而在李德裕等為李訓、鄭注排擠出朝時，投入李、鄭集團，因而發生自京兆尹外放浙西觀察使之際，「制出未行」而拜相，遂牽入甘露

之變事件。因此，〔舊唐書〕「本傳」說他「雖中立自持，然不能以身犯難，排斥姦讎，脂韋其間，遂至覆族。」恐非實論；〔資治通鑑〕云：

初，京兆尹河南賈餗，性褊躁輕率，與李德裕有隙，而善於李宗閔、鄭注。……求出，詔以爲浙西觀察使；戊戌，以餗爲中書侍郎、同平章事。(49)

或較能描述賈餗之拜相與黨爭之間的關係。另外，源乾曜原係罷相任京兆尹，三年後再入相，較不足爲奇；(50)而孫偃因史料所限，無法論斷。

真正自京兆尹任內，因治績而擢爲宰相者僅裴耀卿一人，〔舊唐書〕卷九十八「本傳」載：
 (耀卿)又歷宣、冀二州刺史，皆有善政，入爲戶部侍郎。……其冬，遷京兆尹。明年秋，霖雨害稼，京城穀貴。上將幸東都，獨召耀卿問救人之術，耀卿對曰……上深然其言。尋拜黃門侍郎、同中書門下平章事。

裴耀卿的拜相顯然與其歷任官職的優異表現，以及應對、識見爲玄宗賞識，息息相關。同時，亦可說明自京兆尹的拜相事屬特殊，並非其遷出官的正常途徑。

五、任 期

唐代職官體系原則上是一年一考，是爲「小考」，經考滿後才予昇遷、轉任，是爲「大考」，亦有任期的意味；尤其在高宗總章二年(669)和玄宗開元十八年(730)的改革後，年資成爲官僚昇遷的主要標準之一。(51)但是依考績與年資作爲昇遷標準的規定，常受到政局變動諸如特垂君主眷顧、政治衝突等因素的影響而大打折扣，許多官僚遷轉常逸出考課、年資或任期的限制之外，即以牛李黨爭時期的劉栖楚爲例，〔舊唐書〕卷一百五十四「本傳」載其官歷遷轉是：鄧揅—拾遺—起居郎—諫議大夫—刑部侍郎—京兆尹—桂州觀察使，雖然遷轉不多，但其昇遷之快速與超擢，可見一斑。

因此，自唐代京兆尹任期長短久暫的分析，或可瞭解政治制度的實際運作。現將唐代京兆尹任罷時間可考者，列出其在任時間：

任 期	初唐	中唐	晚唐	合計
一年以下	12	39	62	113
一年至三年	5	15	12	32
三年以上	2	5	4	11
合 計	19	59	78	156

自上表可以發現唐代京兆尹的在任時間，一年以下者佔絕大多數，達72.44%，當是以此爲主；而初唐時期爲63.16%，中唐時微升至66.1%，晚唐更高達79.49%，比例逐漸上升。

至於任期三年以上者有十一任，其比例爲7.05%，分別是初唐劉德威與竇懷貞，中唐源乾曜、孟溫、蕭炅、李充與韓臯，晚唐溫璋、韓建兩任與鄭元規。

京兆尹既多一年內即遷出，這些久任者自有其因素，如初唐時期的竇懷貞，〔舊唐書〕卷一百八十三「外戚竇德明附竇懷貞傳」云：

神龍二年，累遷御史大夫，兼檢校雍州長史。時韋庶人及安樂公主等干預朝政，懷貞每詔

順委曲取容，改名從一，以避后父之諱。……宦官用權，懷貞尤所敬畏，每視事聽訟，見無鬚者，誤以接之。

懷貞不但對韋后、安樂公主等諂順，甚至韋氏黨羽宗楚客者亦在其取媚之列。⁽⁶²⁾同時，連韋氏政敵太平公主也是懷貞所不敢得罪的對象，〔舊唐書〕卷九十八「李元紘傳」載：

元紘少謹厚，初爲涇州司兵，累遷雍州司戶。時太平公主與僧寺爭碾磑，公主方承恩用事，百司皆希其旨意，元紘遂斷還僧寺。竇懷貞爲雍州長史，大懼太平勢，促令元紘改斷，元紘大署判後曰：「南山或可改移，此判終無搖動」。竟執正不燒，懷貞不能奪之。

就中竇懷貞阿附取容的面貌，呼之欲出。可知懷貞於韋氏勢盛時偏於韋黨，太平勢強又倒向太平，依違其間，實不易致。懷貞甚至納「韋后乳媪王（氏），所謂莒國夫人者，故奏婢也。懷貞納之不辭。……世爲媪壻爲阿翁，懷貞每謁見奏請，輒自署「皇后阿翁」，而人或謂爲「國翁」，軒然不慙，以取媚於后。」⁽⁶³⁾因而當隆基起兵誅韋氏時，懷貞亦能手斬其妻首以獻，而僅及於貶濠州司馬，未罹殺身之禍，其後尤能東山再起而拜相。綜此可知竇懷貞得在京兆尹任內三年七月，實其來有自。

玄宗朝久任者爲源乾曜、孟溫與蕭瑒，中蕭瑒爲李林甫黨羽；⁽⁶⁴⁾源乾曜則罷相後任京兆尹，時玄宗開元之初，銳於爲政，頗重吏治，〔舊唐書〕卷九十八「本傳」載：

時行幸東都，以乾曜爲京兆尹，仍京師留守。乾曜政存寬簡，不殿而理。嘗有仗內白鷹，因縱遂失所在，上令京兆切捕之。俄於野外獲之，其鷹掛於叢棘而死，官吏懼得罪，相顧失色。乾曜徐曰：「事有邂逅，死亦常理，主上仁明，當不以此置罪。必其獲戾，吾自當之，不須懼也。」遂入自請失旨之罪，上一切不問之，衆咸伏乾曜臨事不懼，而能引過在己也。在京兆尹三年，政令如一。

是故得以久任善政而再度拜相。

德宗朝李充亦久任而後遭貶，〔舊唐書〕卷一百四十九「奚陟傳」云：

裴延齡惡京兆尹李充有能政，專意陷害之，誣奏充結陸贄，數厚賂遺金帛，充既貶官，又奏充比者妄破用京兆府錢穀至多，請令比部勾覆，以比部郎中崔元翰陷充，怨惡贄也。

從崔元翰曲附裴延齡而陷李充一事看，當時奚陟任刑部侍郎，親自閱京兆府案，結果並無此事。⁽⁶⁵⁾姑不論李充是否參與裴延齡與陸贄的政爭，其有能政而久任則屬實。

德宗在位後期，頗用錢穀聚斂之臣，韓臯即以善斂而得久任，〔舊唐書〕卷一百二十九「韓滉附韓臯傳」載：

改京兆尹，奏鄭鋒爲倉曹，專掌錢穀。鋒苛刻剝下爲事，人皆咨怨。又勸臯搜索府中雜錢，折糶百姓粟麥等三十萬石進奉，以圖恩寵。臯納其計，尋奏鋒爲興平縣令。及貞元十四年，春夏大旱，粟麥枯槁，畿內百姓，累經臯陳訴，以府中倉庫虛竭，憂迫惶惑，不敢實奏，……百姓遮道投狀，內官繼以事上聞。

但是德宗僅以「奏報不實，處理無方」，將韓臯貶爲撫州司馬，可知其久任主要還是因聚斂迎上之故。

至於晚唐時期韓建兩任與鄭元規殆與昭、哀兩君主受制方鎮有關；溫璋則於懿宗朝打擊豪強不遺餘力，「豪右一皆屏迹」，⁽⁶⁶⁾其久任與肅清地方的治績，息息相關。

唐代京兆尹的在任期間短暫，一方面是京畿難以完全掌握，另一方面又要應付中央交辦的各項工作，可說務殷職劇，並非所有任者都能應付裕如。此外，還可以從任京兆尹者的年齡加以觀察。現依兩唐書「列傳」、碑誌狀等明載其卒齡者，復依其任尹時間，以下表列出：

時代	姓名	任尹時齡	任尹年代	卒時年齡	卒時年代	差距
初唐	劉德威	57	638	71	652	14
	盧承慶	56	649	76	669	20
	唐 臨	51	660	60	659	9
	盧承慶	72	665	76	669	4
	蘇良嗣	78	682	85	690	8
	崔日用	38	710	50	722	12
	張 說	44	710	64	730	20
	宋 璟	52	712	75	737	23
	崔日用	41	713	50	722	9
	張 障	60	713	93	746	33
中唐	宋 璟	54	714	75	736	22
	崔日知	57	715	70	728	13
	李尚儼	61	729	75	740	14
	裴袖先	75	730	86	741	11
	裴耀卿	53	732	63	742	10
	鮮于仲通	59	752	62	755	4
	李 峴	45	753	58	766	13
	李 峴	49	757	58	766	9
	劉 晏	46	760	66	780	20
	劉 晏	46	760	66	780	20
	劉 晏	47	762	66	780	19
	李 勉	46	762	72	788	26
	嚴 武	38	763	40	765	2
	第五琦	53	763	70	780	17
	李 勉	51	767	72	788	21
	賈 至	53	770	55	772	2
	杜 濟	51	770	58	777	7
	李國貞	45	759	48	762	3
鮑 防	65	786	69	790	4	
崔 縱	54	783	62	791	8	

	鄭叔則	65	786	65	786	0
	薛珏	71	789	74	792	3
	韓迴	54	785	63	794	9
	李齊運	60	784	72	796	12
	于頎	48	784	74	799	26
	王翊	50	782	70	802	20
	顧少連	60	800	63	803	3
	吳湊	69	798	71	800	2
	韓臯	52	795	79	822	27
晚唐	楊於陵	55	807	78	830	23
	郗士美	52	807	64	819	12
	許孟容	67	809	76	818	9
	王播	52	810	72	830	20
	李遜	58	818	63	823	5
	韓愈	56	823	57	824	1
	胡証	67	824	71	828	4
	鄭覃	53	825	70	842	17
	羅珣	67	802	74	809	7
	杜悰	48	831	80	863	32
	張仲方	70	835	72	837	2
	高元裕	67	841	76	850	9
	盧商	55	843	71	859	16
	韋正貫	62	846	68	851	6
	孫景商	60	852	64	856	4
	張揚	62	875	64	877	2
	章夏卿	59	801	64	806	5
	裴樞	50	890	65	905	15

總計初唐有十任、中唐有二九任，晚唐一八任，合計五七任，其任京兆尹時平均年齡為五六歲，至於平均卒齡為六八歲左右，亦即任京兆尹者，一般情況在十二年中當可能尚在宦途中遷轉。同時，也可發現代宗時期任京兆尹者多於五十歲以下；而且玄宗、德宗時期較為規律，顯示中唐時遷轉較循常軌。

從京兆尹在任期間與年齡的觀察，在任三年以上者大都有其原因存在。理論上，地方官治績良好應予升遷，或予久任，歷代處理方式不同，如漢代因職官等級少，故郡守善政多久任，入朝

則遷九卿，這種現象常爲唐人所稱道，轉而抨擊唐代地方官的遷轉過程，如武則天天授二年（691）劉知幾上疏批評云：

然則歷觀兩漢已降，迄乎魏晉之年，方伯岳牧，臨州按郡，或十年不易，或一紀仍留，莫不盡其化民之方，責以治人之術，既而日就月將，風加草靡，故能化行千里，恩漸百城。今之牧伯，有異於是，倏來忽往，蓬轉萍流，近則累月仍遷，遠則踰年必徙。將廳事爲逆旅，以下車爲傳舍，……既懷苟且之謀，何假循良之績，用使百城千邑，無聞廉杜之歌，萬國九州，罕見趙張之政。(57)

事實上，不只劉知幾建議「刺史非三歲已上，不可遷官」，中宗景龍二年（708）盧懷慎也批評「比來州牧上佐等，在任者多一二年，少者三五月，遂即遷政，不論課最」，而建議「未經四考已上，不許遷除」；(58)雖然代宗寶應二年（763）曾下敕規定以三年爲標準，德宗貞元元年（785）再度重申，(59)但就京兆尹而言，在任不及一年者仍居多數。更甚者如白居易「贈友」詩云：京師四方則，王化之本根；長吏久於政，然後風教敦。如何尹京者，選次不遑巡；請君屈指數，十年十五人。(60)

自此可以想見京兆尹的遷轉頻仍，任期短暫，而且愈至晚唐，其任期益趨短促，遷轉益趨頻繁，亦可說明晚唐職官制度失序的一端。

六、結 論

總結以上對京兆尹遷轉的分析，大體上可以歸納出以下五個現象：第一，不論是遷入或遷出官，皆以尚書省六部尚書、侍郎爲主，顯示京兆尹與其互轉，而作爲內外官的歷練；第二，晚唐方鎮勢盛，京兆尹與節度使互轉亦多，此與唐代地方政治制度的演變息息相關；第三，京兆尹因治理京畿，常兼御史臺官以發揮「肅清邦畿」的功效；第四，京兆尹的任期多不及一年，遷轉頻仍，且就其年齡觀察，係以京兆尹作爲宦途的中介站，而非政治生涯的終點；第五，至於部份遷轉特例與久任者，大抵與政局的變動密不可分，亦可說明京兆尹兼具地方官與中央官雙重角色的特徵。

正如〔太平廣記〕卷八二「呂翁」條與卷二八一「櫻桃青衣」條所載唐人夢想，或可說明唐人政治歷程的理想遷轉，茲錄「呂翁」條所述「黃粱一夢」如下：

明年，舉進士，登甲科。解褐授校書郎。應制舉，授渭南縣尉，遷監察御史、起居舍人，爲制誥，三年卽真。出典同州，尋轉陝州。……遷汴州、嶺南道採訪使，入京爲京兆尹。……遂除生御史中丞、河西、隴右節度使，……轉御史大夫、吏部侍郎。……除戶部尚書，未幾，拜中書侍郎、同中書門下平章事。

如此的官歷遷轉，無疑的以京兆尹作爲內外歷練、地方官轉入中央官的中介站。

註 釋

- (1) 唐人重內官、輕外職的觀念，如長安四年三月，李嶠云：「竊見朝廷物議，莫不重內官，輕外職，每除牧伯，皆再三披訴。比來所遣外任，多是貶累之人。」或如景雲元年寧原悌上疏云：「然而世所重於京都，時見輕於州縣」。類似記載頗多，茲不贅舉；上引俱見〔唐會要〕（世界書局，台北，民六十三年）卷六十八，「刺史上」條，頁1198—1200。
- (2) 洪邁，〔容齋五筆〕（台灣商務印書館，台北，四部叢刊本）卷一，「唐宰相不歷守令」條，頁12197。

- (3) 參見〔新唐書〕(鼎文書局新校標點本,台北,民六十五年)卷七十五下,「宰相世系表五下」,頁3465。
- (4) 〔舊唐書〕(鼎文書局新校標點本,台北,民六十五年)卷四十四,「職官志三」,頁1915—6。
- (5) 參見〔唐會要〕卷六十七,「京兆尹」條,頁1186。
- (6) 〔舊唐書〕卷四十四,「職官志三」,頁1919。
- (7) 拙稿,「唐代京兆尹年表暨輯考」(未刊)。
- (8) 分三期的理由,除每期約百年左右,尚有三點:第一,初期猶稱雍州,且中央政治革命頻繁,京兆尹參預頗多,可謂此期特色;第二,中期除安史之亂外,自玄宗至德宗,對地方吏治的重視程度較高,京兆尹的發展最稱穩定,可謂此期特色;第三,晚期宦官、朋黨政爭激烈,連帶京兆尹遷轉、運作變化最大,職權尤無法伸張,可謂此期特色。但是,分期僅為便於觀察京兆尹遷轉途徑之變化,並非截然可以斷限而毫不相涉。
- (9) 參見孫國棟,〔唐代中央重要文官遷轉途徑研究〕(新亞研究所,香港,一九七八年),頁69。
- (10) 孫國棟,前揭書,頁90。
- (11) 如孫氏略馬載自吏部侍郎遷雍州長史,前揭書,頁484—9;馬載官歷參見〔舊唐書〕卷七十四,「馬周傳」,頁2619。
- (12) 權德輿,「唐故太中大夫守國子祭酒潁川縣開國男賜紫金魚袋贈戶部尚書韓公行狀」,〔權載之文集〕(台灣商務印書館,台北,四部叢刊本)卷二十,頁121。
- (13) 參見穆員,「鮑防碑」,〔全唐文〕(大通書局景印,台北,民六十八年)卷七百八十三,頁10339。〔舊唐書〕卷十七下,「文宗紀」,頁539—42。
- (14) 參見嚴耕望,〔唐僕尚丞郎表〕(中央研究院歷史語言研究所專刊,台北,民四十五年)卷一,「述制」,頁1—19。
- (15) 參見孫國棟,前揭書,頁143—61。
- (16) 〔舊唐書〕卷一百二十六,「本傳」,頁3566。
- (17) 王維,「大唐吳興郡別駕前荊州大都督府長史山南東道採訪使京兆尹韓公墓誌銘」,〔全唐文〕卷三百二十七,頁4194—5。
- (18) 〔新唐書〕卷一百四十一,「魏少遊傳」,頁4657。
- (19) 參見拙稿,「唐代京兆尹與政局」(未刊)。
- (20) 參見王壽南,〔唐代藩鎮與中央關係之研究〕(大化書局景印,台北,民六十七年),有極詳盡的分析。
- (21) 〔舊唐書〕卷一百三十一,「李勉傳」,頁3634。
- (22) 〔舊唐書〕卷一百五十七,「郗士美傳」,頁4146。
- (23) 〔新唐書〕卷二百一,「文藝上元萬頃附元義方傳」,頁5745。
- (24) 參見濱口重國,〔秦漢隋唐史の研究〕(東京大學出版會,東京,一九六六年),頁889。
- (25) 參見余英時,「君尊臣卑下的君權與相權」,收入氏著,〔歷史與思想〕(聯經出版事業公司,台北,民六十五年),頁57。
- (26) 參見孫國棟,前揭書,頁35。

- (27) 同上，頁22。
- (28) 同上，頁29。
- (29) 改善原因大致有二，一為節度使等地位的確立與地方勢盛，一為玄宗以後屢次下詔三省侍郎、郎中、員外郎等與地方官互轉，後者可參見〔唐會要〕卷六十八，「刺史上」條，頁1200—1。
- (30) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷六十，「宗室長平王叔良附晉傳」，頁2346。
- (31) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷六十，「宗室河間王孝恭附晦傳」，頁2250；〔舊唐書〕卷一百一十二，「李恒附李峴傳」，頁3343；〔舊唐書〕卷一百八十三，「外戚吳湊傳」，頁4748—9。
- (32) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷一百八，「崔渙附崔縱傳」，頁3281。
- (33) 這種使職極多，有館驛使、木炭使、喪葬監護使、克渠堰使、置頓使、奉山陵使、會盟使、禮會使、修城堰使、犒師使、壇場使等，參見拙稿，「唐代京兆尹年表暨輯考」。
- (34) 參見孫國棟，前揭書，頁247。
- (35) 同前，頁135—9。
- (36) 參見劉健明，「論韓愈和李紳」，〔大陸雜誌〕第七十卷第六期（民七十四年六月），頁256。
- (37) 同前。
- (38) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷一百六十三，「崔元略傳」，頁4260—1。
- (39) 參見〔冊府元龜〕（大化書局景印，台北，民七十三年）卷五二〇，憲官部「彈劾三下」，頁2738。
- (40) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷十六，「穆宗紀」，頁487—92。
- (41) 劉栖楚兼御史臺官，一載為御史中丞，一載為御史大夫，今從大夫，參見拙稿，「唐代京兆尹年表暨輯考」。
- (42) 李虞仲，「加劉栖楚御史大夫制」，〔全唐文〕卷六百九十三，頁9014。
- (43) 〔舊唐書〕卷一百五十四，「孔巢父附孔戡傳」，頁4099。
- (44) 〔舊唐書〕卷七十七，「劉德威傳」，頁2676—7。
- (45) 同(30)。
- (46) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷一百六十九「羅立言傳」，頁4410。
- (47) 呂溫，「唐故銀青光祿大夫京兆尹兼御史大夫上柱國贈吏部尚書京兆韋公神道碑銘」，〔呂衡州集〕（粵雅堂叢書第二十集，華聯出版社景印，台北，民五十四年）卷六，頁9638—40。
- (48) 〔舊唐書〕卷十四，「憲宗紀上」，頁418。
- (49) 〔資治通鑑〕（世界書局新校標點本，台北，民六十三年）卷二百四十五，「文宗大和九年」條，頁7902—3。
- (50) 參見〔資治通鑑〕卷二百一十一，「玄宗開元四年」條，頁6723—4。
- (51) 參見黃清連，「唐代的文官考課制度」，〔中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊〕第五十五本第一分（民七十三年），頁139—91。
- (52) 〔新唐書〕卷一百九，「竇懷貞傳」，頁4100。

- (53) 同上。
- (54) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷一百六，「楊國忠傳」，頁3243。
- (55) 參見〔舊唐書〕卷一百四十九，「奚陟傳」，頁4022 — 3。
- (56) 〔舊唐書〕卷一百六十五，「溫造附溫璋傳」，頁4318。
- (57) 〔唐會要〕卷六十八，「刺史上」條，頁1198。
- (58) 同上，頁1199。
- (59) 〔唐會要〕卷六十九，「都督刺史已下雜錄」，頁1213 — 4。
- (60) 白居易，「贈友」，〔白居易集〕（里仁書局景印，台北，民六十九年）卷二，頁36。

明鄭時期台灣海商經營日暹貿易之研究—以胡秋官、藍澤兩艘商船為例

朱德蘭

一、前言

關於明清動亂時期，鄭氏對外貿易關係之研究，岩生成一、浦廉一、南棖、賴永祥、山脇謙二郎、林子侯、魏能濤、鄭瑞明等諸位先生之論著^①，雖由不同角度作過若干探討，但因涉及明鄭海商經營海外貿易具體實況之史料稀少，故搜集中外各類文獻，列舉事例解明貿易船實際營運之詳情，是極為必要之課題。

本文即欲以十七世紀日本官方記錄之一篇海事報告，與明鄭降清後，福建海防官查報一艘台灣洋船之口供作根據，以胡球官、藍澤兩隻商船為例，擬就台灣海商從事日本、暹羅（今泰國）之貿易過程，船商組織，貿易品等項目進行探索。

二、史料部份

(一) 胡秋官商船例 (標點依照原文)

A「寬文十一年辛亥年（註：清康熙十年、一六七一年）正月朔日、唐船^②入津之節，唐人船頭より差出目錄，東寧（即台灣^③）船主胡球官，有課（客？）船一隻，于捌月初八日開駕，至正月初一日到長崎，今將姓名貨物開具，于後東寧船主胡秋官，造報本船公司及搭客貨物冊。

公司貨物開具

元與號網中綱伍拾疋 小綱貳細計貳百貳拾叁疋 大素綾壹箱計肆拾捌疋 湖絲伍籠計叁百叁拾陸疋 白糖捌百籠計重捌萬伍千疋 漳烟壹籠

各客附搭貨物開具，搭客許進壹可（許進可）貨物

承豐號網壹拾伍件 內小綱壹百伍拾陸疋，輕紬壹千肆百伍拾貳疋，重紬陸百伍拾伍疋，大萬字紬叁拾陸疋，素紬貳拾玖疋，中綱捌疋，藍號網陸件 內白頭北布肆百疋，本色永春玖拾疋

夥長舵工及各目梢貨物約略開具

湖絲貳籠零貳件計貳百壹拾疋 中綱小綱曠紬毡條等貨計拾餘件 內中綱壹百貳疋，小綱壹百疋，曠紬叁拾疋，毡條捌拾領。

本船軍器開具

斬馬刀貳拾柄（唐長刀二十振） 腰刀壹拾玖柄（唐刀十九腰） 鏃壹拾玖枝（ほこ十九本） 大槓陸門（石火矢六挺） 小槓壹拾肆門（棒火矢十四挺） 大槓子肆拾粒（石火矢玉四十） 小槓子伍拾粒（棒火矢玉五十） 鐵甲叁拾領（唐具足三十領） 鐵鑿貳拾領（同甲二十劔） 火藥肆拾桶（石火矢藥）

東寧船主胡球官造報本船目梢及搭客冊

船主胡球官三十三歲媽祖，」財副陳新官三十歲關帝，」夥長四十歲聖人，」曾夥長五十歲關帝，」舵工五十歲媽帝④

以上共伍拾陸人

船上通共伍拾陸人，其內並無曾載南蠻和尚進天主教之人并日本人等，亦不曾去販呂宋雞籠南蠻廟等處而來，亦不曾收五島薩摩別畧港門，洋中不作非為犯等情，如有前情，任憑王上治罪，通船情願立字是實。

寬文十一年正月初一日 船主胡球官
夥長陳 中
舵工陳 瑞

御奉行所樣

」⑤

B、「同年二月廿一日，唐船歸帆之節，船頭より書上俟帳面

第一番東寧船主胡球官有鳥船一隻，裝載貨物，于本年正月初一日，收入長崎，其貨物賣完將回寧，理合報明，本船目稍及搭客五十六人蒙准搭，第二番普陀船去客一人，原在五十五人，但開駕之日，船中不敢載日本人并本地舊唐人，除准帶小判金及元通錢銀器之外，不敢私帶丁銀并軍器，亦不敢販呂宋雞籠進南蠻廟等處，洋中不敢為非犯法等情，來時不敢載南蠻和尚并進南蠻廟之人及犯法貨物假裝藥材，如品（呂）宋鹿皮或信石斑繼、莞菁等毒藥，更不敢收日本別處港門，再不敢放唐人上山，船直到長崎，任憑王上擇定主家，如有犯法等情，通船人衆情願甘罪，船主家花押為證，所報是實。

遵將通船人姓名逐一造報計開 船主胡球官年三十三歲 財副陳新官年三十歲 夥長陳中年四十歲 曾夥長年五十歲 舵工陳瑞年五十歲 副舵年六十五歲 客人姓名計開 翁士鸞年三十歲蒙准搭第二番普陀船唐（唐船）生理，許進可年三十五歲 已上通船計五十六人，內一人過船，除外實五十五人

寬文十一年二月廿一日第一番東寧船主胡秋官判

宿主下町蘆塚長左衛門印」⑥

(二) 藍澤商船例

「（康熙二十三年，一六八四年七月十九日）據石滯司巡檢沈寅俊報稱：本月（七月）十五日午時，有鳥船一隻泊活嶼，進港詢問，據稱劉國軒下船隻，由暹羅國回廈投誠…管船官藍澤供稱：小的此船係偽武平侯劉國軒的船。於去年（一六八三年）正月間，在台灣製造，撥配白糖二千零五十擔，冰糖一百五十擔，去年閏六月初一日就台灣開船。閏六月二十三日到日本港發賣白糖，冰糖，共版銀一萬三千五百二十兩，除給目梢辛勞糧蔬銀三千五百一十八兩五錢外，尚存版銀一萬零一兩（缺三字，疑是“零五錢”）。此銀就日本買紅銅、金版、茶砵，京酒、柿菓、栗子、醬瓜，鼓、油蜚、鰻魚、鮭魚等項。隨於去年十二月二十五日，在日本開駕。今年二月二十二日到暹羅，將前項貨物發賣。除存紅銅一百六十箱，其餘共賣過紋銀八千三百一十二兩七錢七分五釐。除暹羅發給目梢辛勞糧蔬銀一千五百二十九兩二錢五分五釐，實存銀六千七百八十三兩五錢二分。小的在暹羅奉本爵主諭吊，將船駕回廈門。隨將原銀置船（疑是“鉛”字）錫、蘇木、胡椒、象牙等項，並目梢貨物，現開在冊。於今年（一六八四年）六月初一日，就暹羅開駕。此七月十四日（缺三字，疑是“泊活嶼”）外，有把口哨船盤問，令小的將船駕入內（缺一字，疑是“港”）

，(缺一字，疑是“於”*)十五日灣泊廈門港內。小的船上目(梢)共八十三人，花名並礮火，軍器等項，現開在冊。其船號為東本鳥。船長七丈七尺，濶二丈四尺餘，深一丈五寸。船頭至船尾，大小共二十五艙。……計冊開公司貨物鉛二萬六千四百八十斤，蘇木一十二萬斤、錫四萬斤、上安息四百五十斤、下安息四(缺一字)斤、胡椒一(缺一字)三百斤、荳蔻五十斤，二枝擔象(缺二字，疑是“牙重”)一(缺四字)斤，三枝擔象牙重三百九十六斤、七枝擔象牙重一百七十二斤、官燕窩二籠重八十八斤、半燕窩一籠重三十九斤半燕窩二籠重一百一十四斤、烏燕窩二籠重一百二十六斤、本色象布八十疋即粗西洋布，白象布七十六疋即粗西洋布，尚存銀二兩五錢九分，載回紅銅一百六十箱重一萬六千斤，目梢貨物蘇木二萬五千斤、錫九千五百斤、(玉)米二千五百斤、蝦米一千五百斤、降真香一千斤、檀香一千五百斤，哆囉啤四疋、內綠色二疋、木紅色二疋、紅銅十五箱重一千五百斤、彭亨籐一(缺一字)二百(缺四字)百五十斤，孔雀尾十七個，籐(下缺)」。⑦

三、台灣海商經營日暹貿易之過程

(一)國內—台灣大陸間之走私貿易

一六六一年清政府為徹底打擊鄭氏政權，發佈了最嚴厲之禁海政策「遷界令」，強逼東南沿海居民內徙，企圖採用經濟封鎖方式，斷絕海峽兩岸間之交通接濟，以迫使鄭氏迅速的困守自斃⑧。然而基於台灣大陸雙方官民之需要，三藩叛清動亂，與明鄭進軍大陸諸因素之影響，鄭氏商人與大陸間之走私活動極為活躍⑨。(一)例胡秋官船之台灣長崎貿易，從航行時間上來說，海程六百四十里⑩，通常十至二十餘日內便可抵達⑪，胡船費時四餘月，且船中裝載許多大陸貨物(後述)，由此可知胡船可能是屬眾台船前往大陸進行走私貿易中之一艘，而這些走私船多自明鄭領地起程，先至大陸沿岸，藉賄賂或偷渡方法，透過牙商(經紀人)關係，招攬客商，收購貨物，然後再航往日本⑫。至於(二)例藍澤商船，根據史料所示亦為當時台灣海商探行：鄭氏管轄地→大陸沿岸走私→日本→南洋各地→鄭氏支配地航綫之一例⑬。唯值得注意的是，就貿易時間而言，藍船是在鄭軍反攻大陸敗退台灣，清兵正乘勢伐台，海峽兩岸軍情緊張之際，由於台商不得通航大陸，故只好從台直航長崎，再由日轉航暹羅歸國⑭。

(二)國外—日本、暹羅

日本於德川幕府時代(一六〇三至一八六七年)，為確保政權鞏固，社會秩序安定，一面禁止憾亂人心之傳教活動，一面並為防止良質貨幣之大量出口，引起市場供需失調，礦藏匱竭問題，而實施閉關主義之鎖國政策。當時日本允許貿易之國家，僅有與布教無關之中、荷兩國，長崎則為唯一對外通商之門戶⑯。根據前舉胡秋官船之海事記錄裏，可清楚的察知海商抵達長崎，在上岸卸貨，貿易期間，與交易結束載貨歸航之際，都需經過官方嚴密的調查與監視。商船於進出港口時，亦須分別提出一份報告書，聲明遵守日本法，誓不違背日本禁止天主教，禁購違禁品之國策。禁忌雖多，但因台商掌握了日本之外貿市場，台日貿易利潤鉅大之故，以致明鄭商船不畏諸人為、自然之海上風險，渡日船隻數量超過各地起帆航日之中國船⑰。

在暹羅方面，依據張燮『東西洋考』卷二〈暹羅，交易〉中載：「舟至，則偵者飛報于

王。…所至關，輒聽與其近地交易，不必先詣王也。既至王城。以幣帛橙橘之類貢王。然王深居不得見。」^{①⑦}又，再據法國學者 Savary 兄弟『世界商業大辭典』（*Dictionnaire Universel de Commerce*）中記述：「暹羅之輸入物品，都課徵百分之八之關稅。」^{①⑧}，可以推知一向禮遇華商，歡迎國人與彼通交之暹羅，大約是台商至暹，不受其任何法律束縛，僅需納稅便可自由的與當地僑商進行買賣^{①⑨}。

四、船商組織

(一)資本主

首先，在前錄(一)例裏，說明藍澤商船之資本主為明鄭武平侯劉國軒。該船於台灣建造，船長七丈七尺，寬二丈四尺餘，深一丈五寸，雇傭水手八十三人，約屬載貨量三四十萬斤規模之商船^{②⑩}。船名「東本鳥」之「鳥」字，意指船式為尖底，其特性在能破深水巨浪^{②⑪}；「東本」二字，則可能是東寧（台灣），日本之簡稱。又，(一)例胡秋官船之資本主不詳，亦為尖底鳥船，另再從船員數目來看，大抵是屬於船體略小之貿易船^{②⑫}。

其次，就胡、藍二船貨物與資本主之關連來說，船中皆裝載「公司貨物」，按此所謂之「公司貨物」，為當時通洋商船船主貨物之通稱^{②⑬}，由此可知船主即貨主亦為資本主，管船官藍澤與船主胡秋官均非實際上之資本主，彼等約為替代資本主出航之業務經理^{②⑭}。

復次，以資本主之身分而言，於海峽兩岸政府對峙時期，明清雙方各有戰船巡邏轄境之海域，在無航行護照不得擅自出入港口之狀況下^{②⑮}，參與海上貿易之商人，必須要有雄厚之政治，經濟條件，方可往來無礙。如據藍澤供稱：「撥配白糖二千零五十擔（一擔＝一百斤），冰糖一百五十擔」裏，便可肯定明鄭方面從事航運業之資本主，除了有壟斷重要商品之延平郡王與王室關係人外，大多屬於王之高級將領及其親屬^{②⑯}。

(二)船員

根據(一)例，藍澤商船從台灣起帆開往長崎發放薪資、伙食費三千五百餘兩銀子，由長崎駛往暹國二千四百里之遠洋航程後^{②⑰}，却僅支付一千五百餘兩銀子，追究其中緣由，可能是鄭氏軍潰回台，清廷強化海禁令，船員因為走私大陸困難，大陸貨源缺乏與台產砂糖為政府獨占，無從置貨隨船販賣之故，才以按工計酬之僱傭方式支給。而當船抵長崎，交易完後，船員領獲工資，因有收入購貨出售謀利，故附搭貨物之船員便不再發予薪資。至於船中重要員役如夥長（負責航向者）、舵工（司舵者）、亞班（掌管帆柱者）等人，則可能除允搭載個人貨物外，另付若干工資^{②⑱}。又，再據(一)例胡秋官船內列有客商名單來說，客商加入海外貿易之方法，約為付款私帶貨物售價的百分之二十予資方，以為租借客艙，乘船出航之費用^{②⑲}，復由客商附搭布匹商號貨物裏，可以推測彼等大概是以商務代表之身分，替代國內老板從事海外貿易。

五、貿易品

(一)中國方面

一六六一至一六八一年間，如前所述由於邊界令未能徹底的實行，台灣大陸間之密貿易活動頻繁，故(一)例胡秋官船中，裝運有中國絲貨名產地浙江湖州府出產之原料「湖絲」

⑳，江浙兩省不同質地，尺寸之絲織品，與福建特產之布帛，烟草、南中國地方及台灣所產之白糖㉑等。這些商品長久以來即在日本擁有廣大之消費市場㉒，貿易品中除了砂糖可用來壓艙，加強帆船航海之穩定性外，其餘多屬體積輕，載運量大，利潤厚之貨物。迨至一六八一年後，由於明清軍勢互相消長衰盛，清方有效的控制大陸物資出口之故，一如㉓例所錄，藍澤商船中之中國貨全為台灣生產之砂糖。

(二) 日本方面

台灣海商赴日，在長崎採購之貨有貨幣金（小判），鑄造錢幣與軍器之原料紅銅、銀器具、海產物、加工食品類等等。小判與銅錢因是台灣之主要通貨，亦為亞洲國家經濟市場所需，故為台商輸台及轉販他國之重要對象㉔，如據藍澤船例，即可發現日貨於暹羅銷售時，唯獨紅銅悉數保留裝載返航。

(三) 暹羅方面

暹國土產，據『增補華夷通商考』之記載，種類頗繁㉕，其中適合中國市場之商品有：「象牙（分為二十等、一等品一枝重百斤、二等品二枝重百斤）、鉛、錫、檳榔子…蘇枋（即蘇木、染料之一種㉖）、藥品大風子（Tafousic或Tafiousa）、漆、馬革、水牛革、鹿皮、水牛角兩種、沒藥、犀角兩種，名叫 Loung 的染料，燕巢三種，木香（Puchoc）、香、羽毛、孔雀尾、鹿筋、燒香（Cayelac）等。」㉗按上列香料、染料、藥物、裝飾品等貨，久為暹羅朝貢中國朝廷之貢品㉘，因此藍澤商船大量進口這些特產品供上流社會人士享用，另外鉛、錫因為鑄造貨幣，武器之原料，故亦購入不少。

