

# 東海學報

24卷

—文學院—

## TUNGHAI JOURNAL

Volume 24 June 1983

College of Arts



TUNGHAI UNIVERSITY

Taichung, Taiwan  
Republic of China

中華民國七十二年六月

東海大學出版

本學報由哈佛燕京學社資助印行  
特此誌謝

The publication of this issue of the Tunghai Journal  
has been made possible through the generous grant  
made by the Harvard-Yenching Institute

# 東海學報

## Tunghai Journal

發行人 梅可望

Publisher: Mei Ko-wang

編輯委員會委員

Board of Editors

總召集人 Coordinator

江舉謙 Chiang Chu-ch'ien

總主編 Editor-in-Chief

呂士朋 Lu Shih-peng

執行編輯 Executive Editor

林載爵 Lin Tsai-chueh

各學院主編 Editors

文學院：呂士朋 Lu Shih-peng (College of Arts)

管理學院：李秀英 Lee Shiu-yin (College of Management)

法學院：張華葆 Chang Hwa-bao (College of Law)

理學院：徐長明 Hsu Chang-ming (College of Science)

工學院：陳格理 Chen Ger-li (College of Engineering)

農學院：閻立平 Yen Li-ping (College of Agriculture)

# 東海學報第二十四卷目錄

## 文學院

1. Some Notes on the Grand Council in Ch'ing China ..... 古 鴻 廷 1  
(對清代軍機處的一些觀察)
2. The Concept of God in Confucianism ..... 馮 滄 祥 15  
(儒家對神的觀念)
3. 荀子天論與性論之研究..... 蔡 仁 厚 23
4. The Problem of Autonomy of Human Existence in Later Heidegger's Philosophy  
(論海德格後期哲學中人底自性問題) ..... 陳 榮 灼 39
5. 狹義相對論中時間概念的分析及其哲學意義之研究..... 鄭 芷 人 47
6. Logical Positivism, Analytic Philosophy, and Metaphysics ..... 謝 仲 明 69  
(邏輯實證論、分析哲學與形上學)
7. Kant's "humanistic" Conception of Religion ..... 關 子 尹 95  
(康德的「人文」宗教觀)

Notes on the Grand Council  
in Ch'ing China,  
1926-1911

Hung-ting Ku\*  
Department of History  
Tunghai University

### Introduction

The Grand Council (Chun-chi-ch'u 軍機處) was a unique creation of the Manchu rulers. The primary purpose of its establishment was to set up a small advisory committee to deal with some urgent and important matters, relating to military affairs.<sup>1</sup>

In the early Ch'ing period, important state affairs were discussed at the meetings of the Grand Secretaries or I-Cheng-wang ta-ch'en 議政王大臣 (princes and great ministers with the authority to deliberate on governmental matters.)<sup>2</sup> The power struggle between Emperor Yung-cheng and his brothers might well make these meetings impractical as well as improper to handle urgent and secret matters.<sup>3</sup> In 1726, Emperor Yung-cheng assigned one prince, one Grand Secretary and one Vice-Minister of Revenue to assist him in a campaign to suppress a Muslim revolt in Northwest China.<sup>4</sup> The Emperor must have found the establishment of such a handy and small advisory body very useful. After peace was restored, he formally set up the Grand Council in 1732 and it was called Chun-chi-ch'u, literally military cabinet.<sup>5</sup>

Although the Grand Council was literally called military cabinet, it had duties and functions of providing general advice to the Emperor on all important state affairs. The Grand Councillors were ready for audience with the Emperor at any time. Under the instruction of the Emperor, they read memorials, drafted and issued edicts. They also performed other duties, such as to submit the name lists of eligible candidates to important central and local posts, to be acting governors-general, or to conduct investigation in important criminal cases.<sup>6</sup>

As a common practice, the Grand Councillors were supposedly to act in unison in their recommendations to the Emperor. They might discuss matters of concern and then reach a decision before they presented recommendations to the throne. In the imperial audience, however, only the leader of the Grand Council had the privileges to speak for the whole Council.<sup>7</sup> The leadership of the Council was generally based

\* The author wishes to thank Dr. Chen-tung Chang of the National University of Singapore and Professors Wen-hsiung Hsu of the Northwestern University and Mark Thelin of Tunghai University for their comments on the preliminary version of this paper. The financial support of the Harvard-Yenching Institute and the United Board for Higher Education in Asia is here acknowledged.

upon official rank, seniority and ethnicity.<sup>8</sup> Whenever there was a prince assigned to take charge of the Council, he would be the leader of the Council. In the absence of the princes, the Council was usually headed by a Manchu Grand Secretary. If there were no Manchu Grand Secretary in the Council, a Han Chinese Grand Secretary would be the leader. The Grand Secretaries, who had the highest rank of 1a and their role or potential role as the leader of the Council, would usually have great influence, if not control, over the Council. Thus, even in the early days of its existence, the Grand Council was called "Inner Grand Secretariat" by the court officials.<sup>9</sup>

The nearly all-embracing functions of the Grand Council alarmed many people. In 1805, a censor petitioned the Emperor to correct the tendency, pointing out the inconsistency between the duties and the name of the Grand Council. The petition was rebutted, nevertheless. The Emperor declined to accept the rationale that the Council should limit its activities solely to military affairs. He reinterpreted the term of *chun-chi* 軍機 (military affairs), by stating that it was an equivalent of *chun-kuo ta-shin* 軍國大事 (important state and military affairs).<sup>10</sup> With its expanding functions, the Grand Council has thus been regarded as a substitute for the Grand Secretariat by many scholars.

Generally speaking, two kinds of memorials were submitted by the officials to the throne in Ch'ing China. The regular and formal memorials for routine public matters were called *t'1-pen* 題本. These memorials, passed through various Boards, via the Transmission Office (*T'ung-cheng-ssu* 通政司), to the ruler. They were then handled by the Grand Secretariat. The other kind of memorials, the personal memorials of semi-secret, secret, or urgent nature, were called *tsou-che* 奏摺.<sup>11</sup> They went through the Chancery of Memorials (*Tsou-shih-ch'u* 奏事處) to the Emperor. These memorials were supposed to be opened by the Emperor personally. Under the instruction of the Emperor, the Grand Councillors drafted the edicts in replying these memorials. When the edicts were issued, those with secret nature, called court letters (*t'ing-chi* 廷寄), were sent out by the Grand Council itself, while the others, called public edicts (*ming-fa shang-yu* 明發上諭), by the Grand Secretariat.<sup>12</sup>

### Some features of the appointments to the Council

There was not a fixed number of Grand Councillors in the Council. When it was first created, it had only three members. There was once when the number reached ten. During most of the time of its existence, the number of the Councillors ranged from four to seven.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the Grand Councillors, there were thirty two junior officials served as the secretaries of the Council to assist the Councillors. They were called *Chun-chi ching-chang* 軍機京章.<sup>14</sup>

According to the statutes, the Grand Councillors should be selected from the Grand Secretaries, Ministers of Vice-Ministers of various Boards, and other chief officials in the capital, and the assignment was a concurrent post in nature.<sup>15</sup> As the Grand Councillors had to present themselves before the Emperor whenever they were

required, it is understandable that the candidates for the Grand Councillors had to be important officials in the capital. Since its creation in 1726 until the end of the dynasty in 1911, these appointment regulations were strictly observed. The Grand Councillorship, unlike the Grand Secretaryship or Associate Grand Secretaryship, had never become a decorative title for the local officials. The few local officials who were assigned this concurrent post were all summoned to the capital to hold other central posts. <sup>16</sup>

Throughout the one hundred and eighty five years of its existence, there were altogether 130 officials assigned to hold the concurrent post as the Grand Councillors. <sup>17</sup> Among them, 15 were Grand Secretaries, 37 Ministers, 49 Vice-Ministers and 7 Left Censors-general, while 16 more had been Ministers or Vice-Ministers prior to their assignments to the Grand Council. The others were from various post holders, mainly from the offices in the central government.

Although the duties and functions of the Grand Council expanded as time passed, financial matters seemed to have remained its most important concern. Among those Ministers or Vice-Ministers appointed as Grand Councillors, 28 of them were from the Board of Revenue, 16 from Punishment, 12 from War, 12 from Civil Appointments, 11 from Works and only 4 from Rites. However, it is interesting to note that if we take into account the presentation of officials of various Boards on a yearly basis, the importance of the military affairs was also apparent for the Grand Council. There were Ministers or vice-Ministers of Revenue in the Grand Council during 161 years of the 185 years from 1726 to 1911, Ministers or Vice-Ministers of War for 121 years, 101 years for Civil Appointments, 97 years for Works, 95 years for Punishment and 51 years for Rites. These data seem to indicate that finance and military were most often two major concerns that occupied the Emperor in his consultation with the Grand Councillors. <sup>18</sup>

### The Manchu-Han Chinese Balance in the Council

Although there was no legal regulation explicitly stating that the Manchus and the Han Chinese should have equal shares of posts in this important agency, the total number of Grand Councillors was nearly the same for the two ethnic groups. <sup>19</sup> It is of significance to observe, however, that the number of the Manchu Grand Councillors was almost twice that of the Han Chinese in the first period (1726-1820). Before 1820, not only had more Manchus served on the Grand Council, but they also usually maintained a majority in the Council on a yearly basis. <sup>20</sup> During these ninety four years, there were only fifteen years when Han Chinese outnumbered the Manchus on the Council, while the Manchus had a majority for forty nine years. By contrast, in the second period between 1821 and 1911, a total of forty Han Chinese but only twenty three Manchus held concurrent posts as Grand Councillors. Moreover, fifty out of the total ninety one years in this second period, the Han Chinese had a majority

in the Council, while the Manchus were in the majority for only eleven years.<sup>21</sup> These changes seem to indicate the rise of power of the Han Chinese in the late Ch'ing period. As time passed, the Manchu ruler seems to rely more and more on his Han Chinese subjects to give advice on urgent and important state matters.<sup>22</sup> As an alien ruler, the heavy reliance on the loyalty and ability of the ruled was, of course, not a safe way to rule an empire.<sup>23</sup> To counteract the over-dependence on the Han Chinese, the Emperor assigned one prince after another to take charge of the Grand Council. During the first period, only three princes were assigned to the Council. They stayed in the Council for a total of only six years. To assign a prince as the leader of the Council became nearly a pattern in the second period, for more than half of this period, the Grand Council was under the supervision of a certain prince. Altogether, five princes were assigned this supervisory role in the second period.<sup>24</sup>

To assign princes to take charge of the Grand Council, of course, was not without risk. As a matter of fact, Emperor Chia-ch'ing even issued an edict in 1799 to exclude the princes from the Grand Council to prevent their usurpation of imperial authority.<sup>25</sup> During the reign of Chia-ching (1796-1820), the dynasty was still in its heyday, though the dynasty already had some problems by the Chia-ching period. Fifty years later, the conditions deteriorated to the edge of danger. China was defeated by Great Britain in the Opium War (1839-41) and plagued constantly by the "ocean barbarians" since then, while the gigantic Taiping Rebellion broke out in 1852. The survival of the dynasty was seriously threatened by the threats from without and the rebellions from within. The Manchu ruler had to rely on the Han Chinese to cope with both internal and external problems to prevent the Empire from crumbling.<sup>26</sup> The use of the Han Chinese, though indispensable, was not desirable for the dynasty as an alien regime. The appointment of princes to the Grand Council thus seems to have become the lesser of two evils.

### Career Mobility of the Grand Councillors

The Manchu ruler was not only the source of authority in theory, he actually ruled the Empire. The power to appoint officials was never delegated to others. Every official above the seventh rank was personally appointed by the Emperor.<sup>27</sup> The Grand Council as well as the Board of Civil Appointments could only submit the name list of eligible candidates for various vacancies according to the preference order indicated in the service codes. It was the Emperor alone who decided the appointments. If he wished, and in fact he did, he could disregard the recommendations of his advisers and appoint someone of low standing in the list to show his "special favor" to certain persons.<sup>28</sup> Of course, the prerequisite for courting the special favor would be to become the Emperor's acquaintance. Although originally an informal ad hoc advisory body for military affairs, the Grand Council later developed into an important link between the Emperor and other administrative agencies. To hold a con-

current post as a Grand Councillor meant not only enjoying the exercise of power and influence in the bureaucratic system, but it also meant a better chance than the other officials to impress upon and receive special favors from the Emperor.

The Grand Secretaryship was the highest post an official in Ch'ing China could ever dream to reach. To climb up to this towering position was understandably a difficult journey. Between 1726 and 1911, there were altogether 1071 persons appointed to the Vice-Ministership, a post ranked at 2a. Of these Vice-Ministers, 347 (32%) were later promoted to a Ministerial post, and only 84 of them eventually became Grand Secretaries.<sup>29</sup> The chance of a Vice-Minister who was assigned to the Grand Council was much greater than that of an ordinary Vice-Minister in his promotion. Between 1726 and 1911, 49 Vice-Ministers were assigned to hold the concurrent post as Grand Councillors, and of these 49 officials, 37 (75.5%) were later promoted to the Ministership. This means that the proportion of these Vice-Ministers-cum-Grand Councillors enjoyed more than twice as much change of promotion to Ministership than other ordinary Vice-Ministers. While there were only 84 Vice-Ministers who eventually reached the Grand Secretaryship, 23 of them had been a Vice-Ministers-cum-Grand Councillors.<sup>30</sup> Since only 62 Vice-Ministers<sup>31</sup> had the opportunity to hold the Grand Councillorship for the whole period, this means that 37 per cent (23 out of 62) of the Vice-Ministers holding the Grand Councillorship later became the Grand Secretaries.<sup>32</sup> This contrast strongly with a mere 6 per cent (61 out of 1009) of these Vice-Ministers who, having never been assigned to the Grand Council, were eventually promoted to the Grand Secretaryship. It is thus obvious that the career experience as a Grand Councillor was a great asset for a Vice-Minister who aimed at climbing to the very top of the official hierarchy.

The same can be said of the Ministers. Between 1726 and 1911, among 442 Ministers appointed, 93 of them were later promoted to the Grand Secretaryship. This means that about every one of five became the Grand Secretaries later. Within this category, nearly half of them were Ministers-cum-Grand Councillors, while the other half were ordinary Ministers. It should be noted, however, there were only 95 Ministers holding the concurrent post as the Grand Councillors and among these 95 lucky ones, 45 became the Grand Secretaries (see Table 1.) For the rest 347 ordinary Ministers, only 48 of them were promoted to the Grand Secretaryship.<sup>33</sup> It is obvious that Ministers-cum-Grand-Councillors had a much better chance to reach the top of the bureaucracy than those who had never been a Grand Councillor.

Sources: Tsung-mao Fu, *Ch'ing-tai chun-chi-ch'u tsu-chih chi chih-chang chi yen-chiu*, appendix of the name list of the Grand Councillors (pp. 529-683); Ch'i-yun Chang and others, compiled, *Ch'ing-shih*, Vol. 4, pp. 2462-2512.



Table 1

## The Upward Mobility of the Ministers-cum-Grand-Councillors, 1726-1911

	Total number * of Ministers- Cum-Grand-Councillors	Number promoted to the Grand Secretaryship
1726-1820	47	25
1821-1911	48	20

\* There were 37 Ministers assigned to the Council, while 58 more were promoted to Ministerial posts after they entered into the Council.

The assignment to the Grand Council not only improved the chance of a Vice-Minister's or Minister's promotion to the Grand Secretaryship, but it also sped up the promotion process. During the first period (1726-1820), it took a Vice-Minister-cum-Grand Councillor about fourteen years and ten months on average to become a Grand Secretary, while an ordinary Vice-Minister spent one and a half more years. For the second period (1821-1911), those who had been Grand Councillor took thirteen years and nine months to reach the top while those who had not took fifteen years and two months.<sup>34</sup>

Although the Grand Councillors were indispensable for the Emperor in the process of decision-making, they did not have any specific administrative responsibility in their role as Grand Councillors. As individuals, their dismissals were often due to old age, physical unfitness or punishment received in their principal posts as ministers, Vice-Ministers or other portfolios. Since the Grand Councillors usually acted in unison, the reward or punishment were often received by them as a group.<sup>35</sup> As a group, they enjoyed much longer tenures than other officials.<sup>36</sup> Before 1821, the average length of tenure for them was about six years for each appointment. The span of their appointments became somewhat shorter after 1820. It averaged four years and three months for each appointment.<sup>37</sup> A further inquiry into the causes for the dismissals in the post 1820 period shows that there were power struggles. Besides the common causes for the dismissals such as old age, illness or punishment received in their principal posts, there were block dismissals in 1861, 1884 and 1900.<sup>38</sup> These were years when China had troubles with foreign powers. The development of internal politics and external relations were often interrelated with each other in the history of modern China. The decline of the control and strength of the Emperor in the years of difficulties often bred power struggles. The Empress Dowages dismissed those Grand Councillors who might otherwise endanger her power. By dismissing those Grand Councillors in block, she did succeed in regaining the supreme control over her "servants," particularly those in the court.