六、結語

以上，本文以明鄭在台時期諸多台商從事日暹貿易之兩例，就其營運貿易過程，船商組織貿易品等問題，作了粗略地考察。由於受到史料與篇幅之限制，分析極不充分，容待日後繼續發掘材料予以修正。文末，歸納拙稿內容要點如下：

1、台灣海商利用大陸禁海政策，內地商民不易出海，日本實行鎖國令，中暹兩國長期以來所建立之良好通交關係之機會，一方面活潑的進行走私貿易活動，以有易無，以紓解台民生活上之困境；一方面並從事多邊轉口貿易，藉商品市場產地價格之差異賺取厚利，進而更為台灣鄭氏政府豐富了財源㉙。

2、於明清政府對立，沿海地方海防森嚴時期，有力參與海上貿易之資本家，多屬明鄭王室與王之高級部屬，航運業主為減輕貿易損失，大多採用部分允許船員攜帶私貨，藉售貨利潤作為船員工資，部分支薪之僱傭方式。由於船員兼具貨主，雇工雙重身份，因此商船海上航行之安危，交易利害得失，便與全體成員息息相關。

3、從台→日，與台→日→暹→台之貿易事例裏，可以窺知海禁寬弛階段，台商渡日，多先前往大陸走私貨品，其中尤以輸出江、浙地區出產之良絲名絹、台灣砂糖㉚為主體；船抵長崎，則以購置日本金、銅供應台地或轉售他國之用，另亦兼買若干銀具、食品運販暹羅；台商在暹，則將日貨換購暹貨，而於進口暹貨中，又以我國加工業所需要之原料與消費性之奢侈品為主要內容。

註 釋：

- ①岩生成一，三百年前に於ける台灣砂糖と茶の波斯進出（南方土俗二卷二號，一九三三）；同氏，近世初期の對外關係，第二章，日支新關係の展開（收入岩波講座日本歷史第六卷，岩波書店，一九三四）又，近世日支貿易に關する數量的考察（史學雜誌六十二編十一號，一九五三）；浦廉一著，賴永祥譯，延平王戶官鄭泰長崎存銀之研究（台灣風物十一卷三期，一九六一）；南棲，台灣鄭氏五商之研究（台灣銀行季刊十六卷二期，一九六五）；賴永祥，台灣鄭氏與英國的通商關係史（台灣文獻十六卷二期，一九六五）；山脇悌二郎，長崎の唐人貿易（吉川弘文館，一九七二）；林子侯，明鄭對日關係與存銀事件（台灣文獻二十五卷四期，一九七四）；魏能濤，明清時期中日長崎商船貿易（中國史研究，一九八六年二期）；鄭瑞明，台灣明鄭與東南亞之貿易關係初探—發展東南亞貿易之動機，實務與外商之前來（台灣師範大學歷史學報十四期，一九八六）
- ②所謂唐船，泛指中國各地與南洋諸國起航赴日之中國船。參見浦廉一，唐船風說書の研究（收入華夷變態上冊，東洋文庫，一九五八）。
- ③川口長孺，台灣割據志（台灣文獻叢刊第一種，台灣銀行，一九五七）頁五五、五九
- ④媽祖爲船員出海於船中祭拜之守護神，其他神明則依船員之信仰不同，攜至船內致祭。參閱淺井虎夫，支那日本通商史（金港堂書籍株式會社，一九〇六）頁六七〇、六七一
- ⑤林煒，通航一覽（國書刊行會，一九一三）卷二一一，頁三八四至三八六
- ⑥同⑤，頁三八六、三八七
- ⑦明清史料已編第七本，兵部殘題本（中央研究院歷史語言研究所，一九五八）頁六二六、六二七，本文標點據鄭氏史料三編（台灣文獻叢刊第一七五種，台灣銀行，一九六三）頁二一六至二一九
- ⑧浦廉一著，賴永祥譯，清初遷界令考（台灣文獻六卷四期，一九五五）
- ⑨拙著，清初遷界令時明鄭商船之研究（史聯雜誌七期，台灣史蹟研究中心，一九八五）
- ⑩西川求林齋編，增補華夷通商考（收入小野忠重編，萬國渡海年代記，雙林社，一九四二）卷三，頁一二六
- ⑪大庭脩，江戸時代における中國文化受容の研究（同朋舍，一九八四）頁五二八；拙著（同⑨）表二參考
- ⑫同⑨；另拙著，清初遷界令時中國船海上貿易之研究（中國海洋發展史研討會論文集（二）中央研究院三民主義研究所，一九八六）
- ⑬同⑫
- ⑭類似事例參閱拙著（同⑫）
- ⑮木宮泰彥著，陳捷譯，中日交通史（九思出版，一九七八）第十二章，日本與清朝之貿易；岩生成一，鎖國（中央公論社，一九八四）
- ⑯岩生成一，近世日支貿易に關する數量的考察（同①）；拙著（同⑫）
- ⑰張燮，東西洋考（據台灣商務印書館翻印本，一九七一）卷二，頁二四
- ⑱Savary，世界商業大辭典，於一七二五年成書，本文據宮崎市定所藏一七四一年版之日譯本翻譯爲中文（參閱宮崎氏著，清代對外貿易の二資料，收入アジア史研究第二，同朋舍，

一九八五)頁四三。

- ⑱同⑰；另參閱陳荆和，清初華船之長崎貿易及日南航運(南洋學報十三卷一輯，一九五七)；市川信愛著，劉曉民譯，東南亞華僑經濟的一個側面研究——關於華僑“幫”問題的實地調查記錄——(收入同氏者，華僑社會經濟論序說，宮崎大學教育學部社會經濟研究室出版，一九八五)；鄭瑞明前引論文(同①)
- ⑳同⑩，卷二，頁一二〇、一二一
- ㉑拙著，清康熙雍正年間台灣船航日貿易之研究(台灣史研究暨史料發掘研討會論文集，台灣史蹟研究中心，一九八六)頁四三六
- ㉒同⑳
- ㉓江日昇，台灣外記(台灣文獻叢刊第六十種，台灣銀行，一九六〇)卷一、頁三
- ㉔同⑫
- ㉕岩生成一抄錄英國檔案，周學譜譯，曹永和，賴永祥校訂，十七世紀台灣英國貿易史料(台灣經濟史第五冊，台灣銀行，一九五七)頁二八、六三
- ㉖前引江日昇著書(同⑳)頁二三八、二三九、三五四、三五五、三八七；拙著(同⑫)
- ㉗同⑩，卷三，頁一三六
- ㉘葉顯恩，明清珠江三角洲商人與商業活動(廣東省社會科學院歷史研究所，一九八五)頁十二
- ㉙明清史料丁編第三本，刑部等衙門尚書覺羅雅布(缺一字)等殘題本(中央研究院歷史語言研究所，一九七二)
- ㉚前引山脇悌二郎著書(同①)頁二二七
- ㉛同⑩，卷一、卷二；同⑬，頁四一九～四二二
- ㉜同⑫、⑳
- ㉝岩生成一，近世初期の對外關係(同①)頁六四；山脇悌二郎前引著書(同①)頁二一〇至二一七；拙著(同⑫)等參考
- ㉞同⑩，卷三，頁一三七、一三八
- ㉟同⑰，頁二三
- ㊱同⑬，頁四三〇、四三一
- ㊲同⑰，頁二二、二三；同⑭，頁四二二
- ㊳明鄭官商財力頗鉅，多有捐資養兵者。參閱前引江日昇著書(同⑳)卷八，頁三五四；又請參閱拙著(同⑫)
- ㊴鄭氏領台時期(一六六一至一六八三年)，中日貿易之台灣輸出品有砂糖、鹿皮(參閱拙著，同⑫)，本文實例中因未記載鹿皮，故省略不提。又，比較這兩項特產，仍以砂糖佔重要地位。(參閱翦伯贊、鄭天挺編，中國通史參考資料，古代部分第八冊，北京中華書局，一九七九，頁二八)

兩晉時期西南地區地方官吏叛亂之分析

胡志佳

一、前言

兩晉一百五十餘年的歷史裏(265 - 402)，由於中央政權的不穩、外患迭興，各地區兵燹日起，社會普遍不安，加上南渡後晉室根本所在的荆、揚地區，先後遭到王敦、蘇峻、孫恩、盧循、桓玄等人的破壞，使得中央更自顧無暇，而在今四川地區及雲貴一帶，即兩晉時期包括梁、益、寧三州的西南地區亦不例外，大小亂事相繼不絕，兩晉實際掌握這個地區的時間不到百年⁽¹⁾。這些動亂不論規模大小、時間長短或發生原因的複雜與否，在在破壞社會秩序，也深深困擾晉廷。

兩晉時期除成漢與前秦政權，以外來者身份一度控制西南地區外，西南地區大小動亂尚有四十餘起，威信動亂的次數應更頻仍，但從這些資料或已可略窺兩晉時期西南地區社會發展的一端，及其與晉室的關係。

兩晉時期西南地區的亂事，大致以地方官吏、豪族、少數民族與流民為主⁽²⁾，又以前二者的叛亂事件居多，其彼此之間更有相當程度的重疊⁽³⁾。本文由高居首位的地方官吏叛亂問題著手，兼論西南地區官吏與地方豪族勢力重疊的情況，以期突顯兩晉時期西南地區動亂問題的特殊面，並從亂事發生的經過與結果，比較兩晉對西南地區的態度及統治方式的異同。

本文撰寫期間，資料搜集倍感困難，加以本文研究範圍又屬地僻一隅的西南地區，史料的掌握更屬不易，時人的研究成果亦極有限。但藉著這些零散、有限的資料，透過對叛亂的分析，從另一角度來探討西南地區與中央之關係，俾補以往研究的空白與不足。疏漏桀誤之處，自所難免，敬祈學者方家不吝指正，以爲進一步研究改訂。

二、地方官吏叛亂分析

兩晉時期西南地區地方官吏的叛亂有二十六件，牽涉人數高達三十餘人，今將地方官吏的叛亂區分為地方官與地方掾屬兩大類型來討論，如下表：

時代	職分 官位 人數	地 方 官			地方掾屬		合 計
		刺 史	太 守	都 尉	參軍 護軍	掾吏 士兵	
西 晉		1	4	2	1	8	16
東 晉		5	6	0	4	0	15
合 計		6	10	2	5	8	31

上表數據顯示，地方官叛亂的比例高於地方掾屬。以前者而言，郡太守叛亂人數高居首位，東晉以後刺史反叛的比例明顯增高，皆為地方官型叛亂的特色；而西晉時期地方掾吏士兵的叛亂高達八次之多，此與西南地區地方勢力的發展有密切的關係，以下即分述之。

1. 地方官的叛亂

地方官型的叛亂可就其肇因，約略分為乘亂反，為尋求自保而叛兩大類型。表面上看，反叛的原因並不特殊，但由於這些反叛官吏所具有的特殊身份或兼有強大的地方勢力，致使地方亂事複雜化，使晉廷在平亂時倍增困難。

首先，乘晉政局危急，據西南而叛的地方官吏有趙廞、暴重、張啓、司馬勳、劉稚等人，如下表：

時 間	姓 名	籍貫	官 名	反 叛 原 因
惠 帝 元 康 元 年 300	趙 廞	巴 西 安 漢	益州刺史	廞為賈后姻親，賈后見誅，詔徵廞為大長秋，廞懼連坐，加以見晉室衰亂，陰有據蜀之志。
懷 帝 永 嘉 五 年 311	暴 重		建平都尉	西南亂，殺益州刺史韓松自領三府事。
懷 帝 永 嘉 六 年 312	張 啓	犍 爲	江陽太守	以天下亂，殺益州刺史王異代之。
哀 帝 光 寧 三 年 365	司馬勳	河 內 溫 縣	梁州刺史	為政酷暴，常有據蜀之志，益州刺史周撫卒，乘之而反。
安 帝 義 熙 二 年 406	劉 稚		梁州刺史	乘譙縱亂而反。

上列五起，皆為五品以上職司治民的地方官⁽⁴⁾，在國家政局不穩時，反藉其所掌握的政治力量及地方勢力與中央相抗。

如益州刺史趙廞之謀叛，史載：

(廞)本巴西安漢人也。祖世隨張魯內移，家趙⁽⁵⁾。

惠帝元康六年(296)，晉鑑於局勢變化，重新規劃全國州郡，更梁、益二州為重州⁽⁶⁾，趙廞以益州刺史的身份再次回到西南地區，總統西南軍事。在西南地區趙廞並結合出自同郡的李庠等流民的力量，以壯聲勢，其武力基礎即由這批流民構成⁽⁷⁾。

永康元年(300)，趙廞眼見賈后被誅⁽⁸⁾及中原亂局日益擴大，於是據蜀自立。後趙廞與

李氏流民之間，因內訌而分裂，廆亦為流民所殺，但這股反叛的勢力在流民李特等人的領導下，日益膨脹，終於釀成長達四十餘年的流民之亂⁽⁹⁾。

與趙廆事件類似的是江陽太守張啓之殺益州刺史王異。張啓為犍為武陽人，〔華陽國志〕載，張氏為武陽大姓之一⁽¹⁰⁾；懷帝永嘉六年（312），趁原益州刺史張羅卒，平西司馬王異代行事時，與廣漢大族羅琦共謀，取而代之。張啓這種以本地人出任地方官⁽¹¹⁾，及藉社會勢力謀取更大利益的作為，充分顯示西南地區豪族的坐大及中央面對亂事的無力。

懷帝永嘉年起，流民力量日熾，晉在西南地區的勢力逐漸退至巴東地區，此後地方官一連串的內訌與殺伐，使原本平靜未受流民戰亂波及的巴東地區漸趨不安⁽¹²⁾，自懷帝永嘉四年（310）至愍帝建興元年（313），四年之間，益州地區先後更換了八任刺史⁽¹³⁾；而其任命方式多由「三府⁽¹⁴⁾官屬共表」，然後再由中央予以認可，列如下表⁽¹⁵⁾：

時 間	姓 名	任 命 方 式
永嘉四年 310	韓 松	三府官屬表之為益州刺史
永嘉五年 311	張 羅	三府文武共表之行三府事
永嘉五年 311	王 異	三府文武共表之行三府事
永嘉六年 312	向 沈	三府文武共表之行西夷校尉
建興元年 313	蘭 維	蜀郡太守程融、宜都太守楊芬、西夷司馬常歆、都安令常倉，共推之為西夷校尉。

這種戰亂時期權宜措施，加上地方官之間的殺戮，更顯示中央對益州地區控制力的薄弱，而巴東地區的混亂局面，更給流民可乘之機⁽¹⁶⁾。

趙廆與張啓憑藉擁有的地方勢力與中央政權相抗，對中央及地方皆造成極大的傷害，而梁州刺史司馬勳憑藉政治力量結合社會勢力向中央挑戰，所產生的影響更為深遠。

司馬勳為宗室，但以其出任梁州刺史長達二十二年，藉著官職之便，在梁州建立起雄厚的政治與社會勢力⁽¹⁷⁾。司馬勳未叛以前在梁州即以暴酷著稱，史載：

（司馬勳）為政暴酷，至於治中別駕及州之豪右，言語忤意，即於坐梟斬之，或引弓自射。……在州常懷據蜀，有僭偽之意。桓溫聞之，務相綏懷，以其子康為漢中太守⁽¹⁸⁾。

當時梁州以北的中原地區，早已成為戰亂之地，司馬勳雖未能向北收復失地⁽¹⁹⁾，但以其對長安地區的熟悉⁽²⁰⁾及擁有的地方勢力，猶能堅守梁州地區，屏障東晉以防止北方勢力的侵入。基於現實環境的考慮，桓溫在得悉司馬勳有僭偽自立之意時，亦只能加以懷柔，而無法予以制裁。

在安撫利誘不成之下，哀帝光寧三年（365），司馬勳「擁衆入劍閣」、「自號梁益二州牧、成都王」⁽²¹⁾。整個叛亂過程歷時不長，未及一年即被朱序所平⁽²²⁾，但梁州穩固的形勢至此瓦解，此後不到七年時間，孝武帝寧康元年（373）前秦苻氏大舉侵入梁、益，繼任的梁州刺史楊亮無力應付，三個月之內（八月至十一月），梁、益相繼淪陷⁽²³⁾。

除乘天下亂而反者外，兩晉時期西南地區地方官因求自保而叛晉的事件亦不在少數，而其中又以寧州的比例最高，此亦為西南地區叛亂的特色之一。

寧州地區⁽²⁴⁾由於僻遠的地理位置，不便的交通，及蠻夷錯雜分佈等因素，自漢以來，除統

治上特別倚重軍事控制外⁽²⁵⁾，並常將地方政事委於當地豪強。在歷經兩漢、三國蜀漢的發展，豪族大姓勢力已相當活躍⁽²⁶⁾。進至兩晉，晉廷相繼任命部份有影響力的寧州大姓官職⁽²⁷⁾，這種近乎羈縻的統治方式，在中央勢強或地方吏治清明時，或可達到維持地方安寧的效果，但當地方發生動亂或外力介入時，基於現實環境的考慮，這班地方豪強往往為尋求自保而叛晉。

兩晉時期以日趨混亂的天下局勢，中央對西隅控制力日益遞減，使得寧州具有這種地方豪強身份的官吏叛亂事件層出不窮，如下表：

時 間	姓名	籍 貫	官 職	反 叛 原 因
愍 帝 建興四年 316	雷紹	朱 提	平夷太守	寧州刺史王遜嚴猛，喜誅殺，率衆三千家叛降於成漢。
	董霸	建 寧	平樂太守	
明 帝 太寧元年 323	李釗	廣 漢	越 嶺太守	成漢將李驥、任回寇臺登，釗、載以郡降。
	王載	廣 漢	漢嘉太守	
明 帝 太寧二年 324	麴暈	建 寧	梁水太守	寧州刺史王遜在州殘暴，舉郡反。
	李暹	晉 寧	益州太守	
成 帝 咸和八年 333	董炳	南中大姓	朱提太守	成將李壽拔朱提，炳、彪降。
	霍彪	南中大姓	建寧太守	

由寧州地區郡太守反叛者來看，可發現其籍屬西南的比例相當高，尤以南中⁽²⁸⁾本地豪族居多。其中較特殊者為李釗、王載之叛降成漢。李釗，世為廣漢郡豪族⁽²⁹⁾，惠帝太安元年（302）寧州因時勢需要再次復置時，其父李毅以寧州刺史的身份出監寧州諸軍事⁽³⁰⁾，毅於光熙元年（306）卒於任上，釗於次年由廣漢至寧州代其父領寧州府事⁽³¹⁾，承繼其父在寧州地區的勢力。至懷帝永嘉四年（310），新任的寧州刺史王遜猶不得不「表釗為朱提太守，治南廣，御李雄」⁽³²⁾，來維持朱提郡境內的安定。

王載與李釗同為廣漢郡豪族⁽³³⁾，而在寧州地區亦擁有相當地方勢力，〔華陽國志〕載：

光熙元年春三月，（寧州刺史李）毅薨。……文武以毅女秀明達有父才，遂奉領州事。秀初適漢嘉太守廣漢王載，載將家避地在南，故共推之。又以載領南夷、龍驤將軍。⁽³⁴⁾

此時，北部益州地區有李雄之亂，寧州有于陵承之亂，在新任寧州刺史未到任之前，寧州地方的安危，幾繫於李、王二氏之手。

這些地方豪族，基於地緣或蔭任關係，得到地方官的職位，對地方的安定亦貢獻相當的心力，但在有更大衝擊時，往往仍為維持本身的利益，而傾其所有的地方勢力叛晉。如李釗與王載，在明帝太寧元年（323）李雄傾全力南向寧州時，朱提、漢嘉二郡首當其衝，在求自保的考慮下，釗、載舉郡降⁽³⁵⁾。又如西晉末年，寧州刺史王遜以嚴苛著名⁽³⁶⁾，平夷太守朱提雷紹與平樂太守建寧董霸為求自保，而於愍帝建興四年（316），帥二郡三千餘家叛降⁽³⁷⁾。

無論漢夷與否，這些出身豪族的地方官反叛時，往往是舉郡、縣或全族之力而起。類似的叛亂事件，使晉室不但喪失土地，連勞動力、賦稅及地方資源的徵收也大受影響⁽³⁸⁾。

此外，這種地方官吏的叛亂，亦常使得入侵的外力，利用他們對地方的熟悉與影響力，迅速地擴張勢力，造成中央與地方極大的傷害。如東晉咸和七年（332），流民軍大將李壽圍朱提城，歷經三個月，城中朱提太守董炳及建寧太守霍彪，終因糧盡而投降⁽³⁹⁾。成漢在打下朱提、建寧後，更以霍彪出任寧州刺史，藉其對地方的影響力來控制寧州地區，不及兩個月時間，寧州全陷入成漢之手⁽⁴⁰⁾。

以上種種情況，使得晉室原想利用這些地方豪族來安定地方秩序的理想完全破滅，反需花費大的人力與更多的精力，才得以將亂局救平。如寧州地區，在咸和八年（333）淪陷後，一直要到穆帝永和三年（347），桓溫大舉伐蜀後才再次收復。

2. 地方掾吏的叛亂

兩晉時期西南地區地方掾吏的反叛事件亦層出不窮，就官職而言，地方掾吏不如地方長官，但在性質上卻極為類似，而各有特殊處。

〔通典〕云：

漢縣有丞尉及諸曹掾，多以本郡人爲之，三輔則兼用他郡。⁽⁴¹⁾

自秦漢帝國建立以來，由於疆土日益擴大，州郡劃分愈趨細密，爲避免地方權力的集中，行政首長向例以外郡人擔任⁽⁴²⁾。爲了協助這些由外地而來的官吏熟悉當地的風俗民情，其屬下的掾吏多在當地辟任，藉其對地方的了解輔佐郡守、縣令來治理地方。在這種需求下，豪族憑藉在地方上的優勢，往往較易得到出任地方掾吏的機會。這是隋唐以前，中國地方行政制度發展過程中的特色之一⁽⁴³⁾。

進至兩晉，地方豪族的基礎更趨穩固，當中央勢盛時，中央、地方官與掾吏之間，尚能維持正常的關係，地方官能掌握掾屬，而豪族出身的掾屬爲其自身利益與本地福祉考慮，也多能與地方官配合；但逢時事倥傯、政本動搖時，地方官則常反受制於擁有地方勢力的掾屬，一旦發生亂事或地方官的作爲危及到他們的利益時，其或將率先反抗，釀成叛亂。西南地區因其地理、人文因素的特殊⁽⁴⁴⁾，致使地方掾吏叛亂的情形甚爲普遍。

時 間	姓 名	官 職	反 叛 原 因	地 點
武帝 泰始四年 268	王 富	中 軍 士	有罪逃匿，密結亡命刑徒得數百人，反。	臨邛、晉原
泰始七年 271	呂 匡	汶山守兵	殺汶山督將以叛	汶 山
泰始八年 272	張弘等	佐 吏	汶山胡反，隨益州刺史皇甫晏出征，以山道險，懼出征，共殺晏。	都安、灌縣
咸寧四年 278	龔祚等	漢中郡吏	欲謀殺漢中太守姜宗以叛。	漢 中
惠 帝 太安元年 302	毛 植 襄 班	巴西郡丞 五官掾	李蕩寇巴西，巴西太守張演棄城走，植、班降。	巴 西
太安元年 302	李 猛	太中大夫	朱提太守雍約無治。	朱 提

太安二年 303	李 叟 毛 詵	鐵 官 中 令 郎	建寧太守杜俊，朱提太守雍約無治	建 寧
太安二年 303	徐 叟	平西參軍	欲求爲汝山太守及連結范長生，刺史羅尚不許，降李流。	蜀 郡
穆 帝 永和三年 347	蕭敬文	振威護軍	以晉新平蜀，又有范賁之亂，乘之而反	涪 城
安 帝 義熙元年 405	侯 暉 譙 縱	平西參軍	益州刺史毛璩欲順流東下討桓振，蜀人不欲遠征，舉譙縱起而爲亂	益 州
義熙二年 406	楊承祖	益州參軍	由巴東出征譙軍，至宕渠乘亂殺刺史司馬榮期，自稱巴州刺史。	宕 渠

由上表所列地方掾吏反叛事件可看出其主要因素，仍是爲維護身家利益而叛。兩晉時期西南地區因掾吏所引起最大的動亂，應屬東晉安帝義熙元年（405）至義熙八年（412）的譙縱之亂。

譙縱，巴西人氏⁽⁴⁵⁾，安帝時出任安西府參軍。元興元年（402），桓玄於荆、揚大肆擴張，企圖連結其他的地方勢力以穩固權勢基礎。爲免於腹背受敵，首先向上游駐守西南地區的益州刺史毛璩示好，毛璩不爲所動，反趁機遣軍向北襲擊駐於漢中的桓希，並親自帥三萬大軍順流東下討伐桓玄⁽⁴⁶⁾。毛璩聲討桓玄的行動，本是晉廷與地方政府之間有效聯繫的表現；但這種大規模的遠征，卻引起巴蜀士民的不安，反造成叛亂事件在西南各地蜂起，譙縱事件即爲其中之一。⁽⁴⁷⁾

由於譙氏所掌握的兵力多來自家鄉，因本身利益一致，故在初反時，勢力極易凝聚，在相繼殺害總轄西南軍、政大權的毛氏一族後，佔領了梁、益二州的大半，史載：

（毛）璩聞（譙）縱反，自略城步還成都，遣參軍毛瓊率三千人討縱，又遣弟瑗領四千兵繼瓊後進。縱遣弟明子及（侯）暉距瓊於廣漢，瓊擊破暉等，追至縣竹。明子設二伏以待之，大敗瓊衆，死者十八九。……縱以從弟洪爲益州刺史，明子爲鎮東將軍、巴州刺史，率其衆五千人屯白帝，自稱成都王⁽⁴⁸⁾。

隨著亂局迅速地擴大及晉軍的反攻，這個憑藉地方勢力而興的叛亂集團漸呈不支之勢。譙氏於是轉向與其他的割據勢力結合⁽⁴⁹⁾。譙氏與桓氏、後秦、盧循等勢力的合流，使荊州地區再次陷於戰亂中，晉室亦落入數面受敵的窘境。

次於譙縱的地方掾吏叛亂事件，乃西晉惠帝太安二年（303）平西參軍⁽⁵⁰⁾徐叟的投降李流。徐叟世爲涪陵豪族，蜀漢時期由涪陵遷至蜀地，爲獵射官⁽⁵¹⁾；太安二年（303）六月，晉汝山太守陳圖爲李流所殺，徐叟求爲汝山太守，並以其對西南形勢的了解，建議益州刺史羅尚連結天師道領袖之一的涪陵豪強范長生，以共同對付日漸擴大的流民之亂，而羅尚對徐叟的請求與建議不予理會，叟遂怒而降李流⁽⁵²⁾。

從表面上看，徐叟的反叛是一個單純求官未遂而反的事件，但所產生的影響卻極爲深遠。早在二年（303）正月，面對日益膨脹的流民勢力，晉遣荊州刺史宗岱、建平太守孫臯帥水軍三萬救益州。二月，流民大敗，領袖李特、李輔、李遠等人爲晉軍所殺，原本依附流民軍的人民，多降歸晉⁽⁵³⁾，可說是流民軍最爲失勢的時刻，而徐叟七月的叛降與說服范長生的加入，不僅供給

李氏經濟支援，也因其於西南地區的影響力，使得更多的人民支持李氏，這可說是直接導致成漢政權得以割據西南地區達四十六年之久的重要原因之一⁽⁵⁴⁾。

地方掾吏的叛亂事件，對西南地區所造成的傷害極大，也為晉室在統一的過程中憑添莫大的困擾。在譙縱亂後，國子博士周祗會上書指出：

益州荒殘，野無青草，成都之內，殆無子遺。計得彼利，與行軍之費，不足相輔也⁽⁵⁵⁾。

綜合以上對西南地區地方官吏叛亂問題的分析，可以發現兩晉時期西南地區的叛亂，以與社會勢力結合者最易成事，擁有軍事武力者次之；晉廷在應付這些叛亂的困難程度是與前者成正比，此為西南地區叛亂的一大特色。

三、地方行政與亂事處理

兩晉時期，西南地區震蕩不絕，此起彼落的各類型叛亂事件，無疑的，是其歷史發展上的一大特色。正因為這種種叛亂事件的迭生，顯示出晉對西南的統治有其根本困擾之所在，因而對西南地區的態度與統治政策，亦顯現出其特殊的地方色彩。

〔華陽國志〕載：

晉泰始元年春，（益州）刺史袁邵以治城將被征⁽⁵⁶⁾。

由袁邵因修治城池，未先上報朝廷即被征還治罪的情形可看出，西晉初年對於益州地區的控制事無鉅細，均呈現強而有力的態勢；至西晉末年，經過流民及大小動亂的蹂躪，西南地區民心不安，值此之際，天水氐楊茂搜率族人入寇，據漢中，而愍帝則以「胡寇方盛，欲懷來戎翟，拜（楊茂搜）為驃騎將軍、左賢王」⁽⁵⁷⁾。比較晉室對袁邵與楊茂搜二事的處理態度，很清楚的可以看出，愍帝時中央對西南地區的控制力大不如前，羈縻方式逐漸取代以往嚴密的掌握地方官之作爲，適足以說明晉對西南地區統治方式的變更，與時局的安定與否，有不可分離的關係。

對位於西南更南的寧州地區，兩晉在態度上亦呈明顯的差異，武帝於太康五年（284）認爲已足以控制寧州，遂罷寧州，恢復以南夷校尉總其事的措施，〔華陽國志〕載：

太康五年，罷寧州，置南夷，以天水李毅爲校尉、持節，統兵鎮南中，統五十八部夷族都監行事。每夷供貢南夷府，入牛、金、旃、馬、動以萬計，皆預作念患致校尉官屬；其供郡縣亦然。……自四姓子弟仕進，必先經都監⁽⁵⁸⁾。

由此可以說明武帝在位時，對南中地區曾有一段強有力的控制期；至惠帝太安年間，晉對南中的駕馭已感力不從心，永昌郡從事孫辨因而提出再置寧州的建議：「七郡斗絕，晉弱夷強，加其人屈塞，應復寧州，以相鎮慰⁽⁵⁹⁾。」

雖然復置寧州，但此後晉室對南中的控制更日益蹙促，〔晉書〕「王遜傳」記載：

惠帝末，西南夷叛，寧州刺史李毅卒，城中百餘人奉毅女固守經年。（懷帝）永嘉四年，治中毛孟詣京師求刺史，不見省。孟固陳曰：「君亡親喪，幽閉窮城，萬里訴哀，不垂愍救。……」朝廷憐之，乃以（王）遜爲南夷校尉、寧州刺史，使之郡便之鎮⁽⁶⁰⁾。

至永嘉年間，晉室甚至一度萌生放棄南中的傾向，賴毛孟力爭，而重新更派寧州刺史。此後寧州刺史在南中地區掌有絕對的權力，「使之郡便之鎮」即是最好的寫照。

此外，由晉室對西南地區動亂處理方式的改變，亦可顯現兩晉對西南地區關切程度的高低。

如前所述，西晉初年，對西南地區仍擁有相當的控制力，對亂事的處理，一如東漢順、桓帝以後的「權之遣軍，任之州郡」⁽⁶¹⁾。換言之，西南地區的叛亂問題，多由地方官自行派兵救平

，而且在李特起事前（296），西南地區叛亂的性質較為單純，且其規模不大，故大抵依循舊制，如王富、呂匡等人的反叛事件，均由西南地方官出兵平定的。

當西南地區亂事發生後，一切平亂所需的補給支援，亦多由本地就地供給。惠帝元康六年（296）關中氐與馬蘭羌叛亂，晉詔「發梁州及東羌、鎮西討之，不克。」益州刺史羅尚遣牙門馬玄、尹方救援，另以鹿車運成都米給軍糧⁽⁶³⁾。稍後惠帝永寧元年（301）流人李特等正集中兵力進攻成都時，益州刺史羅尚孤立無援，並轉向梁州及南夷校尉求援，而「南夷校尉李毅遣兵五千助尚」⁽⁶³⁾。從前者晉室仍能「詔發梁州兵」討伐，以及後者李毅之解益州圍，顯然對西南地區仍保有相當程度的控制力。

但西南地區這種相互救援的情形，只在西晉初期出現，自李特、李雄父子相繼為亂後，直迄東晉末年，一方面晉室對整個西南地區無法全盤掌握，另一方面相繼發生的亂事，也影響了各地對晉室的向心力，因而亂事的平定，多需仰賴西南以外地區的支援。

然而，外來的支援，由於受到交通路線改變的影響，在晉室南渡前後，亦呈明顯的差異。八王亂前，晉室對西南的支援，多由關中經漢中沿陸道南下。惠帝太安元年（302），河間王顥遣督護衙博，由長安西南進入益州攻討流民⁽⁶⁴⁾；此後流民勢力日盛，梓潼、葭萌、廣漢等南入的交通要地，幾全在李氏掌握之下，加以關中地區因受宗王相互攻伐，陷於兵燹。戰亂的頻仍，常使北來的援軍為戰亂所阻，甚至梁州之軍亦無法入益⁽⁶⁵⁾。因此在太安二年（303）首度自荊州派軍入蜀救援⁽⁶⁶⁾。逐漸形成了荆、益之間聯繫日漸重要，以及外援來自荊州的局面，才產生將西南的梁、益、寧三州納入荊州都督管轄之舉。

另一方面，晉室對西南的援救原多來自北方，故李特等流民的主力亦集中於成都以北的交通要道上，用以截斷晉的援軍，而疏於東方的防衛。太安二年（303）荊州刺史宋岱與建平太守孫臯，沿長江西來，直抵德陽，如入無人之境，進而與困守成都的益州刺史羅尚相約，一舉擊潰流民，斬李特、李輔及李遠等，迫使流民勢力退至縣竹一帶⁽⁶⁷⁾。鑑於這一次的挫敗，此後流民逐漸將防禦線東移，以期阻斷由巴東而來的晉軍。東晉安帝義熙元年（405）爆發的譙縱之亂，在其興兵後，首先自率五千人屯白帝⁽⁶⁸⁾，以扼自荆、襄而來的晉軍，即為此中轉變的最佳例證。

東晉以後中原地區淪於胡人，建康與西南之間的聯繫，日益仰賴江道，但常為叛軍所阻，使晉的救援無法順利展開；此外，由於補給線的遙長，晉必須有效地掌握戰略重地的巴東，才能首尾呼應，連成一氣。安帝義熙四年（408），劉敬宣自三峽入蜀伐譙縱時，晉軍與譙氏大將譙道福相持於黃虎，達六十餘日不得進，在後援補給不及的情況下，因糧盡、疫疾，只得引軍還荊州⁽⁶⁹⁾。這次征伐，晉軍損失相當鉅大，更暴露出東晉在討伐西南亂事，軍事調度上的一大問題，而其癥結在義熙十年（414）益州刺史朱齡石率軍伐蜀時，朱齡石與劉鍾對戰術運用的爭論裏表現無遺：

（朱）齡石謂劉鍾曰：「天方暑熱，賊今固險，攻之難拔，祇因我師，吾欲蓄銳息兵，伺隙而進，卿以為何如？」鍾曰：「不然。……若緩兵相持，虛實相見，涪軍復來，難為敵也。進不能戰，退無所資，二萬餘人應為蜀子虜耳。」

由於道路的遙遠難行及補給困難，晉軍較佳的戰術是急攻，早在東晉穆帝永和三年（347）桓溫伐蜀前，朝臣即以「蜀道險遠，衆少深入」而持反對意見，桓溫排除衆言，獨採袁喬之議：「全軍而進，棄去釜甄，齎三日糧，勝可必矣⁽⁷¹⁾」，一舉而降成漢。其後朱齡石之伐譙縱，亦採劉鍾之議，以急攻一舉攻下成都⁽⁷²⁾。

東晉討平這兩次亂事，戰術運用得當自是致勝的主因，但是對於西南地區與交通路線的透徹了解，才能發揮其功效。同時東晉本身權力的集中也有極大的關係，前者桓溫秉政，掌有相當軍力，加上成漢內部發生嚴重的權力爭奪；後者亦復如此，安帝時期劉裕業已掌握泰半的軍權，全力支持朱齡石伐蜀，綜合敵我雙方此消彼長，配合戰術運用得當，而得以順利敕平戰事。

基本上，西南州郡兵力設置的不足，使晉室不能利用地方兵力以防患未然，更是無法順利平亂，導致亂事更迭發生的主因之一。西晉以降，鑑於漢末地方割據，除封宗王出鎮外，反對州郡置兵的浪潮亦極洶湧。武帝對州郡的地方兵力加以限制，〔晉書〕「山濤傳」載曰：