In Ch'ing China, the local governments were created and directed by the central government. To make control by the throne more effective, the Emperor personally appointed magistrates of the *chou* (prefecture) and *hsien* (district), not to mention the governors and governors-general of the provinces. Moreover, all important criminal cases were reviewed in the capital. As the close advisers of the Emperor, the Grand Councillors might be assigned to supervise the construction or repair of river works, or to conduct investigations of important criminal cases. They were also sent out to be acting governors, military generals, governors-general for a short period. During the first period (1726-1820), the Grand Councillors were sent out 13 times to act as local officials, 28 times to supervise water works and 54 times to investigate important cases. Through the frequent assignments of the Grand Councillors to check the local affairs, the Emperor seemed to have every tight control over the local government. The involvement of Grand Councillors in local affairs seemed to be reduced greatly during the second period (1821-1911). In the post-1820 period, there were altogether only 6 occasions during which the Grand Councillors acted as governors or governors-general. They were also sent out only 4 times to check the river works and 16 times to investigate important cases. Although the internal conditions deteriorated after the mid-19th century, the rise of many powerful governors and governors-general might have greatly "relieved" the burden as well as control of the central government over local affairs in this period. Not only were there fewer and fewer Grand Councillors sent out as special imperial commissioners, but the Emperor also seemed to refrain himself from transferring central officials to local posts. Altogether there were 13 Grand Councillors transferred to local posts in the first period, while only 7 were transferred in the second period.<sup>39</sup>

The rise of the powerful governors and governors-general in late Ch'ing times can also be seen in the changing fortunes of local officials. From 1722 to 1820, there were 238 governors and governors-general appointed. Among them, 54 (23 per cent) were later either demoted or dismissed. From 1821 until the end of the dynasty in 1911, 179 persons were appointed to the governorship or governor-generalship. Only 30 of them (16.7 per cent) met the ill fate of demotion or dismissal.<sup>40</sup> The Manchu ruler's control over the central officials in general, and the Grand Councillors in particular, nevertheless, seemed to remain tight until the downfall of the dynasty. The proportion of Ministers punished was practically identical between the two period. For the Grand Councillors, the imperial control actually became even more strict in the second period. In the first period, 65 Grand Councillors were appointed, and only 10 of them (15 per cent) were later dismissed, demoted or otherwise punished. During the second period, the same number of officials were assigned to the Grand Council, but 15 of them (23 per cent) were later dismissed or demoted. The Han Chinese Grand Councillors who were favored by the Emperor with a higher proportion of promotion and smaller chances of punishment than their Manchu counterparts in the first period, were subjected to severe treatment in the second period. Their chances

of promotion were reduced by more than half, while their chances of receiving punishment doubled in the second period.<sup>41</sup> In other words, while the Manchu ruler might have loosened his grasp over the local officials in the last years of the dynasty, he, nevertheless, did not give up the reins of central government. The important central officials, such as the Grand Councillors, remained under a tight imperial control until the end of this alien dynasty. Although more and more Han Chinese were assigned to the Council in the second period and they became indispensable for the Manchu ruler to rule the Empire, they were constantly under a strict discipline.

### Notes

1. For the details on the reasons to create the Grand Council, see Tsung-mao Fu, *Ch'ing-tai chun-chi-ch'u tsu-chih chih-chang chi yen-chiu* 清代軍機處組織及職掌之研究 (A Study of the functions and organization of the Grand Council of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei, Cultural Foundation of the Chia-hsin Cement Co., 1967), pp. 106-117.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-69; Chang-chu Liang, *Shu-huan chi-leh* 樞垣紀要 (Short notes on the Grand Council), (Peking, n.p., 1875, reprinted by Wen-hai Publishers in Taipei, 1966), pp. i-ii.
3. Even after Yung-cheng ascended the throne, his brothers continued to be the potential threat to the Emperor. For the details of the power struggle between Yung-cheng and his brothers, see I-shan Hsiao, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shin* 清代通史 (A general history of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei, Commercial Press, 1967), Vol. I. pp. 856-891.
4. *Ta-Ch'ing li-chiao shih-lu* 大清歷朝實錄 (The veritable records of the successive reigns of the great ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei, Hua-lieh Bookstore, 1964 reprint), Yung-cheng, 82:6.
5. Ch'i-yun Chang and others, compiled, *Ch'ing-shih* 清史 (History of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei, Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yuan, 1961), Vol. 4, p. 2846.
6. *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien* 大清會典 (Collected statutes of the great Ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei, n.p. 1963 reprint), 3:1-15.
7. Erh-hsuan Chao, compiled, *Ch'ing-shih-kao* 清史稿 (Draft history of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Peking, n.p. 1928), p.1382.
8. Based on the chronological lists of the Grand Councillors, I find that the leadership was decided primarily by official rank.
9. Fang-mao Yeh, *Nei-k'o hstiao-chi* 內閣小志 (Short notes on the Grand Secretariat), (Peking, n.p., 1765), pp. 2-9.
10. Chang-shu Liang, *op. cit.*, 1:14-15; *Ta-Ch'ing li-chiao shih-lu*, Chia-ching, 144:4-5.
11. Tsou-che is also known as "Palace Memorials," initiated by Emperor Kang-hsi, To ensure his supreme authority, Emperor Yung-cheng strengthened the palace memorial system. For details, see Silas H.L. Wu, *Communication and Imperial*

*Control in China, 1693-1735*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 66-78.

12. *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien*, 3:1-3: Chang-shu Liang, *op. cit.*, 22:4.
13. The figures are derived from Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2486-2512.
14. The Manchus and Han Chinese had equal shares of these thirty two posts. See *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien*. 3: 10.
15. *Ibid.*, 3:1: Tsung-mao Fu, *op. cit.*, p.166.
16. Throughout the whole period of 185 years, only five local officials were ever offered this concurrent post. Four of them were summoned to the capital to serve as Grand Councillors and were appointed to the position of either Vice-Minister, Left Censor-general or Minister soon after. The other was a military commander who was assigned to the Council while he was staying in the capital for an imperial audience. See Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 2493, 2510, 2511, 2669, 1824 and 2827. As to the changing patters of the appointments of the Grand Secretaries and Associate Grand Secretaries, see Hung-ting Ku, compiled, *The Grand Secretariat in Ch'ing China, A Chronological List*, (San Francisco, Chinese Materials Center, 1980).
17. The total number of the Grand Councillors was 130 which excluded 9 princes who were generally not regarded as regular officials.
18. The above figures are derived from Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2484-2511. Of course, a study on the daily records of the activities of the Council will provide even better understanding on the Council.
19. Among the 130 Grand Councillors, 54 were Manchus, 10 Mongols, 63 Han Chinese and 3 Chinese Bannermen. As a practice in the appointments of the high-ranking officials in Ch'ing China, Mongols were regarded as Manchus, while the Chinese Bannermen were counted as Han Chinese. For appointment regulations, see *Li-pu tse-li* 吏部則例 (The regulations of the Board of Civil Appointments), (Peking, n.p., 1843: Taipei, Chen-wen Bookstore, 1965 reprint), "Chien-hsien Man-chu kuan-yuan pin-chih-k'ao," 1:1-3: "Chien-hsien Han kuan pin-chih-k'ao," 1:1-3.
20. The periodization is of course for the convenience of comparison of two sub-periods. Nevertheless, it is not totally arbitrary, for in 1726 Emperor Yung-cheng created the Grand Council and Emperor Tao-kuang began his reign in 1821 which is generally dated as the beginning of the late Ch'ing period.
21. The above figures are derived from Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.* Vol. 4 pp. 2486-2511.
22. Most years after 1880, only one out of every four or five Grand Councillors was a Manchu.
23. Grand Councillor Ch'i once warned Emperor Hsien-feng that the rise of a powerful Han Chinese such as Tseng Kuo-fan was not at the advantage of the dynasty. See

I-shan Hsiao, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p.411.

In another case, a censor petitioned Emperor Hsien-feng not to appoint another Manchu general to supervise a Han Chinese governor-general in the process of the suppression of the Taipings on the grounds that such an appointment, though would have the function of check and balance, it might well lead to a disaster at this crucial time. See *Tao-Hsien-T'ung-Kuang sze-chiao tso-yi* 道咸同光四朝奏議 The memorials in the reigns of Emperors Tao-kuang, Hsien-feng, T'ung-chin and Kuang-hsu), (Taipei, Commercial Press, 1970), p. 1024.

24. In the post-1820 period, 53 out of a total of 91 years were under the supervision of princes.
25. In November 1799, Emperor Chia-ch'ing dismissed Prince Ch'en from the Council by stating that the appointment of a prince to the Council contradicted tradition and governmental principles. For the edict. see *Ta-Ch'ing li-chiao shih-lu*, Chia-ching, 53:22.
26. After the Taiping Rebellion broke out, Shu-shun, a powerful Manchu official, strongly supported Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang and other Han Chinese in their efforts to put down the rebellion. Shu argued that there was no capable Manchus to suppress the revolt and the appointments of Tseng and Tso were a necessity. See, Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6. p.4632: I-shan Hsiao, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. pp. 414-415.
27. Emperor Chia-ching stressed that the power to rule as well as the power to appoint officials had never been delegated to others. See *Ta-Ch'ing li-chiao shih-lu*, Chia-ching, 94:21-25.
28. The civil service codes stated that the Civil Appointments Ministers had the preference over the other Ministers in the promotion to the Grand Secretaryship. But, in reality, the Civil Appointments Ministers did not always have the preference.
29. *Ta-Ch'ing li-chiao shih-lu*, Yung-cheng, Chia-ch'ing, Tao-kuang, Hsien-feng, T'ung-chih, Kuang-hsu and Hsuan-t'ung; Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2463-2485. 2616-2843, 2893-3002.
30. Four of them were not Vice-Ministers at the time when they were assigned to the Grand Council.
31. The total number of Vice-Ministers-cum-Grand Councillors was 62. Among them, 49 were Vice-Ministers when they were assigned to the Council while the others were promoted to the Vice-Ministership after they entered into the Council.

32.

#### Table 1

The Upward Mobility of the Vice-Ministers-cum-Grand-Councillors,  
1726-1911

a.

		Total No. of Vice-Ministers-cum-G.C.	No. promoted to Ministers
1726 / 1820	Manchu	21	16
	Han Chinese	11	10
1821 / 1911	Manchu	11	9
	Han Chinese	19	12

b.

		Total No. of Vice-Ministers- cum-G.C.	No. promoted to Grand Se- cretaries
1726 / 1820	Manchu	21	7
	Han Chinese	11	8
1821 / 1911	Manchu	11	5
	Han Chinese	19	3

Note: The Vice-Ministers had to be promoted to the Ministers before they entered into the Grand Secretaryship.

Sources: Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2613-2843; Tsung-mao Fu, *op. cit.*, pp. 529-683.

33. This figure includes 9 Manchus and 11 Han Chinese who were not Ministers when they were assigned to the Grand Council.
34. Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2463-2485; Tsung-mao Fu, *op. cit.*, pp. 529-683.
35. *Ibid.*, pp.229-241.
36. All officials in Ch'ing China were subjected to periodical review. In theory, the officials would be promoted, demoted, dismissed or were given merits which were duly recorded in the official records of the review. In addition to the review, the Emperor rewarded or punished officials from time to time for their performance. The average length of the tenure for both the Ministers and Vice-Ministers was surprisingly short, the Ministers having an average of a little more than two years while the Vice-Ministers had an average of less than two years. The frequent transfers of Ministers and Vice-Ministers at the same ranked posts but in

different agencies might have a function of providing a better administrative experience for these high-ranking officials. More than half of Grand Councillors had experience with two or more Boards before they were assigned to the Council. For the above figures, see Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, 2486-2412, 2609-2843.

37. These figures are somewhat different from Thomas Metzger's study. The differences are probably due to the different ways of calculation. It seems that Thomas Metzger averaged the length of appointments on the basis of "persons," rather than "appointments." Sometimes, a person might be assigned to the Council several times during his official career. For Metzger's study, see Thomas Metzger, *The Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 242-244.
38. Ch'i-yun Chang and others, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 2497, 2505, 2508, 2511. In the first period, there was only block dismissals in 1799 when Emperor Chien-lung died.
39. *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 2486-2512, 2892-3168.
40. Tsung-mao Fu, *Ch'ing-tai tu-fu chih-tu* 清代督撫制度 (The institution of the governors and governors-general in the Ch'ing dynasty), Taipei, Cheng-chi University Press, 1963), appendix of the name list of governors and governors-general.
41. In the first period, although the chance to be assigned to the Council was slim for Han Chinese, once a Han Chinese was selected to serve as a Grand Councillor, his chances of reaching the Grand Secretaryship were great. Nearly sixty per cent of them were later promoted to the Grand Secretaryship, and only twelve per cent of them were punished. But in the second period, only twenty three per cent were promoted to the Grand Secretaryship, and there were twenty three per cent punished.

# 對清代軍機處的一些觀察

古 鴻 廷

東海大學歷史研究所

## 摘 要

軍機處之設置，為清代行政組織中的一大特色，軍機大臣由皇帝從大學士、各部尚書、左都御史、各部侍郎乃至三品以上京堂中簡用，其職位為兼職而非專任。然因其與皇帝間之關係密切，其權力之運用與影響，卻頗為重要。本文討論之重點：

一、對軍機大臣中滿漢人數之相互消長情形的探討。在前期中，雍、乾、嘉三期滿人人數遠比漢人為多，簡派親王監督軍機處之情形不常見。漢人一旦被任為軍機大臣，其獲獎賞之機會則較滿人為大。清季則可能因內外情勢大變，滿人人才凋蔽，漢人在軍機處始佔多數，為求有效駕御，清帝遂長期任命親王領軍機處。在獎懲上，漢軍機大臣則較滿軍機大臣獎少懲多。

二、一般學者，多半認為軍事及財務為軍機處最主要之業務。本文從軍機大臣之本職，及各部大臣入直之情形旁證軍事及財務問題確為軍機處之主要職務。

三、最後一點，乃在探求軍機大臣之行政資歷在高層官員升遷過程中之重要性。在高層官員中，以侍郎為例，曾任軍機大臣之侍郎，三分之一以上後來入閣為大學士，而從未擔任軍機大臣之侍郎，則只有二十分之一的機會入閣，兩者之間相差頗大。入直軍機處的官員，確比一般官員更容易獲得君主的賞識得而升遷。





## THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN CONFUCIANISM

Hu-Hsiang Fung

Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University

### I

In *The Religions of China*, Prof. James Legge, the well-known translator of Chinese classics, tried to describe Confucianism and Taoism in contrast to Christianity. It is a very interesting work, however, there are many mistakes resulted from Legge's forced interpretation from the standpoint of ego-centricity. For instance, Legge concludes that "In every department of morality, in a word, our religion is superior to the religion of China."<sup>(1)</sup> Unfortunately, Legge fails to prove it either by the facts or the theories in Chinese religion. If he could give the picture of Chinese religion from an objective analysis, I believe he could have been more capable of making a just contrast.

One of the main reasons for Legge's failure in understanding Chinese religion is that he only focuses the study on the Confucian doctrine about man, and neglects the fruitful doctrines of God (which is often used as *Heaven* in Confucianism). Similar mistake was also committed by Max Weber in his book *The Religion of China*. Weber was thus misled by saying that "Confucianism was only interested in affairs of this world such as it happened to be."<sup>(2)</sup> Actually, Confucianism does not simply look at the world as what it happened to be; it endeavors to change it and improve it toward the final end of perfect self-realization as what it ought to be.

From the above instances, we can see how important it is to expose the concept of God (Heaven) in Chinese religion. It is the main purpose of this paper to explore the Chinese concept of God in contrast to Christian doctrines and Whitehead's philosophy of process. Since Confucianism has been the main stream of Chinese culture, I will confine myself to Confucian concept of God (Heaven) and expose it from the following eight aspects.

### II

First, God (Heaven) in Confucianism is regarded as the Creator of all beings. This is very similar to Christian doctrine, except that it is a philosophical God in Confucianism rather than a personal God in Christianity.

In Confucianism, there are three indispensable participants in the cosmic process, i.e., Heaven, Earth, and Man. Heaven is supposed to be the Creator of all beings, Earth is regarded as the Pro-Creator of the Cosmos, and Man, the cocreator in matching with the creative power and procreative power of Heaven and Earth. The significance of this doctrine rests on the affirmation of the dignity and greatness of humanity. Prof. Thomé H. Fang is perfectly right here in saying that "the universal process of change

which is creative creativity in life is the essence of Heaven, and only the supreme kind of exalted virtues can be equal to its pervasiveness and grandeur.”<sup>(3)</sup> In other words, Confucian doctrines of God (Heaven) indicates the importance of the self-exaltation of man and the harmonious relation and continuity between God and Man. According to Confucianism, man is not only the essence of the attributes of Heaven and Earth, but also the heart and mind of Heaven on Earth. We can clearly see the affirmation of human dignity and the harmony between Heaven and Man in the following Confucian statement:

“Heaven and Earth exert their influences and there ensue the transformation and production of all things. The sages enter into sympathetic unity with the minds of men, and the result is harmony and peace throughout the world. If we have an inward eye for these sympathetic influences, the true essence of the universe and all things in it will be perfectly intelligible.”<sup>(4)</sup>

Second, God (Heaven) in Confucianism is regarded as both the initial point and the final point of the cosmic process. This is also compatible with Christian doctrines in the book of revelation. However, Confucians emphasize the innate ability of man to achieve salvation while Christians emphasize the need for divine grace from beyond.

According to Confucianism, it is Heaven in perpetual creative advance, and Man is regarded as the copy of Heaven. Since the nature of God (Heaven) is to initiate all beings in its creative process, Man should also follow its example so as to fully realize his potential creativities. It is interesting to compare this in contrast to Christian doctrine. For Christianity, God creates Man according to His own image, and in Confucianism, God (Heaven) inspires Man according to His creative nature.

On the other hand, God (Heaven) in Confucianism is not only the initial point to inspire man, but also the final point for man to attain. It is clearly said in the Book of Change that return to the nature of Heaven (God) is what is called restoration.<sup>(5)</sup> That means, anyone who is alienated from the original good and initial creativity of God (Heaven) should have the self-awareness of his alienation and return himself to the initial point, which is also the final point for him, i. e., God. This is indeed very close to the Christian doctrine affirming that God is initial point and final point, that God is alpha, and omega also.

However, in Confucianism, the process of salvation, or, disalienation, is autonomic according to the original good of human nature, while in Christianity, it is often emphasized that man needs the power from beyond since the concept of original sin denies the possibility of self-salvation.

Third, God in Confucianism is regarded as the goal of Change, and the nature of God (Heaven) could be regarded as both the Primordial Nature and the Consequent Nature in Confucianism. This bears some resemblance to A.N. Whitehead's process philosophy.

According to Confucianism, "The endowment of God is what is called Life, the fulfilment of Life is what is called Tao, and the cultivation of Tao is what is called Religion." (6) In other words, God in Confucianism is not only the primordial creator of the cosmic life, but also the consequent judge of the cosmic cultivation, and between the Primordial Nature and the Consequent Nature, "there is a nexus, a chain of creations constituting the cosmic order." (7) This is indeed a claim very suggestive to the process philosophy of Whitehead.

According to A.N. Whitehead, the Primordial Nature of God means the unlimited conceptional realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality, and the Consequent Nature of God means the creative advance towards this goal. (8) Whitehead explores this concept in his *Religion in the Making* (9) which is not only very suggestive in developing a process theology, but also very useful in understanding the Confucian concept of God.

In Confucian philosophy of change, the first hexagram is called "ch'ien" ( 乾 ) which means creative creativity, and the last hexagram is called "Wei Chi" ( 未濟 ), which means inexhaustibility of the process, or, incompleteness in the making. Both of them convey the idea that the Universe is saturated with an all-pervasive incessant Flux of Life, this is really very interesting in the comparative study between Confucian philosophy of change and Whitehead's philosophy of process.

Fourth, God in Confucianism is regarded as the ultimate sincerity, and the Confucian doctrine of God involves a penetrating sincerity which is also compatible with Whitehead's doctrine.

For Whitehead, religion is a force of belief cleaning the inward parts, and the fundamental essence of religion is a penetrating sincerity. (10) This is also very important in understanding the Confucian concept of God. For Confucians, "Sincerity is the way of Heaven (God), and the attainment of sincerity is the way of man." (11) In other words, sincerity is the fundamental foundation connecting Heaven and Man. It is also said in the Confucian doctrine:

"Sincerity is the end and beginning of things, without sincerity there would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the attainment of sincerity as the most excellent." (12)

That is to say, according to Confucianism, we can even use "God" to replace "sincerity" because God is the end and beginning of all things, and between the end and beginning is the value creations of sincerity. For Confucians, "the penetrating sincerity is like a God", (13) and the cosmic process can be described as following:

"It is only he who is possessed of the most penetrating sincerity that can exist under Heaven (God), who can give its full development to his nature . . . Being able to match the creative and procreative power of Heaven and Earth, he may form a trinity with

Heaven and Earth.” (14)

In other words, the concept of God is not only a metaphysical term in a bio-centric cosmology, but also an axiological term in a value-centric ontology. God in Confucianism means not only the Supreme Good, but also the penetrating sincerity; this is not only an important foundation for Confucian morality, but also a keypoint for us to grasp the essence of Confucianism.

Fifth, God in Confucianism is resulted from solitariness, this is not only compatible with Whitehead's theme, but also coherent to Paul Tillich's doctrine of courage-to-be.

For Confucians, it is Heaven's will to suffer a hero's bones in order to awaken him and strengthen him. Mencius, the greatest interpreter of Confucius, once said, “When Heaven is about to confer a great office on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger and subjects him to extreme poverty. It confounds his undertakings. By all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetences.” (15)

Since this paragraph emphasizes that suffering is Heaven's trial to supply one's incompetences it bears some resemblance to Whitehead's claim: “Religion is solitariness, and if you are never solitary, you are never religious.” (16) According to Confucians, the perfect self-realization cannot be attained if you are never self-aware through solitariness. Mencius once said:

“They are the friendless minister and concubine's son who keep their hearts under a sense of peril, and use deep precautions against calamity. On this account, they become distinguished for their intelligence.” (17)

In other words, Confucians believe that any person who are solitary could be more sympathetic and more humane. Confucius once said his way (Tao) is that of an all-pervading unity which consist in sympathy and empathy. (18) Here we can clearly see the relation between solitariness and the principle of sympathy and empathy, we can even say that, for Confucians, solitariness is the mother of sympathy, which not only can strengthen one's soul, but also can stimulate one's benevolence to others. This is indeed a positive and constructive attitude of life for today.

Sixth, God in Confucianism is regarded as the most respected, and the Confucian concept of God represents a transcendental power and supreme authority for Man to respect. This may remind us of the Christian teaching that God is power.

Confucius once said there are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. (19) He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven; he stands in awe of great man; he stands in awe of the words of sages. In other words, the highest standard for Confucians to follow is the ordinances of Heaven.

Besides, Confucius also emphasized that “He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.” (20) This statement presupposed that Confucius emphasizes

pray, and Heaven is the supreme authority to respect. Confucius also said once: <sup>(21)</sup> "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continuing being produced, but does Heaven say anything?" This declares the supreme power the Confucian God has.

However, Confucian God is a philosophical God, not a personal God as in Christianity. This is the reason why Heaven does not speak but only show his creative power in an all-pervasive Flux of Life. Thus, one difference is worthnothing here between Confucianism and Christianity. That is, Confucian God is "transcendental" which still affirms a continuity between God-Man through the all-pervasive Flux of Life, while in Christianity, it is a "transcendent God" which presupposes a gap between this world and the other Kingdom beyond. In other words, Confucianism could perhaps be regarded as a "God-centric humanism", while in Western philosophy, by humanism it often presupposes a dualistic opposition between God-Man. This is a worthnothing difference, and it seems to me Confucian doctrine might be very suggestive in the humanist movement today.

Seventh, God in Confucianism is regarded as the immanent good, and the concept of God in Confucianism means a divinity immanent in all human beings.

Mencius once said, "He who knows the Nature of Man can know the nature of God (Heaven)". <sup>(22)</sup> He also claimed that all things can be encompassed within my Self so that one can identify one's Self with the cosmic life by comprehending the Nature of Man.

In other words, according to Confucianism, since the nature of God is good, the nature of man is also good. That man may become condemnably insignificant is just because he falls by suppressing his original good. That is to say, he "alienates" himself from the original good of Heaven. Thus, what is important is to recover the original good and recognize the Heavenly spirit as his own spirit. For Confucians, the process of "disalienation" is a process of realization and restoration of his own goodness and greatness by way of righting his inner life. Wang Yang-ming, a famous Neo-Confucian, has clearly expressed this point:

"Human mind is a heaven and an abyss. The substance of mind is all-comprehensive, like heaven, but, if imbued with evil desire it will lose its substantiality. The reason of mind is infinitely fathomless, but if filled with evil desire, it will lose its profundity. Now let mind, in its workings, have the good conscience in grip, sloughing away all the evil desires; then it will be able to restore substantiality and profundity to itself like heaven and earth." <sup>(23)</sup>

Eighth, God in Confucianism is regarded as the supreme ideal, and the concept of God (Heaven) in Confucianism means the supreme ideal for human being to identify with. This is a worthnothing difference between Confucianism and Christianity.

In Christianity, there is a break between God on the one hand and Man on the

other; God is above, and Man is below, and there is no way for Man to become God. Although the concept of "Incarnation" could be regarded as a connective bridge, however, it has not been accepted as the major stream in Christianity. Nevertheless in Confucianism, man is seen to be potentially as great as Heaven, it is at least theoretically possible that man could attain the greatness of God, for God and Man are not two distinct species of beings. Mencius once said:

"Wherever the excellent man passes through, he will remodel the character of his followers, wherever he abides, he will work wonders among them. His spiritual influence will spread out all over the world, becoming concurrent with that of Heaven and Earth."  
(24)

In other words, as long as man can be self-aware of his own goodness and creativeness and actualize it, he can become the co-creator matching with Heaven and Earth. Confucius once admired a Sage Yao: "Great indeed was Yao as a sovereign! How majestic was he! It is only Heaven is grand, and only Yao corresponded to it."<sup>(25)</sup> Yao is great because he can devote himself selflessly in much linking of Heaven's spirit. Here we can see the intimate relation between a religious belief and a moral conviction in Confucianism. This also reminds us of a Kantian theme that the only rational religion is that which rests on a moral ground. In my opinion, the Confucian rationality here is also very suggestive for the development of a humanism movement today.

### III

In sum, after comparing the Confucian and the Christian idea of God, we can see that there are many worthnoting compatibilities, although there are also some differences, they can still be regarded as the constructive suggestions to the humanist movement today. I think Confucius is right in saying that "All things are nourished together without their injuring one another. All Taos (Ways) are proceeded parallelly without their rebelling one another."<sup>(26)</sup> As long as we can sincerely work out the interfaithful dialogue, I am confident that the futural world could be more promising and more harmonious.

#### Notes:

- (1) James Legge, *The Religions of China*, (London, 1880), p. 268.
- (2) Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, tran. by H.H. Gerth, (Illinois, 1951), p. 155.
- (3) Thome H. Fang, *The Chinese View of Life*, Linkin Press, 2nd ed., Taipei, 1982, p. 98.
- (4) *The Book of Change*, the Compendium of the Hexagram "Hsiên".
- (5) *The Book of Change*, the Compendium of the Hexagram of "Fu".

- (6) *The Conduct of Life* (The Doctrine of the Mean), tran. by Ku Hung-ming, Chap. 1.
- (7) Thome H. Fang, *The Chinese View of Life*, p. 13.
- (8) A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, N.Y., 1929, p. 522.
- (9) A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, N.Y., 1929, pp. 68-74.
- (10) A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 15.
- (11) *The Conduct of Life*, (*The Doctrine of the Mean*), Chap. 18.
- (12) *Ibid.*, Chap. 25.
- (13) *Ibid.*, Chap. 24.
- (14) *Ibid.*, Chap. 22.
- (15) *The Works of Mencius*, Bk. 6, Pt. 2, Chap. 15.
- (16) A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 18.
- (17) *The Works of Mencius*, Bk. 7, Pt. 1, Chap. 18.
- (18) Confucius, *Analects*, Bk. 15, Chap. 23.
- (19) *Ibid.*, Bk. 16, Chap. 8.
- (20) *Ibid.*, Bk. 3, Chap. 13.
- (21) *Ibid.*, Bk. 17, Chap. 19.
- (22) *The Works of Mencius*, Bk. 7, Pt. 1, Chap. 1.
- (23) Wang Yang-ming, *Collected Works*, Pt. I, The Philosophical Meditations, Vol. 2, Lecture-Notes, pp. 6-7.
- (24) *The Works of Mencius*, Bk. 3, Pt. 1, Chap. 11.
- (25) Confucius, *Analects*, Bk. 8, Chap. 19.
- (26) *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chap. 30.



## 儒家對神的觀念

馮 滄 祥

東海大學哲學系

### 摘 要

本文系旨在透過比較研究，闡述儒家對神（或天）的觀念，並一一分述其與基督教義與懷海德歷程哲學的異同，俾使國際人士能對中國文化對「神」的主要看法有一扼要的瞭解。

本文分從八項重點分析儒家對「神」的看法，第一，視神為宇宙的創造者，而人則為參贊化育的參與者，因而得以同時肯定「天」與「人」的偉大，然又不同於基督教義的人格神。第二，視神為宇宙創造的始點，亦同時為終點，此與基督教義甚為接近。第三，儒家的神同時展現有「原創性」與「後得性」，此又與懷海德歷程神學甚接近。第四，儒家的神性同時也代表至誠，此所謂「至誠若神」，與懷海德所論之宗教本質極為神似。第五，儒家的神性基本上來自憂患意識與悲憫精神，此亦與懷海德論「孤寂」之宗教感甚為接近。第六，儒家的神有其至高的超越性。第七，儒家的神亦同時有其至深的內在性。第八，儒家的神更為至善的代表，而且人與神（天）之間並無鴻溝，此特色亦與一般基督教義有所不同。

本文除闡述儒家八項對「神」的觀念外，亦曾說明四項與基督教義不同之處：一為基督教人格神的觀念，二為基督教原罪的觀念，三為儒家天人合一的觀念，四為儒家慎終追遠的祭祖觀念。

本文之作，在透過持平的比較研究，而增進兩者之同情瞭解，若能因此而幫助西方學者認識儒家對神的看法，相信對促進「不同信仰之對談」（interfaithful-dialogue）或有相當助益。

# 荀子天論與性論之研究


蔡 仁 厚

東海大學哲學系

## 弁 言

荀子天論與性論的觀點，與儒家正宗之說全然不同。本文的主要目的，即在對荀子天論與性論所顯示的思想進路及其理論的特色，作一步深入的探討。

荀子的思想結構，可以簡示如下表：



據這個表看，荀子的思想，首先是天人二分。天是自然，居於被制裁被利用的地位，屬於負面，人纔是正面的。在「人」這一面，又分爲性與心，性亦是自然，是負面的，必須加以轉化。一切價值都要通過「化性起偽」而成就，而化性起偽（道德實踐）的根據，主觀面是心，客觀面是禮義之統。心與禮義，居於正面的地位。無論個人的修養、社會的教化、國家的政治，都要靠心的作用以及禮義之道的統貫，而後乃能得到完成。

天與性，既然在荀子思想中同居負面的地位，則本文一併加以研究，自較相宜。但爲了行文之時敘述的方便，仍然分爲甲乙兩篇，依序進行疏解與說明。

## 甲篇：荀子的天論

### 一、天之自然義

荀子以天爲自然，而孔子嘗言：「天何言哉！四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？」（註1）人或以爲，天無言而四時行，百物生，正表示天的自然義，與荀子天論篇以「不爲而成，不求而得」說明天之職能，意思亦相類似。其實，孔子的話，是取譬以說明聖道之教不待言而著，而並不在於彰顯天的自然義。而且孔子所說的天或天道，與他所講的仁道亦是相通的。天道生生顯諸仁，天道生生，仁道亦生生。而論語泰伯篇載孔子稱頌帝堯之德，曰：「唯天爲大，唯堯則之。」天之所以爲「天」與天之所以可「則」，正由於天是一德化的天。而荀子的天論，則根本沒有這層意思。