平吳之役，帝詔天下罷軍役，示海內大安，州郡悉去兵，大郡置武吏百人，小郡五十人。……永寧之役，屢有變難，寇賊叢起，郡國皆以無備不能制，天下遂起大亂⁽⁷³⁾。

雖然山濤之以爲罷州郡兵是亂事繼起的唯一原因，不免將此一問題單純化，但無疑的，在普遍罷滅州郡兵，加上晉對各地復有輕、重州之分，重州得屯駐重兵，而輕州多半「無事罷州郡兵」⁽⁷⁴⁾，對於地處僻遠的西南地區而言，相信自太康元年（280）平吳後，州郡兵力相當有限。甚至在惠帝元康以後，因全國陷入動盪不安，詔使刺史、太守冠將軍號，恢復領兵之權，但州郡能夠掌握的兵力仍極有限，如惠帝永康元年（300），益州刺史趙廞謀反時，惠帝以「梁州刺史羅尚爲平西將軍、領護西夷校尉、益州刺史，督牙門將王敦、上庸都尉羲歆、蜀郡太守徐儉、廣漢太守辛冉等凡七千餘人入蜀⁽⁷⁵⁾。」此時羅尚所掌握的兵力僅七千餘人，不得不借助當地少數民族（即叟兵）及塢堡堡主的支援⁽⁷⁶⁾；稍後羅尚軍失利，南夷校尉李毅亦遣「叟兵」助尚⁽⁷⁷⁾，都顯示了晉軍兵力的單薄。

州郡兵的「備而不足」，正是西南亂事得以持續的一項主因⁽⁷⁸⁾，而且愈至後期愈形嚴重，每當亂事發生時，必須自外地調軍平亂，軍隊成員複雜，常是「官所遣兵皆烏合受募之人」⁽⁷⁹⁾，既缺乏精良之訓練，又關於形勢，同時對晉室的效忠程度不一，使得平亂倍感困難。

由上述可知，由於政局的不穩，使朝廷無力派出更多的軍隊駐防各地，當時中央所賦予地方的兵力，大致爲「卒二十人。（而）諸州邊遠，或有山險，濱近寇賊羌夷者，又置弓馬從事五十餘人」⁽⁸⁰⁾。故如（梁州刺史）張光⁽⁸¹⁾與陳頴⁽⁸²⁾皆擁有部曲或宗黨的情形，正是朝廷援用以爲地方官吏的考慮之一；但以其力量仍極其有限，不足以安定地方秩序，故東晉以後，鑑於西南地區控制力的不足，漸趨採用「家族式」的治理方式：即滅成漢以後，將西南地區的統轄權交由一個或數個擁有地方勢力的家族，一方面用以安撫籠絡，另一方面藉其勢力應付地方動亂。廢帝太和六年（371）苻堅入侵梁、益前夕，桓溫以原寧州刺史周仲孫「監益、梁二州諸軍事，領益州刺史」⁽⁸³⁾。值此之前，周氏家族在西南地區已經五、六十年的發展，子弟分任西南重要地區的地方官⁽⁸⁴⁾，因而周楚卒後，桓溫基於「梁益多寇，周氏世有威稱」⁽⁸⁵⁾之考慮，遂以周仲孫統掌西南軍事、行政大權。

就晉室而言，當中央權力有所不逮時，藉著家族的治理方式，既可保持其權威於不墜，勉強維持西南地區的秩序，亦可免於長途遠征之耗費。但是「家族式」的治理方式亦有其侷限，也非晉室所能完全掌握，有時甚而引發不可收拾的局面。孝武帝寧康元年（373）前秦苻堅遣大軍入侵梁、益，〔晉書〕「苻堅載記」云：

（苻堅將）楊安進據梓潼。晉奮威將軍、西蠻校尉周虓降于（朱）彤。揚武將軍、益州刺史周仲孫勒兵距彤等于縣竹，聞堅將毛當將至成都，仲孫率騎五千奔於南中。安、當進兵，遂陷益州。於是西南夷邛笮、夜郎等皆歸之⁽⁸⁶⁾。

周仲孫並無法抵抗苻堅大軍的強勁攻勢，經此，周氏長期在西南地區建立的勢力遂告瓦解，代之而起的為滎陽武毛氏家族。安帝義熙元年（405），以毛璩為「征西將軍、都督益、梁、秦、涼、寧五州諸軍事」，毛璩出任「梁、秦二州刺史」，毛璩為寧州刺史⁽⁸⁷⁾，一族總統西南地區的軍事、行政大權；譙縱亂起，旋即相繼殺毛璩、璩、璩，西南地區立刻陷入大亂之中，而譙氏得以迅速擴張，席捲西南。換句話說，晉室希冀藉「家族式」治理方式來維持其帝國，不但暴露了統治力量的薄弱，也反映出承平之際，世家大族或能維持地方秩序，但遇到強大外敵或規模龐大的亂事時，其力並不足以與之對抗。

此後，隨著譙氏之亂的平定，劉裕掌握朝政，逐漸加強對西南地區的控制。由義熙十年（414）以後，西南地區地方官的選任漸復舊制，非西南人士出任地方官的情形日漸普遍，如朱齡石、沈叔任等相繼出任益州，索邈、馬敬、郭恭任梁州刺史⁽⁸⁸⁾；此一對西南地區地方官的掌握，在劉宋建國初期，表露無遺。

四、結 論

兩晉時期，政局動盪不安，各地騷然，西南地區因其地形封閉、晉室態度，以及其社會發展的特殊性，致使動亂事件亦呈現特殊的風貌。首先，當中央勢盛時，所委任的官吏尚能掌握地方，而地方豪族基於本身利益與本地福祉，也多能與其配合；隨著晉室的內訌與豪族勢力的日漸膨脹，使中央對地方的控制力日漸減低，更使地方豪族的勢力愈漸穩固。兩晉時期西南地方叛亂事件中，最普遍的情形是地方官吏與豪族勢力的結合。

比較兩晉西南地區地方官叛亂事件可看出，西晉時期是以中下級的地方官、佐屬為多；東晉以後，大率屬於郡守、刺史等五品以上的官吏。大致來說，魏滅蜀、晉代魏，政權的轉移並未掀起鉅變，人民的生活未受大影響。但隨著政局動盪所引起的社會不安，勢將波及於百姓。賈后亂政，兵燹四起，人民開始四處流徙，進入梁、益等地者，亦有數萬人之多。流民勢力膨脹，首先面臨威脅的便是這些兼具豪族身份的地方官吏，為確保自身利益與家族安全，在動亂發生時，往往捨晉以全身，此或為西晉時期據佐叛亂事件較為突顯的一項主因。而東晉以後，為強化地方治安，不得不賦予地方官較大的職權，地方首長遂逐漸集軍事、行政、財政權於一身，故東晉以後刺史、太守以上的地方官叛亂事件普遍增多，且非西南地區人士的比例亦有增高的趨勢⁽⁸⁹⁾。換言之，其勢力主要來源是政治力量，而不再以社會勢力為其主要基礎。這點正說明東晉為應付紛起的亂事，賦予地方官較大的職權，相對地，對地方官的統馭亦倍加困難，形成尾大不掉之局。

至於兩晉對西南地區的統治政策與態度，乃因叛亂的頻仍及其性質的複雜有所改變。晉初，由於局勢穩定與叛亂性質的單純，晉仍以一貫的態度對待；隨著亂事不斷爆發與政局日趨動盪，晉對西南的統治方式亦逐漸顯現其特殊性。首先，以本地人為官的情形漸漸普遍，而其比例的高低與晉室控制力伸展的程度成反比，如寧州即為比例最高的地區，但這種羈縻政策所能實行的效果極其有限，寧州也是地方官叛亂比例最高的地區。當藉本地人安定地方秩序的目的不克達成時，遂出現類似「世襲式」的家族統治方式，晉不得不賦予一個或數個與中央保持良好關係的家族權統西南事務，「家族式」的統治方式在地方安寧時，或能藉其勢力達到對地方的控制；但亂事發生時，往往非其力所能掌握，甚而反因中央賦予其較大權限，而使晉對西南地區的掌握更加不易。這種情況一直要到劉裕掌握朝政以後才有所改變，再度恢復以外地人出任西南地方官。

附註：

- (1)：成漢政權割據達四十六年之久(298—347)，東晉時期前秦苻氏入侵西南亦有十二年(373—385)。
- (2)：兩晉時期西南地區除地方官吏型的叛亂外，尚有豪族、少數民族與流民等動亂問題。豪族方面，以其具有的地方勢力為基礎，在政局動盪、身家利益受威脅時，常據地而叛，造成晉廷很大困擾；少數民族方面，因其所居地理位置的不同，接受中原文化的程度不一，與晉室之間一向維持若即若離的關係，種族之間的爭鬥擄掠常是亂事發生的主要因素；其三為流民問題，兩晉時期西南地區因流民引發的動亂，次數並不多，但亂事的延續及影響極為深遠，本文限於篇幅，對這三類型叛亂事件將另文探討。
- (3)：以為首者略作分類，大致是官吏型叛亂二十六次，地方豪強十九次，少數民族與流民則各別為一次及四次；其中兼具官吏及豪族身份者有十次，豪族與流民、豪族與少數民族結合的叛亂事件則各為一次。本數據引自拙作未刊碩士論文〔兩晉時期西南地區與中央之關係〕(附表一)「西晉時期西南地區叛亂事件表」，頁158～173。以下諸官吏叛亂附表皆源於此，文中不再重複說明。
- (4)：晉官品，郡太守、都尉及刺史不領兵者五品；刺史領兵者四品。〔通鑑〕(新興書局，台北，民國五十四年)卷三十七，職官十九「晉官品」條，頁209。
- (5)：常璩著，劉琳校注〔華陽國志校注〕(成都巴蜀書社，四川，一九八四，以下簡稱〔華陽國志〕)，卷八「大同志」，頁623。
- (6)：同上註，頁616。
- (7)：由趙廞造反時軍事主力的來源即可看出，〔華陽國志〕載：「(廞)反時(李)庠和兄特，弟流、驥、妹婿李含，天水任回、上官晶、扶風李攀，始平賈他，氏符成、隗伯、董勝等四千騎在北門，廞使庠斷北道。」卷八「大同志」，頁622。
- (8)：參見〔通鑑〕卷八十三，晉紀五，「惠帝永康元年」，頁2647—2649。
- (9)：其經過情形，參見〔晉書〕卷一百二十「李特載記」，頁3023—3025；〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」，頁616；〔通鑑〕卷八十三，晉紀五，「惠帝永康元年」，頁2647。
- (10)：〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」載：「(張)啓，犍爲人，蜀車騎將軍張翼孫也。」頁652；宮川尚志亦明確地將張氏列入武陽大姓之中，參見氏著「蜀姓考」，收入〔六朝史研究—政治、社會篇〕(日本學術振興會，東京，1956)。
- (11)：〔晉書〕卷十四「地理志」：「蜀章武元年，分犍爲立江陽郡」，頁439。而張啓之爲江陽太守，應後自犍爲而分。
- (12)：永嘉四年羅尚卒，詔書以長沙太守皮素爲益州刺史，行至巴東，以羅宇不給譙登糧援，欲治其罪，羅宇即遣人刺殺皮素，建平都尉暴重又殺羅宇，而後繼任益州刺史的韓松及張羅，又先後爲暴重及氏民符成、隗文所殺，至永嘉六年，江陽太守與廣漢羅琦又殺新上任的王異，這種地方官因權力鬥爭而相互的攻伐，深深影響地方政治的運作。參見〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」，頁648，卷十一「後賢志」，頁883—884；〔通鑑〕卷八十七，晉紀九，「懷帝永嘉三年十月」，頁2746。
- (13)：此八任刺史先後爲皮素、韓松、王異、張啓、向沈、王遜、杜毗、應詹。本資料引自

拙作未刊碩士論文〔兩晉時期西南地區與中央之關係〕附表二「兩晉時期西南地方官吏表」，頁176～178。

- (14): 「三府」，為平西將軍、益州刺史、西夷校尉三者駐防地，皆羅尚原領，各開府署，置官屬。參見〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」，頁649（註8）。
- (15): 資料來源同(13)。
- (16): 〔華陽國志〕載：「（建興元年）中原既亂，江東有事，救援無所願望，（蜀郡太守程）融等，共率吏民北出枳，欲下巴東，遂為雄將李恭、費黑所破獲。」巴東地區至此遂淪於成漢之手。卷八「大同志」，頁652。
- (17): 參見〔晉書〕卷三十七「濟南惠王遂附司馬勳傳」，頁1102。
- (18): 同上註，頁1102－1103。
- (19): 〔晉書〕卷八「穆帝紀」：「時（永和五年）石季龍死，中國亂，雍州諸豪帥馳告勳，勳率衆出駱谷，壁于懸鈞，去長安二百里，遣部將劉煥攻長安，又拔賀城。於是關中皆殺季龍太守令長以應勳。勳兵少，未能自固，復還梁州。」永和七年四月，勳「出步騎三萬，自漢中入秦州，與苻健戰于五丈原，王師敗績」。十年「桓溫伐關中，命勳出子午道，而為苻雄所敗，退屯于女媧堡」，頁197；卷三十七「濟南惠王遂附司馬勳傳」，頁1102。
- (20): 〔晉書〕卷三十七「濟南惠王遂附司馬勳傳」載：「（勳）年十餘歲，愍帝末，長安陷，劉曜將令狐泥養為子。及壯，便弓馬，能左右射。咸和六年，自關右還。」頁1102；可知司馬勳生長在長安的時間相當久。
- (21): 同上註。
- (22): 同上註。
- (23): 參見〔晉書〕卷一百十三「苻堅載記上」，頁2896－2897；〔通鑑〕卷一百三，晉紀二十五，「孝武帝康寧元年」，頁3264－3265。
- (24): 泛指秦漢時期巴蜀以南的西南夷故地，總括今雲南及貴州省一部分。晉於武帝泰始七年，將南中建寧、雲南、永昌、興古四郡。由益州分割出來，設立寧州。此後州的大小或有變動，但大致不脫這個範圍。參見〔晉書〕卷十四「地理志上」，頁440－441。
- (25): 參見蕭璠〔春秋至兩漢時期中國向南方的發展〕（台大文史叢刊，台北，民國六十二年）第四章「秦漢時期對南方的經營」，頁133。
- (26): 寧州大姓有大部分是漢置郡縣後由內地遷來的漢移民，他們與當地少數民族首領之間，藉著通婚及習俗的相染，逐漸形成地方性的豪強勢力。至兩晉時期，寧州地方豪強勢力以霍、孟、爨三姓為最大。參見〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」，頁357－469；李昆聲、祁慶富〔南詔史話〕（文物出版社，北京，1985），頁20－22。
- (27): 參見拙作未刊碩士論文〔兩晉時期西南地區與中央之關係〕附表二「兩晉時期西南地區地方官吏表」。
- (28): 即寧州的另一名稱，大致出現在三國以後。參見〔南詔史話〕，頁20－21。
- (29): 參見〔華陽國志〕卷三「蜀志」，頁263；宮川尙志，前揭書，頁217。
- (30): 參見〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」，頁369。
- (31): 惠帝光熙元年前後，西南地區北部的益州境內，流民所引發的亂事正迅速蔓延，而寧州

地區，由于陵承所率少數民族，結合大姓建寧毛詵、朱提李猛，扇動謀反，〔華陽國志〕記載當時的情況：「……夷愈強盛，破壞郡縣，沒吏民。……晉民或入交州，或入永昌、牂柯，半亦為夷所困虜，夷因攻圍州城。（李）毅但疾力固孤城，病篤，不能討戰，……光熙元年春三月，毅薨。子釗任洛，還赴到牂柯，路塞，停住交州。……首尾三年，釗乃得達丁爽。文武復逼釗領州府事。」頁 371 — 372。

- (32): 同上註，頁 373。
- (33): 同上註，頁 371。
- (34): 同上註，頁 371 — 372。
- (35): 參見〔晉書〕卷六「明帝紀」，頁 159。
- (36): 〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」記載王遜「嚴猛太過，多所誅鋤」，頁 374。
- (37): 參見〔晉書〕卷五「愍帝紀」，頁 130。
- (38): 蕭藩氏認為在以夷制夷的策略下，朝廷當以此區蠻夷做為戰爭或鎮壓叛亂的工具，加以地方資源的富厚，使其常成為在凶年時賑濟飢民的穀倉，另對此區賦稅的徵收更不遺餘力；參見氏著前揭書，頁 125 — 148。進至兩晉在中央與地方有正常聯繫時情況亦復如此。如〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」載：「太康五年，罷寧州，置南夷。……每夷供貢南夷村，入牛、金、旃、馬，動以萬計，……其供郡縣亦然。」頁 363。
- (39): 參見〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」，頁 673 — 674。
- (40): 朱提與建寧二郡為南中最富庶與重要的地區，成漢攻下二地後，對南中地區的掌握更加容易，並切斷寧州與外地的聯繫。參見〔華陽國志〕卷四「南中志」，「朱提郡」、「建寧郡」條，頁 402、414。
- (41): 〔通典〕卷三十三職官十五「總論縣佐」，頁 191。
- (42): 嚴耕望先生在其〔秦漢地方行政制度〕（收入氏著〔中國地方行政制度史〕上編，中央研究院歷史語言研究所，台北，民國六十三年）一書中，對於秦漢時期地方官吏任用之籍貫限制，有詳細的說明。大致而言，漢在武帝以後，地方長官例避本籍。其中或有例外，但畢竟是少數，此情況大致維持到黃巾之亂以前，頁 345 — 350。
- (43): 至隋，諸曹掾盡用他郡人。參見〔通典〕卷三十三職官十五「總論縣佐」，頁 191。
- (44): 西南地區四周山巒障蔽，易守而難攻，形勢上是一完整的封閉地形；其內資源豐富，物產富饒，交通便利，人民得以自給自足。但這樣的地理形勢相對的限制人民向外拓展的意願，對中原政權的關切程度不高，常為叛亂者據地自雄的資本。
- (45): 〔晉書〕卷一百「譙縱傳」記載：「譙縱，巴西南充人也。祖獻之，有重名於西土。縱少而謹慎，蜀人愛之。」頁 2636。
- (46): 參見〔晉書〕卷八十一「毛寶附毛璩傳」，頁 2127。及卷一百「譙縱傳」，頁 2636。
- (47): 〔晉書〕卷一百「譙縱傳」載曰：「義熙元年，（益州）刺史（毛璩）遣縱及侯暉等領諸縣進兵東下。侯暉有貳志，因梁州人不樂東也，……與巴西陽味結謀於五城水口，共逼縱為主。縱懼而不當，走投於水，暉引出而請之，至於再三，遂以兵逼縱於輿上。……縱乃自號梁、秦二州刺史。」頁 2636。
- (48): 同上註，頁 2636 — 2637。
- (49): 義熙三年九月，譙縱首先遣派使稱藩於姚興，並以征討劉裕為名，乞師於姚興；次年五

- 月，與江東的盧循互通聲息；義熙六年更聯合姚興、盧循、桓謙，東下荆、揚。參見〔晉書〕卷一百「譙縱傳」，頁 2637；〔通鑑〕卷一百十四晉紀三十六「安帝義熙四年」，頁 3606；「義熙六年」，頁 3609。
- (50): 參軍，官名。兩晉南北朝凡諸王及將軍開府者，皆置參軍，為重要幕僚。〔通典〕卷三十三「職官十五」，頁 189。
- (51): 參見〔華陽國志〕卷一「巴志」，頁 83 - 84。
- (52): 參見唐長孺「范長生與巴氏據蜀的關係」〔收入氏著〔魏晉南北朝史論叢編〕，生活、讀書、新知三聯書店；北京，1959〕一文，頁 155 - 162。
- (53): 〔通鑑〕卷八十五晉紀七「惠帝太安二年」，頁 2678。
- (54): 參見唐長孺，前揭文。
- (55): 〔宋書〕卷四十七「劉敬宣傳」，頁 1413。
- (56): 〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」，頁 603。
- (57): 同上書，卷二「漢中志」，頁 159。
- (58): 同上書，卷四「南中志」，頁 363。
- (59): 同上註，頁 369。
- (60): 〔晉書〕卷八十一「王遜傳」，頁 2109。
- (61): 東漢順、桓以前，西南地區發生動亂時，多由中央派將督軍平定，但因西南地區社會發展的特殊性，中央所派之平亂軍，往往造成此區夷民的困擾，故漢中郡計曹掾程包即上言曰：「昔中郎將尹就伐羌，擾動益部，百姓諺云：『虜來尚可，尹將殺我』……如臣愚見，權之遣軍，不如任之州郡。」參見〔華陽國志〕卷一「巴志」，頁 53。
- (62): 同上書，卷八「大同志」，頁 616。
- (63): 〔晉書〕卷一百二十「李特載記」，頁 3027。
- (64): 參見〔晉書〕卷一百二十「李特載記」，頁 3027；〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」，頁 632；〔通鑑〕卷八十四晉紀六「惠帝太安元年」，頁 2669。
- (65): 〔華陽國志〕卷八「大同志」載：「梁州刺史許雄數遣軍討（李）特，特備險，不得進。」頁 634。
- (66): 參見〔晉書〕卷一百二十「李特載記」，頁 3029。
- (67): 同上註。
- (68): 同上書，卷一百「譙縱傳」，頁 2637。
- (69): 參見〔宋書〕卷四十七「劉敬宣傳」，頁 1414
- (70): 〔晉書〕卷一百「譙縱傳」，頁 2637。
- (71): 〔晉書〕卷八十三「袁瓌附袁喬傳」，頁 2168 - 2169。
- (72): 參見〔晉書〕卷一百「譙縱傳」，頁 2637；〔宋書〕卷四十八「朱齡石傳」，頁 1422 - 1423。
- (73): 〔晉書〕卷四十三「山濤傳」，頁 1227。
- (74): 參見〔續漢書〕「百官志五」，劉昭注，（收入〔後漢書〕，鼎文版，七十年四月）頁 3620。
- (75): 〔晉書〕卷一百二十「李特載記」，頁 3024。

- (76): [華陽國志]卷八「大同志」,頁633。
- (77): 同上註,頁634。
- (78): 唐長孺等學者並不同意「山濤傳」所言,其以為永寧以後天下之大亂,是由「郡國無備」所引起的。參見氏著「魏晉州郡兵的設置和罷廢」(收入[魏晉南北朝史論拾遺],中華書局,北京,1983)。
- (79): [宋書]卷四十七「劉敬宣傳」,頁1413。
- (80): [晉書]卷二十四「職官志」,頁745。
- (81): 參見[晉書]卷五十七「張光傳」,頁1564。
- (82): 參見[晉書]卷七十一「陳頴傳」,頁1892—1894。
- (83): [晉書]卷五十八「周訪附周仲孫傳」,頁1586。
- (84): 如周楚出任益州刺史、周熾為梓潼太守、周仲孫居寧州刺史之位,同上註「周訪附周楚、周熾、周仲孫傳」,頁1578—1590。
- (85): 同上註,頁1586。
- (86): [晉書]卷一百十三「苻堅載記上」,頁2896—2897。
- (87): [晉書]卷八十一「毛寶附毛璩傳」,頁2126—2128。
- (88): 參見拙作未刊碩士論文「兩晉時期西南地區與中央之關係」附錄二「兩晉時期西南地區地方官吏表」,頁181、190。

The Ontology of Universals: A Critical Study in Strawson's Metaphysics

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1. Introduction

Like other perennial philosophical problems, the problem of universals still is an interesting topic of discussion. The old labels 'realism', 'nominalism', and 'conceptualism' still have their places of application in contemporary philosophy even though they dub arguments and perspectives quite different from the classical ones. In the area of analytic philosophy with which we are presently concerned, the problem of universals is no less important. Treatments of the problem bear heavily upon philosophies of logic and language; specific interpretations of logical notations and meaning analyses of language, for example, are often underlied by specific theories of universals.

P. F. Strawson's treatment of the problem of universals is a species upon itself. He resists classical (Platonic) realism; his theory of particulars is a strong statement against it. (The theory was represented in an article by the author in the previous issue of this publication.) Yet, he is by no means a nominalist; his theory of universals upholds that universals are irreducible to particulars. There is a good sense in which Strawson is a conceptualist proponent; his approach, however, is quite distinct from the traditional epistemological or psychological approach. Strawson follows a logicolinguistic line of reasoning; but, at the same time, he assumes an epistemic-metaphysical foundation for the notion of universals. Above all, Strawson's theory of universals is essentially related to the notions of predicate term and predication.

To define Strawson's position on the issue of universals, the following contrasts between his *version* of realism and some popular forms of nominalism must be noted. The logical nominalists, notably W. v. O. Quine, refuse to allow general terms to occupy the position of 'x' in the schemata 'Fx', which is accessible to quantifiers,¹ whereas Strawson maintains that general terms can be quantified over, and thus he would endorse the logic of higher calculus of functions. The reductionistic nominalists, for example, Gilbert Ryle, propose to reduce all statements seemingly about universals to statements about particular things,² whereas Strawson does not believe that such a reductionistic program can be carried through. The linguistic nominalists, for example, some Wittgensteinians like Morris Weitz, deny the existence of any common characteristics among a class of objects subsumed under one general name,³ whereas Strawson maintains that there are "types" in language which are thought of as units of meaning.⁴ These contrasts unambiguously show the kind of position Strawson maintains. He is anything but a reductionistic nominalist.

According to Strawson, the following categories of "things" are universals:

qualities, numbers, species, relations, kinds, states, processes, language types, classes, propositions, and so forth. To be more specific, "things" like snow, gold, water, furniture, swimming, anger, blood, bacon, music, Beethoven's Symphony No. 9, dress, engineering, civilization, football-game, $2+2 = 4$, courage, happiness, the number 4, the word-type 'red', the proposition "all crows are black," flammability, man, auto-makes like 1987 Mercede Bens, and so forth, are all universals. The inventory can be enlarged; but this much is enough for a denotative definition of universals. Yet, surely an enumeration of universal "things" cannot satisfy our need. What we need is a general characterization of universals so that we could distinguish them from particulars.

As far as the English language is concerned, the grammatical forms of expression may seem helpful in identifying the presence of universals, thus, for example, the common nouns (for example, 'man'), the collective nouns (for example, 'sheep'), the material nouns (for example, 'mutton'), and the abstract nouns (for example, cleverness, 'poverty', 'choice') are all grammatical indications of universals, as are adjectives and finite verbs; while on the other hand proper nouns are in most cases indications of particulars. The grammatical guide may be helpful, yet it does not fully serve philosophical purposes. For, on the one hand, it is parochial, that is, restricted to one language; and, on the other hand, unreliable because some proper nouns may be used as common nouns as 'Czar' in 'the Czar of Russia', 'Newlon' in 'the Newton of the age'; also they may be transformed into a verb, as 'Plato' into 'Platonize', or transformed into an adjective, as 'Kant' into 'Kantian'.

Another attempt to draw the distinction between particular and universal suggests that the distinction may be made through the distinction between singular and general terms. To make the latter distinction, however, is no easier task. Quine suggests that, grammatically, singular terms have no plural endings or preceding articles while general terms admit of both; and, semantically, a singular term "names or purports to name just one object while general terms possess built-in modes . . . of *dividing* their reference."⁵ The grammatical point may be discarded for the same reason as argued previously, while the semantical point is dismissed by Quine for the reason that some terms, for example, 'Pegasus', commonly recognized as singular terms, may name nothing while some other terms, for example, 'natural satellite of the earth', commonly acknowledged as general terms, have no divided reference.⁶

The common logical or linguistic attempts to provide a characterization of universals do not seem to yield satisfactory results; yet, this does not mean that the path is closed. We may extract from Strawson's writings a theory of universals.

In an investigation of the conditions of the successful introduction of a term, particular or universal, into a proposition, Strawson finds that the successful identifying reference to a particular universally *presupposes* an empirical proposition of a relevant fact in the world, while the introduction of a universal needs not presuppose such an empirical proposition but may presuppose some fact or knowledge about the

language used. Or, in other words, for the introduction of a particular to be successful at all, it is required of both the speaker and the hearer to know some individuating fact about the particular concerned; whereas, in the case of the introduction of a universal, it generally suffices to have the speaker and the hearer understand the language that is in use.⁷ However, it is not clear exactly what this theory means as is presented in *Individuals*. Elsewhere, we find Strawson clarifying his point. In one of his later articles, there is a quasi-definition of universal which reads as follows:

It is a necessary condition for a thing's being a general thing that it can be referred to by a singular substantival expression, a unique reference of the words making up that expression.⁸

This quasi-definition partially explains why the introduction of a universal does not necessarily involve a presupposition of a fact about the world save an understanding of the language used. For, to say that one understands the language used to introduce a universal, is to say that he apprehends the meaning of that language; and, to be able to apprehend the meaning is to be able to know *which* universal is being talked about or introduced, since, according to the quasi-definition, universals are such that unique references to them are determined by the meaning of the linguistic expressions of them. For example, the meaning of the expression 'wisdom' suffices to determine what the answering universal is, namely, wisdom. In contrast, the meaning of the expression 'the wisest philosopher' alone cannot determine which particular answers to it. Let us call this a *linguistic definition* of universals.

As against particulars, universals may be said to be principles of grouping or collecting. Hence there is a *functional definition* of universals. The category of universals is then a system of principles of grouping particulars. Thus, for example, the universal philosopher, groups such particulars as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, *et cetera*. The fact that universals group particulars corresponds to the logical fact that the variable of the function 'Fx' has values.

The grouping of particulars by a universal is not unrestricted; it is governed by a principle. As Strawson puts it, the principle is that "the term [universal] may be said to group all those particulars whose designations may be coupled with it to yield true statements."⁹ The principle is also stated as that a term "may be said to *collect* just those terms such that when it is assertively tied to any one of them, the result is not only a significant, but also a true, proposition."¹⁰ Thus, for example, the expressions, 'Wise is Socrates!' 'Is Socrates wise?' 'Socrates is a Roman' are not cases in point, while the sentence 'Socrates is wise' is. Now it is noticeable that the grouping theory of universals, so to speak, seems suggestive of a metaphysical explanation of the semantic and the syntax of the logical function 'Fx' and of propositional symbolisms like "Socrates is wise." Furthermore, the theory is seen to be instrumental in making the distinction between subject and predicate and in explaining the logical fact that the subject term in a subject-predicate proposition is accessible to quantifiers whereas the

predicate term is not.

3. Types of Universals

There are at least three major types of universals, namely, characterizing, sortal (instantial), and feature universals.¹¹ The classification is not meant to be exhaustive and it can be expressed with different terminology. Thus there are qualities or properties, substances, and materials, having their linguistic counterparts as quality or property-names, substance-names, and material names, respectively.¹²

Characterizing universals are such as indicated by adjectives, verbs, and abstract nouns; and sortal universals are indicated by common nouns. Feature universals, often indicated by mass-nouns, are a special type of universals which does not serve as a grouping principle for particulars, but rather provides a basis for the introduction of particulars. We will discuss Strawson's treatment of features in greater detail.

Besides the general principle of grouping, an *ad hoc* principle for the grouping function of characterizing universals is that there must be "a certain characteristic resemblance between those particulars" collected at the same time or different times,¹³ whereas the *ad hoc* principle limiting the grouping function of sortal universals is that the particulars collected "will have to each other a general, or sortal, resemblance."¹⁴

Within each major type of universals, there are also type-distinctions, that is, the universals are arranged into a hierarchical scale. Thus, some universals are said to be of lower or higher type than others in the same category. For example, property of property is of a higher type than property, and kind is of a lower type than kind of kind; from this we then could say that color is of higher type than red, and that mankind is of lower type than animal.

The hierarchy of types of universals within the same category is explained by saying that universals not only group particulars, they also group *ways* of grouping particulars.¹⁵ That is to say, some universals also group some other universals, such as the characterizing universal, virtue, collects another characterizing universal, honesty, to yield a true proposition "honesty is a virtue."

Concerning such a theory of types of universals, the following remark is important. According to Strawson, the grouping of universals by universals is not on the same level as the grouping of particulars by universals. The grouping function of universals is *primarily* to group particulars, that is, the grouping of particulars by universals is fundamental to the grouping of universals by universals. The latter sort of grouping is simply an *analogical extension* of the fundamental sort. "We think of universals collecting other universals in ways analogous to the ways in which universals collect. . . particulars,"¹⁶ Strawson says. The role of this notion is extremely important in that it provides a ground for Strawson to deal a double-blow to Platonic realists and nominalistic reductionists on the issue of universals, therefore it helps to define Strawson's position as one of neither extreme realism nor extreme nominalism.

As a passing remark, Strawson's theory of universals, though in some respects it

resembles Aristotle's hierarchical scale of beings, differs from his in a crucial point: universals are for Strawson not essence *in* particulars as they are for Aristotle. It also differs from Plato's hierarchy of forms at least in that the Strawsonian universals do not possess the sort of reality that the Platonic forms possess.

4. Relations of Universals

Particulars form a system, so do universals. As Strawson has indicated in the last chapter of *Individuals*, "non-particulars, too, may be related and ordered among themselves; they may form systems; and the structure of such a system may acquire a kind of autonomy, so that further members are essentially identified by their position in the system."¹⁷ However, when he wrote this he did not seem to have in mind a definite and clear idea of what the system of universals is like, and this is perhaps the reason that such a system never comes to view in *Individuals*. In one of his latest articles,¹⁸ the image of the system becomes visible.

In an attempt to explain the asymmetry of subjects and predicates, Strawson elaborates about the asymmetry of particulars and universals and puts forth the following two theses. Thesis I, of the exclusiveness of universals:

Every general character is such that . . . there is some other general character, or range of characters, the possession of which, in question would be *incompatible* with its possession or of any member of which, by the individual of the specified character.¹⁹

Thesis II, of the involvement of universals:

[Any general character is such that] whatever individual particular it is presented as assigned either there is some other general character (or characters) the possession of which by the specified individual would be sufficient for that individual's possession of the assigned character or there is some other general character (or characters) the possession of which by the specified individual would be *necessary* for that individual's possession of the assigned character.²⁰

To exemplify and illustrate Thesis I, consider a simple, fundamental case. Given any universal, for example, color, as assigned to an individual particular, for example, a piece of glass, to yield the proposition, "this piece of glass is colored," there is another universal, for example, colorless, the assignment of which to the piece of glass would result in the proposition, "this piece of glass is colorless," incompatible with the former one.

To exemplify and illustrate Thesis II, we may consider the same universal, color, as assigned to the piece of glass. For the piece of glass to have color, there is a *sufficient* condition, namely, that it is, for example, red. The proposition resulted from the assignment of the universal, color, to the particular piece of glass is entailed by another proposition resulted from the assignment of another universal, red, to it. Thus, the

universal color stands in an involvement relationship with another universal red *vis a vis* a specified particular. The involvement relationship can be represented the other way round. For what has been said about the universal color's involvement is equivalent to saying something about the universal red's involvement, namely, that the possession of color is *necessary* for the piece of glass to be red.²¹

Summing up these two notions about the logical relations of universals, Strawson says,

General characters come in groups the members of which are related by relations of mutual exclusiveness or (sometimes) of one way involvement *vis-a-vis* any and every *individual* particular they may be presented as assigned to.²²

In contrast, particulars do not come in such a way. Here in consists a significant distinction between the two broad categories of particulars and universals.

Elsewhere the exclusiveness/involvement of universals is explained and expressed by means of a metaphor. In Strawson's later work *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar*, he talks of "concepts" coming in "ranges"²³ instead of general characters coming in groups. "The concepts of lion, tiger, panther, belong to one range, the feline-animal-species range; the concepts of yellow, red, blue, to another, that of colour or hue."²⁴ The notion of a range is explained in terms of a metaphorical notion of logical space, which is drawn from the notion of a physical space. We think of a physical space as occupied by a number of particulars; in a like manner, we think of a range as a logical space occupied by a number of universals (that is, concepts).

The metaphor can be easily maneuvered so as to explain the notion of exclusiveness of universals. Particulars are thought of as occupants of a physical space, exhibiting spatial exclusiveness; so, universals can in a like way be thought of as occupants of a logical space, exhibiting logical exclusiveness against other universals of the same range.

As the metaphor goes, it provides vocabulary for expressing the differentiation of universals. For particulars, the ultimate principle of individuation is given by their positions in the spatio-temporal system. For universals, the ultimate principle of differentiation is given by their "exclusive occupancy of a position in a logical space."²⁵ For example, that red is distinguishable from green, can be explained by the metaphor that red and green respectively occupies a region in a logical space such that any particular assigned to red cannot at the same time be assigned to green. The differentiation is thus brought out in terms of the mutual exclusiveness between red and green *via* an assigned particular.

Now the notion of involvement of universals can be explained in the same terms. Let Strawson speak for himself:

One concept [that is, universal], we say, may be wholly included in a part of the region of logical space occupied by another or contain another within a part of its logical space. Thus the region of logical space occupied by the concept *red* includes as a part that occupied by scarlet and is included in that occupied by *coloured*. . . .²⁶

On such an explanation, it is easy to see why the notion of involvement of universals has been such that, for any universal already assigned to a given particular, either there is a universal the assignment of which to the particular is a necessary condition, or there is a universal the assignment of which to the same particular is a sufficient condition of the assignment of that previous universal to the particular.

There is nothing mysterious in Strawson's metaphor of logical space. Strawson stresses the point that universals exhibit this logical character through assignment to particulars, and this produces a proposition effecting the configuration of a logical space. With regard to the notion of involvement explained in terms of (logical) space containment, we observe an affinity with the Aristotelian notion of specimen-species-genus. In an occasion when Strawson talks about different kinds of "ties,"²⁷ his allusion to this Aristotelian notion appears unambiguously. There he indirectly suggests that universal may have "a characteristic relation to each other, which is sometimes described as that of sub-or super-ordination,"²⁸ as, for example, "Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier,"²⁹ The affinity, however, should not be over-stated as to become assimilation.

5. The Notion of Feature Universals

There is, in Strawson's opinion, a special type of universals called *feature* universals or simply *features*. His theory about feature universals is very interesting and plays a very special role in his metaphysics.