又有人以爲，荀子以天爲自然，可能受了道家的影響。所謂「不爲而成，不求而得」，與道家所講的道之用（無爲之用，無用之用），亦很相近似。然而——

(1)道家的自然，是通過清靜無爲而達到的精神境界，是形而上的。而荀子以天爲自然，則根本是實然的，而不是形而上的。

(2)道家主張「法自然」，天即代表自然，所以道家的天人關係甚爲密切而和諧。而荀子則言「天人之分」，不但無所謂「法天」「法自然」，而且以天爲物，而主張制天用天。

(3)荀子的天論頗顯示科學的色彩，而道家言天言自然則並無科學的意味。

據此三點說明，可見荀子以天爲自然，與道家的思想立場並不相干。

依荀子，自然的天，沒有理智，沒有愛憎好惡，亦無所謂意志的作用。而自然之生，亦只是天地之「真」，而不是天地之「善」或天地之「德」。

1 自然的天——沒有意志、沒有理智、沒有愛憎。

荀子說：「不爲而成，不求而得，夫是之謂天職。」「爲」與「求」是意志的作用，天既「不爲、不求」，表示天是沒有意志的。又說：「天行有常，不爲堯存，不爲桀亡。」堯是聖王，桀是暴君，而天並不因爲人的賢聖或昏暴而改其常行，可見天是不識不知、沒有理智的。不識不知，無所愛，無所憎，亦因而沒有感應，所以「天不爲人之惡寒也輟多，地不爲人之惡遼遠也輟廣。」（註2）

天沒有意志與理智的作用，亦沒有愛憎好惡之情的反應，它只是循着永恆的軌道，機械地、自然地運行而已。至於天論篇所謂「天有常道矣，地有常數矣」，其所謂常道，只是意指自然的法則、自然的秩序。這個自然的法則秩序，始終爲天地所遵循，所以亦名之爲常道。但荀子自己說過：「道者，非天之道，非地之道，人之所以道也，君子之所道也。」（註3）因此牟先生認爲「荀子只言人道以治天，而天則無所謂道，卽有道，亦只是自然之道也。」（註4）

天既然遵循一定的軌道，然則，「日月之有蝕，風雨之不時，怪星之黨見」（黨同儕，儕見，謂偶而見之），這些變異的現象，是否逸出了天行的常軌？荀子認爲，這類變異之事，「無世而不常有之」，所以禹之時有九年之水，湯之時有七年之旱。另如流星下墜、社木之鳴，亦只是「天地之變，陰陽之化」，對於這些「罕至」之物，「怪之，可也；而畏之，非也。」（註5）天行既然不會逸出常軌，天象的變異亦只是自然的現象，並沒有意志目的存乎其間。如果人見日月之蝕，便以爲是上天的警告，見大水大旱便以爲是上天的懲罰，因而驚惶恐怖，依荀子看，那是愚不可及的。所以，荀子的天，不是宗教的，不是道德的，亦不是形而上的，而只是自然的，是可以作爲科學之對象的。

2 自然之「生」——只是天地之「真」，而非天地之「善」。

詩書中的天，具有意志天乃至宗教的天之性格。到了春秋時代，宗教人文化（道德與宗教通而爲一），宗教的天（人格神的天）轉化而爲形上的德化的天。孔孟以下，形成「天道性命相貫通」的義理骨幹，故凡所謂天，皆不指天的自然現象，而是指說天的價值。

就天之「生」而言，亦認爲是天之德、天之善。故易傳云：「天地之大德曰生。」（註6）生，是天地之德，天地之化生萬物，卽是生生之德的流行發用，這是善的昭顯，亦是價值的創造。由此可知，孔孟是以道德心（仁）、理想主義的態度，來體認天之「善」（德）；而不是以認知心（智）、理智主義的態度，以認識天之「真」。而荀子則恰恰相反。

荀子所謂心，是思辨的、認知的，他是理智主義的態度。而認知心的對象，必然是客觀外在

的，所以荀子所說的天，是指自然現象而言，這是天之「真」，而不是天之「善」。自然的天，不識不知，既無所謂道，亦無所謂善。荀子雖然承認天地是「生之始」，但天地之生，乃是「不見其事而見其功」的自然之生；凡天生而自然者，皆是負面的、被治的，所以不能說善，亦不能說德。亦以此故，人對於天無可言「法」，無可言「合」，故荀子不說天人合一，而說「天人之分」。

## 二、天人之分

天人相對，分而為二，故天歸天，人歸人，天與人各有其分。

天論篇云：

「天行有常，不為堯存，不為桀亡。應之以治則吉，應之以亂則凶。強本而節用（本，謂農桑），則天不能使之貧；養備而動時，則天不能使之病；修道而不貳，則天不能使之禍；故水旱不能使之飢，寒暑不能使之疾，妖怪不能使之凶。本荒而用侈，則天不能使之富；養略而動罕（動罕，謂怠惰），則天不能使之全；倍（背）道而妄行，則天不能使之吉；故水旱未至而飢，寒暑未薄（近）而疾，妖怪未至而凶。受時（天時）與治世同，而殃禍與治世異，不可以怨天，其道然也。故明於天人之分，則可謂至人矣。」

又云：

「治亂，天邪？曰：日月星辰瑞曆（曆象、節令），是禹桀之所同也，禹以治，桀以亂，治亂非天也。時邪？曰：繁啓蕃長於春夏，蓄積收藏於秋冬，是又禹桀之所同也。禹以治，桀以亂，治亂非時也。地邪？曰：得地則生，失地則死，是又禹桀之所同也，禹以治，桀以亂，治亂非地也。」

天行有常，自然運行，既無意志存乎其中，亦與人間之事不相感應。吉凶禍福皆由人為，不關乎天。荀子認為，天既不能禍福人生，亦不能影響治亂。禹桀之時，天地四時都一樣，而禹則治，桀則亂，可見治亂在人，而不在天地四時。假若人「應之以治」——以合乎禮義的行為來肆應，譬如強本節用、養備動時、循道不差，則能得福而吉；縱有水旱之災、寒暑之厄、妖怪之變，人民依然可以衣食無虞、幸福康寧。反之，假若人「應之以亂」（註7）——以不合禮義的行為來肆應，譬如本荒用侈、養略動罕、背道妄行，則必得禍而凶；縱然風調雨順、寒暑宜人、妖怪不至，人民依然會有飢寒之累、疾病之災。由此可證，治亂吉凶的關鍵，只在人為，而不在天意。怨天求天都沒有用，有用的是人為。所以荀子稱「明於天人之分」者為「至人」。

自然的天，既然只是依自然法則而運行，人便無須慕天頌天，亦不必怨天求天。這種「自然還其為自然」、「自然只作自然看」的觀點，在科學心靈的活動中是必然而且必須的。不過，荀子的觀點雖是「自然只作自然看」，但卻不會把自然的天作為研究的對象。他所面對的不是「知識問題」，所以雖然把天作自然看，卻並未採取積極地理解自然之態度。凸顯於荀子心中的，乃是社會問題、政治問題——這是「人」的問題，不是「天」的問題。所以，荀子所彰顯的，並不是科學的知識系統，而是人文世界的行為系統。

說到這裡，必須對荀子「聖人不求知天」與「夫是之謂知天」這二句看似矛盾的話，作一步義理的疏解。

天論篇云：

「不為而成，不求而得，夫是之謂天職。如是者，雖深、其人不加慮焉；雖大、不加能焉；雖精、不加察焉。夫是之謂不與天爭職。」

「列星隨旋，日月遞炤，四時代御，陰陽大化，風雨博施，萬物各得其和以生，各得其養以成。不見其事，而見其功，夫是之謂神。皆知其所以成，莫知其無形，夫是之謂天功。唯聖人爲不知知天。」

這二段文，分別說明「天職」、「天功」，以及「不與天爭職」、「不知知天」。天生萬物乃是一個自然的事實，人皆知之；至於天如何生萬物，則是人所不可得而知的。人只見天不用作爲，便自然成了；不用營求，便自然得了。此便是荀子所謂「不爲而成，不求而得」的「天職」。而「天功」之功，非謂功德，乃功能義。天功「無形」，故「不見其事」。所可見者，只是天生養出來的成果（見其功）。所可知者，只是萬物各得陰陽之和以生、各得雨露之養以成的事實（皆知其所以成）。至於萬物何以如此而不如彼，這是屬於萬物之超越的所以然之理（存在之理）。關於這一層，荀子沒有正面討論，但所謂天職之「深、大、精」，似乎即表示此所以然。只因聖人「明於天人之分」，故「不加慮、不加能、不加察」。荀子於此，是採取一「存而不論」的態度。在君道篇他亦說到君子之「於天地萬物也，不務說其所以然，而致善用其材」。因爲萬物之生，是天之事，自有「天職、天功」使之如此，這是莫知其然的。人若越分而欲加以思慮察辨，便是「與天爭職」。君子只求如何善用天地萬物之材，而不必去了解天地萬物之所以然。此之謂「不知知天」。

可是，荀子又說「夫是之謂知天」。

天論篇云：

「天職既立，天功既成，形具而神生，好惡喜怒哀樂藏焉，夫是之謂天情（自然之情）。耳目口鼻形能各有接而不相能也（形、謂形體。耳目口鼻形體，各有接物之能，但亦只有一能而不相能），夫是之謂天官。心居中虛以治五官，夫是之謂天君。財非其類以養其類（財、裁也。非其類、謂禽獸草木；其類、謂人類），夫是之謂天養。順其類者謂之福，逆其類者謂之禍，夫是之謂天政。——暗其天君，亂其天官，棄其天養，逆其天政，背其天情，以喪天功，夫是之謂大凶。聖人清其天君，正其天官，備其天養，順其天政，養其天情，以全天功。如是，則知其所爲，知其所不爲矣；則天地官而萬物役矣。其行曲治，其養曲適，其生不傷，夫是之謂知天。」

天職、天功，屬於宇宙的天。而天情、天官、天君、天養、天政，則屬於人生人文的範圍。（以其皆屬天生之自然，故亦用「天」字而名之爲天情、天官、天君；以其順乎自然而爲，故亦謂之天養、天政。）自「暗其天君」至「以喪天功」，這是毀其生；自「清其天君」至「以全天功」（保全天地生物之功），這是成其生。成毀的關鍵在天君（心）之「清」或「暗」，而心之清明或昏暗，乃是人事，不關乎天。「聖人清其天君，正其天官，備其天養，順其天政，養其天情，以全天功」，是聖人爲其人事之所當爲，而且亦仍然是在「天人之分」的原則之下，克盡人的職分。所以荀子說「如是則知其所爲，知其所不爲矣」。其「所爲」者，是人的職分；「所不爲」者，則指「不與天爭職」。宇宙一面的天職天功，是人所不爲的，故「不知知天」。而所爲這一面，屬於人的職分，當然必須知之。知人職而爲之，則天地萬物皆爲我用（天地官、萬物役），不但其行可曲盡其治，其養可曲盡其適，而且亦可不傷害天地之生，如是便謂之「知天」。

由此可知，「不知知天」，是不求知「天職、天功」之所以然，而「知天」是順天人之分而「知其所爲、知其所不爲」。「不知知天」與「知天」，二者各有所指，而亦各有所當。蓋天地之運，四時之序，陰陽之化，萬物之生，從其「所以然」一面看，是不可知的，亦不必知。但從

其「實然」一面看，則既有形迹可尋，亦有形象可見；所以，這實然層的「自然現象的天」，是可知的，亦是必須知的。

天論篇云：

「故大巧在所不爲，大智在所不慮。所志於天者，已其見象之可以期者矣；所志於地者，已其見宜之可以息者矣；所志於四時者，已其見數之可以事者矣；所志於陰陽者，已其見和（和、原作知。據楊涼注及王念孫改）之可以治者矣。官人守天，而自爲守道也。」（各句「所志」之志，知也。各句之「見」字，讀爲「現」。）

「天」顯現「象之可以期」，「地」顯現「宜之可以息」，「四時」顯現「數之可以事」，「陰陽」顯現「和之可以治」。這些，都是現成之自然，所以人可以依之而「期、息、事、治」（依天象以預期風雨陰晴，依土宜以蕃息作物，依四時之歷數節氣以應時勞作，依陰陽之和與寒暑之宜以修治人事）。而人之知天，亦只應限於此類自然之現象，而加以掌握利用，以期有利於人事之進行。荀子「知天」的目的，是在於裁萬物以厚養生，他正是爲了「利用厚生」而知天，而不是以純知識的興趣去理解自然。至於天文之事，自有日官、星官、太史負責；聖王主政教，只須「守道」以治理天下。而首句「大巧在所不爲，大智在所不慮」（註8），亦正表示在「天人之分」的原則之下，人只應「知其所爲、知其所不爲」；而無須在「象、宜、數、和」之外，再去探究天之所以然。

上文曾經提到過，天之「所以然」，本有二層。經驗層的所以然，是事物本身的「形構之理」（形成之理、構造之理），這是科學家所探索的。超越層的所以然，是事物之所以如此存在的形上根據，是爲「存在之理」、「實現之理」，儒家正宗所體證的「天道、天理」，即是這一層上的所以然。對於這兩層所以然，荀子皆視爲「無用之辯，不急之察，棄而不治」（天論篇語）。由於不求知經驗層的所以然，所以未曾開出科學知識（此非才智問題，而是態度問題）；由於不求知超越的所以然，乃顯出荀子本源不透，所以其論天、論性，皆與儒家正宗大流之思想形成極大的差異。

### 三、天生人成

上述天之自然義、天人之分義，皆是荀子「天生人成」這個原則的張本。富國篇云：「天地生之，聖人成之」。而首先指出「天生人成」乃荀子思想之基本原則的，是牟宗三先生。（註9）之後講荀子者，類能言之。

天論篇云：

「天有其時，地有其財，人有其治，夫是之謂能參。舍其所以參，而願其所參，則惑矣。」

禮論篇云：

「故曰天地合而萬物生，陰陽接而變化起，性僞合而天下治。天能生物，不能辨物也；地能載人，不能治人也。宇中萬物生人之屬，待聖人然後分也。」

此二節很明顯地表示「天生人成」的原則。前一節指出天地只能供給「時」與「財」，而人則能加以治理。能治理天時地財而善加利用，就叫做「能參」。參，乃「人有其治」的引申，含有治理、成就之義。「所以參」即所以治，亦即能治，指人這一面而言；「所參」即所治，指天時地財而言。「舍其所以參，而願其所參」，亦即舍棄人這一面的「能治」而不爲，而徒然希慕「所治」一面的天時地財之用，這是棄人而從天、舍本而逐末，所以說「則惑矣」。後一節是說

，天地只能生物、載人，卻不能辨物、治人（辨、亦治也）；萬物與人類，皆有待聖人之道（禮義）以定其分位，而後乃能各得其所、各得其宜。據此可知，前一節是就治天地而言，後一節是就治人物而言。這種天生人成之原則所透顯的，是「自然世界爲人文世界所主宰」的思想。

「天生人成」之原則，荀子在王制篇亦有綱領性的說明，其言曰：

「天地者，生之始也。禮義者，治之始也。君子者，禮之始也。爲之、貫之、積重之、致好之者，君子之始也。故天地生君子，君子理天地；君子者，天地之參也，萬物之總也，民之父母也。無君子，則天地不理，禮義不統，上無君師，下無父子，夫是之謂至亂。」

天地是「生之始」，但天只能生而不能治，必須以禮義行其治；而禮義乃君子所生，所以君子是「天地之參、萬物之總、民之父母」。如果沒有君子，則天地萬物（自然世界）之條理秩序，禮義法度（人文世界）之綱紀統領，皆將無法顯立，故曰「天地生君子，君子理天地」。

又前節所引「天職既立，天功既成」一段，亦是對「天人之分」與「天生人成」一原則之說明。前半段說的是「天地生之」，後半段說的「聖人成之」。「生」是天地的職能，是自然而然的。而「成」則必須通過禮義的效用。聖人清其「天君」而制禮義，以禮義被諸「天官」則天官正，被諸「天養」則天養備，被諸「天政」則天政順，被諸「天情」則天情養。在禮義的廣被中，天之所生得以成，天之功用得以全。由此可知，天之功在「生」，人之能在「成」。假若一任天生而不加人治，則天之所生濫而無節，而天功亦將有毀喪之虞。所以必須節之以禮義，而後乃能成其生。