Roughly speaking, the central thesis of the theory is that there are such concepts (or universals) as features and such facts as *feature-placing* facts underlying the thought of particulars and universals (sortal and characterizing). The features and the *feature-placing* facts are said to provide the basis for the introduction of the notion of a particular. There are many complexities and problems involved in, and about, the theory.

What are feature universals? Strawson claims that in ordinary language there are "convincing examples of cases where we operate . . . merely with the universal feature itself and the notion of placing."³⁰ These examples are such as given in the statements 'there is *gold* here', 'there is *water* here', 'there is *coal* here', *et cetera*. The material names incorporated in these statements are names for features, the index 'here' indicates the placing of the feature; and the statements are thus called *feature-placing* statements. Besides those, there is an abundance of others: *snow, bacon, blood, flesh, music, jam, sugar, rain, wool*, just to mention a few. Generally speaking, those stuff-like things, whose names are called 'material names' by Strawson, 'mass-terms' by

Quine, or 'collective nouns' by Goodman, are what Strawson would include in his inventory of feature universals.

But the stuff-like things are not the only feature universals; there are many others which, however, are not so apparent. Thus, according to Strawson, when we speak of "smelling *cat*," "*cat* again," or "hunting *lion*," we are operating with the feature concepts of *cat* and *lion*. Analogically there must be such things as apple-, man-, stone-feature. Generally, there are also features of the substance-like things.

Now, what of the notion of *placing*? Unfortunately, Strawson has not given any explicit and elaborated explanation of it. However, on the basis of his theory of the spatio-temporal system and the examples he gives of *feature-placing* statements, we may attempt a rough sketch of what the notion amounts to. The *placing* of a feature is the locating, demonstratively with space or time indices, the presence of a feature. The occurrence of 'here' or 'now' is, then, characteristic of a *feature-placing* statement, and brings out the force of 'placing'. This implies that the feature is given in the perceptible field. Hence a *feature-placing* statement is an empirical, existential statement the truth of which is warranted by immediate acquaintance.

From what have been said about the notions of *feature* and of *placing*, we may interpret Strawson's idea of a *feature-placing* statement in the following way. A *feature-placing* statement is a statement about *something* that is *given* in experience; while this *something* is not apprehended as a particular instance of some sort but is apprehended as a general feature of particulars of a sort. When we say "*Cat* again" we are reporting or claiming that something *featuring* what we call cats is given again; or when we say "It is *raining* now," we are reporting that something *featuring* raining is present now. Interpreting Strawson's notion of *feature-placing* statements in this way, we might have brought it very close to Johnson's notion of primitive propositions.³¹

6. The Primitiveness of Features

Feature universals constitute "the primitive pre-particular level of thought."³² This level is called the pre-particular level as it is prior to the introduction of particulars and thus prior to the appearance of sortal and characterizing universals. It is primitive in the sense that it is simpler, in respect to its logical complexities, than that of the level on which we operate with the thought of particulars and universals.

The relation between the two levels of thought is that the *feature-placing* level, as it were, *underlies* the level of particulars and universals. The relation can be put in another way as follows: "The facts they [that is, the *feature-placing* statements] state are presupposed. . . by the introduction of certain kinds of particulars"³³ in the sense that the *feature-placing* fact provides the materials, or a basis, for the introduction. The notions as indicated by 'primitive', 'pre-particular', 'underlies', 'are presupposed', *et cetera* come to the same point. They all can be explained by the following quotation:

In making the feature-placing statement, we uttered a completed sentence without mentioning individuals. If we *merely* mention the individual without going on to say anything about it, we failed to utter a completed sentence; yet what the feature-placing sentence does explicitly is, in a sense, implicit in this mention. So . . . we may regard the notion of a particular instance of *certain sorts* of general things as a kind of logical compound of the simpler notions of a feature and of placing.³⁴

This is the central thesis of the feature-theory. It is, then, desirable to give a more detailed analysis of it.

Strawson's point can be metaphorically restated and illustrated as follows. A particular of a sort is the *folding-up* of a *feature-placing* fact. Thus, for example, the fact as stated by 'there is water here' is *folded up* into a particular as indicated by, for example, this (pool of) water'. In the original *feature-placing* sentence, the word 'water' indicates the feature water, the index 'here' indicates the placing of the feature. (For Strawson, the fundamental ground for differentiating particulars from one another is the multiplicity of places). But what of the locution 'there is'? It indicates the *given* of the feature and hence determines the character of the statement as an existential, empirical statement. In the expression introducing the particular pool of water, the word 'water' indicates the particularized feature. While the demonstrative 'this' has many functions: It absorbs the notion of placing and thus has the force to particularize the feature; it also achieves what 'there is' achieves. Then the notions of the feature and of placing are *folded up* into the notion of the particular, this (pool of) water.

But what of the parenthesized 'pool of'? The preposition 'of' has no significance here; its presence is required by grammar. The word 'pool' indicates the interpolation of a set of criteria adopted for the particularization. To show what this means, consider the following. But adopting a *different* set of criteria for the particularization, we can *fold up* the same *feature-placing* fact to yield such a particular as "this (glass of) water." By adopting still another set of criteria, we may have such a particular as "this (pond of) water." As to what determines which set of criteria to be adopted we will not discuss here, since this problem has no immediate concern with our purpose.³⁵

On the above model analysis, many notions of the feature-theory can be explained easily. The notion of a particular is seen to be a logical compound of the notions of a feature and of placing; and, consequentially, the *feature-placing* level is simpler than that of the level of particulars. It is also easy to see why the *feature-placing* facts are said to underlie, or be presupposed by, or provide a basis for, the introduction of particulars. For it is now clear that the introduction of such particulars as "this (pool of) water," "this (glass of) water," "this (pond of) water," *et cetera*, all have their basis in the fact that there is water here.

Two points must be noted. The type of particulars here explained in terms of the

feature-theory is the basic type of particulars. Other non-basic types of particulars are dependent on, and thus explainable in terms of, the basic type. And, it is not the case that for *every* sort of particulars there is a *feature-placing* fact. Thus, for instance, it is not the case that for particulars of the sort "pools of water" there is a *feature-placing* fact "there is a pool of water," and for particulars of the sort "glasses of water" there is another *feature-placing* fact "there is a glass of water." Rather, it is the case that particulars of the different sorts, "pools of water," "glasses of water," "ponds of water," and so on, have the same basis in the *feature-placing* fact that there is water here.

7. Problems of the Feature Theory

The nature of the feature-theory appears to be problematic. As Pears has remarked, the possibility of feature concepts is not unquestionable.³⁶ Even Strawson himself acknowledges that the theory has "a speculative and uncertain character."³⁷ The problem: Since it is altogether not sure, to others as well as to Strawson himself, whether there is such a level of thought as constituted by feature concepts underlying the level of thought of particulars and universals, on what ground does Strawson envisage the theory and under what condition can the theory be accepted? Strawson has an argument in defence of the theory. Thus he says, "they [that is, skeptics of the theory] do not show that it is logically absurd to *suppose* that there *might be* such a level of thought," and then proceeds to "suppose that the idea of such a level of thought is coherent."³⁸ The argument as such is far too weak and negative to defend anything, and, if taken seriously, it is unacceptable since it is plainly an argument from ignorance. The problem, then, remains here unsolved. However, the problem must be given a solution, unsatisfactory as it may be, in order that we can go on with our discussion. In his argument, Strawson seems to suggest a way of viewing the feature-theory so as to make it defensible.

The theory could be properly regarded as a *supposition* or *postulate* in Strawson's philosophy. Its place is justified by the service it provides for explanations and reasonings. If the theory is so viewed, then problems about it would be mostly matters of logic, namely, whether it is free of contradiction, and whether it is necessary for the set-up of his logico-metaphysics.

But, to take the theory as a supposition or postulate is not altogether promising; another problem arises. Since Strawson claims his metaphysics to be *descriptive*, the feature-theory would seem to be foreign to the nature of his metaphysics if it were viewed in the way we propose. For supposing is not describing, any more than describing is speculating. If the feature-theory is taken as a supposition, then, whether there is such a level of thought as the theory advocates would be open to serious doubt, in other words, whether Strawson, with regard to his feature-theory, is revealing the general features of the conceptual scheme we are operating with would be a question for him. Strawson seems to be aware of this problem; he justifies the theory in the

following way:

Perhaps there are such stages [that is, from the feature level to the particular level] in the history of the individual person's conceptual development. Perhaps there are not. I do not know and it does not matter. What is in question is not an order of temporal development, but an order of explanation.³⁹

It does matter!

So, it seems that Strawson is confronted by a dilemma: If the feature-theory is taken as a theory about the conceptual scheme we are operating with, then Strawson must make sure of himself or argue more positively that there *is* such a level of thought as constituted by feature concepts; if the feature-theory is not taken in this way but as a supposition or postulate, then it is not consistent with what the descriptive metaphysics claims to attain. Strawson is frank enough to admit that the theory has a "speculative and uncertain character" and he could not forward any positive argument for it nor would he accept the consequence that the feature-theory is foreign to the general nature of descriptive metaphysics. This may not be a genuine dilemma if there is a way of avoiding the two alternatives, but we do not know where the way lies.

After all, what exactly is the distinction between a feature and a sortal universal? As we have discussed before, sortal universals supply, perhaps themselves are, principles for *grouping, distinguishing, enumerating, identifying, and reidentifying* particulars, especially of the basic type. Feature universals such as *snow, water, and coal* are not sortal universals since "no one of them of itself provides a principle for distinguishing, enumerating and reidentifying particulars of a sort."⁴⁰ Distinguishing feature from sortal universals in this way is the reason why Strawson regards *snow* as a feature but not a sortal universal. *Snow* of itself does not supply principles for distinguishing, enumerating, and reidentifying particulars, therefore, it is not a sortal universal. We may look at another example. The feature universal, *cat*, is distinguished from the sortal universal, *cat*, in that the former does not supply principles for distinguishing, enumerating and reidentifying particulars. So, in 'cat again' or 'smelling cat' the word 'cat' introduces the feature universal, *cat*, whereas in 'cats are quiet' or 'Candy is a cat' it introduces the sortal universal, *cat*. However, it is always arguable whether the universal introduced by 'cat again' or 'smelling cat' does or does not supply principles for distinguishing, enumerating and reidentifying particular cats, in other words, whether it is a feature or a sortal universal. But to argue in this way amounts to arguing whether there are feature universals as distinguishable from sortal universals, and, indeed, to doubting whether there are feature universals at all. This brings us back to our criticism of the feature-theory as a whole.

Suppose that there is such a thing as *cat-feature*, then it must not be the same

as the sortal *cat*, or, what amounts to the same, it does not supply such principles as the sortal *cat* does. To put the distinction between the feature and the sortal universals in this way seems tantamount to making an analytical or definitional criterion. But except this, we could not find another better way of clarifying the obscurity in Strawson's treatment of feature universals in contradistinction to sortal universals.

8. Summary

The functions and characters of universals as elaborated by Strawson are summed up as follows. Grammatically, universals are in most cases indicated by common nouns (abstract or concrete), by verbs, and by adjectives; semantically, they can be referred to with expressions by virtue of their meanings alone. Again universals function primarily as principles of grouping or collecting particulars and derivatively as principles of grouping other universals.⁴¹

There are two senses in which universals are said to have types. First, universals are recognized as distinguishable into many kinds; the major ones are sortal, characterizing, and feature universals. Second, they are also arrangeable into a hierarchical order so that a universal may be said to be of higher or lower type than another.

The theory of the logical relationships of universal holds that, for any universal already assigned to a given particular, there is at least one other universal the assignment of which to the same particular is logically incompatible with the assignment of that previous universal to the particular; and, for any universal already assigned to a given particular, either there is a universal the assignment of which to the same particular is a necessary condition, or there is a universal the assignment of which to the same particular is a sufficient condition, of the assignment of the (previous) universal to that particular. This is the theory of the exclusiveness/ involvement of universals, which is also explained and expressed in terms of the metaphor of logical space.

The most primitive level of thought is constituted by features. A feature concept is a concept of some given experiential evidence cognizable and recognizable as pervading particulars of a sort. A feature-placing statement is one that particularizes a feature into space and time locations.

The theory of feature suffers at least two difficulties. First, the existence of the level of thought constituted by features is problematic; it is agreeable that we do have such a level of thought. Second, the distinction between sortal universals and feature universals is unclear; there are cases where a feature may be said to supply principles of grouping particulars like a sortal does.

After all, the chief contribution of Strawson's theory of universals, as we see it, consists in its providing an epistemic-metaphysical explanation for predication in logic and language, thereby showing that the subject-predicate structure is *not* a mere

accidental or conventional feature in logic and language. The theory of universals explains how predicate terms are combined with subject terms in subject-predicate propositions. For Strawson, a predicate term primarily introduces a universal while a subject term primarily introduces a particular; and, the ways they are combined into a subject-predicate proposition are explainable in terms of the characters and functions of universals and the nature of particulars.

However, the theory of universals, together with the theory of particulars, is not sufficient to found predication on a firm basis because the theory cannot explain why there must be subject-predicate propositions at all. Strawson is well aware of this problem and he does attempt to deal with it. This, we will discuss in another occasion.

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Note

1. The term 'logical nominalists' is coined solely for the purpose of indicating the outlook of the position concerned; it has no other special meanings or associations. So are the terms 'reductionist nominalists' and 'linguistic nominalists', which will appear hereafter. For Quine's argument against realism and his contention, see Quine, "On What There Is," in the author's *From a Logical Point of View*, pp. 9-15, and his "Logic and the Reification of Universals," in *From a Logical Point of View*, pp. 102-29.
2. Thus Ryle contends, "It is my own view that all statements which seem to be 'about universals' are analysable in the same way, for example, the sentence 'Colour involves extension' is analysed as 'Whatever is coloured is extended', and

- consequently that general terms are never really the names of subjects of attributes." See Gilbert Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," original in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* XXXII (1931-32): 139-70, reprinted in *The Linguistic Turn*, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Phoenix Books edition, 1967), p. 91.
3. There are different interpretations of Wittgenstein. When we refer to "some Wittgensteinians" as linguistic nominalists, we are not implying that Wittgenstein himself is a nominalist, but rather, we mean those philosophers who develop some nominalistic theses from Wittgenstein's writings. Thus Morris Weitz analyses the concept of art on the basis of his understanding of Wittgenstein's sayings about "games" in *Philosophical Investigations*. Weitz contends, "If we actually look and see what it is that we call 'art', we will also find no common properties — only strands of similarities." Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," original in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* XV (1956), reprinted in *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, 4th ed., & intro, by Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 514. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed. of the English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), propositions 66 and 67 on pp. 31^e-32^e.
 4. See Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 233-34.
 5. Quine, *Word and Object*, pp. 90-91 (italics mine).
 6. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-96.
 7. See Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 180-186.
 8. Strawson, "Particular and General," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 49 (italics Strawson's).
 9. Strawson, "Singular Terms and Predication," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 68.
 10. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 167.
 11. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68, 202.
 12. See Strawson, "Particulars and General," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 33.
 13. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 170.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
 15. See Strawson, "Singular Terms and Predication," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 68.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
 17. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 233.
 18. Strawson, "The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates," first published in *Language, Belief and Metaphysics*, Vol. I, ed. by Howard E. Kiefer & Milton K. Munitz (New York: State University of New York Press, 1970); reprinted in the author's *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, pp. 96-115.
 19. Strawson, "The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 102.
 20. *Ibid.*

21. The example and its explanation here provided is due to Strawson. See his "The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, pp. 104-105, 113.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 112 (Strawson's italics).
23. See Strawson, *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar* (London: Methuen, 1974,) pp. 17-20. By "concepts" he means general concepts; and general concepts, general characters, and universals, are mere different names for the same category of entities. This assimilation is one of the important, but implicit, assumptions of Strawson's.
24. Strawson, *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar*, p. 18.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
26. *Ibid.* (Strawson's italics).
27. See Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 167-73.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
31. According to W. E. Johnson, the exclamatory or impersonal are *primitive* propositions such as 'It lightens!' 'Lightening now!' (These examples are similar to Strawson's examples as 'It is raining', 'Cat again'.) A primitive proposition asserts "not a piece of given knowledge, but a piece of given reality that is to be characterised in knowledge." This "piece of given reality" is perhaps what Strawson would call a feature. See Johnson, *Logic*, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921; reprinted edition, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1964), Chpt. II, especially page 21.
32. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 206.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 203 (italics mine).
34. Strawson, "Particular and General," in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 38.
35. For Strawson's discussion of the criteria in question, see his "Particular and General," section X, in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, pp. 46-48; and *Individuals*, pp. 204-205, 207.
36. See D. F. Pears, "A Critical Study of P. F. Strawson's *Individuals*," Part II, *Philosophical Quarterly* XI (1961): 262-77.
37. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 209.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 205 (italics mine).
39. Strawson, *Individuals*, p. 209.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
41. It must be noted that particulars also group or collect universals. Hence "Socrates is wise" and "Socrates is a philosopher." Two universals are collected by the same particular. But there is a difference between particular's grouping universals and universal's grouping particulars. The difference is in the principles of grouping.

On the one hand, in the case of a particular grouping sortal universals, the principle is that the universals grouped "will have a characteristic relation to each other, which is sometimes described as that of sub-or super-ordination;" where in the case of a particular grouping characterizing universals, the principle is such as "supplied by the continuity of the particular . . . vaguely referred to as spatio-temporal continuity," See Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 169-70. On the other hand, the general principle of universal's grouping particulars is, as mentioned before, the principle of resemblance among the particulars grouped.

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the Chinese people. It is argued that the study of the history of the Chinese people is not only a study of the past, but also a study of the present and the future. The second part of the paper discusses the role of the Chinese people in the world. It is argued that the Chinese people have played a significant role in the world, and that their role will continue to be significant in the future. The third part of the paper discusses the relationship between the Chinese people and the world. It is argued that the Chinese people and the world are interdependent, and that the relationship between them is a complex one. The fourth part of the paper discusses the future of the Chinese people. It is argued that the Chinese people will continue to play a significant role in the world, and that their role will be even more significant in the future.

FOUNDEDNESS AND MOTIVATION

Chan Wing-Cheuk

"Foundedness" and "Motivation" are two fundamental notions in phenomenology. (1) But what is the relationship between them? It seems to be quite difficult to find an answer to this question in the existing literature of phenomenology. For example, no one can deny that these two concepts play important roles in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*. But to this question Merleau-Ponty did not provide any answer. He did not even give us any thematic characterizations of both concepts, except for some short notes of clarification. The lack of an explicit clarification of the relationship between "foundedness" and "motivation" often makes one wonder if these two concepts are synonymous or interchangeable. Our task here is to trace back the problem in the phenomenology of Husserl and to provide a clarification of these two concepts, so that a precise relationship between them can be determined.

I. The Nature of Foundedness:

As early as in the *Investigation III of Logical Investigations* Husserl defines "foundedness" as follows: "A content of the species *A* is founded upon a content of the species *B* if an *A* can by its essence... not exist, unless a *B* also exists" (p.475). But a distinction between reciprocal and one-sided foundedness exists, "according as the law in question is convertible or not" (p.466). For example, there is a reciprocal foundedness between "colour" and "extention", "since no colour is thinkable without a certain extention, and no extention without a certain colour" (*Ibid*). As another example, judgement can only be "one-sidedly founded on underlying presentations, since these latter need not function as foundation of judgements" (*Ibid*). On the other hand, there is distinction between immediate and mediate foundedness, "according as the two parts are immediately and mediately associated" (*Ibid.*, p. 467). For example, the generic "moment" of Colour can be only mediately founded on the generic "moment" of Determinate Extention, since the former, "can only be realized in and with a 'moment' of combination with a certain definite extention" (*Ibid*).

In addition, Husserl emphasizes that the relation of foundedness is a "lawful" connection. The validity of reciprocity or one-sidedness, mediacy or immediacy "is based by law on the pure Genera involved" (*Ibid*). That is to say, although foundedness is a relation between two contents or individual existents, it is not an empirical relationship. It is rather a "formal" relation between two contents or things according to their pure Species or essences. In this sense, foundedness can be regarded as a

relation between two pure Species or "material essences" (*Ibid*, p.463)

But foundedness is also characterized as a formal-ontological relationship. (2) Then, in addition to foundedness as a "structural-formal relationship" between two empirical contents, it can also be understood as a formal-ontological as well as a material-ontological relationship. As a formal-ontological relation "foundedness" is a relation between two "formal essences", e.g., a pair of parts of whole. As a material-ontological relation it is a relation between two "material essences", e.g., "colour as such" and "brightness as such". It is true that formal ontology is essentially different from material ontology. While the formal-ontological truth is purely analytic, the material-ontological truth is synthetic. (3) The former grounds itself in the *Sinne* of formal essences or categories; the latter is based on the material essences or pure Species. That is to say, the formal-ontological truth is established through a *Sinn*-analytic, on the other hand, the justification of material-ontological truth appeals to the "eidetic variation". But, according to Husserl, there is also a "correlative equivalence" between formal and material ontologies. He points out that the formal essence or category, though it differs from the material essence, is nothing but "an empty form which fits all possible [material] essences" (*Ideas* § 10). For example, a "part" is essentially a "more essential form" and as empty form it can fit the material essences such as "colour as such". In virtue of this kind of formal universality, any formal-ontological relation, such as foundedness, has an equivalent material-ontological counterpart. For, according to Husserl, the formal ontology "prescribes to the material ontologies a formal constitution common to all of them" (*Ibid*). On the other hand, genetically speaking, the formal categories can be regarded as a result of the formalization of the material essences or of the contents of pure Species. Hence, one can say that the concept of foundedness as a formal-ontological relationship is "genetically derivative". In fact, for a phenomenologist, the appeal to the procedure of formalization can only play a secondary role. It is because "Difficult notions employed by us in our clarificatory study of knowledge, and made to work rather in the manner of a lever, cannot be left unexamined, till they spontaneously emerge in the systematic fabric of the logical realm" (*Logical Investigations*, p. 435) that a phenomenologist is led to employ formalization. In other words, formalization can serve the phenomenologist only insofar as it is a means to help him clarify the difficult concepts. Since "foundedness" is one of these difficult concepts, it is necessary for Husserl to formalize this concept in order to clarify it in the realm of formal ontology. Therefore, the "ambiguous" status of "foundedness" is not "paradoxical" but quite natural. As it is put by Husserl, this is "a quite harmless equivocation" (*Ibid*, p. 463). However, since foundedness as a formal-ontological concept plays only a secondary role in phenomenology, the proper meaning of "foundedness" as a phenomenological concept must be understood as a relationship which holds between two contents according to their pure Species.

For this phenomenological concept of foundedness, there is also a formal-apophantic way of explication. It is possible to start with the concept of "necessary condi-

tion," to give a formal-apophantical explication of foundedness. (4)

Suppose: the operator "F" means foundedness,
the operator "G" means givenness,
the arguments "A", "B", "C" means different contents of
different species,

hence, "F (A, B)" means A is founded upon B:

then we have:

$F(A, B) = \text{df. } G(A) \Rightarrow G(B)$

and

(1) in case of reciprocal foundedness

$Fr(A, B) = \text{df. } G(A) \Leftrightarrow G(B)$

(2) in case of one-sided foundedness

$Fo(A, B) = \text{df. } [G(A) \Rightarrow G(B)] \ \& \ - [G(B) \Rightarrow G(A)]$

(3) in case of mediate foundedness

$Fm(A, B) = \text{df. } (\exists c) ([G(A) \Rightarrow G(B)] \Rightarrow [[G(A) \Rightarrow G(C)] \ \& \ [G(C) \Rightarrow G(B)])$

To a certain extent this kind of explication can also provide a clarifying effect similar to the formal-ontological explication. Of course, one has to bear in mind that "foundedness" and "necessary condition" are two concepts belonging to different disciplines. While the former is primarily a phenomenological concept, the latter is an apophantic-logical concept.

On the other hand, "foundedness" is also different from "grounding" as well as "institution" (Stiftung). While "grounding" and "institution" are primarily transcendental concepts, "foundedness" is not necessarily to be understood in the sense of transcendental condition of possibility (grounding) or transcendental condition of realizability (institution). In addition, "foundedness" does not *eo ipso* imply that the founding term provides any justification for the legitimacy of the founded term.

II. The Nature of Motivation

Historically speaking, the root of Husserl's concept of motivation can be traced back to the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Brentano. (5) This concept appears also as early as in *Logical Investigations*. In the analysis of the essence of signs in *Investigation I* Husserl discusses some important features of motivation. Here "motivation" is first characterized as "a *descriptive unity* among our acts of judgement in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker" (*Logical Investigations*, p. 270). But, according to Husserl, motivation cannot be conceived as a "*Gestalt-quality*" which is founded upon our acts of judgement. Rather, motivation as a way of act-combination has an objective connection,

which is expressed in the word "since" as its objective correlate. We can see that: in contrast to indication, motivation here is primarily not a relation between states of affairs but a relation between acts of judgment. (6) Motivation, similar to indication, is not an "objective necessary" but a contingent relation or connection. However, Husserl also admits that "motivation in a general sense" covers *Begründung* as much as empirical indication. (7) But the term "Begründung" here can mean "transcendental grounding" and "strict demonstration". Therefore, "motivation in the general sense" covers at least the following heterogenous relationship: (1) strict demonstration; (2) transcendental grounding; (3) empirical indication; and (4) descriptive unity of acts. We can see that: while (1)-(3) are primarily "objective" relations, (4) is a "mental" or "subjective" connection.

However, these two senses of motivation were further developed into a new conception by Husserl in his works after *Logical Investigations*. While this new understanding of motivation is merely an "operative concept" in *Ideen I* (e.g., § 47), it is only in *Ideen II* that Husserl gives us a fuller thematization for this new conception of motivation. (8) In *Ideen II*, "motivation" is understood as the fundamental law of the spiritual world (§ 56). Motivation is now no longer merely conceived as a descriptive unity of acts. The concept of motivation is extended to cover the relations between thing-noema and subject, noesis and noesis, noema and noema, and person and person. As stated by Alfred Schutz, the concept of motivation is "equally applied to the I as being attracted by an object, the I as the system of faculties of the form 'I can', and the social interrelationship". (9)

Although motivation can be regarded as a form of causation, it is nevertheless a special form of it, which differs from natural causality and psycho-physical conditioning. While motivation is essentially an "intentional relationship", natural causality and psychophysical conditioning are "real relationships". The fundamental difference between these two kinds of relationship can be formulated as follows: "The real relationship disappears, when the thing does not exist, the intentional relationship remains valid" (*Ideen II*, p. 215). The nonexistence of the thing merely causes a modification but not an elimination of the intentional relationship. The relata in the intentional relationship are not real or physical objects. As it is put by Elmar Holenstein, the two poles in the motivation "are not soul and real thing, but subject and thing-noema, not the psychic and the physical, but I and the surrounding world". (10) One has to agree with Bernhard Rang that "The phenomenological concept of motivation does not relate itself to the sphere of 'transcendent reality', but merely to the "pure phenomenological sphere". (11) Hence, when one is "imprisoned" within the "natural attitude" and blind to the "spiritual attitude", any talk of the motivation is condemned to miss its proper essence.

Husserl points out that there are different possible kinds of classification of motivation, according to different criteria. The most fundamental and important distinction is between the rational or active motivation and the associative or passive motivation.

(12) While the rational motivation is characterized as "authentic" (*eigentliche*), reasonable, free, active and intentional apprehending, the associative motivation is essentially "inauthentic" (*uneigentliche*), "unconscious", impulsive and passive. (13) The very possibility of rational motivation presupposes the active participation of the ego. But in case of associative motivation, the ego remains detached and passive. While the rational motivation appears on the level of act-intentionality, the associative motivation operates primarily in the realm of passive genesis. (14)

In the supplementary text in *Analysis zur passiven Synthesis*, which bears the title: "Static and Genetic Phenomenology", Husserl writes that "Every motivation is apperception. The appearance of a lived experience 'A' motivates another lived experience 'B' in the unity of consciousness; the consciousness of 'A' is furnished with a from-there-out-pointing (*hinausweisen*), the coexistence- 'indicating' intention" (p. 337). On the other hand, Husserl defines apperception as "a consciousness which has not only in general something in itself to be conscious, but it has to be conscious as motive for another (givenness --- added by the present author)" (*Ibid*, p. 338). We can discover that the relationship between motivation and apperception is so closed that the possibility of each of them has to presuppose the other. Of course, while "apperception" here cannot be understood in the sense of "apprehension", "motivation" means primarily "associative motivation": (15)

Furthmore, "motivation" is distinguished from "noematic intentionality". According to Husserl, "every noematic level is a 'presentation' 'of' the data of the levels that follows. But 'presentation' does not here mean presentational experience, and the word 'of' does not express the relation of consciousness to its object. It is, as it were, a *noematic intentionality over against the noetic*." (*Ideas*, § 101) In short, the noematic intentionality is essentially a relationship between noemata. On the other hand, although motivation is not necessarily confined to the realm of noemata, there is the concept of "noematic motivation" or "motivation as a noematic connection". It is well possible that the two poles of the noematic motivational relation are identical with those of the noematic intentionality. For example, there can be a motivational as well as a noematic-intentional relationship between the noema "A" and the noema "B". It is also true that both noematic intentionality and noematic motivation are intentional relationships. But while the noematic intentionality is essentially *static*, the noematic motivation is *dynamic*.

Is it also possible to give a formal-logical explication of the concept of motivation? One may try to explicate this concept in terms of "sufficient condition" in the following way:

Suppose the operator "M" means motivation
 the operator "G" means givenness
 the arguments "A", "B" means any pairs of lived
 experiences or phenomena,

hence, "M (A, B)" means A motivates B
then we have

$$M (A, B) = \text{df. } G (A) \Rightarrow G (B)$$

But it is not difficult to find out that motivation, as a phenomenological concept, cannot be subject to a formal-logical explication in the above way. For it is quite easy to give a counterexample to it. For example, it is conceivable that the seeing of a picture of a beefsteak this time motivates my decision to go to a restaurant, but next time the seeing of the same picture motivates merely my remembrance of the last dinner in that restaurant.

In general, the phenomenological concept of motivation as an intentional relationship cannot be subject to any explications by means of extensional logic. It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty rightly characterizes the phenomenological concept of motivation as a "fluid" concept. (16) Hence, one has to distinguish this new conception of motivation from "strict demonstration".

This new conception of motivation is also different from "transcendental grounding" as well as "institution". Motivation, being a contingent connection, differs from "transcendental grounding". On the other hand, since "motivation" does not necessarily imply that the motivating factor is more "fundamental" than the motivated factor, it has to be distinguished from "institution". (17)

III. The Relationship Between Foundedness and Motivation

With the above respective characterizations of foundedness and motivation we can start to investigate the relationship between these two important phenomenological concepts. (18)

Foundedness is essentially different from motivation. While the relation of foundedness is primarily *ideal* and *static*, the connection of motivation is essentially *intentional* and *dynamic*. In *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty remarks on "foundedness" that "the founding term, or originator. . . is primary in the sense that the originator is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the former, and yet the originator is not primary in the empiricist sense and the originated is not simply derived from the former, since it is through the originated that the originator is made manifest" (p. 394). This remark makes one wonder if foundedness is a genetic relationship, on the one hand; or, on the other hand, if it can be identified with production or creation; But as clearly pointed out by Eugen Fink "*Fundierung* is not *historical*; it does not involve a *habitus*". (19) Since the establishment of the relation of foundedness is purely based on the "essential", and not the accidental, contingent nature of the phenomenon, "foundedness" is primarily an ideal and "objectively necessary" relation. Hence, "foundedness", being an ideal, structural, static relationship, cannot be a genetic relationship. In fact, Husserl warns us not to confuse "foundedness" with

“temporal succession”. (20)

That is to say, “foundedness” is essentially an atemporal relationship. Motivation, however, being intentional, is at the same time a temporal relationship. The motivation and the motivated factors establish a temporal sequence. (21) Hence, it is not an ideal relationship. In addition, we have shown while one can give a formal-logical explication for foundedness, motivation does not subject to any explications in term of extensional logic.

However, foundedness and motivation share a common character: they are not real relationships. Since the validity of the relations of foundedness is not based on the accidental existence, but on the “essential nature” of the data, foundedness is not a real relationship. On the other hand, motivation, being intentional, is also distinguished from any real relations. In addition, both “foundedness” and “motivation” must be distinguished from “production” or “creation”. Neither “foundedness” nor “motivation” implies “production” or “creation”. (22)

Finally, there is a certain dimension of consciousness to which both “foundedness” and “motivation” are applicable. In particular, they can have the same relata. For example, there is a foundational as well as motivational relation between recollection and perception. In fact, while “foundedness” is a fundamental concept in static phenomenology, “motivation”, in particular, the “associative motivation”, plays an important role in genetic phenomenology.

Insofar as the relationship between “foundedness” and “motivation” is concerned, we can conclude that: “foundedness”, being ideal, atemporal, ahistorical and static, and “motivation”, being intentional, temporal, historical and dynamic, are essentially different from each other. But they also play a “complementary” role in phenomenological investigations.

Note

1. The German word for “foundedness” is “Fundierung”. Previously, on occasions scholars have translated it as “foundation”.
2. In *Logical Investigations*, “foundedness” is thematized in the theory of part and whole.
3. Cf. *Logical Investigations*, pp. 455-462.
4. But there is a shortcoming in this explication: “foundedness” is formally indistinguishable from “transcendental grounding” and “institution”. Also see below.
5. Cf. Elmar Hohenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*, p. 171.
6. Traditionally, talk of “motive” is confined to the field of emotional, in particular, of volitional phenomena. Cf. *Logical Investigations*, p. 273.
7. Cf. *Logische Untersuchungen* § 28; J. N. Findlay translated *Begründung* as “strict demonstration”.

8. In some manuscripts one can also find out his analysis of this new conception, e.g., A VI 25, pp. 7-9: "Motivation, passive und aktive Motivation" (1924); p. 11: "Ob man bei Assoziation von Motivation sprechen Kann" (1924); A VI 19, p. 17: "Verständlichkeit der Motivationserkenntnis" (1916?); A IV 17, p. 30a: "Motivation und Assoziation" (untranscribed) and E III 2, pp. 53-4: *Kausale Erklärung von Phychischen und Motivation*. (1921) (partially quoted in Holenstein's book, p. 184); also in *Ding und Raum*, pp. 358-368, *Motivationszusammenhang und Apperzeption* (1916).
9. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers III*, p. 37.
10. Holenstein, op. cit., p. 185.
11. Bernhard Rang, *Kausalität und Motivation*, p. 115.
12. The active motivation is also called by Husserl "I-motivation".
13. Cf. Holenstein, op. cit., p. 188.
14. For a detailed exposition of the roles played by the rational and associative motivations in the problem of constitution, cf. Rang's *Kausalität und Motivation*.
15. For an analysis of the different meanings of "apperception", cf. Holenstein, op. cit., pp. 132-166.
16. Cf. *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 49-58. Whether it is possible to work out a kind of modal logic which is "strong" enough to develop a "logic of motivation", still remains an open-problem. But the author is skeptical as to this possibility.
17. But the meaning of "indication" is included in this new conception of motivation. Namely, the "noematic motivation" covers the "indication".
18. Hereafter we adhere to Husserl's new conception of motivation.
19. Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, p. 13.
20. Cf. *Ideen II*, p. 240.
21. For the role played by the associative motivation in the *Sinnogenesis*, cf. Holenstein, op. cit.
22. *Logical Investigations*, p. 571.

關於康德論古典力學的形上基礎

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Also kann, so scheint es, niemand die Quantentheorie, das heisst die heutige Physik, wirklich, mit philosophischer Strenge, verstehen, der nicht zuvor Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft verstanden hat. Selbst wenn er dann Kant kritisieren wird, muss er zuvor begriffen haben, wovon Kant redet.

————— Carl F. von Weizsäcker.

(這樣說來，一個人如果不理解康德的自然哲學理論，那麼，他就決不能在嚴格哲學的意義下了解量子論，也就是說，不能了解今天的物理學。即使有人想批評康德，也必須對他先有認識，先了解他在說些甚麼(註①)。

§ 1.0 自然科學的形上基礎

在本文的開端，我們引用了當代德國物理學家兼哲學家惠錫克 (von Weizsäcker) 對康德「自然科學理論」的簡短評述，這個評述因惠錫克氏的學術背景而具有特別意義。他所謂康德的「自然科學理論」，基本上是指康德在他的“*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*”一書所展示的理論而言。如果把這本書的「*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*」讓我們首先依照這個書名中所謂「自然科學」及「形上基礎」二詞加以詮釋和分名稱譯為中文，便是「自然科學的形上基礎」，我們在本文把它簡稱之為「形上基礎析」。

§ 1.1 關於康德的「自然」一詞之意義：

「自然科學」一詞又涉及兩方面，這就是所謂「自然」與「科學」二者。現在，讓我們先說明「自然」這個詞項的意義。

§ 1.11 從哲學史上對「自然」一詞的觀察：

「自然」一詞，在西方的學術史(包括哲學和科學史)上是多義的，也就是說：「自然」這個概念及隨着學術思想的變遷而改變的。現代歐洲民族的語文與拉丁文有着密切的關係，而希臘文化又對羅馬人有着一定的影響，因而希臘文也就直接影響了拉丁文。在這種情況下，古希臘文字對現代歐洲語文也有一定的關係。譬如英文的 *physics* 及德文的 *Physik* 一字，就是來自拉丁文 *physica* 一字了，而 *physica* 其實又來自希臘

文的 $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (此字拉丁化便成爲 *physis*)。在另一方面，西賽羅 (Cicero) 又把希臘文的 $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ 譯爲拉丁文的 *natura*，於是英文中的 “*nature*” 與德文中的 “*Natur*” 也就與古希臘文的 $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ 有着「語意」(semantical) 上的關連。簡單來說，「自然 (*natura*)」在西方思想史上有下列六個重要的意義。關於這六種意義，本文作者在別的地方已有較爲詳細的分析，我們在此只述其要 (註②)：

- ①在亞里斯多德之前，「自然」一詞分別指經驗世界的抽象原則及指現實的存在物。
- ②在亞里斯多德的「物理學」(亞氏的「物理學」也可譯爲「論自然」)，「自然」一詞有二義，這分別是指「具有運動或靜止原則的存在物」及事物的「形式」。「形式」(*eidos*) 乃指事物的本質而言。事物的本質決定了事物運動(發展)的方向(註③)。
- ③希羅時代的斯多亞學派所謂「自然」，基本上乃指世界及人性中的理性成原則而言，也就是所謂「洛各斯」(*λόγος*)。
- ④在中世紀，自然分爲 *natura naturata* 及 *natura naturan* 二者。前者爲被動的物質世界，而後者則指產生物質世界的實體而言。其後的斯賓諾薩就是採取此說。
- ⑤在理性主義時代，自然主要是指人及上帝之外的物質世界。
- ⑥康德所謂「自然」，是包括牛頓在其「自然哲學的數學原理」一書的「自然」義意。機械論的自然觀在理性時代已形成了，牛頓就利用數學方法來描述自然界的規律性，康德就是通過這些機械的規律性 (*mechanical lawlikeness*)，也就是所謂「自然律」來了解「自然」一詞。儘管這樣，我們卻不宜把康德在經驗意義上所指的「自然」限制於所謂「牛頓的自然」。康德在「形上基礎」一書對自然概念有清楚的說明，由於本文的重點是在於分析康德的「自然哲學的形上基礎」，所以我們要進一步討論康德的「自然」意義，並且也要把其他詮釋者對有關問題所作的詮釋進行分析。

在「形上基礎」一書的「緒論」中(註④)，康德對於「自然」一詞有以下的說明：

「如果只從形式意義說，(自然這個字乃表述一些屬於事物存在的基本而內在的原則)，有多少不同的事物，便有多少不同的自然科學，而每種事物本身具有決定這些事物的特定之內在原則。在另一方面，『自然』亦可從其實質意義方面說，這不是指『質』方面，而是指所有感官對象的總體，因而也就是指經驗對象(註⑤)。」在這裡，康德把「自然」分爲二個意義，即：

- (1) 從形式意義說，自然乃指事物的內在而又基本的原則而言。
- (2) 從實質意義說，「自然」乃指「感官對象的總體，因而也就是指經驗對象。」

關於實質意義的「自然」，康德說：

「在這個意義下，根據我們感官上的主要分別，『自然』二字有兩個主要的部分：其一是包含了外感官的對象，其二是內感官的對象。所以，對於自然的兩個層次之理論是可能的，這就是指『物體的理論』及『心靈的理論』。前者是有關廣延的自然，而後者則涉及思維的自然」(註⑥)。

在實質意義上，「自然」既然指感官對象的總體，因而也就是指經驗世界。在康德的語言中，感官乃有外感官及內感官之別，而所謂外感官對象，在康德來說就是指物體，因而也就是指牛頓力學的宏觀對象。至於所謂內感官之對象，其實就指心理學對象。

由於康德所謂形式意義的「自然」在上列引文中並不很清楚，因此我們接下來便另立一節而進一步作分析：

§ 1.12 關於康德所謂形式意義的「自然」：

「形式意義的自然」一詞，綜合起來看可有二義，這就是本體論意義的自然及知識論意義的自然。前者為本體論原則，後者則為知識論原則。本體論原則用以說明事物之所以如此這般的理由，而知識論原則則用以說明知識之所以成爲可能的根據。

(甲) 本體論的「自然」意義：

形式意義的自然，作爲本體論原則來說，就是亞里斯多德界定 *φύσει* (自然) 時所採用的原則，這就是指事物的「自然之性」，自然之性使事物「自然地」如此 (*physei, exist by nature*)。在亞氏的思想中，這其實就是指「事物內在地所具有的運動及靜止的原則而言」。由自然之性而導出所謂「順其自然」(*according to nature, kata physin*) 這個概念，亞氏並且以這個概念來解釋自然現象。例如，石塊由空中掉下來，這是順着石塊之性(自然)的結果。進一步來說，自然之性就是事物的「形式」或「理型」(*form*)，這是亞氏從柏拉圖那裡得來的概念。從文字結構上說，從“*form*”而產生“*formal*”，從而導出“*formal meaning of nature*”(「自然」的形式意義或形式意義的自然)(註⑦)。亞氏這種「形式」的自然之性也可詮釋爲事物的「內在可能性」(*interna possibilitas*)，這是說，某一事物之所以這樣發展，因爲這些事物內在地具有這種可能性。西方中世紀哲學把這種「內在可能性」詮釋爲事物的「本質」(*essentia*)，遂有所謂「本質決定存在」之說。

現在的問題是；康德所謂自然的「形式意義」是否就是這裡所指的本體論的「自然」呢？他說：「自然這個字乃表述一些屬於事物存在的基本而內在的原則」，又謂「有多小不同的事物，便有多少不同的自然科學」。如果把他所謂「屬於事物存在的基本而內在的原則」詮釋爲上述的本體論原則，在文理上是順適的。本體論的自然義，既然具有「本質」的意思，則由於事物的本質之不同，而有不同的研究方法，於是便可像康德所言：「有多少不同的事物，便有多少不同的自然科學，而每種事物本身具有決定這些事物的特定之內在原則」。然而康德所謂的自然之形式意義，是否真的指本體論方面的自然呢？這於這個問題，待我們在下面展示知識論方面的形式意義的自然之後，再作評鑑。

(乙) 知識論的自然義：

僅是從上列一段出於「形上基礎」一書的緒論之引文，我們實在不易判斷康德關於他所謂「自然」的「形式」意義之所指。因此，爲了明辦其意義，我們唯有求助於別的資料。在「未來形上學導論」一書裡，我們找到一段與此有關的論述。當康德在「未來形上學導論」談到「自然」本身是如何可能時，認爲這個問題可分爲兩部分。他說：

「這個問題——超驗哲學所能達至的極點，同時，作爲它的界限與完整，它一定要達到的——正確地包含了兩個問題：

第一：在實質意義上，『自然』（按：此不宜譯作自然界）究竟如何可能，這是指藉着直覺而把之視為現象的總體是如何可能。時間、空間以及充實於這兩者之中的東西——即一般的感覺對象是如何可能？答案是：藉着我們感性的構造，按照這樣的構造，感性受到各種物體特殊的薰染，而這些物體又為感性所不認識的，並且與那現象完全不相同。這個答案是在純粹理性批判中的超驗攝像論中提出來，同時在「導論」一書裡第一個一般問題也作了解答（註⑧）。

在這段引文裡，康德清楚地說明實質意義的「自然」之所指，簡言之，這是指現象的總體而言。由於康德所謂「實質」既然指現象，並且是從感性和直覺方面說的，他甚至指出有關現象是如何可能的問題在「第一批判」的攝像論中已提出答案，可見實質意義的自然乃指「自然界」（現象界）的實際內容而言。至於形式意義的自然（並非指自然界），康德在「導論」一書也有清楚的說明。他說：

「第二：在形式意義上，作為規則總體（在受其所規約的所有現象，為要能被思維而被連結在經驗裡）的自然是如何可能的？這個答案必然是這樣的：這種可能性是藉着理解的構造，所有上述的感性之表像必然要歸於一個意識，藉之而使到我們那種特殊的思維（藉着規則），以及我們的經驗因而才成為可能。但這卻必須與對象自身的洞悉有清晰的區別。在『純粹理性批判』中，這個答案是在於超驗邏輯中提出的，而本書提供的答案則在解決第二個主要問題時作出的（註⑨）。

在這裡，康德所謂形式意義的自然其實是指「規則的總體」而言。在康德知識論的語言中，「規則」（Regel）乃指理解本身所具有的範疇系統而言。

現在，我們回到上文有關「形上基礎」一書的「形式意義」之自然或是「自然」的形式意義之詮釋問題。在「形上基礎」一書中，康德又說：

「由於『自然』二字本身就具規律的意義，而『規律』這個概念本身又具有決定存在界事物之必然性，這樣，我們就能明白到何故自然科學一定要從它的純粹部分（即：從它的先驗原則）而得享自然科學之名，以及何故自然科學只藉着它的純粹部分而稱之為正規科學的理由（註⑩）」。

康德在上述引文中從「自然」本身具體規律性而指出「自然科學一定要從它的純粹部分而得享自然科學之名」。若要了解康德何故謂自然科學因其純粹部分才得享自然科學之名，那就非從自然科學的純粹部分着眼不可。康德所謂純粹部分在這裡就是指上文所謂的「規則之總體」而言，而規則又是指理解（或純粹理解）本身的規則。這些規則是自然（此非現代所謂自然界）、經驗界（經驗對象，經驗知識），或現象界的立法者。換言之，若缺少這些規則，那麼人類所知識（經驗知識的知識）便無從建立。所以，純粹理解的規則系統便成為事物存在的基本而又內在的原則。

綜合以上所述，則康德所謂自然（在知識論上），其實就是指經驗知識的那個對象而言。換言之，他所謂自然，就是指一般的經驗界或現象。他把這樣的經驗界

分成兩方面考察。若從經驗對象的具體內容方面說，是要藉感性直覺才能提供，康德稱之為自然的實質意義。但是，這樣的經驗世界是經過理解力的建構才能成立的，理解力本身就具備一套規則，康德就把這套理解力本身所具有規則系統，稱之為「形式」意義的自然。

以上說明康德所謂自然的形式意義。以下再就他所謂實質意義作進一步的討論。

§ 1.13 康德所謂「自然科學」的「自然」，乃指經驗對象的總體

- (a) 康德在講及他所謂「實質意義」的「自然」時，把自然視為「感官對象的總體」，由於是藉着「感官」或「感性」(sensibilities) (所謂感性是感官的接受形式) 界定經驗，因此，所謂「感官對象的總體」也就是指「經驗對象的總體」而言。但是，如果自然是指經驗對象或感官對象的總體，那麼，對「自然」的理論就不該只有物理學(康德所謂“Körperlehre”，物體的理論)及心理學(康德所謂Seelenlehre，心靈的理論)，因為最低限度，生物學也該列為有關對「經驗」領域的自然之一。康德把外感官的對象只限於「物理學」是別有原因的，這個原因就在於他所謂「正規學科」(eigentliche Wissenschaft)的問題。這個問題我們在下文再深入討論。儘管化學、地質學、生物學在十六及十七世紀已有相當可觀的進展，而生物學在亞里斯多德時已開始研究，但是康德卻把研究「自然」的理論只限於物理學，可見他所指的「自然」是一個問題，而對「自然」的理論又是另一個問題，因為在康德看來，其他有關外感官的經驗對象之研究，除牛頓力學之外，皆不算是正規的科學。
- (b) 康德在「形上基礎」一書從實質意義而以感官對象或經驗對象界定自然，這是與其在本「純粹理性批判」中從「現象的連結」以界定自然的意義是相通的。康德在那裡說：「在經驗意義上說，自然是現象的連結，這是從它們根據必然規則，即是說，依據規律的存在而言。因此有某些規律(Gesetze)，它們是先驗的，藉着這些規律而使自然成為可能」(註①)。

在這段引文裡，康德所謂自然乃指「現象的連結」，又謂「自然」乃由某些先驗的規律作為條件而成為可能，可見康德所謂經驗意義的自然，就是指經驗界的對象或這些對象的總體而言。因為根據康德的理論，經驗對象乃藉着感官及理解這兩方面的合作才成為可能。感官的形式為時間及空間的接受形式，一切經驗(感官)資料都要接受時空條件的整合，然後再經過理解活動形成加以組織，使之成為經驗對象，理解的形式也就是思維的形式。康德認為無論是感性形式或理解(思維)形式，都是先驗的，而這些形式，就是使別經驗知識成為可能的條件。

- (c) 無論在「未來形上學導論」，在「純粹理性批評」及在「自然科學的形上基礎」裡，康德所謂的「自然科學」皆針對牛頓力學而言。在「形上基礎」一書中，康德基本上是在於分析牛頓力學的形上基礎，對於這個問題的分析和展示，就是本文的主要目的。我們說康德所謂的「自然科學」是針對牛頓力學，而康德所謂經驗意義的「自然」是指牛頓力學所處理的那個經驗對象或經驗世界。很明顯的是：在這個意義下的自然不能詮釋為「指完全由牛頓定律作為決定條件的牛頓力學之自然」，因為後一意義其實就等於說「利用牛頓力學所透視出來的那個自然界」。把自然視為「經驗界」、「

經驗界的存在物之總體」或是指「藉着先驗規律之連結」才成爲可能的「經驗界」等，其所指都是一樣的，但是，這卻與「利用牛頓力學所透視出來的那個自然界」，這兩者之間的意義（無論內延意義或外延意義，前者指語意，後者指所涉及的事物）皆不相等。把康德的經驗意義之「自然」詮釋爲完全由牛頓力學定律所確定的「自然」，因而就是指利用牛頓力學所透視出來的那個「自然」的詮釋者之一就是馬丁（G. Martin），他明確地把康德所講自然視爲「牛頓的自然」（Die Natur bei Kant als newtonische Natur, Nature in Kant as Newtonian nature）（註⑫），他說：

「我們所謂牛頓的自然，是指完全依據牛頓定律所決定的那個自然。這樣的自然是一個純粹力學體系，同時在牛頓力學的意義下，它是一個封閉的體系」（註⑬）。

馬丁這些話是很清楚的，我們不必再作疏解，儘管這樣，我們還要指出這樣詮釋康德的「自然」，並非完全無誤。有兩點關於康德的自然而對象或經驗對象是值得在此一提的：

- ①康德的經驗對象基本上是宏觀的，因而也包括了牛頓力學所描述的對象。
- ②宏觀對象固然包括牛頓力學的對象，但在原則上也可包括山河大地（這些皆可成爲知識的或經驗的對象）。在康德的理論中，在論及自然科學的可能性時，他的着眼點無疑是落在牛頓力學上，因爲這是當時他唯一認爲是正規科學的理論（康德不認爲當時的化學是正規科學）。康德有句名言，謂人類的理解能力乃自然界的立法者。由於康德當時的心目中只有牛頓力學是唯一正規的科學，所以我們可以把他在這句話裡所謂「自然界的立法者」（Gesetzgeber）所建立的法則（Gesetz，其實是指一般所謂自然律）視爲牛頓力學裡的力學定律（mechanische gesetzmäßigkeit）所以成爲可能的先驗規則而言。但是，這些力學所透視的自然界畢竟與康德所謂「經驗可能性」或「自然的可能性（possibility of experience or of nature）中的「經驗」或「自然」不恒等。理由很簡單；因爲牛頓力學所透視的整個力學體系之原理，並不一定就窮盡了所有自然界的規律性，牛頓和康德都沒有證明牛頓力學的完整性，而康德也沒有強調牛頓力學的唯一性。

海德格對康德的「自然」意義的詮釋與馬丁的觀點基本上相似，他說：

「在被經驗及可經驗的東西之意義下的經驗，就是自然，爲經驗的對象。但是，『自然』在牛頓的原理一書中是被理解爲世界的體系，因此，經驗的內在可能性之基礎這個問題對康德來說便同時是回答下列的問題：『一般性的自然是如何可能的？』答案就在於『純粹理解的所有原則的系統』。所以，康德謂（在未來形上學導論 §23）這些原則構成了 physiologisches System（康德指 λόγος of the φύσις，即自然界的原理）或自然的體系（system of nature）（註⑭）。」

在這裡，海德格從「經驗對象」的「自然」跳躍到牛頓的自然體系去。康德在「未來形上學」一書謂：

「可能經驗的原則同時是『自然』的普遍規則，這是能夠先驗地被認知的。因此，我們的第二個問題，即：『純粹自然科學如何可能』的問題，便得到解決」（註⑮）。

康德認為使經驗成爲可能的原則能解答有關「自然科學如何可能」的問題，我們相信康德心目中的自然科學是牛頓的系體，但卻沒有限制於牛頓的體系，因爲康德沒有說過牛頓系體是唯一的自然科學體系。在同一個地方，康德接着又說：

「建立在其上（按：邏輯系體）的概念包含了所有綜合及必然判斷之先驗條件，由是而構成了一個超驗系統。最後，藉着原則而使到一切現象歸屬於這些概念之下，構成了物理系統（按 *physiological system* 英譯爲 *physical system*，因爲康德所指實爲物理系統），這是指自然系統…」（註⑯）。」

康德這裡所謂的“*physiological system*”或說“*physical system*”，只是泛指，並未確定限制於牛頓體系，他不過是說，任何對經驗界建立知識的正規科學體系皆需要他所提出的那套超驗原則系統而已。換言之，這個超驗的原則系統在康德看來是使任何正規科學成爲可能的先驗條件，而不僅對牛頓系統來說是如此。可是，當海德格詮釋這方面的問題時，就把「自然體系」視爲牛頓的「自然哲學的數學原理」的系體，所以他便把牛頓系統作爲「世界系統」（按：「世界系統」一詞有二義，(1)牛頓原理一書最後部分稱爲“*system of the world*”，這是天文物理學問題。(2)牛頓原理一部所處理的問題涉及世界上物體的各種運動），而跳躍到「自然體系」或「物理體系」（註⑰）。

綜上所述，我們可以這樣說：康德所講及的「自然科學」，其中「自然」一詞乃指「經驗對象的總體」而言，這當然包括了牛頓力學的自然界，但卻不必只限於此，因爲當康德提出「自然科學如何可能」時，這裡所謂「自然科學」雖然可以視作基本上乃指牛頓系統（牛頓體系乃綜合了伽里略、開普勒等人的理論），但由於康德沒有指出牛頓系統是唯一的自然科學理論，所以我們也就沒有理由把康德所謂的經驗界或自然界只限於牛頓理論所及的那個自然（如馬丁所謂的 *Newtonian Nature*）。

§ 1.2 康德所謂的「科學」意義：

§ 1.21 科學與系統：

關於「科學」的概念，如果要訴諸希臘的古義，那麼我們發現這就是古希臘人所謂 $\epsilon\pi\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ ，拉丁化而成爲“*episteme*”，哲學上的“*epistemology*”（知識論）一字便由此而來。“*Episteme*”這個字既可譯成「知識」，也可譯爲「科學」，可見在希臘古義中，「知識」與「科學」這兩個概念是互通的。在希臘的哲學家家中，亞里斯多德的科學觀是非常值得現代人讚賞的，因爲在他的「分析後論」裡已明確地提出演繹與歸納這二方面而談論科學方法的結構。

康德把科學界定爲：

「任何一種理論，如果能成爲一個系統，這是說，如果是一套依據原則而具有次序的知識整體，則這樣的理論就稱之爲科學（註⑱）」。

根據這段引文，康德對科學的界說是從下述三個條件而作出界定的，這就是：

(1)科學是一種「理論」（*Lehre*）。

(2)它必須是個系統。

(3)這樣的系統乃「一套依據原則而具有次序的知識整體」。

康德對於“*Lehre*”這個字，雖然在第一及第二批判中使用這個字（例如所謂 *Methodenlehre*, *Elementarlehre* 等），但卻沒有對“*Lehre*”一字作界定。因此，當康德用這個字時，乃隨一般意義，這是指「學說」或「理論」之意，而所謂的學說或理論，也是順隨一般通俗意義。重要的是：康德是藉着「系統」及「依據原則而具有次序的知識整體」這兩個概念以界定科學。

就形式科學來說，無論數學或邏輯，在合理化的要求下，公理系統的結構便成爲形式科學的典範，這是順着歐氏幾何結構的系統模式。在經驗科學方面，由牛頓按照歐氏幾何原理的結構模式也成爲日後「理論」物理學的方法典範。因此，在康德的構想中，「系統性」是構成「科學性」（*Wissenschaftlichkeit*）的充足而必須的條件。在這個意義下，零散的眞命題不能稱之爲科學。牛頓的理論是「科學」，因爲它把許多不同的眞命題按照一定的原則而構成一個系統性的知識。然則構成系統的原則又是甚麼呢？就形式科學的公理系統來說，這些原則就是公理、定義及推論規則；就經驗科學方面說，一個物理學的理論在嚴格意義上說是由三部分組成，而這些部分又可由許多的其他理論構成。這三部份就是：(1)物理學的原則（或假設），(2)數學作爲推論或演算工具，(3)連貫物理原則及所用的數學理論之間的「詮釋規則」（*semantical rules*）（註⑲）。有些理論物理學家把一個理論物理學的理論視作一個由：(1)數學理論，(2)基本經驗領域，(3)貫通有關的數學理論與基本經驗領域之間的原則，這些原則稱之爲「射影規則」（*Abbildungsregeln*）（註⑳），這些觀點其實在實質上都是一樣。上述這些不同部分的原則或規則（*principles, rules*），皆可歸於康德所謂「一套依據原則而具有次序的知識總體」這句話中的「原則」意義，特別是數學理論在系統內所具有的作用。數學理論不但使到物理學成爲嚴格的科學（順通俗意義），而且使到有關理論成爲一個演繹系統，這樣的演繹性就是康德所謂「具有次序的知識總體」。

演繹性的理論有三個重要的功能：

(1)組合各種有關的眞命題（知識）。

(2)預測未知的事件（當預測不符合事實時便修改理論）。

(3)解釋與描述事象。

以上三點，雖然不是一個物理學理論的本質，但卻是物理學理論的功能，而第一項（系統結構）乃使到「預測」及「解釋」成爲可能的重要方法。所謂科學的解釋可以簡單地這樣來說明：例如 *P* 爲一已知的眞命題，於是我們就設法提出一些定律及其他條件，簡稱之爲 *K*，如果從 *K* 把 *P* 推論出來，我們就視 *K* 解釋了 *P*。假若 *P* 的眞確性原是不知道的，而 *K* 則爲已知，那麼，若從 *K* 而把 *P* 推論出來，我們就稱 *P* 爲一項預測，它是需要等待證實的。設若 *P* 在驗實過程中視爲可接受的，那麼我們便把「*K*—*P*」稱爲科學的

描述 (scientific description)。然而，無論是科學的預測、科學的描述，或科學的解釋，皆要在演繹的結構下（因而也就是系統的結構下）才可能。故康德把科學視為「一套依據原則而具有次序的知識整（總）體」。

§ 1.22 正規的自然科學：

我們上文從公理系統的演繹結構以說明康德所謂系統知識的意義，這也就是康德所謂科學的確實意義。為了說明科學的真正意義，康德在「形上基礎」一書還提出了所謂正規與非正規的科學之間的分別。康德認為非正規的科學（在嚴格意義下）不能享得科學之名，因此，只有正規的科學才是真正的科學。

現在的問題是：何謂正規與非正規的科學呢？對於這個問題，康德說：

「自然科學包括正規的自然科學及非正規的自然科學，前者依據先驗原則而處理整體的對象，而後者則依據經驗原則以處理對象的（註②）。」

我們在上文已指出，康德所謂「自然科學」其實即「經驗科學」，而不是二十世紀所謂的自然科學，因為康德把「自然」恒視作「經驗」。因此，康德所謂正規及非正規的自然科學其實就是指正規或非正規的經驗科學而言。「正規」這個詞項在康德的原文為“eigentlich”，這是有「精確」、「原本」、「實在」等意思。「正規的經驗科學」在於它（或它們）依據先驗原則以處理整體的對象，而「非正規的自然（或經驗）科學」則依據經驗原則以處理對象的。在字面上看，康德似乎把「非正規的自然科學」也視為「自然科學」之一。康德既然把科學界定為「一套依據原則而具有次序的知識總體」，那麼，其所依據的「原則」便可以為經驗的原則，也可以為先驗的原則。因此，依據經驗原則而具有次序的知識總體也便合乎科學的定義，然而康德卻進一步指出，這種以經驗原則來處理的「知識」系統只能視之為「非正規的科學」。然則這個理由在那裡呢？這是因為康德認為藉經驗原則而建立的知識系統缺乏「必然確定性」（apodiktische Gewißheit）。他說：

「只有那些知識的確定性是必然無疑的時候，才能稱之為正規的科學，而那些只含有經驗的確定性之知識則只能稱之為非正規的科學。當知識的整體是系統性時，便稱之為科學，而在這系統中，知識的連繫是一種理由與結果（Gründe und Folge, grounds and consequents）之間互相融貫時，就稱之為理性的科學。但是，當這些理由或原則只是經驗的原則時，以及當理性用以解釋已知事實的那些律則是經驗的時，那麼，這些律則便缺乏必然性（並非必然地確定），因為理論的整體便在嚴格的意義下無法享得科學之名（註②）。」

由此可知，康德把「非正規的科學」是在嚴格意義下排除在科學之外（「無法享得科學之名」），而真正的理由是在於這些經驗原則缺乏「必然的確定性」。至於正規的自然（經驗）科學之所以能成為正規的科學，理由是在於用作建立系統性的知識原則具有「必然的確定性」。在康德的思想中，具有這種必然確定性的原則一定是先驗的，而藉着經驗歸納而得的原則，永遠是缺乏這種確定性。「先驗」這二個字在康德的語言中又稱之為純粹。康德接着又說：

「因此，對自然界的理論，只當自然律為非經驗的，而是先驗地被認識時，這種理論才能稱之為科學（註⑳）」。

這節引文中所謂科學，可知是指他所謂的「正規」科學而言，它的「科學性」就在於系統內所使用的原則之先驗性。因此，康德所謂「正規」的科學就是指在嚴格意義下的科學而言。

綜合以上所述，我們可以對康德所謂「自然科學」（經驗科學）的意義作這樣的結論：

- (1) 康德所謂的「自然科學」其實是指「經驗科學」。
- (2) 無論是自然科學或經驗科學，在嚴格的意義上說乃指正規的自然科學或正規的經驗科學而言。非正規的自然（經驗）科學在嚴格的意義上說是無法享得「科學」之名。
- (3) 正規科學的充足而又必要的條件乃在於構成系統的原則本身具有「必然確定性」。
- (4) 必然確定的原則一定是先驗的。因此，正規科學的充足而又必要的條件乃在於構成科學系統的原則具有先驗的確定性。

現在進一步的問題是：既然正規科學的必要而充足的條件乃在於科學系統之先驗原則，又由於康德的先驗原則又名之為「純粹」（rein, pure）原則，那麼，正規的科學（可簡稱之為「科學」）豈不是含有其「純粹部分」嗎？對於這個問題的答案不但是肯定的，而且，展示正規科學的純粹部分之原則系統，就是康德的知識論之主要工作之一。

§ 1.3 特殊的經驗科學之形上學

自然（經驗）科學如果要正真成爲一門科學（康德稱之為正規的自然科學），必須具有其先驗或純粹部分，所以，康德說：

「由於『自然』本身就具有規律的意義，而規律這個概念本身又具有決定存在界事物之必然性，這樣，我們就明白到何故自然科學一定要從它的純粹部分（即：從它的先驗原則）而得享自然科學之名，以及何故自然科學只藉着它的純粹部分而稱之為正規科學的理由（註㉑）」。

康德在這裡所謂「自然本身具有規律」，又謂我們這樣「就能明白到何故自然科學一定要從它的純粹部分而得享自然科學之名」。這是由於他認爲自然（經驗）對象之建立乃以理解活動的思維形式才能建立起來的，因此，經驗界即現象的連結，故說「自然本身就具有規律的意義」。經驗（自然）與經驗科學雖然是有所不同，前者為知識對象，後者為知識系統。但是，由於經驗對象是建構經驗知識的一部分，所以，若前者具有先驗因素，則後者也具有這些先驗或純粹條件，只是建立經驗（自然）知識的時候所涉及先驗條件不限於此。

把建立知識（科學理論）時所涉及的純粹部分展示出來，這項工作就是形上學。所以，康德說：

「所以，正規的自然科學需要純粹部分，在這個基礎上，理性所追求的必然確定性才能在這種科學裡建立起來。……從概念而得的純粹理性知識稱之為純

粹哲學或形上學，而藉着在先驗直覺中呈現對象以建構概念的知識，則稱之為數學（註⑳）」。

康德謂形上學乃指「從概念而得的純粹理性知識（*reine Vernunftkenntniss*）」稱之為純粹哲學或形上學，這裡所謂「理性的知識其實乃指先驗原則的認知而言，而康德在此處所謂的形上學，就是他在「未來形上學導論」一書中所謂的「作為科學的形上學」。這樣說來，則「正規的自然（經驗）科學」便預設了「自然（經驗）的形上學」（*Metaphysik der Nature*）。總的來說，自然的「形上學」所要處理的律則是使到「自然概念的一般性成為可能」（註㉑）。

但是，分析「自然概念的一般性」如何可能的問題，是屬於「一般的形上學」（*allgemeine Metaphysik*）。康德認為除了「一般的形上學」之外，我們也可以分析某種特定事物的先驗條件。這樣，形上學也就可以處理某一特定問題了。因此，康德說：

「形上學也可以處理某一特殊之物，……例如說：它把物質這個經驗概念或思維之物作為基礎，並且追問知識的領域，在這樣的領域中，理性能夠先驗地涉及這些現象。這樣的科學一定仍可稱之為自然形上學（*Metaphysik der Natur*），即是物體的或思維的自然之形上學（*die körperliche oder denkende Natur*）。但是，如果上述的超驗原則是應用在這兩種感官對象上，那麼，它就不是一般的形上學，而是特殊的形上自然科（*besondere metaphysische Naturwissenschaft*）（物理與心理學）（註㉒）」。

「一般形上學」在於處理「自然」（也可稱為一般的自然）或「經驗」是如何可能的問題。如果我們把目光從一般的「自然」而移落在個別的自然（指個的經驗對象）上，例如「物體的自然」或「思維的自然」（即物理現象或心理現象），並且分析這些現象的先驗條件或超驗原則，那麼，我們這種分析工作便可稱之為「特殊形上學」，這其實就在於分析物理學或心理學的超驗部分。

既然「特殊的形上學」就是分析個別的自然（經驗）科學的先驗或超驗因素，那麼，我們就要分析該特定科學所處理的特定對象的理論之先驗條件，也就是分析特定對象的理論之先驗可能性。論及這個問題時，康德提出一個非常重要的論點，就是有關數學對處理「特殊形上學」時的重要性。他說：

「因此，爲了要認識某一確定的自然物之可能性，因而要先驗地認識它們，這就進一步需要與概念所相對應的直覺要先驗地提供出來。這是說，概念要能被建構起來。一個藉着概念建構的理性知識就是數學。所以，一般有關自然的純粹哲學（這是指研究構成一般自然的觀念）是可以沒有數學的。但是，有關某一確定的自然事物之純粹理論（包括有關物體及心靈的理論）卻只是藉着數學才可能。由於在所有的自然理論中，只有具備先驗知識的學科才算是正規科學，因此，在自然理論方面，有多少門學科採用數學，便有多少門正規科學（註㉓）」。

在上述這段引文中，康提出下述幾個要點：

- ①若要先驗地認識某一確定的自然之物的可能性，就需要把那些與概念相對應的直覺先驗地建構起來。
- ②這種建構起來的理性知識就是數學。
- ③在這個意義下，對於某一確定的自然（經驗）事物之純粹理論只是藉着數學才可能。
- ④由於數學是先驗知識，這就符合康德只有具備先驗知識的科學才算是正規科學這個條件，因此，康德遂進一步謂：「在自然理論方面，有多少門學科採用數學，便有多少門正規科學」。

康德在這裡把一門學科是否應用數學，而判斷該門學科是否為正規科學，這其實只是說嚴格的經驗科學必須取用數學的意義，牛頓的大著「自然科學的數學原理」，就是這樣的嚴格或正規科學。康德的「自然科學的形上基礎」一書便是以牛頓力學為基本對象的「特殊形上學」。康德在「自然科學的形上基礎」一書的緒論中，說明了這本書的書名何故標出「自然科學」而實際上卻只限於牛頓力學的理由。對於這個問題，康德的意思是說：「物體學說」（指牛頓力學）在最嚴格意義下只是自然科學的一門，而他這本書之所以標明自然科學，乃是根據「一般的用法」吧了，但是，在另一方面，由於只有牛頓力學（康德稱之為「物體理論」（*Körperlehre*））才採用數學的「正規自然科學」，因此，用「自然科學的形上基礎」為書名，在實際上是不会引起意義的含混（註⑳）。以上我們闡明康德所謂「自然科學」的意義，並且說明「自然科學的形上基礎」一書乃針對古典力學的先驗條件之「特殊形上學」理論。因此，在討論康德這種「特殊形上學」理論之前，我們先行把古典力學的基本原理展示出來。

§ 2.0 古典力學的基本原理

§ 2.1 牛頓的「自然哲學之數學原理」

所謂古典力學，其實並不限於牛頓在其大著「自然哲學的數學原理」一書中所處理的問題。但是我們展示古典力學的基本意義之前，先把牛頓「原理」一書作一概述。

(A) 基本概念：

牛頓的「原理」一書分為上下兩卷，上卷包括了二部分，並且在第一部分之前，牛頓提出一些非常重要的概念，這些概念乃牛頓「原理」一書的基礎。

- ①定義：共有八個定義，其中定義四至八皆有關「力」的各種概念，其餘定義一、二、三則分別為「物質」、「運動量」以及「物質的內在力」（*Vis insita*）。

牛頓在說明力的各種意義之後，特別指出他對有關力的定義只是一些「數學的觀念」（*mathematical notions*）而已，而不考慮它們的物理因及其所在的根基（*their physical causes and seats*）（註㉑）。

數學定義與物理學的定義之間的最主要差別是：後者的內容涉及經驗界，為了達成這個目的，這其定義法在現在的科學方法論中稱之為「運作定義法」。至於「力」作為數學概念則基本上與經驗界無關。

- ②註釋（*scholium*）：有四個，主要在說明他所謂「絕對時空」、「絕對運動」及

「相對運動」等概念的意義。

③公理或運動定律，這就是俗稱牛頓運動三定律。

④六條推論。這六條推論非常重要，推論(一)及(二)乃提出力的合成與力的分解之原則。推論(三)及(四)是從公理(一)及公理(二)所導出的動量守恒定律。推論(五)及(六)是展示伽里略的「相對性原理」(註⑳)。

(B)第一部分 (book I) 的主題：

首先提出「流數原理」，藉之而確定無限小的量之比。然後討論公轉的軌道問題，從橢圓運動的焦點之一作為力的中心，提出這種力是與其距離的平方成反比，以及論證開普勒定律等問題。最後，牛頓還討論粒子穿過兩種不同介質的空間時，其中一種媒質吸引該粒子的問題，從而解釋了光的衍射和折射的現象。

(C)第二部分：

討論有關在阻力介質中的運動，對流體力學、彈性流體的波動，粘性等問題作了分析。從而批評了笛卡爾以旋渦說以解釋環繞太陽轉動的構想，認為若按照笛卡爾的旋渦說，則開普勒的行星運動定律便無法恰當地得到解釋。

(D)第三部分：

這部分稱之為「世界的體系」，牛頓特別標明這是「採用數學方法」處理的。牛頓在他的世界體系中，太陽系的結構是採用哥伯尼的太陽中心說，而以開普勒的三大定律說明行星的運動。至於行星運動的軌道，則由彼此間的引力所決定。並且討論和分析了地球上的潮汐現象，地球的橢率計算、月球的不均等性、行星的衛星運動、落體運動和拋物體運動等問題。

牛頓的「原理」，一方面以批判的態度綜合了前人的一些理論，並且創造性地建立了一個大及行星，小至粒子的動力學系統，奠定了古典力學的基礎。

§ 2.2 古典力學的基本原理

我們現在所謂古典力學，乃包括靜力學、運動學及動力學三部分。運動學主要是由伽里略建立起來的(註㉑)，靜力學在阿基米德時代已作了初步的分析。牛頓雖然沒有對靜力學加以建構，但力的平衡概念已蘊函於公理一或第一運動定律中。康德在他的「自然科學的形上基礎」裡雖然沒有分析靜力學的形上基礎，但是，有系統地展示古典力學的基本原理，對我們討論康德哲學是極重要的。又由於康德特別強調數學乃構成「正規科學」的必須而且充足條件，所以，我們在下列展示古典力學的基本原理時，我們不但不會放棄數學語言的運用，更特別注意這些數學語言的性質和結構(特別是坐標、矢量等概念)。下述的展示是分析性的，系統性的和結構性的。

§ 2.21 古典力學的基本意義

古典力學的意義，可藉下述幾點來說明：

- (1)力學是討論物質(matter)的簡單機械運動之形式，這種運動基本上是物體(body)在一定的時區內相對於另一物體而表現之位置變遷而言。
- (2)在古典力學中所考察的物體，其速度遠較光在真空中的速度為小。對於較接近光速的