總之，從「天生」一面看，皆是負面的、被治的，天生自然實無善之可言。從「人成」一面看，才是正面的、能治的，在人爲禮義這裡，才可以說善——善是落在禮義上說。若依孔孟，禮義乃由天生，亦即由性分中出，這樣說的禮義，是有根的（既有天道作爲它超越的根據，又有本心善性作爲它內在的根據）。而荀子既以天爲自然，又主性惡之說，如此一來，禮義遂失其根據而無處安頓，所以只好歸之於「人爲」。但如此而爲出來的禮義，實只有對治「天」與「性」的工具價值，而並無內在的價值。雖然荀子知統類、一制度、隆禮義，將人生宇宙皆統攝於一大理性系統之中，固已透顯客觀精神而達於莊嚴隆重之境；但與主觀精神（仁與心性）絕對精神（天道）相隔絕的「客觀精神」，是否足以盡其「人成」之責，實大有疑問。（此屬另一論題，須別論。茲只作一提示，不能詳。）

#### 四、制天用天與事天

荀子認爲人之所以爲人，在於——

- (1)人有辨：「人之所以爲人者，何已（以）也？曰：以其有辨也。……辨莫大於分，分莫大於禮。」（非相篇）
- (2)人能群：「人何以能群？曰：分。分何以能行？曰：義。故義以分則和，和則一，一則多力，多力則強，強則勝物，故宮室可得而居也。故序四時，裁萬物，兼利天下，無他故焉，得之分義也。」（王制篇）

以禮義明分，各任其事，各得其宜，因而上下齊心，和衷共濟，於是便有了力量。強有力則可以制裁自然，生活亦遂可得改善。所以說「序四時，裁萬物，兼利天下，無他故焉，得之分義也」。這就是荀子主張「禮義爲制天用天之根本」的確切證明。

天論篇有一段話，特別爲近人所稱賞，茲分句引錄解說如下：

大天而思之，孰與物畜而制之！（與其尊大天而思慕之，不如以天爲自然物而制裁之。物畜

、以天爲一物也。亦卽視天爲自然，自然只作自然看之意。）

從天而頌之，孰與制天命而用之！（與其順從天而讚頌之，不如裁制天生之物而利用之。天命、謂天之所命，指天生之物。）

望時而待之，孰與應時而使之！（與其盼望天時調順而等待豐收，不如應時耕作而役使四時。）

因物而多之，孰與騁能而化之！（與其因任物類自然生長而望其豐足，不如運用智能以增加生產。化、生也。）

思物而物之，孰與理物而勿失之也！（與其思得物類以爲己物，不如治理萬物使得其宜而勿令失喪。物之、謂徒視爲物而不加治理。）

願於物之所以生，孰與有物之所以成！（物之所以生，在天；物之所以成，在人。與其希慕天之生物，不如致力於人事以成就萬物。有、借爲右（佑），助也。）

故錯人而思天，則失萬物之情。（措置人事之努力而思求於天，則萬物亦將不能盡其用而違失自然之理。）

這是荀子「制天用天」之思想最有代表性的一段文字，語句的形式亦很明顯地是天人相對而說。荀子要把天當做自然物而制裁它，要憑藉天生之物而利用它，要應時耕作而役使它，要運用智能以增加生產，要治理萬物使之各得其宜，各盡其用。總之，他認爲物之生在天，而成物則在人。爲期在人爲中成就價值，就必須制裁利用天生之自然物。而且，他把「裁萬物、養萬民」，看做是王者之政的要務。

王制篇云：

「王者之法（原本無法字，據王念孫補）：等賦、政事、財（裁）萬物，所以養萬民也。」（註10）

非十二子篇云：

「一天下，裁萬物，長養人民，兼利天下……則聖人之得勢者，舜禹是也。」

「裁萬物以養萬民」，是王者之法，亦是舜禹之政。天論篇亦說：「裁非其類以養其類……順其類者謂之福，逆其類者謂之禍。」所謂「裁非其類以養其類」，亦卽「裁萬物以養萬民」之意。能夠裁物以養民，是謂「福」，否則，萬民無以爲養，便謂之「禍」。福禍雖與萬物有關，但得福招禍的權柄則操之在人。萬物本身因無所謂禍福，亦無所謂宜與不宜，故富國篇云：「萬物……無宜而有用於人」。人能裁之則可有用於人，有用於人就是宜，否則便是不宜。譬如水火，善用之則有益，不善用之則有害，故水火之宜與不宜，全在人之能裁與否。

然則，如何裁？王制篇云：

「草木榮華滋碩之時，則斧斤不入山林，不夭其生，不絕其長也。黿鼉魚鱉鱸孕別之時（別、謂與母體分別，指生育而言），罔罟毒藥不入澤，不夭其生，不絕其長也。春耕、夏耘、秋收、冬藏，四者不失時，故五穀不絕，而百姓有餘食也。汙池淵沼川澤，謹其時禁，故魚鼈優多，而百姓有餘用也。斬伐養長不失其時，故山林不童，而百姓有餘材。」

這一段話，着眼於一個「時」字。應時而養長生殺，謂之能裁；違時而養長生殺，是謂不能裁。「時」是自然法則，把握自然法則，就可以制裁自然，利用自然，而使百姓「有餘食、有餘用、有餘材」，此卽荀子所謂制天用天。

荀子既然視天爲自然，又言「天人之分」，「天生人成」，而主張「制天用天」，何以又言



「事天」？在此，可有二點解答：

- (1) 荀子所說的「天」，實含兩層意思，一是自然義，如前文所說。二是本始義。天地是「生之始」，亦是「生之本」。事天以報本返始，是道德真誠之流露，亦是人文精神之表現，而並非有所祈求於天。
- (2) 荀子不言天道，不言地道，而言人道、治道，故以「禮義之統」為其思想最高之綱領。在禮義之統所涵蘊的人文理想中，正人心、厚風俗的禮樂教化是重要的內容之一。禮中既有祭禮，則「祭天、事天」自是應有之義。

禮論篇云：

「禮有三本：天地者，生之本也。先祖者，類之本也。君師者，治之本也。無天地，惡生？無先祖，惡出？無君師，惡治？三者偏亡，焉無安人。（偏亡，闕其一也。焉、則也。）故禮上事天下事地，尊先祖，而隆君師，是禮之三本也。」

荀子尚理智，但他不是淺薄的「理智一元論」者，他的思想是理智的理性主義，或理智的人文主義。他反對慕天、頌天，而卻將事天地，與尊先祖、隆君師同時並舉，而稱之為「禮之三本」。這裡所顯示的純是「報本返始」之義，而並沒有祈願求福的意思，亦沒有依賴信靠的心理，更不帶任何迷信的色彩。儒家後來所特重的「三祭」之禮（祭天地、祭祖先、祭聖賢），正與「禮之三本」相互關聯。

禮論篇載荀子論祭之言曰：

「祭者，志意思慕之情也。……苟非聖人，莫之能知也。聖人明知之，士君子安行之，官人以爲守，百姓以成俗。其在君子，以爲人道也；其在百姓，以爲鬼事也。」

子孫對於祖先的思慕，乃是人情之真，思慕之情不容自己，於是便以祭祀的形式來表達，這就是所謂「追遠」。追遠，是人文活動中的事，並沒有祈福消災的心理夾雜，荀子所謂「其在君子，以爲人道也」，即表示這個意思。一般庸衆不明此意，所以「以爲鬼事」。鬼事乃孔子所「不語」的「怪力亂神」，自應予以破斥。但破斥的乃是對鬼神之迷信，至於禮儀中所含藏的人文教化之意義，則必須加以認取。

天論篇云：

「日月蝕而救之，天旱而雩，卜筮然後決大事，非以爲得求也，以文之也。故君子以爲文，而百姓以爲神。以爲文則吉，以爲神則凶。」

日蝕月蝕，天昏地暗，民心驚慌，故鳴鼓以示救護。久旱不雨，民情惶急，故祈禱求雨（雩、求雨之祭名），以撫慰人心。遇大事而朝議紛紛，故卜筮而後作決定（蓋事本兩難，互有利弊，故無論卜筮結果如何，無傷也）。這些事情，一方面是自古相傳的禮俗，一方面亦是人文世界中可被容許的活動，所以荀子並不反對。但亦須知，這些舉動乃是政事上的文飾（政治藝術的運用），並非真的認爲可以得其所求。若認爲禱祝可以得其所求，則人民事事禱祝，勢將荒廢人事，甚至招致禍亂，故曰「以爲神則凶」。荀子以「非以爲得求也，以文之也」一語，融通實然界與應然界之對立，他所表現的，正是理智的人文主義之精神。

## 乙篇：荀子的性論

### 一、性之三義

荀子對於性的界說，有三則很簡要的話：

(1)正名篇：「生之所以然者，謂之性。性（生）之和所生，精合感應，不事而自然，謂之性。」

(2)性惡篇：「凡性者，天之就也，不可學，不可事……不可學不可事而在人者，謂之性。」

(3)禮論篇：「性者，本始材朴也。」

這三則文字，分別表示性之「自然義」、「生就義」、「質樸義」（註11）凡順「生之謂性」一路言性者，必涵此三義。這表示性只是自然生命之質，是中性的，沒有道德理性，沒有善的根。

第一則，直就「生之所以然」說性。「所以然」有從物理現象而經驗地說的、形而下的所以然，亦有從本體論的推證而超越地說的、形而上的所以然。荀子所說的「生之所以然」，是屬於形而下的所以然。他是就自然生命的自然徵象而作陳述，所謂「生之所以然謂之性」，意即「生之自然謂之性」。故下文接着又說：「性之和所生，精合感應，不事而自然，謂之性。」這幾句話，正是對上句「生之所以然者謂之性」所作的申述。依孔子之前「性者生也」的古訓（訓詁），可知性與生兩個字可以互用，「性之和」即是「生之和」（註12）。楊倞注「和」字云：「陰陽沖和氣也。」牟先生解「生之和」為「自然生命之綱縕」（註13），義尤顯豁。自然生命之綱縕所生發（蒸發）的自然徵象，如感官之自然感應、生理之自然欲求、生物之自然本能、心理之自然情緒，總起來便名之曰「性」。這種意義的性，實只是「自然之性」。荀子的意思是說，自然生命之綱縕所生發的自然徵象，通過感官之精靈（自然的能力或作用）與外物相接觸，便引起主觀之反應（如耳目之精靈與外物接觸，便引起耳辨聲、目辨色之反應）。這些都是不待後天學習而自然而然的，荀子即就此先天本自如此的自然徵象而說「性」。此自然之性，即是所謂「生之所以然」（生之自然）。這是指說性之「自然義」。

第二則，由「天之就」說性。凡是天所生就的自然之質，都是「不可學」而得，「不可事」而成的。這先天生就、自然如此的質素，落在人的生命中，便謂之性。這是性之「生就義」。

第三則，就「本始材朴」說性。先天本始如此的素樸之材質，即是性。這是性之「質樸義」。董仲舒云：「性之名，非生與！如其生之自然之質，謂之性。」（註14）董生之言，可以視為「生之謂性」最恰當的解析，亦可視為「性者本始材朴也」這句話的註腳。

## 二、性之內容（性惡）

荀子言性，其內容果何所指？

性惡篇云：

「夫好利而欲得者，此人之情性也。」

「今人之性，生而有好利焉……生而有疾惡焉……生而有耳目之欲、好聲色焉。」

「若夫目好色，耳好聲，口好味，心好利，骨體膚理好愉佚，是生於人之情性者也。」

樂論篇云：

「凡人有所一同：飢而欲食，寒而欲煖，勞而欲息，好利而惡害，是人之所生而有也，是無待而然者也，是禹桀之所同也。目辨白黑美惡、耳辨聲音清濁，口辨酸鹹甘苦，鼻辨芬芳腥臊，骨體膚理辨寒暑疾養（癢），是又人之所常生而有也，是無待而然者也，是禹桀之所同也。」

據上引幾段文字，可知荀子言性的內容，不外下列三行：

(1)感官的本能——如耳目口鼻之辨聲色臭味，骨體膚理之辨寒暑疾癢等等。

(2)生理的欲望——如飢欲食，寒欲煖，勞欲息，以及耳目之欲等等。

(3)心理的反應——好利而欲得，好利而惡害，以及疾惡（恨怒厭惡）之情等等。

這三行內容，都是生物生命的內容，只能算是人的動物性之遺留。在這裡，只能見到「人之所以為動物」的自然生命之徵象，而不能見到「人之所以為人」的道德價值之內涵。就動物性而言性，則性中只有盲目的好與惡，而沒有合理的迎或拒；只有實然的生物生命之活動，而沒有應然的道德價值之取向。荀子所見到的人性，只是這一層生物生理的自然生命。如果順其生物生命之活動而不加引導節制，則「性惡」便是很自然的結論。而事實上，荀子亦正是把「性、情、欲」三者看做是同質同層的。

正名篇云：

「性者，天之就也。情者，性之質也。欲者，情之應也。」

「性者天之就」，是說性是先天生就、生而即有的。「情者性之質」，是說性以情為質（質地、本質），情外無性，情即是性，性與情是同質同位的。故荀子書中，情性二字常常連合做複詞用。「欲者情之應」，是說欲是應情而生的。耳目聲色之好即是欲，欲乃應愛好之情而生，有了愛好之情，便引生獲得之欲，所以說「好利欲得」乃是「人之情性」。荀子分別界定性、情、欲，卻正好說明三者並無實質上的差異。而「以欲為性」，亦遂成為荀子論性的最大特色。（註15）既然以欲為性，所以性是惡的。

性惡篇云：

「今人之性，生而有好利焉，順是，故爭奪生而辭讓亡焉。生而有疾惡焉，順是，故殘賊生而忠信亡焉。生而有耳目之欲，好聲色焉，順是，故淫亂生而禮義文理亡焉。然則從人之性，順人之情，必出於爭奪，合於犯分亂理，而歸於暴。故必將有師法之化，禮義之道（導），然後出於辭讓，合於文理，而歸於治。用此觀之，然則人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。」又云：

「今人之性，飢而欲飽，寒而欲煖，勞而欲休，此人之情性也。今人飢、見長者而不敢先食者，將有所讓也。勞而不敢求息者，將有所代也。夫子之讓乎父、弟之讓乎兄、子之代乎父、弟之代乎兄，此二行者，皆反於性而悖於情者也。然而孝子之道，禮義之文理也。故順情性，則不辭讓矣。辭讓，則悖於情性矣。用此觀之，然則人之性惡明矣，其善者偽也。」

這二段文，從心理反應與生理欲望說性。前一段指出，人若依順「好利」「疾惡」「耳目之欲」，而不加「師法之化，禮義之導」，必將做出「爭奪、殘賊、淫亂」之行。人順情性必為惡，這是以行為之惡反映人性之惡。後一段則指出，人悖於情性而後有善，這是以善行不出於性反證人性之惡。荀子之所以如此看性，其本質的關鍵，是在「以欲為性」。

順自然生命的欲求說下去，當然不見有善而只見其惡。由「性惡」而透出自然之質這一層的不足，自然之質既有不足，則主觀地彰顯心君之重要，客觀地彰顯禮義之重要。（在荀子思想中，天與性皆屬負面，心與禮義則居於正面之地位。）其實，荀子亦未必不知自然之質既有惡的傾向，亦可有善的傾向。（註16）但即使性有善的傾向，仍須治之以禮義，要通過「師法之化、禮義之導」，而後乃能表現合乎禮義文理的善行。人，不能停在自然之質這一層上，必須超越這一層以開出道德理性的領域，所以荀子既言人性惡，隨即又言「化性起偽」。平常總說荀子「主性惡」，我覺得這個「主」字下得太重。「人之性惡」其實只是荀子的觀點、說法，而「化性起偽

」纔是荀子的正面主張。

### 三、化性起偽

性惡篇開宗明義第一句，便說：「人之性惡，其善者、偽也。」善出於偽，不出於性。然則「性」與「偽」如何區分？

性惡篇云：

「凡性者，天之就也，不可學，不可事。禮義者，聖人之所生也，人之所學而能，所事而成者也。不可學、不可事，而在人者（註17），謂之性。可學而能，可事而成之在人者，謂之偽。是性偽之分也。」

又云：

「若夫目好色，耳好聲，口好味，心好利，骨體膚理好愉快，是皆生於人之情性者也；感而自然，不待事而後生者也。夫感而不能然，必且待事而後然者，謂之生於偽。是性偽之所生，其不同之微也。故聖人化性而起偽。」

「不可學，不可事」的自然之質，以及「感而自然，不待事而後生」的愛好之情，是說明「性」之自然義。「可學而能，可事而成」，以及「感而不能然，必待事而後然」，是指說「偽」之人爲義。這是荀子對性與偽所作的區分。