物體之運動，乃屬相對論的課題，至於有關微觀粒子運動的一些特殊情況，則又為量子力學或波動力學的研究對象。相對論與量子論皆不屬古典力學。這裡所謂微觀物體乃指那些在靜止時，質量不會大於原子的靜止質量而言。

(3)物體乃指由為數極多的原子或分子所構成的宏觀體系。古典力學中的物體可因其性質及處理的方便性而可分為質點、剛體、理想流體、理想彈性體等。

(4)分類：

古典力學一般分為三部分：

(a)靜力學：討論力的加法及有關固體、液體及氣體的平衡條件。

(b)運動學：討論物體運動的機械形式，而不理會彼此間的互為影響之情形。

(c)動力學：討論物體運動時，彼此互相影響的情形。

§ 2.22 數學描述的基本理論

(1)參考系統：

在描述物體的運動時，必須要訴諸一個真實的或想像中的物體，以此等物體作為定點，把這種定點稱之為參考系統。根據不同的參考系統以描述物體之運動，其結果通常是有差異的。

在運動學中，我們可隨意地選擇參考系統以描述物體的運動。但在動力學中，參考系統可分為慣性與非慣性二種，而參考系統的選擇，則視乎方法上的方便性及所要處理的問題及對象之性質而定。

(2)坐標系統：

為了使參考系統能幫助我們分析物體運動的情形，我們便可在紙上作坐標系統，以便能確定物體運動之位置。一般所用的坐標有直角坐標、平面坐標、柱坐標及球坐標。在以下的描述中，我們將採用直角坐標系統，如圖(-)。

(A)若質點(定義見 § 2.231)於 t 時間位於


P (如圖(-))，則 P 的位置可如下表示：

$$x(t), y(t), z(t) \dots \dots \dots \textcircled{1}$$

(B)若考慮質點於空間中的時空關係，則其方程式便是：

$$x = x(t), y = y(t), z = z(t) \dots \dots \dots \textcircled{2}$$

這是用直角坐標系統來表述的質點運動方程式。



(C)時鐘：

坐標系統與參考系統只是表示運動物體的空間位置，除此之外，我們尚要表述運動物體的時間意義，因此，參考系統中還需要時鐘以指示運動物體在不同方位上的時間。

(D)哲學問題：

從知識論方面考慮，參考系統所涉及的時間和空間問題是極待作進一步分析的，古典力學假定了下列四個命題為真命題：

(a)空間是平直的。這說：每一坐標軸在任意延長時皆保持歐氏的平直意義。根據歐氏幾何的公理，則一直線在任意延長時仍保持為直線。

(b)時間流為均勻一致的。

(c)時間與空間無關。

(d)兩個發生在不同空間上的事件可有「同時」意義。

以上四個命題，其實是假定了時間及空間的絕對性及獨立性。

(3)向量代數的建立：

(A)定義：向量乃指具有方向之量，並且遵守平行四邊形之規則者。以 \vec{A} ， \vec{B} 等代表向量，而單位向量則指一個長度單位之向量。

(B)基本規則：

(a)若 \vec{A} 和 \vec{B} 的方向相同，並且大小相等，則 $\vec{A} = \vec{B}$③


(b)設 \vec{A} 及 \vec{B} 為二向量，並平移 \vec{A} 及 \vec{B} 而使其始端互相連接，以 \vec{A} 及 \vec{B} 作為隣近而作一平行四邊形，則此平行四邊形的對角綫R便是 \vec{A} ， \vec{B} 二向量之和。此稱為平行四邊形法則，即 $\vec{A} + \vec{B} = \vec{R}$④

(c) \vec{A} 減去 \vec{B} 即 $\vec{A} + (-\vec{B})$ ，故：

$$\vec{A} - \vec{B} = \vec{A} + (-\vec{B})$$

.....⑤

此規則利用圖解表示則極明顯，此即康德所謂呈現於直覺。



[圖二]

(d) \vec{A} 與 \vec{B} 的積可用下述方式規定：

$$|\vec{A} \times \vec{B}| = |\vec{R}|$$

$$= |\vec{A}| |\vec{B}| \sin \theta,$$

.....⑥

其中 θ 為 \vec{A} 與 \vec{B} 的始點平移而交於一平面所構成的交角。至於其標積（數量積 $\vec{A} \cdot \vec{B}$ ），則可規定為：


$$\vec{A} \cdot \vec{B} = |\vec{A}| |\vec{B}| \cos \theta$$

.....⑦

(e)向量分解與組合：

向量分解是把有關的向量投影在坐標軸上，變成分向量，然後採取一般代數運算。情形如下：

[e-1] 向量 \vec{A} 分解於直角坐標軸上而成 \vec{A}_1 ， \vec{A}_2 ， \vec{A}_3 ，即：



[圖三]

A_1, A_2, A_3 乃在 x, y, z 軸上 A 之各個分矢量。 i, j, k 分爲在 x, y, z 軸上的單位矢量，故：

$$A = \vec{A}_1 + \vec{A}_2 + \vec{A}_3 \dots\dots\dots ⑧$$

亦即：

$$A = A_x i + A_y j + A_z k, \dots\dots\dots ⑨$$

其中 A_x, A_y, A_z 爲代數量。

[e - 2] 若有 n 個矢量 $A_1, A_2, \dots\dots A_n$ ，則根據⑨而得：

$$\vec{A}_i = A_{ix} i + A_{iy} j + A_{iz} k \dots\dots\dots ⑩$$

$$\vec{A} = \sum \vec{A}_i$$

$$= \sum A_{ix} i + \sum A_{iy} j + \sum A_{iz} k \dots\dots\dots ⑪$$

各矢量在每一軸上的投影便成爲代數和，即：

$$A_x = \sum A_{ix}, A_y = \sum A_{iy}, A_z = \sum A_{iz} \dots\dots\dots ⑫$$

[e - 3] 從⑫可得合矢量之大小，即：

$$A = \sqrt{A_x^2 + A_y^2 + A_z^2} \dots\dots\dots ⑬$$

[e - 4] 又 A 與 x, y, z 三軸之夾角分別爲 α, β, γ ，則可求 A 之方向，

$$\text{即： } \cos \alpha = \frac{Ax}{A} ; \cos \beta = \frac{Ay}{A}, \cos \gamma = \frac{Az}{A} \dots\dots\dots ⑭$$

矢量代數因而建立起來。

(4)從矢量方程到物理方程：

有些物理量的運算是可用一般代數方法處理的，例如溫度、質量等，稱之爲標量。但是，有些物理量的運算是不遵從一般代數規則的，例如力，衝量，加速度等，它們除了有量的大小和方向之外，還必須遵守平行四邊形的加法規則（見方程④），這些量便是矢量。在力學裡，速度、位移、加速度、衝量、動量、作用力、力矩、角動量等皆爲矢量，它們均遵從平行四邊形的加法規則，故有關這些物理方程，便無可避免地要借助矢量代數。按照這種關係，我們便可建立一種詮釋規則，使有關的矢量方程詮釋爲物理方程。或者說，利用詮釋規則，說明矢量代數如何能應用於力學裡。

§ 2.23 運動學的建立

§ 2.231 質點運動學：

(0) 當我們處理物體之運動時，有關物體的大小和形狀均可不必理會，則這樣的物體便可被視爲質點。例如，有關行星的公轉問題，在處理此問題時，行星便被視作質點。若依運動的幾何方式分，則質點運動有直線和曲線運動兩種。若依速度來分類，則有等速運動和變速運動兩種。

(1) 瞬時速度：設質點在時間 t 而經過 Δt 所經過的位移爲 $\Delta \vec{r}$ ，則 $\Delta \vec{r}$ 與 Δt 之比的極限，便是質點的瞬時速度 \vec{v} ，即：

$$\vec{v} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Delta \vec{r}}{\Delta t} = \frac{d \vec{r}}{d t} \dots\dots\dots ⑮$$

- (2) 速率：速度的大小稱為速率，以 v 表示速率，而以 ds 表示弧長，則可建構速率的方程：

$$v = |\vec{v}| = \frac{d\vec{r}}{dt} = \frac{ds}{dt} \dots\dots\dots(16)$$


- (3) 利用速率方程，施以積分，便可得質點運動所經過的長度（距離）(s)：

$$\int_{s_0}^{s_1} ds = \int_{t_0}^t |\vec{v}| dt \dots\dots\dots(17)$$

- (4) 若用直角坐標系統來表述質點從 P_1 到 P_2 所經過的位置，則：

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta\vec{r} &= (x_2 - x_1) \mathbf{i} + (y_2 - y_1) \mathbf{j} \\ &\quad + (z_2 - z_1) \mathbf{k} \\ &= \Delta x \mathbf{i} + \Delta y \mathbf{j} + \Delta z \mathbf{k} \dots\dots\dots(18) \end{aligned}$$

[圖四]



- (5) P_1 的位置本不成一向量，但 P_1 對參考點 O 的位置便可用向量表示，稱為位置向量或矢徑，即：

$$\vec{r} = x\mathbf{i} + y\mathbf{j} + z\mathbf{k} \dots\dots\dots(19)$$

- (6) 應用方程(19)，我們可把瞬時速度投影在直角坐標軸上，這是用 Δt 除方程(18)兩邊，並加以微分，遂得

$$\vec{v} = \frac{d\vec{r}}{dt} = \frac{dx}{dt} \mathbf{i} + \frac{dy}{dt} \mathbf{j} + \frac{dz}{dt} \mathbf{k} \dots\dots\dots(20)$$

其中 $\frac{dx}{dt} = v_x$ ， $\frac{dy}{dt} = v_y$ ， $\frac{dz}{dt} = v_z$ ，它們分別是速度在坐標軸上的投影。

- (7) 加速度 (\vec{a})：速度 (\vec{v}) 在 Δt 時間所所改變的 $\Delta\vec{v}$ 與 Δt 之比的極限值，即

$$\vec{a} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Delta\vec{v}}{\Delta t} = \frac{d\vec{v}}{dt} \dots\dots\dots(21)$$

- (8) 從方程(20)的時間微分，便得加速度在直角坐標系中的方程即：

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{a} &= \frac{d\vec{v}}{dt} = \frac{d^2x}{dt^2} \mathbf{i} + \frac{d^2y}{dt^2} \mathbf{j} + \frac{d^2z}{dt^2} \mathbf{k} \\ &= \frac{dv_x}{dt} \mathbf{i} + \frac{dv_y}{dt} \mathbf{j} + \frac{dv_z}{dt} \mathbf{k} \dots\dots\dots(22) \end{aligned}$$

以 a_x ， a_y ， a_z 分別表示 \vec{a} 在直角坐標軸上的投影，則：

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d^2x}{dt^2} &= \frac{dv_x}{dt} = a_x \\ \frac{d^2y}{dt^2} &= \frac{dv_y}{dt} = a_y \\ \frac{d^2z}{dt^2} &= \frac{dv_z}{dt} = a_z \dots\dots\dots(23) \end{aligned}$$

- (9) 其他運動方程（如平均速度，或已知其加速度而描述質點所經之距離等），皆可建構

§ 2.232 剛體運動學：

(0) 若物體的幾何形式是守恆的，則這樣的物體就是剛體。換言之，若物體內任意兩個質點的距離保持不變，則這樣的物體便可稱之為剛體。在古典物理學中，剛體被視作一個由質點所組成的系統，其中質點與質點之間又被視作固定不變地連系着。剛體是個理想的概念，既然是理想的概念，我們便可順着康德的知識論而追問它的先驗可能性，並且順着康德所提出的方案而加以建構。

剛體的運動基本上可分為平移、迴轉及平面運動三類。在平移運動中，組成剛體的各質點均假設作同樣的運動。平移運動又可分為直線平移及曲綫平移。前者為質點系統中各質點均保持直綫運動；而後者則各質點均作曲綫運動。迴轉運動乃指剛體繞一固定軸之運動，而平面運動則為平移與迴轉兩種運動的結合。

在描述剛體運動時，把所需要的獨立坐標變量之數目稱之為自由度。一般來說，當我們描述在空間中的一個質點時，就需要三個這樣的變量，故其自由度為 3，描述自由落體時所需要的獨立變量為一，故其自由度為 1；至於剛體繞一個定點運動時，其自由度為 3 等。

(1) 剛體的平移運動可約化而成質點的平移運動：

在本節的 § 0 裡，我們已把剛體視為一個質點的系統，又由於當剛體作平移運動時，剛體上任意二質點不但被假設成具有相同的速度和加速度，而且彼此還保持着相互平行。所以，對整個質點系統運動的描述便可約化為對一個質點的運動之描述。又由於質點系統就是剛體，因此而使到剛體的平移運動的描述可以還原成為對一個質點運動之描述。在這個意義下，剛體的這種運動與質點運動是沒有差別的。

(2) 剛體在環繞一定軸而迴轉時，剛體內任意二質點皆作圓周運動，並且在相同時間 (Δ t) 內，其所轉動的角度相同 (Δ θ)。角位移 Δ θ 與 Δ t 之比例極限便是角速度。角速度為一矢量，我們用符號 $\vec{\omega}$ 表示，則：

$$\vec{\omega} = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Delta \theta}{\Delta t} = \frac{d \theta}{d t} \dots\dots\dots 24$$

以 α 表示角加速度，則從角速度 $\vec{\omega}$ 的時間微分便得：

$$\vec{\alpha} = \frac{d \vec{\omega}}{d t} \dots\dots\dots 25$$

以上所展示的，乃運動學的一些基本原理。有了這些概念，我們便能夠落實地，順着康德所謂自然科學或正規科學如何可能夠的問題，追問這個理論內的先驗條件，康德對這個理論的形上基礎有詳盡的分析。關於這個問題，我們留待本文 § 3.0 再討論。

§ 2.24 動力學的基本原理：

關於動力學的意義，我們在本文 § 2.21 一(4)裡解釋過了。動力學是牛頓在其「自然科學的數學原理」一書作了系統性的處理，而其基本原則就是牛頓運動三定律以及萬有引力定律。牛頓運動三定律（公理）並非從經驗生活中獲得的，因此，這些定律基

本上合符康德所謂先驗命題，並且是先驗綜合命題（判斷）。因此，深入分析牛頓這三條公理的意義：無論從科學方法論、科學哲學、及康德知論的觀點看，都是極為重要的。因此，我們在下文先分別分析這三定律或公理的內含以及它們在動力學中的意義。

§ 2.241 牛頓第一公理：

這個公理是說：

「任何物體都會繼續保持它的靜止狀態，或保持其等速直線運動，直至有力作用於這物體上而迫使它改變原有的狀態（註⑳）」。

牛頓這個定律，明顯是從笛卡爾那裡拿來的，笛氏在他的「哲學原理」第二部分第38節論及自然界第一定律時說：

「自然界第一定律：任何事物在自身的力量中，恆是保持同一狀態的，因而，若它一旦被推動，便一直繼續地移動（註㉑）。」

又當笛氏自己解釋這個定律時，他說：

「這些定律中的第一個定律是：任何物體，設若它的簡單的或不可分割的，會恆常地在其自己的力量中繼續保持向一狀態，同時，除非有外在原因，否則便不會改變這種狀態（註㉒）」。

比較牛頓和笛氏的說法，可見這兩者的「第一定律」基本上是一樣的。牛頓雖然在他的公理中加上「靜止狀態」或「等速直線運動」的字眼，但這並沒有對笛氏的「自然界第一定律」有任何的增添。笛氏第二個自然界定律是講及直線運動的，然而這個定律實已包含在第一定律中，因為在外體不受外力作用的情形下，則物體的運動狀態只有靜止或等速直線運動。

接下來，我們先展示這個定律所包含的重要意義：

(A)牛頓第一公理的內涵意義：

(a)這個定律的意思也可以這樣說：當施於物體上的外力之和(\vec{F})為0時，則該物體便沒有加速度。因此，我們又可把它表示為(\rightarrow 為邏輯上的函蘊關係)：

$$\sum \vec{F} = 0 \rightarrow (\vec{a} = 0) \dots\dots\dots \textcircled{23}$$

(b)上述(a)函蘊了二個重要的因素：

①外力或力是改變運動狀態的原因（注意，是「改變」運動狀態的原因）而不是「運動」的原因，因而也就是加速度的原因。

②物體本身具有靜止或等速直線運動之性質，這種物體的性質，稱之為慣性。

(c)第一公理表面上與日常經驗違背。經驗方面告訴我們，一物體在不受外力的作用下，很快便從運動狀態中靜止下來。消除這二者之間的矛盾，便是提出摩擦力及其他阻力的概念。因此，一物體一經運動，若在無阻力的情形下，便不會停止下來，而永作等速直線的運動。

(d)第一定律確定了所謂「慣性參考系統」的意義。

當觀察者是以加速度運動時，第一定律便沒有效了。事實上，牛頓三公理皆只當觀察者處身於慣性參考系統裡時才有效。

在古典力學裡，當牛頓第一定律（公理）對於某一參考系統為有效時，此系統便

稱之為慣性參考系統。任何一個相對於慣性系統的參考系統，皆可視為慣性系統，換言之，任何相對於慣性系統而作加速度運動的參考系統，皆非慣性系統。

(B)力的加法規則：

這個原則明顯地提及「作用力」又隱含着「慣性力」。關於這二種力，牛頓分別在定義四及定義三作了說明（註②⑥）。以下我們展示有關力的加法之基本規則：

(a)平行四邊形的有關合力及分力之規則，此乃矢量規則之應用（見 § 2.22 - (3) - (B) - (b)）。

(b)若多個力 $\vec{F}_1, \vec{F}_2, \dots, \vec{F}_k$ 作用於質點A，則其作用力 \vec{F} 為各個別作用力之矢量和，即：

$$\vec{F} = \sum_{i=1}^k \vec{F}_i \dots\dots\dots(27)$$

\vec{F} 可藉一個封閉的有關 $\sum_{i=1}^k \vec{F}_i$ 的多邊形而建構起來。

(c)這些力可投影於笛卡爾直角坐標上的各軸，並且各軸的代數和為：

$$F_x = \sum_{i=1}^k F_{ix}, F_y = \sum_{i=1}^k F_{iy}, F_z = \sum_{i=1}^k F_{iz} \dots\dots\dots(28)$$

(C)質量的概念：

牛頓把質量視為物質之量（the quantity of matter），並且界定為有關物體的密度與其體積之乘積，即 $m = D V$ （註②⑦）。從質點方面說，則物體的總質量可用下列二式表示：

$$\textcircled{1} \quad m = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i \dots\dots\dots(29)$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad m = \int_0^V D dV \dots\dots\dots(30)$$

在一個同質的物體中，其密度分佈是均勻的，故：

$$\textcircled{3} \quad m = D V \dots\dots\dots(31)$$

(D)衝量

牛頓在解釋慣性力時，認為慣性力既可解釋為反抗力，也可解釋為衝力（impulse）（註②⑧）。現在以 \vec{K}_i 代表某質點 m_i 之衝力（衝量），則根據牛頓之定義（定義二，運動之量）：

$$\vec{K}_i = m_i \vec{v}_i \dots\dots\dots(32)$$

$$\text{或} \quad \vec{K} = \int_{(m)} \vec{v} dm = \int_{(v)} \vec{v} D dV \dots\dots\dots(33)$$

至於在點系統中，n個質點所構成之衝量為：

$$\vec{K} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{K}_i = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i \vec{v}_i \dots\dots\dots(34)$$

§ 2.242 牛頓第二及第三公理

(A)牛頓第二公理

(1)論到第二公理時，人們就會提出這樣的問題，即：第二公理究竟是實驗定律抑或是對力的定義？在討論這個問題之前，讓我們先看看這個公理在牛頓原文對這個公理的說明：

「運動的改變是與其作用力成正，而且這種改變是按照該力所作用的直線方向發生的（註⑳）」。

現在於一般教科書中，把牛頓定律寫成：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = m \vec{a} \dots\dots\dots (35)$$

其中 $\Sigma \vec{F}$ 為作用力之合力，而 m 為質量， \vec{a} 為加速度。

古斯尼哥夫 (B. G. Kuznetsov) 在他的「從伽里略到愛因斯坦」一書在解釋這條公理時，謂牛頓在這條公理並未使用加速度這個概念（註㉑）。但是，在字面上，牛頓是沒有使用加速度這個詞項，然而所謂加速度的意義卻已包含於上述的定義，這個問題可從兩方面詮釋：

(a)詮釋一：

牛頓在公理二中所謂「運動的改變」乃指「運動量」而言，而牛頓所謂「運動量」(the quantity of motion) 就是指「動量」，關於運動量或動量的定義，牛頓說得很清楚：「運動量是用以量度運動，是由速度及質量之乘積（註㉒）」。按照這個定義，則第二公理便成為：

「運動量（動量）的改變是與其作用力成正，而且這種改變是按照該力所作用的直線方向發生的」。

「運動量的改變」即

$$\frac{\Delta \vec{K}}{\Delta t} = \frac{\Delta (m \vec{v})}{\Delta t} \dots\dots\dots (36)$$

於是第二定律便成為：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = \frac{\Delta \vec{K}}{\Delta t} = \frac{\Delta (m \vec{v})}{\Delta t} = m \frac{d \vec{v}}{d t} = m \vec{a} \dots\dots\dots (37)$$

(b)詮釋二：

1877年，建立電動力學的物理學家麥斯威爾 (Maxwell) 在他詮釋牛頓力學的「物質與運動」一書裡，使用動量與衝量來詮釋第二公理，他說：

「物體的動量之改變，乃數量地恒等於產生它的衝量，並且其方向相同（註㉓）」。

根據這個意義，則

$$\Sigma \vec{F} \cdot \Delta t = \Delta (m \vec{v}) \dots\dots\dots (38)$$

把方程式⑳移項，則得：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = m \frac{\Delta \vec{v}}{\Delta t} = m \frac{d \vec{v}}{d t} = m \vec{\alpha} \dots\dots\dots 39$$

由此可見，把第二公理寫成 $\Sigma \vec{F} = m \vec{\alpha}$ ，這是符合牛頓原有的定義。

(2)接下來的問題是：究竟牛頓把第二公理視為定義？抑或視之為實驗定律？Max Jammer 在他的「力之概念」一書裡認為這兩種解釋都不正確（註④）。把第二公理視作為力的定義是不正確，因為牛頓清楚地分列定義與公理，可見公理不是定義。另一方面，第二公理也不能視作是實驗定律（儘管這公理可用實驗確定），因為牛頓明確地提出，他「對這些力的考慮不是物理上的（經驗上的），而是數學上的」（註④）。所謂以力作為數學的概念，這基本上是指力的概念並無經驗內容，因此，則第二公理自然也就非經驗規律。第二公理既不宜視作力的定義，又不是經驗規律，那麼剩下來的可能性便是先驗規律了。事實上，牛頓的三條公理都是先驗的。

(B)第三定律：

牛頓在其「原理」一書中對第三公理的說明是這樣的：

「對任何作用力皆有另一相等並相反的作用力，或者說：兩物體在相互作用時恒有相等，但方向相反的作用力（註⑤）」。

故第三公理就是：

$$\vec{F}_{ab} = -\vec{F}_{ba} \dots\dots\dots 40$$

作用力與反作用力是同時出現，也同時消失。這個公理無疑也是先驗的，因為在經驗界中，我們根本無法觀察到反作用力。


§ 2.243 萬有引力與相對性原則：

(A)萬有引力定律：

兩個任意質點或物體皆互相施出其吸力，這種吸力（ \vec{F} ）是與這兩質點之乘積（ $m_i \times m_j$ ）成正比，而與其距離（ γ ）之平方成反比。〔圖五〕

根據這個意義，以 $\vec{\gamma}_{ij}$ 表示從質點 m_i 到 m_j 之矢徑，並以 \vec{F}_{ij} 代表對 m_i 所施之吸力， f 為引（吸）力常數，則得：

$$\vec{F}_{ij} = f \frac{m_i m_j}{\gamma^2} \cdot \frac{\vec{\gamma}_{ij}}{\gamma} \dots\dots\dots 41$$



根據第三公理，我們便可寫出施於質點 m_j 的吸力（ \vec{F}_{ji} ），它的數值與 \vec{F}_{ij} 相同，但方向相反，即：


$$\vec{F}_{ji} = -\vec{F}_{ij} = -f \frac{m_i m_j}{r^2} \cdot \frac{\vec{r}_{ij}}{r} = f \frac{m_i m_j}{r^2} \cdot \frac{\vec{r}_{ji}}{r} \dots\dots\dots(42)$$

在「原理」一書的第一、第二及第三部分，牛頓都討論萬有引力定律，並且在第二及第三部分裡應用此定律分析行星運動、月球的不均性和潮汐等問題。

(B)力學的相對性原則：

這個原則是伽里略所發現的（註④），伽氏指出：當船以等速直線運動時，在船中所發生的一切運動皆與船在靜止時在船中的一切運動以同樣形式進行。他把地球作爲一個慣性體系，而在等速直線運動的船也是一慣性體系，這樣，相對於一個慣性體系（慣性參考系統）而作等速直線運動的所有慣性體系都是慣性體系，因而一切力學規律在各慣性系統中都是等價的。利用相對性原則，我們便可說明這樣的現象：當汽車從台中開往台北，並在高速公路上以等速直線運動時，車內的一隻蚊子何故不費勁地仍能在車內作正常的飛行，卻不會因車子的高速運動而迅速地往車子的後方移動（儘管車子此時以一小時90公里的速度向前行駛）。當觀察者從一個慣性體系（例如坐在岸上）變換到另一慣性體系（例如站在以等速直線運動的船上），這兩個慣性系統之間便出現時間和空間的交換方程，稱之爲伽里略變換（Galilei-Transformation）。

[圖六]



$$x_2 = x_1 - v t, y_2 = y_1, z_2 = z_1, t_2 = t_1$$

或： }(43)

$$x_1 = x_2 + v t_2, y_1 = y_2, z_1 = z_2, t_1 = t_2$$

方程式 $t_1 = t_2$ ，說明古典力學中假定時間條件在一切慣性系統中皆有其絕對性，這是說：在所有慣性系統中，時間皆以同樣的方式流逝。

§ 2.25 靜力學的基本原理

關於靜力學的研究，以阿基來德爲最早，阿氏在他的「論平面的均衡或平面的重心」一書，已對靜力學的一些問題作了分析（註④）。伽里略的名著「關於兩種新科學的對話」（Dialogues Concerning the Two New Sciences）一書的「第二天」也討論了一些靜力學的問題（伽氏該書是分作四天的對話寫成的）（註④）。現在靜力學的最基本原則，亦可在牛頓的第一及第二公理裡找到。靜力學的最基本原則爲平（均）衡，但是，平衡的概念必須預設合力的概念，後者基本上是可由矢量代數來建立。因此，如果我們真的要深入分析靜力學的基礎，那麼，康德所謂正規科學必須

要以數學或先驗原則作為條件的論點在此處也有特殊的意義。以下展示有關問題的基本原理。

(A) 一個質點的平衡：

根據牛頓第一公理，我們可以說：物體平衡的情形表現於該物體繼續保持靜止狀態，或依等速直線運動。此時作用於該物體的一切外力之矢量和為 0，因此，作用於一個質點上的平衡意義，便可用下述方程④④表述，即：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{F}_i = 0 \quad \text{.....} \textcircled{44}$$

方程式④④乃表示一個質點平衡的必須而且充分的條件。

(B) 一個質點系統平衡的必須條件：

(a) 從作用於質點系統的外力 ($\Sigma \vec{F}$) 方面說，其平衡條件為：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{F}_i = 0 \quad \text{.....} \textcircled{45}$$

(b) 從力矩方面說，質點系統的平衡條件為：

$$\vec{M} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{r}_i \times \vec{F}_i \quad \text{.....} \textcircled{46}$$

\vec{M} 為力矩 ($M_0 = \vec{r} \times \vec{F}$ ，其中 \vec{r} 為力臂， M_0 為一力對一個定點，如坐標參考點之力矩)。 \vec{r}_i 亦為第 i 個質點對於原點 O 之位置向量。(關於位置向量概念見本文方程①⑨)。

(C) 一個剛體之平衡：

以 \vec{c} 表示力偶， m 為力偶之數目，而 n 為力 (\vec{F}) 之數目，則一個剛體之平衡的必須而且充足之條件為：

$$\Sigma \vec{F} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{F}_i = 0 \quad \text{.....} \textcircled{47}$$

$$\vec{M} = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{r}_i \times \vec{F}_i + \sum_{j=1}^m \vec{c}_j \quad \text{.....} \textcircled{48}$$

除了平衡的向量方程之外，也可把這些向量方程改寫成平衡的純量方程，此處從略。

以上，我們就從方法論的層面，系統性和結構性地把古典力學的基本原理展示出來。這些展示，無論是對科學方法論的討論，抑或對康德有關古典物理學的形上基礎問題的分析，都是必要的。以下，我們就討論康德如何論古典力學的形上學基礎。

§ 3.0 古典力學的形上基礎

在上述所展示的古典力學理論中，我們可以看到這個理論涉及許多概念及原則。在運動學中，我們有時間、空間（距離）、運動、質點、矢量、參考系統、坐標、剛體等概念。在動力學中，我們有力、慣性、質量等基本概念，而基本原則有三①公理、②平行四邊形定律、③萬有引力、④相對性原則等。至於靜力學，我們還有平衡這個概念。

在一般的物理學教本中，把物理學的概念分爲基本概念及導出概念二種，而其中所謂基本概念是指時間、空間及質量而言。所謂「基本」的概念既然是相對於「導出」概念，所以，這樣的所謂基本概念是指用以界定其他概念所用的概念而言。但是，即使從這個意義來說，則力學中的基本概念實不限於上述三個，例如量、因果關係等都不能約化爲上述三個概念的。在康德的知識論中，時間和空間是屬於感性直覺的形式，而概念則指用以思維的範疇而言。康德認爲用作思維活動的最基本概念稱爲理解活動的純粹概念。關於康德所指的純粹概念，是任何略聞康德哲學的人都聽聞過，故此我們在這裡不必把之列舉出來。康德宣稱：除了範疇表中所列的基本概念之外，再也沒有涉及物性的理解之純粹概念了。康德這個大膽的宣示雖然使人吃驚，但是，我們在這裡卻不打算討論這個問題。

我們現在要順着康德的路向而展示的，是有關康德對古典力學的形上基礎問題。這裡所謂形上基礎是指古典力學所涉及的先驗條件而言，這是康德在「自然哲學的形上基礎」一書所要處理的。康德把有關的問題分爲四個部分，這就是他所謂的「運動學」、「動力學」、「機械學」及「現象學」。不過，康德所謂運動學並非現代物理學上的“Kinematics”而是指“phoronomy”，後者應譯爲「幾何運動學」，這是伽里略採用歐氏幾何原理及幾何方法而建立的運動理論，至於現代意義的運動學（Kinematics），在方法是用採用微積分作爲運算工具，而與伽氏的幾何方法不同。康德從伽氏的幾何運動學以分析物體運動的形上基礎，這種可能是由於他不但把運動視作物體在空間移動的各種情形而強調其空間化，甚至在他分析運動時，也傾向於把「時間」空間化，這其實就是伽里略所採用的方法（註④）。此外，康德在「形上學」一書中，所謂的「動力學」及「機械學」（或譯作力學），其實皆屬於古典力學中的「動力學」。至於康德在該書中所謂現象學，德國學者對這部分的詮釋，或認爲這部分並無必要，或以爲這部分只是涉及物質概念之建構與認知能力的關係（註⑤）。這些詮釋實在有待商榷的必要，因爲一個詮釋者把康德的一部分理論視爲「沒有必要」，那是以批評者的身份，而不再是以一個詮釋者的身份說話了。至於把現象學部分視爲是有關物質概念的形上建構與認知能力之間的關係論述，這個論點卻使人看不出現象學部分與其他部分有何連貫性及整體性？其實康德在「幾何運動學」、「動力學」及「力學」三部分的工作中對有關問題的形上建構，皆離不開認知能力，而不獨現象學部分爲然。筆者綜觀整個「形上基礎」一書的結構，以及「現象學」部分的文義，認爲這部分明顯地是有關運動概念的模態詮釋（modal interpretation），這種詮釋可「類比」於科學方法論上的「語意規則」（Carnap）、「運作定義法」（Bridgman）或射影規則（Abbildungsregel G. Ludwig）（註⑥）。

關於這四部理論中所要建構的概念及規則與康德所謂的思維或理解形式（範疇）之關係，康德在該書的「緒論」中有如下的說明：

「完整的形上學系統之模式（無論是一般性的自然或特殊性的物質自然），就是範疇表。除了範疇表中的概念之外，再沒有其他的理解之純粹概念是涉及物性的。利用量、質關係及模態這四類範疇，則所有一般性的物質普遍概念之決定條件，以及有關這方面的所有能被先驗地思維的事物（包括數學之建構或如經驗的確定

對象那樣在經驗中被給與，皆必然能夠被建立起來。這裡已沒有別的方法能有所發現或增加，但一些缺乏清晰及徹底的地方，仍可加以改進（註②）」。在這裡清楚地表明康德對他所發現的範疇表之自信，他並且更進一步指出：利用量、質、關係及模態這四大範疇，則所有一般性的「物質普遍概念」、「數學之建構」、以及有關的經驗對象之先驗條件等，皆能夠建構起來。然則古典力學中的基本概念又與理解力的純粹概念有甚麼關係呢？對於這個問題，康德說：

「所以，物質的概念必須藉着理解的概念之四種功能而實現出來（分爲四章），在每種功能中，我們對物質概念增加新的條件。外感官的事物之基本決定條件必定是運動，因為只有這樣，外感官才會受到影響。理解把所有其他物性的述詞帶回到運動裡，故自然科學便是純粹的或是實用的運動學說。『自然科學的形上基礎』一書因而分爲四章。第一章稱爲幾何運動學，在幾何運動學中，根據運動之組合而把運動只視爲一純粹之量，並不涉及任何有關『質』方面的情形。第二章可名之爲動力學，在這一章中，運動只被視作在根源的動力名目下的物質之質。第三章名之爲機械學，在這一章裡，具有動力學性質的物質是涉及運動之間的關係。第四章稱之爲現象學，在這裡，物質的動靜是由呈現之模式（*Vorstellungsart*）或模態所決定的，也就是說，把物質視作外感官之現象（註③）」。

根據這段話，則康德所謂「幾何運動學」、「動力學」、「機械學」及「現象學」四章是依據量、質、關係及模態四大範疇而設立的，其主要內容如下：

- ①第一章，取名爲「幾何運動學」，其主要論點是討論運動之組合，並且把「運動」視作一「純粹之量」（*reines Quantum nach seiner Zusammensetzung*）。這是屬於量範疇。
- ②第二章取名爲「動力學」，其主要論點是從「根源的動力」（*ursprünglich bewegende Kraft*）的概念下討論運動及有關物質之質（*die Qualität der Materie*），這其實就是分析「力」以及「力與物體運動」的形上說明而言。這是理解活動在質範疇方面所表現的功能。
- ③第三章取名爲機械學，這是分析物質運動與運動物質之間的關係。
- ④第四章名爲現象學，康德自謂這裡所處理的是把「物質視作外感官之現象」，這其實就是上述三章中有關的概念與經驗之間的關係之一些模態詮釋，包括經驗的可能性，實在性及必然性。

這樣說來，康德的「形上學基礎」一書所討論的四章，其實是論及以下三個問題：

- ①古典力學中有關運動學的形上基礎，這是該書第一章的主題。
- ②古典力學中有關動力學的形上基礎，這包括該書第二章及第三章所論。
- ③關於作爲純粹形式規則系統的運動學及動力學之模態詮釋，這是該書第四章所展示的。

接下來，我們便從上述三方面來展示有關的問題。

§ 3 · 1 運動學中的形上基礎

正如上文所說，關於運動學中的形上基礎問題，是康德在他的「自然科學的形上基礎」一書第一章所討論的主題。首先，康德把該章名為「幾何運動學的形上基礎」。「幾何運動學」原是伽里略運用歐氏幾何方法（應用歐氏幾何）而處理運動學，因而伽氏的方法並非代數法。康德把運動學視為「幾何運動學」，明顯地與伽氏之學有關。在「幾何運動學的形上基礎」一章裡，康德基本上是從「絕對空間」來「建構」運動學的概念及其原理的。所謂「建構」一個概念乃謂把對應於一概念的直覺先驗地展現出來（A 713，B 714），或者說：概念的建構是謂「在直覺中先驗地給與一個概念」（A 722，B 750）。

「幾何運動學的形上基礎」一章由五個「說明」，一個基本原則（Grundsatz），一條定理，及一些評註所組成。其中的「說明」部分可視作概念建構之說明或定義。

§ 3.11 幾何運動學的概念之建構：

(1) [說明一]：

「物質是在空間中的可運動者（das Bewegliche），自身為可運動的空間稱為實質空間或相對空間。一切運動最後必須要存想於一個空間之中，這樣的空間稱為純粹的，或因而是絕對的空間」（註④）。

在這裡，康德說明了三個運動學裡的基本概念：

(a) 物質：這是指在空間中的可運動者。

(b) 相對空間：又稱為實質空間，這是指自身為可運動之空間。

(c) 絕對空間：當我們存想物體之運動時，我們必把它存想在一個空間中，而其中最終的那個空間稱為絕對空間。

在這項「說明」之後，康德提出二個評註，這是對上述的「說明」作進一步的解釋，這二個評註主要說明下述二個概念的先驗性：

A、物質：運動學的問題只是有關運動問題，因此運動物體的惟一屬性便只是有關它的「可運動性」（movability, Beweglichkeit）。在這個意義下，物體的可運動性便可藉着「點」來描述，由於這樣的點並沒有經驗的成分，故可視之為數學點（mathematical point）（康德在「說明二」中雖稱之為物理點，但這樣的物理點仍只是形式的）。進一步來說，數學點的「運動性」或「可運動性」是要藉着量概念來說明的。在這個意義下，運動學的基本意義便成為「運動的純粹量」之理論（reine Größenlehre der Bewegung）（註⑤）。在這裡所指的「量」，康德雖然標明為速度及方向（方向之量為向量），但是，他又認為在運動學，速度只有空間的意義（註⑥）。這樣，運動性便約化為空間性。

B、絕對空間：我們在〔§ 2.22〕節裡論到描述物體的運動時，必須要依據一個真實的或想像中的（即想像其為真實的）物體作為定點或參考點。康德稱這種實物所在的空間為經驗空間，或相對空間。然由於一切的經驗空間都是相對的，因此，我們一定要設想一切經驗的空間乃存在於絕對空間之中。由於具有經驗對象的空間都是相對空間或經驗空間，因此絕對空間就不可能有經驗對

象存在，因而絕對空間必然為非物質的。關於絕對空間的問題，康德說：「因此，絕對空間自身是虛無的，並且完全空無一物，它只表徵其他所有的相對空間而使我能在已知的空間之外隨時可作進一步的存想，同時，我只能在每個已知的空間而推廣至無限，把絕對空間視作包含已知的空間並且在絕對的空間中我才能設想已知空間的運動。由於我把這個放大的，並且仍屬於物質（實質）的空間只存在於思維中，又由於這個所指涉的空間之物質對我而言成為毫無所知，於是我便從物質中加以抽象，因此，我表象出來的空間便是一個純粹的，非經驗的絕對空間。我能夠把任何經驗空間與這個絕對空間加以比較，並且把前者作為運動之物而表象於後者之中，因而後者便恒被視為不動的（註⑤7）」。

康德這段有關絕對空間的論證極為清楚。康德的意思是說：當我們現實的空間在意識中不斷推展時，我們總能夠把已知的空間作為空間的一部分。如果把已知的空間（或已知空間的對象）抽去，結果我們在意識中仍可有空間的意象，這樣空無一物的空間為非物質性，因而為非經驗性，康德稱之為純粹空間或絕對空間。在第一批判裡，康德把這樣的絕對空間稱為外感官的直覺形式。這樣的直覺形式是構成物質及運動概念的先驗條件。

(2) [說明二]：關於運動。

「東西的運動乃其外在關係在已知空間中的變遷」。

(3) [說明三]：關於靜止。

「靜止乃永久地處於同一位置之中，而永久乃指在時間中一直存在着」。

根據「說明二」，運動概念可以這樣建構：我們在意識中存想二點（點是沒有廣延性，因而只表示一位置），而這二點在一已知的空間中，其位置相對地出現變遷。

至於靜止概念的建構，康德說：

「因此，靜止不能解釋為運動之缺乏，把運動視作 $=\bigcirc$ ，這是無法被建構的，而必須被解釋為在同一地方的持續停留（*die beharrliche Gegenwart*）。因為這個概念可藉着『有限的時間以無窮小的速度之運動』這個表象（意象，*Vorstellung*）來建構」（註⑤8）」。

康德所謂「有限的時間以無窮小的速度之運動」一語宜改為「在有限的時間內作無窮小的位移」。他以為用這樣的一個表象就能夠建構「靜止」這個概念。但是，這種建構顯然涉及時間的因素，對於這個因素的先驗性，康德在這裡卻沒有論及。

(4) [說明四]：運動組合概念之建構：

從 [§ 2.231] 節中，我們可以看出，在直線運動方面，有關運動組合的建構有三種情形：

$$\textcircled{1} \int_{s_0}^{s_1} d\vec{s}$$

$$\textcircled{2} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \vec{v} dt$$

以上兩個概念見於方程①②，至於另一概念可從方程①推演而得，即：

$$\textcircled{3} \vec{s} = \vec{s}_0 + \int_{t_0}^t \vec{v} dt \dots\dots\dots \textcircled{49}$$

在數學上，①，②兩個概念所表述之量是相等的，而③的概念只是②式加 \vec{S}_0 而成。至於①及②兩個概念，則可分別約化為：

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \vec{v} dt &= \vec{v}_1 dt_1 + \vec{v}_2 dt_2 + \dots\dots + \vec{v}_n dt_n \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{v}_i dt_i \dots\dots\dots \textcircled{50} \end{aligned}$$

又由於 $\vec{v}_1 dt_1 = \vec{S}_1$ ， $\vec{v}_2 dt_2 = \vec{S}_2$ ， $\vec{v}_n dt_n = \vec{S}_n$ ，所以：

$$\int_{t_0}^{S_1} d\vec{s} = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \vec{v} dt = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{v}_i dt_i = \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{S}_i \dots\dots\dots \textcircled{51}$$

所以，方程⑤告訴我們，運動之組合可直接組合每一瞬時距離 S_1 ， S_2 …… S_n 而成，也可先建構 S_1 ， S_2 ， S_3 …… S_n （藉 $\vec{v}_1 dt_1$ ， $\vec{v}_2 dt_2$ ，…… $\vec{v}_n dt_n$ ），從而再組合 S_1 ， S_2 ，…… S_n 。至於康德對於運動組合概念之建構，他說：

「建構『組合運動』這個概念，乃謂把一個或多個運動在一個運動物體中接合起來而成一個運動，這個接合是在直覺中先驗地描述出來（註⑤⑨）」。

以上這個所謂對「組合運動」之建構這個概念所指的組合乃指：

$$\int_{S_0}^{S_1} d\vec{s} \quad \text{或} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n \vec{S}_i \dots\dots\dots \textcircled{52}$$

而言，這是指把⑤這種組合在直覺中先驗地描述出來。康德還特別指出，這種建構只是量方面的，而無質的成素參與其中。

(5) [說明五]：運動之組合：

「運動的組合乃把一點的運動等同於組合該點之二個或多個運動之表象」。

「表象」一詞在德文為*Vorstellung*，乃指呈現於意識中的概念或圖像而言。關於運動的組合問題，康德說：

「在幾何運動學裡，我認識到物質是藉着運動性而不是藉着其他性質，因而，可把物質本身視為一點，而運動是只可視為空間的描述，但是我們考慮運動時，我不但要像幾何學那樣要注意所描述的空間，而且還要注意其所涉及的時間，因而要注意速度，點藉之而描述空間。因此，幾何運動學是運動量的純粹理論（註⑥⑩）」。

儘管康德在此強調速度及時間與運動之間的關係，但是，在他的建構方案中，始終是以空間為主要對象，並且是指空間上所表現的「量」而言。如果把幾個運動或運動的量組合起來，那麼就要先把其中二個量組合起來，例如有 S_1 ， S_2 ， S_3 ，…… S_n 這些運動之量（空間），那麼，我們先建構 S_1 與 S_2 的組合 S_a ，然後使 S_a 與 S_3 組成而為 S_b 等等。所以，康德謂運動的組合理論基本上可約化成為二個運動之組合（註⑥⑪）。

§ 3.12 描述運動的基本原則及其定理

(A) 描述運動的基本原則

在 § 2.22 節裡，我們說明了參考系統的意義，而對運動的描述乃相對於參考系統而言，這樣的參考系統，就是牛頓所謂相對空間。牛頓分辨絕對時間與相對時間，絕對空間與相對空間，絕對運動與相對運動等。他說：

「I、絕對，真正與數學的時間自身，其本性是與任何其他外物無關而作均勻地流動，它的另一個名字就是 *duration*。相對的，外表的以及一般的時間，是可感覺到的，以及為藉着運動而對 *duration* 的外在量度（無論準確或不均勻），這是一般地用來代替真正的時間。例如一小時、一天、一個月、一年。

II、絕對的空間，在它本性上說，是與任何外物無關的，它永遠保持相似及不動。相對的空間是絕對空間的一些可動的（*movable*）向度或大小，這是我們感官所確定的物體之位置，它通常被視作不動的空間……

IV、絕對運動是物體從一個絕對的地點（*absolute place*）往另一地點之移動。相對運動是指從一個相對的地點往另一地點之移動（註②）」。

牛頓把絕對的空間及絕對的時間視為真實的或真正的空間與真正的時間。康德的觀點與牛頓有別。在現在的科學方法論中，認為經驗科學的概念基本上是靠運作定義法來界定，否則只為純形式意義（即缺乏經驗意義）的數學概念吧了。但是，牛頓一方面假定了絕對的時間和空間，這樣的時空只能算是數學的，然而在另一方面，牛頓又假定絕對的時空為「真正」的。康德對真正的或真實時空觀是：只有相對的時空是真實的，絕對的時間對我們來說乃非真實（絕對的時空只能視之為感性之純粹形式），因而所謂絕對運動也就沒有「實際」意義。康德所謂幾何運動學中的「基本原則」（*Grundsatz*）就是指描述運動的相對空間而言。這個原則是這樣的：

「作為可能經驗的對象之運動可以這樣隨其所好（*nach Belieben*）而觀察的：要嘛是把物體視作運動，而其中的空間為靜止；要嘛是把物體視為靜止，而空間則以同樣的速度作反向運動（註③）」。

康德這裡的基本意思是謂選擇用來描述運動的參考系統原則是隨意的，這基本上乃在於方法上的方便性。進一步而言，康德對於這條描述原則作評註時，更指出在描述物體的運動時，除了物體之外，還要有物體所在的空間作為外在的經驗對象，因而這樣的空間便成為實質的。所以：

「絕對運動，也就是說：以非實質的空間作為參考的運動是根本無法被經驗到的，因而對我們來說是一無所有（*nichts, nothing at all*）（註④）」。

「一無所有」就是非真實的。康德把絕對空間視為非真實，此點不但大異於牛頓，而且在方法論上看也是可取的。實際的空間為經驗空間，也就是實質的空間。在描述物體的運動時，我們可以把物體視作在運動，而其所在的空間為靜止，也可以把物體視作靜止，而其所在的空間則在運動，其速度是與第一種情形相同，只是方向相反而已

。至於我們採那種方法來描述運動，這只視乎其方便性吧了。

(B)定理：

康德這裡所謂定理，乃在於確定如何建構運動的組合問題，這條定理是這樣的：

「同一（物理）點之兩個運動之組合只能這樣加以思維：把其中一個運動表象於絕對空間，另一個運動則不作這種表象，而是把它表象於一個相對空間的運動，其速度與第一個運動相等而方向相反（註⑥5）」。

這個建構原則說明如果我們要了解運動的組合意義，那麼就按照此原則進行建構。而且由於量範疇（概念）包含了「同質組合」的概念，因而運動之組合便是一個涉及「量」的理論。康德甚至認為這個量的理論可根據量範疇之統一性，多數性及整體性而包含了一切作為量的運動之可能性。關於這個問題的意義詮釋，以及其中的是非曲直，當別立專文再討論。

§ 3.2 動力學的形上基礎

上文已經指出：我們這裡所謂「動力學」乃順着古典力學中所謂動力學而言，而不僅指康德在「形上基礎」一書的動力學領域，總而言之，康德所謂動力學及機械學之形上基礎，實即指古典力學中的有關動力學之形上基礎而言。

康德在「動力學的形上基礎」一章的主題，在於分析「力」這個概念的先驗根據，從而以力的概念來說明物質的一些屬性。在上述的一章裡，康德既然要以「力」這個概念來說明物質在動力學方面的性質，就不能不對傳統的原子論提出批評，原子論的觀點亦為牛頓所持。依原子論的觀點，原子具有絕對的不可入性，並且又假定原子運動於真空的空間之中。正如上文所說，從科學方法論看，絕對空間這個概念是缺乏運作意義，因而亦即無法用實驗方法加以觀測。於是，康德利用「力」這個概念以建構動力學中的一些形上基礎，以代替舊的理論基礎。這可分三方面說。

- ①以斥力（repulsive force）或相對的不可入性代替原子論的絕對不可入性。
- ②以引力概念處理事體的遠距離作用之爭。
- ③以充實的空間概念代替絕對真空的空間之說。

以上三個概念（即：斥力、引力及充實的空間）皆在原則上可具有（直接或間接）運作的意義。

以下我們就分析「動力學的形上基礎」一章的要旨。

§ 3.21 力的概念

A、力與物質的關係

康德是從物質這個概念的分析而引導出力這個概念的。他從動力學的角度把力定義為：

「物質是當它充實於空間時的可動者。所謂充實於空間乃謂抗拒任何可動者，它們藉着運動而向某一空間推壓。一個設有被充實的空間為真空的空間（註⑥6）」。

在這裡，康德用「抗拒」這個概念來建構「充實於空間」這個意義，而再利用後者來

建構物質這個概念。然而，所謂「抗拒」又是甚麼意思呢？要回答這個問題，我們就不妨從「充實於空間」這個概念來考慮，所謂「充實於空間」其實乃指「佔有空間」而言，物體一旦佔有空間，便具有空間性，這其實又等於說它具有了廣度量。這樣說來，則動力學上所謂「抗拒」必當物體之廣度量被減小時才出現的，可見物體之「充實於空間」與其「抗拒」作用有密切關係。所以，現在進一步的問題是：物體（質）是如何充實於空間呢？

康德認為：物體是藉着一種特殊的力才充實於空間的，他把這種力暫時稱之為「一種特殊的動力」（eine besondere bewegende Kraft）（註⑦）。同時，這種特殊的動力就是使物體運動的原因。

B、吸力與斥力

康德把上述的特殊之動力分為二種，這就是吸力與斥力。前者乃指使其他物體移向自身的力，而後者則指使其他物體離開自身之力而言，更重要的是；康德認為這二種力是我們所能想像（思維）的最基本之動力，其他各種力皆可還原回到這二種力來。然而，為甚麼只有吸力和引力是我們所能想像的二種動力呢？他的論證是這樣：力的傳遞是直線進行的，那麼，我們便考慮直線上的兩點（質點、物理點），對於這二點來說，它們的運動只有兩種，第一種是第一點從另一點後退，第二種是二點互相拉近，使到這二點作這樣運動之原因而也只有二種，前者為斥力，後者為引力（註⑧）。

C、張力

康德進一步從斥力而導出張力這個概念。物質既然佔有空間，因而具有廣性質，而物體的廣延性之所以可能，乃在於其本身的張力（force of extension），這種力就是充實於物質各部分的斥力。它本身具有不同的強度（註⑨），因為對於任何已知的力來說，我們皆能想像另一更大的力，也能想像另一較小之力。因此，物體之所以能抗拒其他外物而存在，乃由於它本身具有這種斥力或張力，而這種力乃具有程度性的。

進一步來說，物體之彈性也是由這種張力所形成的兩壓縮力，這個概念也可以由此導出來。壓縮力是表示當一個張力受到另一個更大的張力作用時，使到較小的張力減少其所擴張的空間。

§ 3.22 可入性與不可入性

「壓縮力」這個概念建構起來之後，我們便可利用它來建構「可入性」這個概念。康德說：

「當一個物體藉着壓縮而使到另一物體的空間之廣延消失時，便稱該物體侵入另一物體（註⑩）」。

從可入性而過渡到不可入性，這在康德的理論中是個非常重要的概念。「不可入性」可分為兩種：

(1) 相對的或動力學的不可入性：

這是指藉着已知的壓縮力而對物體（質）作若干程度之入侵是不可能的。

(2)絕對的不可入性或數學的不可入性。

這是指物體根本上無法被壓縮這個假設而言。康德認為絕對不可入性根本上乃屬玄遠不實的性質（*qualitas occulta*），這明顯是他批評原子論而發的牛頓也代表原子論的觀點。

康德之所以提出相對的不可入性以代替絕對的不可入性，乃因為物體乃藉着其張力，使自己成為廣延物而充實於其空間之可能性，但是，由於這種張力具有程度性，因而就由可另一更大的力（壓縮力）所克制，這也就是說，它能由一壓縮力作若干程度的入侵（*penetrable*）。

從物體的可入性或相對的不可入性，便可建構物體的可分性。康德說：

「物體（物）可無限地分割而成爲部分，而每一部分仍然是物質（註①）」。由於物質所具的空間每一部分皆有它們的張力，而張力又有程度之大小，因而可被另一力所克制。於是，每一部分皆可分離於其他部分。

§ 3.23 物質與引力

(A)物質的第二種基本力：

我們在上文已指出：康德以「充實於空間」這個概念來建構物質，而所謂「充實於空間」其實又指張力或斥力言。在這個意義下，張力便成為物質的基本力。但是，這種張力是會不斷地向其所佔的空間作無限的擴張，而無限擴張便使物質解散。所以，如果物質只具有張力，則物質是無法成為物質的，因此，若要建構物質，便需要另一種與張力對抗的力，這種力一定是壓縮性的，它的方向與張力相反。康德稱這種力為引力（吸力）。根據上述分析，引力是壓縮着張力而使力系出現平衡，這樣才能維持物質的存在。因此，引力便是構成物質的第二種基本力。

(B)萬有引力的先驗根據

構成物質的引力是直接地從一物質施加於另一物質。換言之，宇宙中的任何一部分之物質是向任何的其他物質施以引力的。康德企圖先驗地證明物質的引力直接而無窮地延伸到宇宙的每一個角落。牛頓雖然提出萬有引力定律，但卻沒有分析或展示原因（註②）。康德企圖從形上層次（先驗條件）論證引力，但他的論證的可行性殊待商榷，而他的目的至為明顯，就是先驗地建構引力（但不是牛頓的定律）。

康德所謂的「質」範疇是包括「真實性」、「否定」及「限制」三者。康德於是在「動力學的一般評註」一節便謂他在「動力學的形上基礎」對物質概念的分析是按照質範疇的真實性，否定及限制三方面進行的。從真實性範疇而以張力或斥力說明物質的真實性。從否定的範疇，說明藉引力而闡述物質的「可入性」。最後從限制範疇而指出張力受引力之「限制」才能充實於空間。

§ 3.24 力學定律的先驗建構：

康德在他的「機械學的形上基礎」一章從先驗層面建立他所謂「機械學」（此處也可譯作「力學」）三定律。康德基本上認為他的「形上基礎」一書結構不但是按照範疇表，而且還認為古典力學的基本原理及概念可溯源於範疇表。運動學乃對應於量範疇，

動力學乃對應於範疇，機械學就對應於關係範疇，最後，現象學對應於模態疇。範疇是藉著「理解的原則」而應用於「可能經驗」(possible experience)之中，所以，在這個脈絡下，則直覺公理、知覺的預測、經驗的類比、以及經驗思維的公設，便分別用來建構運動學、動力學、機械學及現象學的概念及原則了。

「機械學的形上學」一章既然是籍關係範疇及經驗的類比原則而建立起來，因此，我們就先列舉康德所謂經驗的類比原則，這些原則依照①實體與屬性②因果關係及③共在關係而有三條，都是有關於異質的關係：

①第一類比：

一切現象的變遷中，其實體保持不變，它在自然界的量既不增加，也不減少。

②第二類比：

一切現象的改變皆依照因果關係發生的。

③第三類比：

一切能被知覺為在空間共存的實體，皆互為關係，康德認為他的力學三定律是按照上述三條類比原則而建立的。

(A)、力學第一定律之建立：

「關於物體的自然方面，物質量的整體是守恒的，既不增加，也不減少」。

康德對這個定律的申述是這樣：他從「可運動」這個概念出發，由於實體之量就是指「可運動部分」（這是指動力而言），因為實體在一切的變遷中保持不變，所以實體之量或物質之量在變遷中也維持不變（守恒）。

(B)力學第二定律之建立：

「物質的任何變遷皆有一外在原因」。

康德認為這個定律其實是慣性定律的另一種表述方式，換言之，力學的第二定律也可這樣表示：

「除非有外在原因逼使物體改變其狀況，否則任何物體便保持其靜止狀態或保持同向的等速運動」。

對於這個定律的證明，康德認為第二類比已經確定任何改變皆有其原因，那麼，在力學中只要證明物體（質）之改變必有其外在原因即可，而這項論證是這樣的：作為外感官對象的物質，其次決定條件只是空間中的外在關係，因而它的改變只屬於運動。至於運動之改變，必有其原因（根據因果原則），但這個種原因不能是內在的，因為作為動力的物並沒有任何內在的決定依據，因此，物質的一切變遷皆緣於外在原因。

康德這個論證認為：倘若沒有外在原則就沒有永恆保持其原來的運動狀態，而這就是慣性定律。慣性定律最先是笛卡爾提出來的，並且稱之為「自然界的第一定律」。笛氏謂：

「這些定律的第一條是這樣：任何事物，假定它是簡單而不可分割的，便會在其力量中恒常保持同一狀態，除非有力因，否則永不改變，（註⑳）

笛氏並沒有論證何故慣性定律的有效性，他無疑把之視作清晰自明的原則，而清晰自明乃笛氏衡量真假的標準，康德在這裏却藉因果性原則來建立（先驗地）慣性定律。

(c)、力學第三定律

「在一切運動的交流中，作用與反作用恒長相等」。

這個定律明顯地是導源於第三類比。牛頓沒有對這個定律加以證明，康德則先驗地把這個定律建立起來。

§ 3.30 現象學——運動概念的模態詮釋

關於康德的「現象學」部分，我們在§ 3.0節已略有提及，並且把之「類比」於從科學方法論而分析理論物理學結構時的射影規則或語意規則。就以古典力學來說理論物理學對古典力學的處理可視之為一種數學理論，或者稱之為「數學的力學」(mathematical Mechanics)，然而如果要使這樣的「數學的力學」成爲一個「物理學」(具有經驗意義)，那麼就要把理論中的一些基本概念給與物理意義，這基本上是使用運作定義法(operational definition)而達至這個目的，這就稱之爲射影規則或語言規則。現在，康德對古典物理學的基礎研究是形上學的，所以他這個理論不是一種“mathematical Mechanics”，而是一種“metaphysical Mechanics”，中文可稱之爲「形上力學」理論(這其實是建立力學的形上基礎)。「形上力學」基本上是在於對力學中的基本概念及原則提出「形上建構」(metaphysical construction)。「建構」這個概念在這裡極爲重要，它是康德的科學哲學之一大特徵。「現象學」的基本意義是對其所建構的基本概念給與有關其「真實性」(reality)的詮釋，康德是從模態範疇而對這些基本概念加以「經驗」的詮釋。不過這裡所謂經驗只是「可能」經驗，「實在」經驗與「必然」經驗而言，所以我們在此就稱之爲「模態的詮釋」

康德對古典力學的形上建構中，「運動」是個需要建構的基本概念，「建構」在康德來說是把概念對應於直覺而在意識中表象(sich vorstellen)。「現象」的確實意義乃指「外在的經驗直覺」的表象，其特徵是它是一種尚未確定的對象，因此也就尚未成爲「經驗」。

康德說：

「運動猶如其他藉著感覺而表象一樣，只是作爲現象而提供出來的，爲了使運動的表象可成爲經驗，因此，除了只藉感覺而表象之外，還需要理解而加以思維，(註⑭)」。

「現象學」的課題是使表象成爲經驗，僅是感覺並不能構成經驗。而構成經驗的要素，除了感覺之外，尚需要思維。現象本身只具運動的關係，因此，如果我們要對運動物(das Bewegliche)加以思維，那麼我們就「必須提出一些條件，在此等條件下，對象(物質)一定要藉著運動這個述詞，以這樣或那樣方式來確定(註⑮)」。康德這裡所謂要提出的條件，就是我們在此所謂模態的詮釋。這些條件或詮釋是根據模態範疇「純粹理解原則而有三條：

(1)「幾何運動學」的運動模態爲經驗地可能：

幾何運動學因爲不考慮力的概念或力的因素，而只著眼於運動之量，因而只有直綫運動，而不考慮圓周運動。進一步而言，若要描述運動，也就是說，若要把運動成爲經驗知識，就要利用參考系統。參考系統便被視爲相對的空間或實質空間，這意思是說：若把運動概念視爲經驗對象，那麼，我們可以把物體的運動「表象」於相對

的空間中，也可以把相對的空間，以物體為參考點而把之「表象」成運動（此時其實就是以物體為參考系統而以先前的所謂相對空間為對象）。因此當我們把物體的這種相對意義的運動「表象」於意識中（建構）時，它為一個不確定的對象，所以，若要對此種運動加以思維（理解），則它只能具有經驗上的「可能性」而已。故康德說：「在經驗空間中的物體之直線運動只是一個可能的述詞（註⑦）」。

從參考系統考察運動，則運動便是一個相對關係，除非構成運動的兩個條件（物體與所在之空間）為經驗對象，否則運動本身就無法成為經驗對象（即不可能成為經驗對象）。因此，如果我們把相對的空間視作「純粹的」（非經驗的）絕對空間，則絕對空間不是經驗對象。在這個意義下，不以任何經驗事物作為參考的直線運動是絕對運動，它是經驗地「不可能的」。

(2) 動力學的運動為（經驗地）實在：

從動力學方面所建構的運動概念是物體的實際性質（述詞）。例如以圓周運動來說，它是直線運動的連續變遷，因而也是對外在空間關係的連續變遷，在這種情形下，圓周運動基本上也表示了眾多新運動的連續起現。根據慣性定律，運動的出現或產生（正確的说應該是「運動的改變」，即有一加速度）一定要依靠外在的原因（外力之和或合力不為0）。又根據慣性定律，物體在圓周上每一點的運動皆傾向於朝著直線（切綫）而運動，這種朝著切綫而進行的運動顯然與上述因外力而引的運動相違，換言之，物體作圓周運動時，就顯示出其動力（moving force, die bewegende Kraft），而相對於運動物體的那個相對空間並沒有這種動力，因此在動力學的意義下，物體的運動是真實的（wirklich），而如果以此運動物體為定點，則其所在的空間之相對運動是虛假的（nichts als blosser Schein）（註⑦）。

(3) 力學運動的模態為經驗地必然：

康德認為，力學的運動特徵在於任何物體的運動皆「必然」有一方向相反的等量運動，這個意思在一般的力學著作中被詮釋為：「任何兩個相互作用的物體，其作用力與反作用力必然是大小相等，而方向相反」，這就是所謂牛頓運動第三定律。其實這兩種描述是一樣的，因為康德是以動力（這裡所謂動力是指使物體運動之力而言，因此為 \vec{F} ，而非指 $\vec{P} = M\vec{V}$ 的衝力）來界定物體的（註⑦）。康德在論證力學運動的這種必然性時，是分析他所謂力學的第三定律（見本文§ 3.24 — C）而得的，而他所謂「力學的第三定律」也就是牛頓運動第三定律，這是康德藉理解（思維）原則的第三條類比而建立的。從力學第三定律，則物體運動之共在（同時並存）只有藉着它們原有動力之共在才可能，而這種共在又藉着它們之間方向互為相反的等量運動才可能。從力學的角度說，這種運動（力，慣性力，張力）是實在的（actual, wirklich），又由於這種力的實在性非來自外在因素（即非外力），所以，「任何物體的運動（力）皆同時有一方向相反的等量運動」為必然的真實。以上有關運動概念的模態詮釋，是依照模態範疇的所謂「可能性」（與不可能性），實在性（與虛幻）及必然性三個模態範疇，康德無疑認為按照範疇來處理，則這種處理方法便具其系統性及完整性。

§ 4.0 結語：

理性 (ratio) 與經驗乃構成知識的兩大支柱，而知識論的工作，就在於展示這兩個支柱的分際、性質、作用等意義，這種分析的活動，不僅是西方哲學的精神特徵，也是科學精神的具體表現。任何人如何對這種查根問底，並且徹底地要求合理化的精神不感到肅然起敬，那麼，他不但缺少科學的興趣，也根本無法認識哲學究竟是甚麼。德語中把這種徹底要求合理化的哲學工作稱之為 *Begründung*，這個字較英語的 “justification” 更具深義。簡言之，“*Begründung*” 是謂把有關某種知識或科學的基礎或根基建立起來。康德的「自然科學的形上基礎」一書，就是企圖對古典力學的「合理化」作出 “*Begründung*”，情形已如上述。

為了展示和分析康德的 “*Begründung*”，我們就在本文的 § 2.0 先行對古典力學的基本原理系統地重新建構（此處所謂建構乃指「組織」而言，非康德的建構義）。因此，§ 2.0 的主要工作在於表明：

① 古典力學的問題是甚麼？

② 作為古典力學中的關鍵要素的數學語言是甚麼？

把上述二個問題展示出來是重要而且是必須的，否則我們根本無從分辨康德工作的意義。

康德對古典力學的 “*Begründung*”，是在於展示這門理論的先驗條件，因而也成為一種形上基礎的分析。至於康德的理論是否可取，在回答這個問題之前，我們自當先行對康德的立論作深入的研究，正如 von Weizsäcker 所說：「即使有人想批評康德，也必須對他先有認識，先行了解他在說些甚麼」（見本文開端的引文）。因此，我們確實已詳細而有系統地分析了康德的「形上基礎」一書的大義。這無論是對於討論知識論也好，在從事於科學哲學的工作也好，把這種思路引入中文界，藉以培植中華民族未來的新哲學傳統也好，對於分析和展示康德這本著作的玄思，都是極有意義的。至於康德如何處理這些問題，我們在上文已作了整體性和系統性的分析，把其中的問題明明白白地陳示出來。

康德對古典力學基礎的形上分析，下列三點是值得注意的：

① 所謂形上基礎就是分析其先驗條件，而先驗條件之所以值得重視，因為這是主體間之共同基礎（即具有 *inter-subjective foundation*），經驗科學的那個對象界就是由感官材料與這個先驗基礎而建立起來的。因此，在康德的理論看來，經驗科學（例如自然科學）的實際對象，並不是常識層面所認為的「物體本身」（在自然科學方面就不是「自然本身，*Nature in itself*），而是由認知主體及物體自身所提供的材料互相配合而建立起來的經驗世界。康德藉着這種先驗的分析而展示出來的那個科學對象，雖然是遠離常識會面，但卻沒有違背現代的科學（例如所謂哥本哈根學派的量子論詮釋）。最值得我們注意的是：狹義相對論修改了時間的概念，而廣義相對論修改了空間這個概念（註⑩），而量子論的哥本哈根學的詮釋也修改了物質實體的「客觀性」問題。相對論及量子論的這些觀點，是與所謂古典物理學的基本假設相違。

然而康德對古典物理學所提出的形上基礎，卻又沒有與現代物理學（相對論與量子論）相違。那麼，這是否表示康德之路能夠綜合古典和現代物理學之基礎呢？

②康德對古典物理學的基本概念及其原理之建構，並給與模態的詮釋。康德整體地建構理論是自覺地扣緊他所謂「可能經驗」（possible experience）這個基準建構。在建構過程中，康德批評了從Democritus到牛頓之間長達二千年的原子論傳統（不可入性，不可分性），也指出了牛頓系統所假定的絕對空間及絕對運動的觀點。原子物理學或高能物理學的研究指出，原子並不是不可分的，這已是任何現代人對物理學應有的常識了，然而當我們讀到康德在兩百年前已在原則上及方法上反對原子的絕對不可入性這個觀點，難道這是偶然的嗎？或者康德的思路今因而更引起我們多作反省？

③康德的分析，及他所展示的思想模式仍待我們反省之處尚多，例如：

(A)、就古典力學來說，康德並沒有向我們提供有關靜力學的形上基礎，這會是什麼原因呢？這是由於古典力學中的靜力學之基本原則已包含於他所謂力學的三個定律理，因而沒有必要另作形上的建構嗎？抑或靜力學無法藉著他所謂「運動」概念作為基礎而把它排除在「自然科學」之外？更或者是由於他的範疇表中無法把靜力學安置於其間呢？

(B)康德在他的「力學的形上基礎」一章中，按照範疇表的關係範疇而建立起的三條純粹理解之原則，而導出他所謂「力學三定律」中，並沒有牛頓運動第二定律（ $\vec{F} = m\vec{a}$ ），是因為康德認牛頓第二定律缺乏先驗性嗎？抑或牛頓第二定律無法與他的範疇表拉上關係的緣故呢？我們知道，牛頓第二定律在牛頓系列中極為重要，例如

(a)利用牛頓第二定律，我們可把牛頓第一定律演繹出來。因此，從數學的觀點看，牛頓第一定律只是第二定律的一個特殊情況而已。

(b)利用牛頓第三定律，向心力加速度原則，及萬有引力定律，我們可推演出開普勒的第三條有關行星的運動定律。

所以，康德沒有建立牛頓第二定律的先驗根據，而有異於他對牛頓第一及第三定律的處理，則無論就問題上或就方法上看，都是一個值得我們進一步作反省的。

(C)康德在「現象學」一章中，企圖以「充實的空間」來代替絕對真空之說，從而提出了以太概念與 Michelson — Morley 的實驗所要觀測的以太連在一起（這實驗中所構想的以太是作為光的傳導媒體看（註⑩））。這種連繫實在沒有必要，因為我們可把康德之以太作別的詮釋。

重要的問題是：量子論及相對論中的原則，如愛因斯坦的相對性原則，海森堡的不確定性關係，以及玻爾的互補性原則等，是否能從康德的範疇表及他所謂「純粹理解的原則系統」中獲得任何先驗或形上的連繫？一種科學理論要得到甚麼程度上的先驗根據才算是正規科學？

(D)康德即認為正規科學必須要採用數學，然而數學如何能應用於經驗科學呢？對於這個問題，康德雖然在論到「直覺公理」及「知覺的預知」兩節中討論到這個問題。然而，康德在這些地方所展示的觀點是否能夠足以說明向量代數、矩陣理論等數學

理論在自然科學上的有效應用呢？

註釋

- 註①：此語引自“Die Einheit der Natur”（自然界的統一）一書頁409—410。作者 Carl F. von Weizsäcker 在1933年於量子論大師海森柏（W. Heisenberg）的指導下完成博士學位，並曾分別在西德 Strassburg 及 Götting 大學講授理論物理。從1957—1969，在漢堡大學講授哲學。從1970—80年，主持德國的馬士·普朗克研究所（Max Planck Institut）的「科技世界之生活條件研究所」。
- 註②：關於「自然」一詞在西方思想史上的六個意義中前五個，本文作者在「康德人性論」一文有較詳細的分析，該文見於「中國文化月刊」第五十七期，頁68—90。
- 註③：關於亞里斯多德的「自然觀」及其「物理學」的意義，可參考拙文：「運動概念與方法論的關係」一文，見於東海學報第廿七期，頁89—122。
- 註④：康德的「自然科學的形上基礎」一書的「緒論」，本文作者已譯為中文，見中國文化月刊，第八十二期第87—96頁。
- 註⑤：Kant: *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, S. 467; 英譯本由 James Ellington 所譯。
- 註⑥：同前。
- 註⑦：同註③。
- 註⑧：Kant: *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, P. 68.
- 註⑨：同前。
- 註⑩：同註⑤，S. 468—9 英譯本 PP. 4—5
- 註⑪：KdrV, S. 246; A216, B262. Smith, 237。
- 註⑫：Gottfried. Martin: *Immanuel Kant, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie*. S. 78.
- 註⑬：同註⑨，S. 79.
- 註⑭：M. Heidegger: “What Is A Thing?” P. 126.
- 註⑮：Kant: *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, P. 55, § 23.
- 註⑯：同前，P. 56.
- 註⑰：比較 Gerd Buchdahl 對海德格有關這方面的評論。見 Gerd Buchdahl: “The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kants Philosophy of Science”，該文輯入 Lewis W. Beck 所編的 “Kants Theory of Knowledge”，PP. 128—150.
- 註⑱：同註⑤，S. 467，英譯本，P. ⑱
- 註⑲：比較：Foundations of the unity of Science (Vol. I—II) of the Encyclopedia, ed. by R. Carnap, C.W. Morris, etc.
- 註⑳：G. Ludwig, *Die Grundstrukturen einer Physikalischen Theorie*, S. 7—13.
- 註㉑：同註⑤，S. 468；英譯本 P. 4.

- 註⑳：同前。
- 註㉑：同前。
- 註㉒：同前，S, 468—9.
- 註㉓：同前，S, 469.
- 註㉔：同前：“…die den Begriff einer Natur möglich macht.” S. 469.
- 註㉕：同前，S. 470.
- 註㉖：同前，S. 470.
- 註㉗：“…welches denn auch die Ursache ist, wesweg wir und zum Titel dieses Werks, welches eigentich die Grundsätze der Körperlehre enthält, dem gewöhnlichen Gebrauch gemäß des allgemeinen Namens der Naturwissenschaft bedient haben, weil ihr diese Benennung im eigentlichen Sinne allein zukommt und also hierdurch seine Zweideutigkeit veranlaßt wird,” S. 471.
- 註㉘：Newton: “Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica,” Vol. I., P. 5.
- 註㉙：同㉘，PP. 14.—21.
- 註㉚：Galilei, “Dialogue of the Two New Sciences,” in The Great Works of the western World, Vol. 28, PP. 125—260.
- 註㉛：同註㉘，P. 13.
- 註㉜：Descartes: Principles of Philosophy, Part II, P. 59.
- 註㉝：同前。
- 註㉞：同前，P. 2.
- 註㉟：同前，P. 1. 定義—.
- 註㊱：同前，P. 2.
- 註㊲：同前，P. 13. “The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.”
- 註㊳：B. G. Kuznecov: “Von Galilei bis Einstein.” S. 134.
- 註㊴：同㉘，P. 1.
- 註㊵：J. Clerk Maxwell: “Matter and Motion,” P. 39.
- 註㊶：Max Jammer, “Concept of Force,” P. 124.
- 註㊷：同㉘：“For I here design only to give a mathematical notion of three forces, without considering their physical causes and seats.”又謂：
“Considering those not physically, but mathematically” P. 5.
- 註㊸：同註㉘，P. 1
- 註㊹：Galileo Galilei, “Dialogue on the great world systems.
- 註㊺：有關阿氏對平（均）衡問題作處理的例子，見拙文「運動概念與方法論的關係」。至於阿

氏之作，英譯為“On the Equilibrium of Planes, Book I.” In “the Great Books of the Western World,” Vol. 11.