「偽」又有二層，正名篇云：

「情然而心爲之擇，謂之慮。心慮而能爲之動，謂之偽；慮積焉，能習焉，而後成，謂之偽。」

感官與外物接觸而引起好惡喜怒哀樂之情，此即所謂「情然」（如此這般之情）。對好惡喜怒哀樂之情之發作一選擇判斷，以決定其合理與否，這是「心爲之擇」，亦即是所謂「慮」。情然，是性的自然反應；慮與擇，則是心的理智作用。心對情然加以選擇判斷之後，再由「能」（材性之能）爲之發動而表現行爲，這就是第一層意義的「偽」（偽的作用）。經過多次的選擇判斷（慮積焉）與多次的學習實行（能習焉），而後養成的善德善行，則是第二層意義的「偽」（偽的結果）。此第二層意義的偽，亦即上引性惡篇所謂「可學而能可事而成之在人者謂之偽」的「偽」。

就「性」而言，聖人與衆人同；就「偽」而言，則因人而有異。所以性惡論云：「故聖人之所以同於衆，其不異於衆者（註18），性也；所以異而過衆者，偽也。」

說到這裡，可以歸結爲下面幾點意思：

- (1)性是先天的自然，故人人相同；偽是後天的人爲，故因人而異。
- (2)聖人是人倫之極，但其人格乃由「積慮習能」而成，並非先天自然如此。
- (3)偽，是塑造人格的動力。偽既因人而有異，故結果乃有高下之別；而人格之高下，不繫於性，而繫於偽。
- (4)偽可以成就善，而不必盡善；所以荀子只說「其善者偽也」，而不說「其偽者善也」。

性與偽雖然不同，但偽卻必須以性爲底子。性是原料，偽是加工（矯飾、美化），而人格則是加工之後的成品。（註19）故禮論篇云：

「性者，本始材朴也。偽者，文理隆盛也。（文理、謂禮文之理。）無性，則偽無所加；無偽，則性不能自美。」

本始材朴之性，是施設人爲的底子（無性，則偽無所加），而人事之偽，則是矯飾或美化性

的工夫（無偽，則性不能自美）。性雖不能自美，但加上偽的工夫，則可以成就「文理隆盛」之美善。可見善不出於性而出於偽，所以荀子主張「化性起偽」。董生賢良對策所謂「質樸之謂性，性非教化不成」，意亦同此。

然則，如何化性起偽？

性惡篇云：

「今人之性惡，必將待聖王之治，禮義之化，然後出於治，合於善也。」

「今人之性惡，必將待師法然後正，待禮義然後治。今人無師法，則偏險而不正；無禮義，則悖亂而不治。古者聖人以人性惡，以為偏險而不正，悖亂而不治，是以為起禮義，制法度，以矯飾人之情性而正之，以擾化人之情性而導之也，始皆出於治，合於道者也。」

儒效篇云：


「性也者，吾所不能為也，然而可化也。積也者，非吾所有也，然而可為也。注錯習俗，所以化性也。」（注錯、猶言措置、安排。意謂安排禮樂教化以移風易俗，即可化人之性。）

師法與禮義，是二事，亦是一事。故修身篇云：「禮者所以正身也，師者所以正禮也。」化性之道，只是通過師法而歸向禮義。可見荀子所謂「化性」，實只是行為方向之導轉，以使之「出於治，合於善」。而化性起偽，內在面要靠知慮，外在面要靠禮義。但心的知慮，只有選擇判斷的作用，卻不能發動行為；禮義是客觀外在的，它可以作為行為之規範，但不能使人就範。所以，行為的動機，出於情性之好惡；好惡之正確與否，出於知慮之選判斷；而依選擇判斷而發動實際之行為的，則是材性之能。榮辱篇云：「材性知能，君子小人一也。」可見不但「性」人人相同，「知」與「能」亦人人相同。正因為「知、能、性」同樣具有普遍性，「化性起偽」的可能性纔能建立起來。知（慮）可以積，愈積而愈明；能可以習，愈習而愈能。唯有性，只能化而不可積，故荀子又有「隆性」「隆積」之辨。

儒效篇云：

「故有師法者，人之大寶也；無師法者，人之大殃也。人無師法，則隆性矣；有師法，則隆積矣。而師法者，所得乎積（註20），非所受乎性，性不足以獨立而治（註21）。」

「隆性」，謂恣其情性之欲，這是順先天的自然生命走。「隆積」，謂重視積習以化於善；這是加強後天的人為以成就價值。茲表其意如下：



依荀子，聖人由積而致，不由天生。聖人之所以大過人者，只是「積慮習能」之功。人的「知、能」與「性」同樣皆由天生，而性必須化，知慮才能則須加以積習。聖人既由積習而成，然則，人皆可至聖人否？

性惡篇云：

「今使塗之人……積善而不息，則通於神明，參於天地矣。故聖人者，人之所積而致矣。」

「聖人可積而致，然而皆不可積，何也？曰：可以而不可使也。……故塗之人可以爲禹，則然；塗之人能爲禹，則未必然也。雖不能爲禹，無害可以爲禹。足可以徧行天下，然而未嘗有徧行天下者也。……然則，可以爲，未必能也；雖不能，無害可以爲。然則能不能之與不可，其不同遠矣。」

前一段指出聖人是人之所積而致，塗之人（一般人）如能積善不息，亦可至於聖人。後一段則謂塗之人可以爲禹，而未必能爲禹。「可」是原則的肯定，「能」是事實的檢證。原則上人皆可以爲禹（爲聖人），而事實上未必皆能爲禹，此即荀子所謂「無辨合符驗」（註22）之故。但反過來說，事實上雖不能爲，並不妨害原則上仍可肯定人人可以爲禹。荀子這個辯解，形式上並無問題。但從「足可以徧行天下，然而未嘗有徧行天下者也」這句話看，則「人可以爲禹」，亦如「足可以徧行天下」一樣，將不免徒成空言。所以當人問到「聖人可積而致，然而皆不可積，何也？」荀子只好回答說：「可以而不可使也。」可以積而不可使之積，這正是問題的癥結所在。在此，我們可以問：人之積僞到底有沒有自發性？若有，他自能積慮習能以成就善；若無，則他可能根本沒有求積的意願，當然亦就不可強使之積，而「積善不息」之言亦遂失其根據矣。若在孟子，則可不發生這種問題。

孟子肯定仁義禮智是「天所與我者」，是「我固有之，人皆有之」的。人人皆有心性之善，皆有良知良能，人只須擴充其先天本有的心性之善與良知良能，就可以成就善德善行。此事完全操之在己而無須求之於外，所以是自覺自主的，道德的力量亦是內發自發的。以是，孟子只說「是不爲也，非不能也」。人之「不爲」，實只是一時之「弗思」，或物欲之「桎亡、陷溺」；而人之良知本心，必不安於「不爲」，必不忍於「桎亡、陷溺」。此不安不忍之心隨時從內促使人警覺，所以必能自發地「悅理義」而好善惡惡，以表現道德行爲，成就善的價值。

而依荀子，則欠缺這種內發自發的憤排不容已的力量。因而，對於「塗之人」何以「可以爲禹」而又「不能爲禹」，事實上並不能提供充分的解答。因爲人的內在生命中既然沒有善的根源（道德之根、價值之源），則其內發向善的意願與自發爲善的力量，就欠缺先天的必然性，這正是荀子所謂「可以而不可使」的關鍵所在。

然則，「化性起僞」以成德成善的根據畢竟何在？依荀子，內在的根據是「心」，外在的標準則是「禮義」之道。

#### 四、以心治性

前文說過，依荀子，性是負面的，心是正面的。所以荀子思想中的心性關係，可以說是「以心治性」。不過，並不是直接以心治性，乃是通過禮義而治性。

荀子言心，與孟子不同。孟子所說的仁義之心（四端之心、不忍之心、良心、本心），是「道德的心」，是道德主體（德性之體）。荀子所說的知慮思辨之心，則是「認知的心」，是認知主體（知性主體）。荀子說：「心，生而有知。」（註23）這個具有「能知」作用的心，不但可以認知事物以成就知識（雖然荀子並沒有在這方面着力），而且可以認知「道」。

解蔽篇云：

「人何以知道？曰：心。心何以知道？曰：虛壹而靜。」

「心知道然後可道，可道然後能守道以禁非道。」

荀子在此，說到「心」與「道」（禮義）的關係。心的認知能力可以認知「道」，認知了道然後就能肯定道（可道），肯定了道就能守道不悖，以禁制不合禮義（非道）的行爲。據此可知

，「知道」是「可道」的前提，而「可道」又是「守道以禁非道」的前提。禮義之道是行爲的標準，人必須「守道以禁非道」，而後乃能成就善的價值。

在此，我們可以進行三步義理的考察，以說明荀子如何「以心治性」。

### 1. 心是否必然地能認知禮義？

心有認知的作用，但心亦容易受到感官之欲的牽引干擾，而失去清明的心知之用。為期保持並發揮清明的心知之用，荀子在解蔽篇特別提出「虛壹而靜」的工夫。同時說到「人心譬如槃水」，盤水放正，勿使動盪，則泥沙沉澱在下，水便清澈了。水要清明纔能照見物象，同理，心亦要清明纔能察理事理。對於心，必須「導之以理，養之以清」，使它平正而無偏邪，清明而不昏昧，如此，乃能不為異端外物所傾動移易，而可判定事理之是非，決斷疑似之困惑。「定是非、決嫌疑」的客觀標準，是「禮義」。禮義之道雖不在心中，而虛壹靜的大清明之心，其能認知禮義，自無可疑。所以，一般而言的心雖未必能認知禮義之道，但虛靜清明之心，則必然地可以認知禮義。

### 2. 心認知禮義之後，是否必然地能以禮義來治性？

清明之心既然能認知禮義，當然就隨之而認可禮義為行爲之標準。在正名篇，荀子說到人雖「欲生」「惡死」，然而人卻可以「從生」「成死」（從、讀為縱，舍也。成、就也。「從生、成死」，意即舍生就死）。人之所以能不因「欲生」而即苟且偷生，是「心止之也」（心制止他不可偷生）；人之所以能不因「惡死」而即不願就死，是「心使之也」（心使他勇於就死）。這表示人的行爲活動，可以依從「心之所可」，而不依順「欲之所求」。荀子對於「心」與「欲」（性）的這個說明，我們可以稱之為「從心不從性」。在此，顯示荀子之言心，除了「認知義」，亦可含有「實踐義」，雖然荀子所說的心並不能「生起」行爲活動，但卻能使行爲活動依其「所可」而表現。（註24）心既能認知禮義而且認可禮義為行爲活動之標準，則它能以禮義之道來治性，自亦可以有其必然性。

### 3. 性是否必然能依從心之「所可」而化惡成善？

依荀子，禮義之道是節欲唯一的標準，人在追求欲望之時，都應該以禮之「所可」「所不可」來作為取舍的界限。正名篇云：「凡人莫不從其所可，而去其所不可。知道之莫之若也，而不從道者，無之有也。」荀子認為，人既知節欲之方沒有比禮義之道更好的了（知「道」之莫之若也），天下自然就沒有人不從道而行了（而不從道者，未之有也）。這個說法，與解蔽篇所謂「心知道然後可道，可道然後能守道以禁非道」，意思相近。如此說來，心認可禮義，就必然地會以禮義來治性；心以禮義來治性，性就必然地會依從心之所可來表現，以完成「化惡成善」的道德實踐。

以上三步考察，第一問可無問題，第二問亦可無問題，問題是在第三問。蓋心是否必然地能以禮義治性，關鍵不在心，而在性。心能「知道」而「可道」，當然亦能表示「守道以禁非道」的意思；但這只是心之知慮所作的選擇判斷，而真正發動實際之行爲的，卻要靠材性之能。然而先天本「惡」的自然之性，果能依從「心之所可」而表現「善」的行爲乎？這纔是問題的關鍵所在。荀子雖說「知道之莫之若也，其不從道者，無之有也！」但這句話，其實只能說明心必從道，而不足以說明性必從道。不過，內在於荀子的系統，他的話只能說到這裡。若再追究性何以必依「心之所可」而「從道」，荀子是沒有回答的。

但另外還有一個相關的問題，卻必須在此作一討論，是即「人之性惡，則禮義何由而生」？

性惡篇云：

「凡禮義者，是生於聖人之偽，非故生於人之性也。……聖人積思慮，習偽故（偽故，謂往古累積而成之經驗知識），以生禮義而起法度，然則禮義法度者，是生於聖人之偽，非故生於人之性也。……故聖人化性而起偽，偽起而生禮義，禮義生而制法度；然則，禮義法度者，是聖人之所生也。」

荀子認為禮義是「聖人所生」，這句話本身沒有問題。依孔孟，亦可以說禮義是聖人所生（創制），但聖人創制禮義法度的根據，決不在外，而必在內。故孔子曰「人而不仁，如禮何？」（註25）孟子更明白表示「仁義禮智根於心。」（註26）人人皆有道德的本心，皆有仁義禮智之性。則聖人之創制禮義，亦不過是先得我心之同然而順仁義之心做出來，亦即以心同理同的道德心性為根據而做出來。故依孔孟，應該說「順性起偽」，一切價值皆是順道德心性的內在要求而步步實踐出來。禮義法度本就是衆人性分中之事，人亦可以隨時隨分表現禮義法度。各人表現之程度雖有不同，但「人人皆於禮義有分」則無可疑。人人皆於禮義有分，纔能建立禮義的必然性與普遍性。

但依荀子之說，聖人之性（自然本惡之性）與衆人同，則聖人之「偽起而生禮義」，並不繫於他的德性，而是繫於他的才能。性分中既無此事而有待於聖人之才能，則無論「偽起而生禮義」或「禮義之偽」，皆將成為可遇而不可求，因而禮義之必然性與普遍性，根本無從建立。雖說禮義可學而知、可學而能，但衆人性分中既無此事，則雖「可」而「未必能」；如此，則衆人根本沒有「與於禮義」之分，豈不鄙夷生民甚哉！荀子隆禮義而反性善。「禮義」與「性善」既已置於相對衝突的位置，則其所謂禮義乃失去人性之基礎與內在之根據，而人之為善成德亦失其內發性與自發性矣。然則，由荀子一轉手而為李斯韓非，雖不是荀子始料之所及，而亦非偶然也。（註27）

## 附 註

註1：論語陽貨篇。

註2：此節所引，皆見荀子天論篇。

註3：荀子儒效篇。

註4：牟宗三先生「名家與荀子」（台北、學生書局出版），頁214。

註5：上引之語，皆見天論篇。

註6：易繫辭傳下第一章。

註7：按，荀子不苟篇云：「禮義謂之治，非禮義謂之亂。」合乎禮義之行爲謂之治；不合禮義之行爲謂之亂。此所謂「應之以治」、「應之以亂」，正可據以作解。

註8：大巧、大智，皆指聖人。不爲、指不與天爭職，不慮、指不求知天。見李滌生先生「荀子集釋」（台北、學生書局出版），頁369註文。

註9：參見「名家與荀子」頁213至228。

註10：按、等賦、猶言均賦。政事、韓詩外傳作「正事」，謂正理民事。鍾泰「荀子訂補」（商務版）則謂「事」字衍，原作「等賦政、財萬物」，義亦可通。

註11：參見牟宗三先生「才性與玄理」（台北、學生書局出版），頁2～3。



註12：按、王先謙「荀子集解」即已作此解釋。

註13：見牟宗三先生「心體與性體」（台北、正中書局出版）第一冊頁88。網縷、交密之狀。二字語出易繫辭傳下第五章。

註14：董子春秋繁露，卷十，深察名號第三十五。

註15：參見徐復觀先生「中國人性論史先秦篇」（台北、商務版），頁234。

註16：按、荀子禮論篇云：「無僞，則性不能自美。」性雖不能自美，而可以使之美，荀子這句話實亦表示性含有「可美」的傾向。

註17：「而在人者」，顧千里謂當作「之在天者」。見王先謙「荀子集解」引。

註18：「其不異於衆者」，俞樾謂當作「而不過於衆者」。見王先謙「荀子集解」引。

註19：參見陳大齊先生「荀子學說」（台北、中華文化出版事業社印行），頁58。

註20：「所得乎積」，積字原作性，楊倞注以爲乃積字之誤，是，今據改。

註21：「性不足以獨立而治」，原本無「性」字，據王念孫補。

註22：語見性惡篇。辨、別也；別、名詞，指券據而言（周禮小宰鄭注：別之爲兩，兩家各執其一）。符、以竹爲之，亦相合以取信之物。荀子是經驗主義之性格，故事事講求徵驗。

註23：語見解蔽篇。

註24：參見何淑靜小姐台大哲學研究所碩士論文「論荀子道德實踐理論之根據問題」（牟宗三先生指導）第三章第二節之二。該段文中對「荀子所主張的道德實踐途徑，是剋就虛壹靜之心來保證道德實踐之必然」一義，疏釋甚詳。

註25：論語八佾篇。

註26：孟子盡心篇上。

註27：按、荀子雖言性惡，然更重化性起僞，以心治性，由心知通向善，歸於禮義，故實非極端之性惡論。然荀子既已抹去人性的光明之源，則李斯韓非順之而下趨，亦成自然之勢。韓非變本而加厲，以爲人之「性」皆自利自爲，人之「心」皆計慮利害，既無父子之親、夫妻之情，亦無朋友之信、君臣之義。人之內在生命既成一片黑暗，故反對尚德尚賢，而主張嚴法任術以驅策人民。近人每以法家附會法治，殊不知法家之嚴法乃爲尊君利君，故處心積慮以「愚民、防民、虐民、威民」，此既與儒家之「教民、養民、愛民、保民」絕不相類，而與「尊人權、重民意、尚自由、崇價值」之民主法治亦不可同日而語。

## The Problem of Autonomy of Human Existence in Later Heidegger's Philosophy

Wing-Cheuk Chan

Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University

Heidegger's most explicit discussion (Erörterung) of the relationship between human existence (Dasein) and Being after the "turn" (Kehre) perhaps lies in his interpretation of Parmenides Fragment 5: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai in *Identity and Difference*. This thesis of identity between human existence (as thinker) and Being, however, gives rise to a question: does this identity eliminate the autonomy of human existence? Namely, does it reduce human existence to Being? It is the task of our paper to find out an answer for this important question.