註④⑧：Galileo Galilei, “Dialogues Concerning the Two New Sciences,” The Second Day. 同註④②.

註④⑨：關於伽里略對運動學的處理，可見本文作者有關「運動概念與方法論的關係」一文，見註③。

註⑤⑩：認為康德這部分無必要的詮釋家為Adicks及Stadler，而認為這部分只涉及認知能力的是Peter Plaas. 見：P. Plaas; Kants Theorie der Natwriwissenschaft, S. 104.

註⑤⑪：Abbildungsregeln及Zuordnungsregeln乃當代德國理論物理學家G. Ludwig所採用之術語，而Semantical rules則為卡納普所用。此分別見於G. Ludwig: “Einführung in die theoretische Physik,” “Foundations of the Unity of Science” Vol. I—II of Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

註⑤⑫：同註⑤，S. 475—6；英譯本PP. 11—13.

註⑤⑬：同前，S. 476—7，英譯本，PP. 13—15.

註⑤⑭：同註⑤，S. 480.

註⑤⑮：同前，S. 489.

註⑤⑯：“In der Phoronomie brauchen Wir das Wort Geschwindigkeit bloss in raumlicher Bedeutung $C = \frac{S}{T}$.” 同註⑤，S. 484. 式子 $C = \frac{S}{T}$ ，C代表速度，拉丁文為Celeritas。S為空間，T為時間，即 $Celeritas = \frac{Spatium}{Temperus}$

註⑤⑰：同前，S. 481—2；英譯本，PP. 19—20.

註⑤⑱：同前，S. 486；英譯本，PP. 26—27.

註⑤⑲：同前，S. 486.

註⑤⑳：同前，S. 489.

註⑤㉑：“Folghlich lässt die Lehre der Zusammensetzung aller Bewegungen sich auf die von Zweien Zurückführen.” 同前，S. 489.

註⑤㉒：同註⑤⑩，pp. 6—7。

註⑤㉓：同註⑤，s. 487 英譯本 p. 28。

註⑤㉔：同前。

註⑤㉕：同前，s. 490。

註⑤㉖：同前，s. 496。

註⑤㉗：同前，Lehrsatz I, s. 497。

註⑤㉘：同前，s. 498。

註⑤㉙：同前，Lehrsatz Z, s. 499。

註⑤㉚：同前，s. 500。

註⑦⑰：於牛頓萬有引力如何提出來的問題，可本文作者的「運動概念與方法論的關係」一文。

同註③。

註⑦②：同前：Lehrsatz 4, s. 503。

註⑦③：Descartes：Principles of Philosophy, Bk. II, p. 59。

註⑦④：同註⑤，s. 552。

註⑦⑤：同前，s. 555。

註⑦⑥：同前，s. 555，Lehrsatz I。

註⑦⑦：同前，s. 557，Lehrsatz 2。

註⑦⑧：康德在力學方面把物質界定為：

“Materie ist das Bewegliche, so fern es als ein solches bewegend
de Kraft hat” 同前，s. 536. Erklärung 1。

註⑦⑨：關於狹義相對論中的時間概念，可參考拙文：

「狹義相對論中時間概念的分析及其哲學意義之研究」，東海學報第廿四卷，民國72年6月。

註⑦⑩：關於Michelson—Morley之實驗意義，詳見註⑦⑨之拙文。

附本文主要用書錄目

1. Carl F. von Weizsäcker: Die Einheit der Natur, 4. Auflage, Carl Hanser Verlag, München (1984).
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3. Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. by P. Carus, Chicago (1951).
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5. G. Martin: Immanuel Kant, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie, Berlin (1969).
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ON KANT'S THEORY OF THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CLASSICAL MECHANICS

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A B S T R A C T

This paper entitled, "On Kant's Theory of the Metaphysical Foundations of Classical Mechanics," has the purpose to reconstruct and to explicate Kant's theory of the Metaphysical constructions of the foundations of Newtonian Mechanics treated in MF (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science abbreviated here as MF), and consists of the following four parts:

I: The Kantian conception of natural science is disclosed and analysed in the first part of this paper. Kant distinguishes nature in the material sense from that in the formal sense. When he says material nature, he means the totality of the objects of sensation contributed by our sensibility or intuition, according to which it is specifically affected by objects, which are, for Kant, in themselves unknown in it, and totally distinct from the phenomena. Nature in the formal sense is understood as the totality of rules under which all phenomena must be connected. On account of these definitions, the Kantian conception of nature designates nothing but the empirical world and constitutes the total field of our cognition. The Kantian nature, though misinterpreted explicitly both by G. Martin and M. Heidegger as the Newtonian nature which is the object of the classical mechanics based on the Newtonian laws, is in fact the designation of the empirical world in general.

Kant defines science as a systematical whole of cognition ordered according to principles upon which an exact science or the so called science proper in the Kantian sense is based, must be a priori. One of the most primordial tasks carried out in Kant's epistemology consists in the systematic representation of the conditions (or principles) a priori, which render natural science to be possible. Having criticized the Aristotelian theory of categories as random collection of the predicaments, Kant maintained that all acts of understanding might in this sense be represented as a faculty of judgments. It is one of Kant's dicta that understanding is the faculty of thinking, and all objective thinking means judging. No judgment is possible without presupposing the radical concepts which Kant calls with Aristotle, Categories. Hence, if the radical concepts of understanding are to be regarded as the forms of judgments, there must be as many categories as there are kinds of judgments. Kant was on this account convinced of the possibility to deduce the table of categories from that of the judgments based upon the Aristotelian system of syllogism reconstructed and improved by the logicians in the Middle Ages. Making use of the table of the syllogistic judgments as the unique and systematic clue to discover the categories, Kant emphasizes

that his treatment of the discovery of the radical concepts of understanding, unlike that proposed by Aristotle, which Kant considered as only its rhapsodical and haphazard enumeration on account of its completeness can never be guaranteed, are complete and exhaustive on the functions of understanding. The system of the radical concepts is entitled to be called pure concepts of understanding on the ground that it contains them within itself a priori.

The "Transcendental Analytic" is the score of the Critique of Pure Reason in the sense that it exposes the transcendental doctrine of epistemological foundation of empirical science in general. "Transcendental" means here the conditions a priori which renders experience to be possible. Kant holds that even natural laws, viewed as principles of the empirical employment of understanding, carried with them an expression of universal necessity, and so contained at least the suggestion of a determination from grounds which are valid a priori and antecedently to all experience. The laws of nature, according to Kant's epistemological theory, one and all, without exception, stand under a priori principles of understanding. "Transcendental Analytic" heralds in this sense the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences.

II: Since the unique purpose of the MF consists in the metaphysical construction of the whole fundament of the Newtonian Mechanics, it is significant for us to analyze the basic principles of classical mechanics as well as the mathematical framework used in it, before we come on to the exposition of the Kantian theory in MF. The task of the second part of this paper lies, accordingly in the analysis and exposition of the following items:

- 1: The fundamental concepts in the Vector Algebra and its application to Classical Mechanics;
- 2: the foundations of the kinematics of a particle as well as a rigid body in the rectilinear and circular motions and the vector representations of velocity and acceleration of these motions;
- 3: an analysis of the Newtonian axioms in the Principia with special regard to their theoretical implications upon which different physical principles in Dynamics can be constructed, the disclosure of the physical significance of the concept of gravitation and also an illustration of the relative principle discovered by Galileo;
- 4: the relation between the Newtonian axioms and the principles of Statics in regard to the equilibrium of a particle as well as to the equilibrium of a rigid body.

III: Part III of this paper comprises an explication and a reconstruction of the architectonic structure of Kant's theory concerning the metaphysical construction of Newtonian mechanics. Being convinced of the completeness of the table of categories, which can concern the mathematical principles

of corporeal nature, Kant constructs the metaphysical foundation of Phoronomy, Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology based upon the four functions of the concepts of understanding respectively. In the Phoronomy motion is considered as pure quantum, according to its composition, without reference to any quality of matter, while in the Dynamics, motion is regarded as belonging to the quality of the matter under the name of an original moving force. The Kantian Mechanism in which matter with dynamical quality is considered as by its own motion to be in relation is constructed on the basis of the metaphysical analogue of the transcendental Analogies of Experience. Hence, Kant manifests that by the application of the relational categories of substance, causality and community to matter the three laws of universal mechanics, the law of substance, of inertia, and of the reaction of matters cannot be constructed. Finally, in the Phenomenology of motion or the rest of matter is determined with reference to the modes of modality, which are interpreted in this paper as the modal interpretation of the concept of motion.

IV. In the last part of this paper a short critical examination with regard to the beforementioned Kantian theory is made. Are the pure concepts of understanding in the table of categories so complete and so exhaustive that the whole foundations of Physics can be constructed metaphysically? What are the metaphysical foundations of Statics, and the second axiom of the Newtonian Mechanics?

In Classical Mechanics, Vector Algebra is used as the effective mathematical language to formulate the physical laws. What are the concepts a priori on which Vector Algebra is based? How can we justify the validity of the application of Vector Algebra to Physics? Kant's theory affords us no answers to these questions.

Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty: Two Critiques of Cartesianism*

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There are many ways for us to compare Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty, for example, we can compare them on such issues as conception of space and time,¹ existential concernedness,² and conception of bodily experience,³ and so on. Here what we want to do is to compare their critiques of Cartesianism. This comparison is geared to show that both of them not only find *the human body as a new philosophical paradigm*,⁴ but also establish a *non-substantialist approach to ontology*. Beginning from Thales' considering the substance of this world as water, Western philosophy expresses itself as an effort of pursuing substance. In other words, it adopts a *substantialist approach to ontology*. This tradition results in taking things, thought or language as point of departure⁵. This tradition neglects the possibility of regarding the human body and the ontological realm revealed by experiencing the human body as another point of departure. It is Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty who point out this neglect and study these issues. In order to take the human body as a point of departure to enter into the non-substantialist ontological realm, they are forced to critically examine Cartesianism, which is supposed by them to be the most representative substantialist ontology in modern philosophy.

Whitehead's Critique of Cartesianism

Actually the target of Whitehead's critique is Aristotle. For the latter regards the subject-predicate form of proposition as expressing fundamental metaphysical truth. It is this form that Whitehead's philosophy of organism wants to attack. Now according to Whitehead, Descartes resurrects Aristotelianism in the history of modern philosophy by modifying the subject-predicate form. According to Whitehead, it is through Descartes that substance-quality thinking and subjectivist bias are sneaked into the main stream of modern philosophy. Whitehead says:

Descartes modified traditional philosophy in two opposite ways. He increased the metaphysical emphasis on the substance-quality form of thought...He also laid down the principle, that those substances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences provide the primary data for philosophy, namely, themselves as in the enjoyment of such experience. This is the famous subjectivist bias which entered into modern philosophy through Descartes.⁶

According to Whitehead, both Hume and Kant presuppose Descartes's substance-quality forms of thought and subjectivist bias, despite the fact that Hume criticizes Descartes⁷ and Kant criticizes Hume. It seems to Whitehead that Hume merely

develops this Cartesian bias into the "sensationalist doctrine of perception". According to Whitehead's analysis, this doctrine is twofold. One part of it is the "subjectivist principle", the other part of it is the "sensationalist principle".⁸ Kant accepts the subjectivist principle but rejects the sensationalist principle. But according to Whitehead, the sensationalist principle acquires dominant importance, if the subjectivist principle is accepted. Thus in the last analysis, the difficulties Hume and Kant face are the same.

The substance-quality form of thought defines the ontological structure of a thing as an unchangeable substance bearing some essential and accidental attributes. The subjectivist principle is merely the recurrence of Aristotle's subject-predicate form in Cartesian guise. This principle says that "the datum in the act of experience can be adequately analyzed purely in terms of universals."⁹ The sensationalist principle says that "the primary activity in the act of experience is the bare subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid of any subjective form of reception."¹⁰ In Whitehead's view, the sensationalist principle is fully expressed in Hume's doctrine of mere sensation. This implies that the reality of things almost disappears in Hume's philosophy; what is left is merely subjective sensations without any objective basis. Kant's doctrine that the objective world is a construct from subjective experience serves as a substitute for Hume's sensationalist principle, but the former, in Whitehead's view, does not transcend the Cartesian tradition.

To sum up: in Whitehead's view, Descartes, Hume, and Kant provide three misconceptions in the history of modern philosophy, which are

- 1) The substance-quality doctrine of actuality
- 2) The sensationalist doctrine of perception
- 3) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a construct from subjective experience.¹¹

The major error of these misconceptions lies in that the world as delineated by those three doctrines is just a world of abstraction rather than *a world of daily experience*. In terms of phenomenology, what Descartes, Hume, and Kant capture is not the lived world, but its fragmentary picture distorted by the abstraction of the above doctrines. Now we shall show how, according to Whitehead, this distortion results, and what the proper way to attain the lived world is.

According to Whitehead, there are two modes of perception: presentational immediacy and causal efficacy. All philosophers given to the Cartesian way of thinking, Whitehead says, only know the first mode of perception, that is, presentational immediacy. They ignore the primacy of causal relatedness as far as the ontological structure of things is concerned. What they concern themselves with is the primary givens in visual sensation or the five senses. Thus what they perceive are isolated and discrete sense-data without inner togetherness. According to Whitehead, it is this isolation and discreteness that causes the insurmountable difficulty for epistemology. Causal chains, according to Hume's analysis, are the result of a mere constant

conjunction, based on habit, and without any internal connection. This reveals the defect of the Cartesian way of thinking. This defect is due to the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness", a fallacy of expressing concrete facts through universal abstraction.¹²

According to Whitehead's philosophy of organism, reality is a creative process whereby each actual entity achieves self-realization or satisfaction through the concrescence of prehensions that constitute it. When an actual entity is "alive", it is a prehending subject as well as a prehended superject. But when an actual entity perishes, it is no longer a prehending subject, but a mere prehended superject, forever prehended by other actual entities. The process of all of these prehensions is the ontological source of all realities. To Whitehead, the formation of a new reality is merely the formation of a new concrescence of prehensions. There are two sorts of prehensions: physical prehensions, which are the basis of causal efficacy, and conceptual prehensions, which are the basis of presentational immediacy. All of these prehensions together constitute an extensive continuum. The *process* of this extensive continuum serves as the ontological foundation of the creation of all realities. Thus in Whitehead's philosophy of organism, realities need no presupposition of the Cartesian conceptions of "substance" and "subjectivity". Based on this, Whitehead achieves his non-substantialist ontology.

Whitehead observes that all Cartesian philosophers take presentational immediacy to be the fundamental mode of perception, and take causal efficacy to be the derivative mode, founded on presentational immediacy. From Whitehead's viewpoint, the reverse is the truth, that is to say, causal efficacy is the more primitive mode of perception, while presentational immediacy is only the derivative from it. On this point, Whitehead says:

[T]hose elements of our experience which stand out clearly and distinctly in our consciousness are not its basic facts; they are the derivative modifications which arise in the process. For example, consciousness only dimly illustrates the prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy, because these prehensions are primitive elements in our experience. But prehensions in the mode of presentational immediacy are among those prehensions which we enjoy with the most vivid consciousness. These prehensions are late derivatives in the concrescence of an experient subject.¹³

Whitehead continues to distinguish those two modes of perception by showing that the mode of causal efficacy belongs even to organisms of the lowest grade, while the mode of presentational immediacy requires a more sophisticated development and belongs only to organisms of a relatively high grade. Presentational immediacy is, in the last analysis, an outgrowth from the complex datum implanted by causal efficacy. By means of this, the difficulty of the sensationalist principle with regard to causality is overcome.

Although causal efficacy is in Whitehead's view more important than presentational immediacy; he does not downgrade the latter's value. In his philosophy of organism,

causal efficacy is expressed in terms of actual entity, while presentational immediacy offers us the perception of the so-called "eternal object". In Whitehead's theory, actual entities become the substitutes for the Cartesian substance, while eternal objects become the substitutes for the secondary qualities.¹⁴ In Whitehead's system, actual entities do not serve to carry eternal objects, but toprehend them. To prehend them means to actualize the potentiality of those eternal objects. Actual entities are arising or perishing, while eternal objects are actualized or remain in the state of potentiality. This ontological scheme is taken by Whitehead to eliminate the substance-quality forms of thought and the subjectivist principle.

Causal efficacy, as our primitive perception, is however very dim and vague. It is with this dim and vague feeling of causal efficacy that the "vector-structure" as the ontological fabric of our world is formed. This perceptual mode produces in our existence a sense of emotional feeling which belongs to us in the past, passes into us in the present, and passes from us in the present toward us in the future.

Since causal efficacy as our primitive perception is very dim and vague, how could we recognize its existence? According to Whitehead, our bodily experience is the crucial knower. To Whitehead, "Nothing is more astonishing in the history of philosophic thought than the naive way in which our association with our human bodies is assumed."¹⁵ He even says that "our bodily experience is the basis of existence" and that "the body is the basis of our emotional and purposive experience." Therefore, as far as the foundation of knowledge is concerned, it is not strange for us to hear him saying, "our bodily experience is primarily an experience of the dependence of presentational immediacy upon causal efficacy."¹⁶

So feeling the body as functioning is the most direct evidence of our real experience. It could also be inferred that the basic reason for modern philosophers' inverting the relationship between primitive causal efficacy and derivative presentational immediacy is their ignorance of the significance of our bodily experience. Whitehead says, "Hume and Descartes in their theory of direct perceptive knowledge dropped out this 'witness' of the body, and thus confine perception to presentational immediacy,"¹⁷ and "the current philosophic doctrines, mostly derived from Hume, are defective by reason of their neglect of bodily reference."¹⁸

According to Whitehead, if we want to capture the reality of this world lived by us, we cannot ignore the dimness and vagueness of this bodily experience. Actually this is the only way to show us causality as the ontological infrastructure of this world. When he says, "the notion of causation arose because mankind lives amid experiences in the mode of causal efficacy,"¹⁹ the living experience herein refers to bodily experience. Through the dimness and vagueness, we acknowledge that our bodily experience is really the basis of existence. On this point Whitehead says:

The body is ours, and we are an activity within our body. This fact of observation, vague and imperative, is the foundation of the connexity of the world, and of the transmission of its type of order.²⁰

According to Whitehead, bodily experience renders us a sense of importance, a vague feeling about "that which matters". The sense of importance does not refer exclusively to the experiencing self. It differentiates itself into the disclosure of the world, the many, and the self. It is the importance of others which melts into the importance of the self. In short, actuality is the self-enjoyment of importance.²¹

To be sure, the correlation among the notions of body, causal efficacy, and vagueness is the final result of the development of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. This result is also the necessary consequence after the dismantling of the Cartesian edifice. As we have seen above, the vague experience of body directs us towards the vague experience of causal efficacy, while the vague experience of causal efficacy reveals to us the process of the concrescence of causal prehensions as the ontological structure of all realities. Here the three Cartesian misconceptions are uprooted, the Cartesian substance is cancelled. We could say that regarding process as the ultimate is the chief point of Whitehead's approach to his non-substantialist ontology. As a matter of fact, when Whitehead is constructing his ontology, he is strongly aware of his leaving Western philosophy, and going to other cultural traditions.

In this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought. One side makes process ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.²²

Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesianism

In Merleau-Ponty's case, we first assume that his theoretical development, as far as epistemology is concerned, is from *The Structure of Behavior*, through *Phenomenology of Perception*, to *The Visible and the Invisible*. No matter what differences exist among these three, their themes are centered around criticizing the Cartesian substantialist ontology and constructing a non-substantialist ontology as its substitute. Thus Merleau-Ponty has the same philosophical enterprise as Whitehead does. The only difference between them is that the targets of the former include, in addition to Descartes and Kant, Husserl and Sartre.

In *The Structure of Behavior*, Merleau-Ponty modifies Gestalt theory and uses it to criticize dualistic, mechanistic, and atomistic theories of bodily behavior, which are based on the Cartesian theory of substance. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is no ultimate hidden substance. He says that "the organism has a distinct reality which is not substantial but structural."²³ In the context of *The Structure of Behavior*, structure and form are interchangeable. So Merleau-Ponty also says that "the theory of form is aware of the consequences which a purely structural conception entails and seeks to expand into a philosophy of form which would be substituted for the philosophy of substance."²⁴ The attempt to cancel the conception of substance is prominent even at the beginning of his philosophical enterprise.

According to Merleau-Ponty, there are three types of structures: the physical order (matter), the vital order (life), and the human order (mind). These three different orders are just three different expressions of the monist structure of body: the physical order is its solid expression, the vital order is its organic expression, while the human order is its spiritual expression. By means of this analysis, Merleau-Ponty first shows that "the structure of behavior as it presents itself to perceptual experience is neither thing nor consciousness."²⁵ This serves to solve the dualism of mind and matter in the Cartesian philosophy. In saying that the structure of behavior is not consciousness, Merleau-Ponty implies that "the universe of consciousness revealed by the *cogito* and in the unity of which even perception itself seemed to be necessarily enclosed was only a universe of thought in the restricted sense."²⁶ In his view, consciousness accounts for the thought of seeing, but the fact of vision and the ensemble of existential knowledges remain outside of it. To say that behavior is not a thing is saying that our body is not merely a physical reality, that is, not merely a thing of the physical world. On this point, he says:

Form is not a physical reality, but an object of perception; without it physical science would have no meaning. . . in the final analysis, form cannot be defined in terms of reality but in terms of knowledge, not as a thing of the physical world but as a perceived whole. . . .²⁷

From the preceding passage, we see Merleau-Ponty's efforts to retain the structure of behavior within the realm of perception. This position naturally leads Merleau-Ponty to a rejection of the body understood as a mechanical thing consisting of atomic subparts. He excludes the possibility of applying a mechanistic interpretation of causal laws to the meaning of bodily behavior, lest the organic body be disintegrated into isolated and discrete parts which are only externally related. What interests him is the dialectical structure of our bodily behavior taken as a whole. In this regard, he says:

The relations of the organic individual and its milieu are truly dialectical relations, therefore, and this dialectic brings about the appearance of new relations which cannot be compared to those of a physical system and its entourage or even understood when the organism is reduced to the image which anatomy and the physical sciences give of it.²⁸

With this notion of dialectical relations, we can easily understand why Merleau-Ponty says that "in a form, the whole is not the sum of its parts"²⁹ and that "each local effect depends on the function which it fulfills in the whole, upon its value and its significance with respect to the structure which the system is tending to realize."³⁰ In *The Structure of Behavior* we can still find many statements with the same reference, such as the following, "[structure's] decomposition into real parts can never be completed,"³¹ and "an exhaustive analysis of the *de facto* structures is

inconceivable.”³² All of these make the point that “the notion of form has value precisely because it goes beyond the atomistic conception. . . .”³³ In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the expression of the bodily structure is like the performance of a symphony. In applying the notion of form to the task of interpreting bodily structure, Merleau-Ponty leads us to see that each moment in the structure is dialectically determined by the grouping of the other moments.

When the topic of the union of the soul and the body is addressed, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the Cartesian metaphor of the artisan and his tool cannot satisfactorily deal with this union. The major reason is that an organ cannot be compared to an instrument, as if it existed and could be conceived apart from integral functioning, nor can the mind be comparable to an artisan who uses it. This comparison would return us to the conception of a wholly external relation like that of the pilot and his ship which is rightly rejected by Descartes himself. Merleau-Ponty continues to explore this topic by saying:

The mind does not use the body, but realizes itself through it while at the same time transferring the body outside of physical space. When we were describing the structures of behavior it was indeed to show that they are irreducible to the dialectic of physical stimulus and muscular contraction and that in this sense behavior, far from being a thing which exists in-itself (*en soi*), is a whole significative for a consciousness which considers it; but it was at the same time and reciprocally to make manifest in “expressive conduct” the *view of a consciousness* under our eyes, to show a mind which *comes into the world*.³⁴

Thus in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the opposition between soul and body should be conceived of as a “functional opposition” rather than a “substantial opposition”.³⁵ And the theme implied in the preceding quotation is developed in *The Visible and the Invisible* to be that there is a chiasm between mind and body: the relation between them is “not identity, nor non-identity, or non-coincidence.”³⁶ As a result, the tension of the substantialist dualism of mind and body is solved in the relation of chiasm.

From the above, we see that Merleau-Ponty’s *The Structure of Behavior* has dealt with the same three Cartesian misconceptions as Whitehead uncovered, that is to say, the substance-quality doctrine, the sensationalist doctrine (which is an empirical atomism), and the Kantian doctrine (which presupposes the Cartesian opposition of subject and object) are also subject to Merleau-Ponty’s severe critique. Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible* are merely the further development of this critique of Cartesianism. In *The Structure of Behavior* he concerns himself with clarifying the nature of body. In the *Phenomenology of Perception* the focus has been shifted by Merleau-Ponty to our perceptual experience when body is conscious of its being-in-the-world or when it is in a communicational context. Here his interest is not focused on criticizing Cartesian mechanism and atomism, but on

criticizing the Cartesian opposition of subject and object, which is, according to Whitehead, the source of the Kantian doctrine.

When Merleau-Ponty says that "in trying to describe the phenomenon of speech and the specific act of meaning, we shall have the opportunity to leave behind us, once and for all, the traditional subject-object dichotomy",³⁷ he means that, in describing the phenomenon of communication, the Cartesian mode of thought does not work. The reason is that thought, in the speaking subject, is not a representation, that is, it does not expressively posit objects or relations. In other words, within the sphere of communication no intellectual consciousness, such as Descartes, Kant, and Husserl advocate, exists internally and independently. The intellectual consciousness and our linguistic expression are simultaneously constituted through our body.³⁸

To Merleau-Ponty, any linguistic expression is, in the last analysis, bodily expression. The reason is not only that we speak by means of our bodily organs, but that it is the body, not the epistemological subject, that brings about the synthesis of meaning.³⁹ According to Merleau-Ponty, this bodily synthesis is pre-conscious. And in this sense, it could be termed the "pre-reflective" and "tacit" *cogito*.⁴⁰ For this ego, its function is "I can" rather than "I think".⁴¹ In this bodily synthesis, a thing is not established on the basis of representation, but appears to us as the goal of our bodily intentionality.⁴² This means that a thing is not represented by consciousness, but itself presents from our bodily expression. According to Merleau-Ponty, the objective world is represented by our conscious and reflective *cogito*, while a "lived-through" world arises out of our bodily synthesis. "Body" in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy means my body-in-the-world through which the lived-through world prior to the objective world emerges. Such bodily experience shows us that "the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved, and it is my involvement in a point of view which makes possible both the finiteness of my perception and its opening out upon the complete world as a horizon of every preception."⁴³

According to Cartesian philosophers, intellectual consciousness is the most primary. The perceptual representation that radiates from it is the basis for building up linguistic expression; the bodily experience is almost neglected by them. But Merleau-Ponty points out that the body is actually the ontological foundation of linguistic expression and perceptual representation. This point can be detected in his statement that

My body is the seat or rather the very actuality (of the phenomenon of expression (*Ausdruck*), and there the visual and auditory experiences, for example, are pregnant one with the other, and their expressive value is the ground of the antepredicative unity of the perceived world, and through it, of verbal expression (*Darstellung*) and intellectual significance (*Bedeutung*). My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'.⁴⁴

And like Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty discovers that our bodily perception is ambiguous and obscure. In the latter part of the *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty says that "the notion of perception is ambiguous," and that "obscurity spreads to the perceived world in its entirety." Now along with the ambiguity and obscurity of bodily perception, Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* steps into a more profound realm of our bodily experience. From the *Phenomenology* to *The Visible and the Invisible*, the most significant change is that the body no longer plays the role of the subject of perception. The body's role as the subject of perception undergoes more ambiguity and obscurity to the extent that the notion of the invisible *flesh* becomes the pivot of the perceived world. As a matter of fact, only up to *The Visible and the Invisible*, does Merleau-Ponty entirely abandon the Cartesian mode of thought. The *Phenomenology*, though making emphasis on the importance of phenomenal body, is still under Cartesian shadow. Indeed in the statement, "Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body,"⁴⁵ the Cartesian mode of thought is still preserved. This is why, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty says that the problem posed in the *Phenomenology* "are insoluble because I start there from the 'consciousness'-'object' distinction."⁴⁶

As regards the notion of the flesh, the best interpretation of it is Merleau-Ponty's statement that

the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen. It is this visibility, this generality of the sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to myself, that we have previously called flesh.⁴⁷

It is through this visibility that we see reciprocity, circularity, reversibility, intertwining, or chiasm between our body and the world. In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, the *flesh* refers to no empirical entity. It refers to an ontological action, i.e. the action of reciprocity, circularity, reversibility, intertwining or chiasm. According to Merleau-Ponty, this ontological action is based on the *Sich bewegen* of the body.⁴⁸ But it is noteworthy that neither is the bodily movement an empirical movement, since

My body is never *in movement perspektivisch*, as are the other things -
It is not *in rest* either like some of them. It is beneath objective rest and movement -⁴⁹

nor is the body itself an empirical fact.⁵⁰ According to Merleau-Ponty, through the *Sich bewegen* we find that *Wahrnehmen* is synonymous with it. *Sich bewegen* and *Wahrnehmen* then constitute the enclosure of the body,⁵² and thus forms the teleology of the body.⁵³ That is to say, we find that "the things are the prolongation of my body and my body is the prolongation of the world, through it the world surrounds me."⁵⁴

The preceding analysis shows us that the flesh is the ontological foundation of all existences, that is to say, the source of their ontogenesis. The flesh itself is invisible,

but it makes the visible possible. In this regard, we see Merleau-Ponty saying that "the visible things are the secret folds of our flesh."⁵⁵ This means that "what it [consciousness] does not see is what makes it see, is its tie to Being, is its corporeity, are the existentials by which the world becomes visible, is the flesh wherein the object is born."⁵⁶ So arising from the flesh is the presence that "something" is there and that "someone" is there.⁵⁷ This is our primordial "perceptual faith". But all realities existing in the ontological action of the flesh have no alien substances. Neither is the flesh substance. On this point Merleau-Ponty says that "we must not think the flesh starting from substance, from body and spirit,"⁵⁸ that is to say, "it is not the union or compound of two substances."⁵⁹

Conclusion

In Whitehead process is the ultimate, while in Merleau-Ponty the flesh is the ultimate. Although process and the flesh are quite different in various aspects, they are the same in playing a non-substantialist role. In the *Working Notes*, Merleau-Ponty says that destruction of the objectivist ontology of the Cartesians is necessary.⁶⁰ Even the notion of the In Itself is regarded as a version of substance. So Merleau-Ponty describes his ontology as "a going beyond the ontology of the In itself."⁶¹ And in order to uproot the notion of substance, he is even forced to cancel the conception of causality. Merleau-Ponty says, "In denying the conception of perception-reproduction (on my body in itself of the exterior thing in itself), I open up access to a brute Being with which I would not be in the *subject and object* relation, and still less in the relation of effect with cause."⁶² Then "what replaces causal thought is the idea of transcendence," which reveals a world wherein "there are fields in intersection, . . . wherein the subjectivities are integrated."⁶³ The reason why the subjective integration must substitute for causality is that, from Merleau-Ponty's perspective, causality is "a relation from substance to substance."⁶⁴ Now we may ask how Whitehead establishes his non-substantialist ontology with recognition of the conception of causality. The reply is that, in Whitehead's philosophy, causal efficacy is not a relation from substance to substance, it is essentially an ontological process from which realities of things arise. This analysis leads us to see that both Whitehead's process and Merleau-Ponty's flesh are ontological movement, which proceeds without any presupposition of the notion of substance and the notion of causality based thereon.

Whitehead's and Merleau-Ponty's contributions to Western philosophy lie not only in their finding a new philosophical paradigm of the body, but also in their trying to construct a new type of ontology: a nonsubstantialist ontology, which is based on our bodily experience. So what Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty want to do in their philosophical enterprises is to critically examine the defects of the Cartesian mode of thought in order to establish a new mode of ontological thought. Merleau-Ponty says that his philosophical question is "a question of creating a new type of intelligibility (intelligi-

bility through the world and Being as they are -- "vertical" and not *horizontal*)." ⁶⁵
 Now can we say that cosmos in Whitehead's philosophy of organism is also vertical rather than horizontal? This is however another question for us to explore in the future.

NOTES

- * Thanks should be given to Professors Schrag and McBride for their reading this paper and making constructive comments on it.
1. See William S. Hamrick's Ph. D dissertation, "Body, Space, and Time in the Philosophies of Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty," Vanderbilt University, 1971.
 2. In his paper, "Whitehead and Heidegger" (*Dialectica* XLIX, 1959, pp. 42-56; reprinted in *Philosophy Today* IV, 1960, pp. 26-35), Calvin O. Schrag compares Whitehead and Heidegger on this issue. This comparison gives us a hint to make a comparison between Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty on this issue.
 3. This is a topic to which most people in comparing Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty would pay attention, for example, Hamrick's Ph. D. dissertation.
 4. In his paper, "The Human Body as Philosophical Paradigm in Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty" (*Philosophy Today* XX, 1976, pp. 317-326), Raymond J. Devettere achieves this task quite nicely.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
 6. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 159. (hereafter PR)
 7. In history of philosophy, Hume is famous for criticizing Descartes's theory of substance. But Whitehead points out that many aspects of Hume's philosophy presupposes Descartes's theory. For instance, in PR p. 160 Whitehead says: "The fact that finally Hume criticizes the Cartesian notion of mind does not alter the other fact that his antecedent arguments presuppose that notion."
 8. PR, p. 157.
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
 12. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8, 18. Also see Whitehead's *Science and Modern World* (New York: The Free Press, 1925), Chapter III.
 13. PR, p. 162.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
 15. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: The Free Press, 1938), p. 114. (hereafter MT)
 16. PR, p. 176.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
 18. MT, p. 153.

19. PR, p. 175.
20. MT, p. 165.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.
22. PR, p. 7.
23. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The structure of Behavior*, trans. A. L. Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963), p. 129. "Substantial" is here equivalent to "substantialist".
24. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
36. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 264. (hereafter VI).
37. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 174. (hereafter PP)
38. *Ibid.*, Part One: The Body, section 6, The Body as Expression, and Speech.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
40. In PP p. 298 Merleau-Ponty says, "The consciousness of the world is not based on self-consciousness: they are strictly contemporary. There is a world for me because I am not unaware of myself; and I am not concealed from myself because I have a world. This pre-conscious possession of the world remains to be analyzed in the pre-reflective *cogito*." In PP p. 403 he says, "Behind the spoken *cogito*, the one which is converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit *cogito*, myself experienced by myself."
41. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
42. In PP p. 322 Merleau-Ponty says, "The thing appeared to us above as the goal of a bodily teleology, the norm of our psycho-physiological setting."
43. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.
46. VI. p. 200.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

51. According to Merleau-Ponty (VI p. 255), *Wahrnehmen* and *Sich bewegen* are synonymous, they emerge from one another. But ontologically speaking, the latter enjoys more fundamental status. This is why Merleau-Ponty says, "*Wahrnehmen* fails to apprehend *Sich bewegen*," while he does not say the reverse.

52. VI, p. 263.

53. According to Merleau-Ponty, the flesh itself constitutes a "whole circle" (VI p. 260). We can regard this circle as a teleological scope, meaning that all existences are arising from the flesh and reserved within it.

54. VI, p. 255.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

懷海德與梅露——龐蒂

蔣年豐

這篇文章的主旨是要對懷海德與梅露——龐蒂對笛卡兒主義的批判做個比較，闡明他們兩人雖然隸屬不同的哲學派別——前者是機體哲學的創立者，後者是現象學的大師——他們在哲學主張上，尤其在反笛卡兒式的哲學思想方面，有很多不謀而合之處。

他們認為近世的哲學，由於受到笛卡兒的影響，在思維上無法擺脫心物二元，主客對立，實體屬性這些範疇的支配。而其弊病在於我們的“身體”在哲學上的地位被忽略了。這個忽略在哲學學說上造成很大的缺憾。笛卡兒式的世界已非我們所生活的這個真實而具體的世界。

他們兩人的志業便是從活生生的身體出發，企圖建造一個嶄新的非笛卡兒式的存有論，來取代殘破不堪的笛卡兒式的存有論。本文先談懷海德，再談梅露——龐蒂，而重點擺在他們兩人如何批判笛卡兒式的哲學思想，以及如何描述他們兩人所建立的新的存有論的樣式。

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