Taking into consideration Heidegger's later position in his other writings, the appearance of the above question is by no means accidental. First of all, in "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger explicitly declares that "die ek-sistente Freiheit als Wesen der Wahrheit (ist) nicht eine Eigenschaft des Menschen... sondern der Mensch nur als Eigentum dieser Freiheit ek-sistiert".<sup>2</sup> Second, in "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger writes that "das Wesen der Ek-sistenz ist existenzial-ekstatisch aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit des Seins".<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in *Nietzsche II*, "Das Wesen der Menschen bestimmt sich aus dem Wesen (Verbal) der Wahrheit des Seins durch das Sein selbst".<sup>4</sup> Finally, in *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger characterizes the human thinking as "Geheiss".<sup>5</sup>

All these announcements force us to ask: How can human existence maintain his autonomy in the face of Being?

As it is pointed out by Ruprecht Pflaumer, "Die alte theologisch - metaphysische Frage nach der möglichen *Freiheit* des Menschen angesichts der allmächtiger *Wahrheit* des Seins (Gottes) drängt unabweislich hervor".<sup>6</sup>

\* \* \*

In order to find out an answer for the above question, let us start with a clarification of the nature of the *identity*-relationship between human existence and Being.

From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, we can see that already in the period of German Idealism both Schelling and Hegel have developed their respective philosophies of identity through their different interpretations of Parmenides' Fragment 5. But, insofar as the philosophies of identity of the German Idealists belong to the tradition of the metaphysics of subjectivity and hence are to be overcome (überwunden), Heidegger certainly does not understand the concept of "identity" in the direction of German Idealism. Indeed, in *Identity and Difference* Heidegger points out that "identity as it is thought of in metaphysics is represented as a characteristic of Being".<sup>7</sup> Since the German Idealists are imprisoned in this metaphysically

represented conception of identity, they cannot apprehend the essence of identity.

But then what does the term "identity" mean for Heidegger? According to Heidegger, "identity" means "belonging together". It is important to note that, here "belonging together" is not to be understood in the sense of *nexus* or *connexio*. Rather, Heidegger points out that "the 'together' is now determined by the belonging".<sup>8</sup> Clearly, "identity" in the sense of belonging together is not an external relationship. As a belonging together, identity is internal to human existence as well as to Being. On the one hand, "A belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated to Being"; on the other hand, "Being is present and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him".<sup>9</sup>

From this clarification of the nature of identity as belonging together we can see that the thesis of the identity between human existence and Being implies two points. First, it shows that there is an inseparability between human existence and Being. Second, it thematizes the response-character of human existence to Being. Namely, human existence is visualized "as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it".<sup>10</sup> However, all these merely mean that human being as listener is essentially inseparable from Being; they do not assert that human existence can be totally absorbed into Being and hence loses his autonomy. Indeed, the "mutuality" of the belonging definitely prevents human existence from being reduced to Being.

Moreover, in claiming that human existence "is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this", Heidegger himself admits, "This 'only' does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess".<sup>11</sup> That is to say, in explicating human existence as correspondence to Being. Heidegger actually tries to reveal the distinctive feature of human existence in the face of Being. Clearly, understanding such a distinctive feature can enable us to determine the autonomy of human existence even in the fact of Being. In short, the responsive ability forms the first major characteristic of the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being.

In fact, Heidegger has not only thematized the essential inseparability of human existence from Being, he also emphasized the essential inseparability of Being from human existence. He explicitly declares: "Being is present to man neither incidentally nor only on rare occasions. Being is present and abides *only* as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him".<sup>12</sup> For it is human existence, among all beings, "who *alone* lets Being arrive as presence".<sup>13</sup> This capability of "letting Being arrive as presence" constitutes the second major characteristic of the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being. To be sure, as it is already pointed out by Heidegger, this "does not at all mean that Being is posited first and only by man".<sup>14</sup> For human existence lets Being arrive as presence *only* when he is open to Being. Indeed, the response-character of human existence prohibits any possibility of subjectification of Being. Nevertheless, this prohibition does no harm to the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being. For the autonomy of human existence has no necessary

connection with human existence's being as subject (*subjectum*). What the announcements we cited above are meant by Heidegger to deny is only the master position of human existence over Being. But the denial of the master position of human existence and that of the autonomy of human existence are fundamentally two different things. Certainly, these announcements also imply that the autonomy of human existence is basically granted by the Appropriation (*Ereignis*). But this only means that human existence cannot by himself posit his own autonomy, and that the autonomy of human existence must be determined in cooperation with Being. For, according to Heidegger, the *Appropriation* is nothing but the *letting belong together*.<sup>15</sup> Thus, it is incorrect to say that Heidegger sees human existence as a kind of puppet which is totally controlled by Being.

In fact, a reflection of the semantical behaviour of the word "letting" would be helpful. The meaningfulness of an expression like "X lets B happen" presupposes that X has a kind of autonomy. In other words, despite the response-character of the word "letting", its active character cannot be overlooked. Accordingly, in letting Being arrive as presence, human existence clearly shows his own autonomy.

It is true that Heidegger also tells us that this letting-be is not possessed by human existence as a *property*.<sup>16</sup> However, this merely implies the following three things. First, the letting Being arrive as presence is not an ontical property of human existence, but rather constitutes his Being. Second, as far as the source of this capability of human existence is concerned, human existence only receives it from the Appropriation but does not posit it at his own disposal. Finally, human existence can achieve his own autonomy only when he cooperates with Being. In other words, the *letting Being arrive as Presence* is not an arbitrary activity of human existence. Clearly, all these say nothing more than what we have already pointed out in the above clarification. Accordingly, they cannot be used as any evidence to refute the thesis that human existence has his own autonomy in the face of Being.

In face, Being itself differs from the letting Being arrive as presence. That is to say, Being *in itself* cannot replace this letting Being arrive as presence. It is only human existence, among other beings, that can take this role of letting Being arrive as presence. This irreplaceability of human existence's letting Being arrive as presence not only demonstrates human existence's autonomy in the face of Being, but also shows in what way Being needs human existence in the Appropriation. So, the "needed" character of human existence once again guarantees his autonomy in the face of Being. That is to say, since the Appropriation of Being without the Appropriation of human existence would be impossible, the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being is undeniable.

In "Sein und Mensch im Denken Heideggers" Pflaumer also discusses the possibility of finding an answer for the question of the autonomy of human existence within Heidegger's later philosophy. However, Pflaumer seems to conclude that one cannot find a positive answer for this question within the ontological dimension allowed by

Heidegger. Hence, in defending the autonomy of human existence, Pflaumer appeals to a quasi-ontological solution. The key point of his attempt is to define the autonomy of human existence in terms of "living body".<sup>17</sup> He explicitly declares that "auch der Leib des Menschen ist 'Haus des Seins'".<sup>18</sup> For, according to him, "Das Sprechen der Sprache kann er nur durch seinen aus der Sprache und für sie gebauten Leib vollbringen".<sup>19</sup>

However, Pflaumer has to "ontologize" that which Heidegger originally takes to be ontical, or if we insist that our living body is essentially ontical, the kind of autonomy Pflaumer attributes to human existence is merely ontical.

Taking the first alternative, Pflaumer's solution goes beyond Heidegger's own position and hence becomes problematic from a Heideggerian standpoint. However, the second alternative is not only too weak, but also distorts Heidegger's original position. For, Heidegger himself clearly writes: "But we also say *too much* when we mean Being as the all-compassing and thereby represent man only as a particular being among others (plants, animals) and put both into the relation".<sup>20</sup> Indeed, insofar as the relationship of identity between Being and human existence is concerned, "What is at issue here is certainly not the relationship of Being to 'ontical' man" —as it is aptly added by Werner Marx.<sup>21</sup> So, instead of bringing in the problem whether one should broaden Heidegger's ontological position, we can provide an purely ontological solution by concretizing our above discussion of the identity between human existence and Being in terms of Heidegger's analysis of the nature of language.

It is important for us to note that when Heidegger declares that language speaks, he does not deny that man is the speaker, but rather asks, "How does man speak?".<sup>22</sup> In answering that question, Heidegger writes that "speaking, as the listening to language, lets Saying be said to it, this letting can obtain only in so far — and so near — as our own nature has been admitted and entered into Saying".<sup>23</sup> That is to say, man speaks only insofar as he, according to his Being, belongs to language and is capable of replying to it. Although human speaking is needed by language, language "is not merely of or at the command of our speech activity".<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, human speaking has its own autonomy in the face of language. Moreover, since speech (*Rede*) is an *existential* of human existence, here human speaking is something more than an ontical phenomenon. Indeed, speech belongs in an essential manner to man's Appropriation. One can also clearly see that speaking shows the *ontological* autonomy of human existence in the face of Being in concrete manner. To be sure, since human speaking is essentially listening, it echoes again the response-character of human existence in the face of Being. However, one should note that this role as listener merely prevents human existence from becoming a master over Being, it is not incompatible with his autonomy in the face of Being. For Heidegger, the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being lies exactly in his role as a listener to the Saying of language.

Moreover, one should note that when Heidegger says that the ability to listen to

Saying . . . lies in Appropriation", he does not want to deny the autonomy of human existence either.<sup>25</sup> Rather, he wants to emphasize that the autonomy of human existence is only shown in Appropriation. "Appropriation grants to mortals their abode within their nature, so that they may be capable of being those who speaks.<sup>26</sup> This clearly shows that in what way human existence can gain his autonomy in the ontological sense. Accordingly, only when human existence speaks appropriately, can he demonstrate his autonomy in a proper manner. Certainly, this also tells us that human existence can never "produce" or "posit" his own autonomy; rather, his autonomy is granted by Appropriation. However, this does not mean that the granting of autonomy to human existence is accidental to Appropriation. According to Heidegger, Appropriation means essentially that "man is delivered over to the ownership of Being and Being is appropriate to the essence of man"<sup>27</sup> So, if human existence had no autonomy in the ontological sense, Appropriation would become impossible.

\* \* \*

From the later Heidegger's influence on the development of ontological hermeneutics, we can discover that the relationship between the interpreter and the text is structurally similar to that between human existence and Being. Accordingly, the kind of autonomy human existence has in the face of Being is analogous to that of the interpreter facing the text. Following Heidegger, Gadamer thematizes the relationship between the interpreter and the text in terms of the dialogical model rather than by appeal to Hegelian dialectics. By means of a mapping we can also discover that such a dialogical relationship exists between human existence and Being. Indeed, as it is pointed out by Werner Marx, man's "essence must be defined in terms of the 'dialogue' with the nonhuman 'claim' and 'appeal' of Being, the dialogue which man *is* in his essence".<sup>28</sup> Accordingly, the answering role, as well as the necessity of *subtilitas applicandi*, helps us in an analogous manner to understand the nature of the corresponding autonomy possessed by human existence in the face of Being.

It is well-known that Heidegger, in developing his fundamental ontology, takes over Dilthey's view on the hermeneutical circularity between individual existence and history (or tradition) as the model for explicating the relationship between human existence and Being. Clearly, as history or tradition is inseparable from individual existence, Being needs human existence. Indeed, this circularity does not mean that human existence is reducible to Being. Rather since this circularity emphasizes the "interactive" character of the interplay between these two partners, it demonstrates the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being.

So, now we can conclude that when the later Heidegger stresses the responsive character of human existence, he is not attempting to eliminate the autonomy of human existence. What he actually tries to do is merely to prevent us from any attempt to reduce Being to human existence. Indeed, in characterizing human existence as a "listener", Heidegger is appropriating rather than denying the autonomy of human existence in the face of Being. As it is insightfully pointed out by Werner Marx, "all of

these seemingly 'passive' characterizations of human existence should not blind us to the fact that man is allotted the role of cocreating creatively in the occurrence of Being. Man is thought by Heidegger as a necessary and creative *coplayer* in the play of the world".<sup>29</sup>

#### Footnotes:

1. Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. And with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh, New York, 1969, p.27ff.
2. Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit", in *Wegmarken*, zweite, erweiterte und durchgesehene Auflage 1978, Frankfurt, p.186.
3. Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", in *Wegmarken*, zweite, erweiterte und durchgesehene Auflage 1978, Frankfurt, p.330.
4. Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, Pfullingen, 1961, p.194.
5. Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken ?*, Tübingen, 1971, p.153ff.
6. Ruprecht Pflaumer, "Sein und Mensch im Denken Heideggers", *Philosophische Rundschau*, Bd. 13 (1966), p.178.
7. *Identity and Difference*, p.28.
8. *Ibid*, p. 29.
9. *Ibid*, p.31
10. *Ibid*.
11. *Ibid*.
12. *Ibid*.
13. *Ibid*.
14. *Ibid*.
15. Cf. *Ibid*, p.39.
16. Cf. "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit".
17. Cf. Pflaumer, *op. cit.*, pp. 229, 232-233.
18. *Ibid*, 232.
19. *Ibid*, 133.
20. Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. By William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde, New York, 1958. p, 75.
21. Werner Marx, *Heidegger and the Tradition*, trans. by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene, Evanston, 1971, p.213.
22. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. By Albert Hofstadter, New York, 1971, p. 124.
23. Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. by Peter Hertz, New York, 1971, p.124.
24. *Ibid*, p. 125. The German original is: "Die Sprache braucht das menschliche Sprechen und ist gleichwohl nicht das blossе Gemächte unserer Sprechfähigkeit", (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen, 1979, p. 256).

25. *Ibid*, p.129.
26. *Ibid*, p.128.
27. *Identity and Difference*, p.36.
28. *Heidegger and the Tradition*, p.225.
29. *Ibid*, p.227.



## 論海德格後期哲學中人底自性問題

陳 榮 灼

東海大學哲學系

### 摘 要

在其後期哲學中，海德格倡言人與存有之同一性。此同一性論題引生一個問題，就是：「這種同一關係是否意謂人底自性之消失？」換言之，「它是否涵蘊人被存有所“吞沒”？」本文旨在為這一重要問題尋求一個解答。

在對人與存有之同一關係底本性加以釐清後，我們發現：「對存有之回應」與「讓存有作為顯現而降臨」之能力是構成人在面對存有時所可擁有之自性底基本特徵。這表示人底（存有論義）自性不僅是可能，而且是必需的。因此，我們否證了 Ruprecht Pflaumer 從一準存有論的進路來確保人底自性之做法。最後，為進一步說明晚期之海德格並沒有取消人底自性，我們內在于海德格後期哲學之架構提出了一個宇宙論上的論證以及一個存有論的解釋學上的論證。

## 狹義相對論中時間概念的分析及其哲學意義之研究

郝 芷 人

東海大學哲學系

### § 1 時間是什麼？

這是個既現實，而卻又使人感到撲朔迷離的問題。為甚麼這是個現實問題呢？凡是涉及“有”的，都離不開時間，因為物事一定要存在於時間裡，才能稱為“有”。但是，時間又是甚麼呢？在常識層面裡，人們也許認為時間是獨立自存的，並且可以使用時鐘而準確地量度它。這是一般對時間未加反省而有的時間概念。

在哲學上說，第一個對“時間”問題加以反省的哲學家是聖奧古斯丁。他對時間的研究是由於他企圖解決上帝的全知與人的自由意志之間的問題而觸發的。上帝如果是“全知”的，那麼祂必有“前知”的能力，而“前知”就是說未來的事件必將會在未來的時間系列中出現，這樣推論下去，便容易產生一種「預定論」，而人類是否能對自己的行為負責任的問題也因而成為哲學上及神學上的重要問題。如果人類能夠對自己的行為負責，那麼人類一定要有自己決定自己行為的能力，亦即具有“自由”的能力，否則，人若沒有這種行為自決的自由，則責任問題便屬虛幻不實，換言之，如果人類是“自由的”，那麼這種自由又如何能與預定論或上帝的全知原則互相一致呢？這是聖奧古斯丁反省時間問題的基本原因。他對時間的解釋頗為有趣：由於人類的有限性，因而人類的意識中只能具備一種有限的時間意像，即是說，人類只能從回憶“過去”，生活於“現在”和希祈“未來”而了解時間，換言之，人類是把“過去”、“現在”及“未來”綜合成一時間的意識，這是有限的時間意識。但是，上帝為一無限體，因而祂不是藉著有限的意識以了解時間，祂的無限性把整個時間呈現為永恆的意像。因此，對上帝來說，時間不是具有先後次第的連續體，而只是永恆的點。

在這個觀念下，聖奧古斯丁認為上帝的意旨與人類的自由選擇之間是沒有衝突的，由於上帝是全知的，因而祂亦具有前知的能力，但是，這種前知（預知）不是像人類意識領域內有過去、現在及未來之分。他批評世俗這種“前知”觀念為占星術及說預言的迷信，上帝的前知必須這樣理解：對上帝來說，時間只是一無先後分別的永恆意像。上帝的前知與人類的自由之關係便有如“永恆”與“當前”之間的關係。對於人類來說，時間是有連續性的，因而有先後次第的分別；但是，對上帝而言，一切都存在於永恆之中。（註1）

根據聖奧古斯丁的“時間”理論，我們尚難以判斷究竟“時間”是依附於意識而出現的？抑或時間能夠獨立於意識而自存？或者說，時間的本質是否為永恆呢？如果時間原是永恆的，那麼，人的時間意識是否為幻相呢？我們是否能夠以上帝的時間之永恆性作為時間的實在相呢？然則何謂永恆呢？聖奧古斯丁對這些問題沒有提出答案。這樣說來，“時間”豈不是撲朔迷離的嗎

？所以，聖奧古斯丁在他的懺悔錄裡說：

“時間是什麼呢？假如有人問我這個問題，那我是知道時間是甚麼。然而，如果我要向提出這個問題的人作解答，那麼，我就不知道時間究竟是甚麼了”（註2）

“始”與“終”這兩個概念，是從時間上描述事物情況的。淮南子有俶真訓，高秀註謂：「俶，始也，真實也。道之實，始於無有，化育于有。故曰俶真，因以名篇。」俶真訓裡對於宇宙的開關有如下的意見：

「有始者，有未始有有始者，有未始有夫未始有有始者，有有者，有無者，有未始有有無者，有未始有夫未始有有無者。所謂有始者，繁憤未發，萌兆牙孽，……有未始有有始者，天氣始下，地氣始上，陰陽錯合，……有未始有夫未始有有始者，天含和而未降，地懷氣而未揚，虛無寂寞，……（註3）。」

南淮子此處論及宇宙之“有始”“未始”等問題，文句原出於莊子齊物論篇：

「有始也者，有未始有始也者，有未始夫未始有始也者。有有也者，有無也者，有未始有無也者，有未始夫未始有無也者。」（註4）

莊子在這裡所講及的「有始」「未始」，主要在於說明「六合之外，聖人存而不論；六合之內，聖人論而不議」的道理，亦即在於指出言論與事物統統沒有客觀意義，這是直接否定認知活動的。但淮南子卻在討論宇宙的開關。但是，如果我們從「時間」方面討論宇宙的「開始」或「結束」，那在理論思辨上是有困難的。譬如我們問：「世界在時間上有個開始抑或沒有開始呢？對於這個問題，康德在他的名著「純粹理性批判」一書提出時間的背反（Antinomie）論據，情形是這樣：

1 正論：從時間的角度看，世界是有始點（有開始）的。

證明：假設時間沒有始點，則由現在往過去追溯，則必過了一段無限長的時間。在世界上，無窮系列的連續事件也已成爲過去，但是，無窮系列是不能藉著對連續的綜合而完成的，因此，「無窮系列的世界事象成爲過去」這個假設是不對的。也就是說，世界在時間方面有個始點。

2 反論：從時間上看世界是沒有始點（無限）的。

證明：假設世界在時間上有個起點（開始），這個始點本身是一種存在，這樣，在此之前，便爲一種空的時間，在這空的時間裡，必然沒有事象，事物是不能在空的時間（即不在時間）中出現（entstehen）的，因爲，空的時間不具有分別存在與非存在的條件，同樣地，我們亦不能設想事物在這種空的時間中會由它自己或由其他原因所生，但是，許多事物卻又確實有個開始，因此，「世界在時間上有個起點」的假設是不對的，也就是說，世界在時間不能有個起點，既然這樣，則世界就其已經消逝的時間而言是無限的（註5）。

以上兩個論題，一爲正論，一爲反論。問題的要點是：康德指出這兩個剛好相反的論題能夠同時成立，但是，根據邏輯律，如果A命題成立的話，則 $\neg A$ （非A）不能成立；反之，若 $\neg A$ 成立，則A便不能成立。A命題與它的否定（ $\neg A$ ）是不能同時成立的，但是關於時間的「有個開始」與「沒有開始」這兩個背反（A， $\neg A$ ）卻依上述能夠同時證成，爲什麼呢？康德認爲，那是由於我們的理性活動遠離（transzendent）經驗場所致，而知識活動是要在經驗場內的，一旦離開了經驗場，則我們便不能有確實的知識。然而，時間是屬於經驗範圍之事呢？抑或不屬於

經驗範圍之事呢？我們甚至可以問：時間是客觀自存呢？抑或是人類意識裡的事？爲了討論這些問題，我們以下將詳細地分析和比較代表物理學的狹義相對論中之時間概念及代表哲學的康德之超驗攝物學（*transzendente Aesthetik*）中的時間理論。

## § 2 狹義相對論中的時間概念之分析

### § 2-1 古典的世界圖像及以太問題

“運動”是古典力學的中心問題，然而，我們如何了解“運動”這個概念呢？我們可以這樣說，“運動”是在參考系統（*frame of reference*）內才有實際意義，因為我們要在參考系統裡才能描述物體的運動。既然這樣，則運動便是一個相對的概念，所謂「相對」是指相對於「參考系統」而言。當參考系統滿足牛頓第一運動定律時，則這樣的參考系統便名爲「慣性系統」，牛頓名之爲「相對空間」。

問題是：我們能否在各相對空間之上建立「絕對的空間」呢？絕對空間一定要在絕對的參考系統裡才有意義，因此，我們如何建立絕對的參考系統呢？假如空間裡分佈著一種稱爲以太的媒質，那麼，以這種媒質作爲參考系統，則絕對空間便可以建立起來。

以太（*Ether*）這個概念是古代希臘哲學的名詞，遠在公元前四〇〇年（約500 B.C ~ 528 B.C）已經提出空間的最外層充塞著一種名爲以太的物質，從而否定真空的空間（註6）。亞里斯的德也繼承以太這個觀念，把以太列爲水、火、土、氣之外，構成世界的第五種元素（註7）。在十七世紀的偉大哲學家笛卡爾（*Rene Descartes, 1596—1650*）的著作中，也用以太這個概念，以解釋物質和空間（註8）。在「哲學原理」第二部份，第XVI條中，他反對真空的空間之存在，理由是物質既然有廣延性，而空間就不能不是廣延的。因此，空間也必然是物質的（註9）。換言之，笛氏認爲空間也必然地由某種物質所充塞著，否則空間的廣延性，便不可能。第XVIII條最末的一句話是：「由於距離是廣延的一種樣式，同時，如果缺少廣延的物質，則距離是不會存在的（註10）」，可見笛氏這個觀念，是順著希臘哲學傳統而來的。

在光學理論上，牛頓原是主張光的粒狀說的，這些微粒能夠不必藉著以太而在空間散發，但是，科學史家庫斯尼哥夫（*B. G. Kuznecov*）在「從加里略到愛因斯坦」一書裡卻指出牛頓生前曾對光作出多種不同的假設，而其中的一種假設是把光當作以太的振動看（註11）。既然如此則牛頓也接受光的波狀理論了。波狀理論把光的進行情形比擬於在水面上的水波及空氣中的聲波，但是水波及聲波的進行都是需要傳遞媒介的。水波是靠水而傳遞的，而聲波是以空氣爲傳遞媒介的。因此，如果把光視作波狀物，則我們必需要假定一種傳遞光的媒質，而以太的假設自然能夠滿足這種要求，這就是十九世紀由Thomas Young所提出的「光之波狀模型」的觀點。此外，在電學及磁學方面，法拉第（*Farady*）也採用以太這個概念以說明力的傳遞情形，在這種情況下，則以太是否確實存在的問題是極待證明的，在各種證明的嘗試中，以Michelson-Morley的實驗最爲重要。

### § 2-2 Michelson-Morley 的實驗之意義：

甲、假設 ①“波”的傳遞總要靠某些媒質，來自遠方星球的光，經過幾百萬里的空間，才到達地球上。但是，空無一物的真空之空間是不具傳播波的條件，因此我們可以假定空


間並非真空，而是佈滿了假想的以太，以此說明光波進行的可能條件。

- ②光波如果藉著充滿於宇宙空間的以太而傳播，那麼我們便能夠從觀察地球運動對光速的影響，來測定以太的存在。由於地球在它的軌道上按  $30 \text{ km/s}$  的速度運動著，因此可以設想一種與地球運動方向剛好相反的“以太風”，就像騎在機車上，以高速疾馳的人感受向他迎面吹來的空氣風一樣。這樣，沿以太風方向傳播的光波會因媒質的運動而變得快些，（此即假定地球不動，即觀察者置身於地球上的意思）而沿著反方向傳播的光波將會慢些。

### 乙、邁爾遜與摩里實驗 (Michelson-Morley Experiment) 之分析

如右圖假定  $S$  為光源，而  $P$  為半鍍銀的鏡，來自  $S$  的光線到達  $P$  之後便分別射向  $M_1$  及  $M_2$  的鏡面上，然後分別反射回觀察者的眼睛  $G$ ，由於  $M_1 P$  與  $M_2 P$  的距離相等，但需時不等，故從  $M_1, M_2$  經  $P$  反射至  $G$  的光線因相參而出現干涉現象。

1896 年 Michelson 進行測量以太的實驗，其又與 Morley 合作，進行多次實驗，即從比較兩個垂直方向所傳播的光速，以求測出地球相對於以太的速度，由於地球以  $v = 30 \text{ km/s}$  繞太陽而轉，於是我們便可以假定一年之中總會有一時間，其時地球相對於以太的速度為  $30 \text{ km/s}$ 。



$$PM_1 \text{ 來回時間 } (t_1) = \frac{d}{c+v} + \frac{d}{c-v} = \frac{2d}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}, \text{ 以 } \beta \text{ 代 } \frac{v}{c}$$

$$= \frac{2d}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{1-\beta^2} \approx \frac{2d}{c} \cdot (1+\beta^2)$$

$$PM_2 \text{ 來回時間 } (t_2) = \frac{2d}{\sqrt{c^2-v^2}} = \frac{2d}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} \approx \frac{2d}{c} \cdot (1+\frac{\beta^2}{2})$$


$$\text{時差 } \Delta t (t_1 - t_2) = \frac{2d}{c} (1+\beta^2) - \frac{2d}{c} (1+\frac{\beta^2}{2}) = \frac{d}{c} \beta^2 \text{ (時差)}。$$

根據上述推論，則由  $M_2$  來之光線與由  $M_1$  而來之光線是不會同時的，即  $t_1 \neq t_2$ ，在觀察上，如果  $t_1 \neq t_2$ ，則會出現光的干涉作用。現在，這個實驗的功能是調節成變動  $M_1$  及  $M_2$  二鏡，以使出現干涉情形。意思是說；如果把干涉儀作  $90^\circ$  的旋轉，則  $M_1$  與  $M_2$  的位置便剛好對調，在對調過程中，邁爾遜企圖測量  $\Delta t$  的變動情況。然而，當干涉儀轉動時，卻沒有干涉作用的出現，這實驗表示  $t_1 = t_2$ 。

### 丙、對實驗結果的解釋：

解釋一：面對這種實驗結果（事實）Michelson 及 Morley 企圖對此作解釋，以為此時以太可能偶然地以  $30 \text{ km/s}$  向太陽運動，更清楚一點說，這個假定是企圖說明此時地球相對於以太的速度為  $0$ ，如下圖所示：

如果這個假設正確，則在六個月後，地球位於B處，則地球此時相對於以太速度為 $2v$ ，也就是說，在六個月後的實驗結果應倍增於六個月前，但實驗結果，也沒有這種倍增現象。這就表示，這個解釋不正確。



## 解釋二 Lorentz-Fitzgerald 的假設

由於理論與實驗之間互有矛盾，為了解決這個矛盾，Lorentz 及 Fitzgerald 便提出新的假設：

一切沿著反乎以太方向而運動的物體皆依隨運動方向而收縮，此收縮使  $t_1 = t_2$ 。

根據這個假設，我們能夠求出收縮的量：

以  $d'$  代替  $t_1$  中的  $d$  又因為  $t_1 = t_2$ ，所以

$$\frac{2d'}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \frac{v_2}{c_2}} = \frac{2d}{c} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v_2}{c_2}}}$$

$$d' = d \sqrt{1 - \frac{v_2}{c_2}}$$

值得注意的是：這裡所謂收縮，是指處於以太的觀察者而言。但若觀察者是處於地球上，則他永遠不能量度這種收縮現象，因為他用以量度的工具也同樣地相對於以太而運動，故亦作同樣的收縮。

但是，這種假設，在實驗上也得不到滿意的證明。

## § 2-3 愛因斯坦的相對論之意義

由於無數實驗企圖確定地球在以太中運動的情形，但結果都沒有積極性的解答，Michelson-Morley 的實驗只是其中最著名的實驗而已。這樣，遂引起愛因斯坦取消以太這個假設，這是愛氏在他的“Zur Elektro-dynamik bewegter Körper”一文所提出來的：

“這些例子以及企圖發現地球相對於光的媒質而運動的各種失敗的嘗試，皆說明電動力學及力學裡的事項皆不具對應於絕對靜止的觀念。它們顯示出，對於力學裡有效的方程式來說，同樣的電動力學及光學裡的定律皆對所有的參考系統都有效，我們因此而提出一個猜想（這個猜想的內容自此以後名為相對原則），並把這個猜想變成公設（postulate），它表面上似乎與前者無法相容。這公設是說：光在真空裡以固定的速度  $C$  進行，這速度是獨立於物體的運動狀況的。這兩個設準已足夠滿足 Maxwell 的建基於固定物體的簡單而一致的運動物體之電動力學理論，對於引入以太這個設想證明多餘的，……（註 12）。”

上述引文的微言大義是這樣的：如果以太不存在，則所謂絕對運動及絕對空間便失去意義。進一

步而言，若沒有絕對空間，則所有慣性系統都能適合建立物理學的理论。換言之，若自然律在某一慣性系統中較其他系統有優越性，則以這個優越的系統而量度絕對運動便成為可能。也就是說，絕對運動可藉這個系統加以描述。這樣愛因斯坦便提出相對性的設準，這個設準是：

(1)所有自然法則在每個慣性系統中皆具相同形式。

這個意思亦即等於說：所有自然規律對於以恒常速度運動的觀察者來說（慣性觀察者）都是一樣的。

若每一慣性系統皆有同等效能，則光速必也在所有這些系統中以等速向各方發射，此即光速的恒常原則，也是相對論的第二個設準：

(2)光速在真空中，它對各慣性系統的值為  $C = 300000 \text{ km/s}$ 。


愛氏的狹義相對論，就是指以這兩個設準作為原則而建立的理论而言。

## § 2-4 從狹義的相對論原則而來的一個重要結果——運動中的時鐘之分析

### 甲、光鐘的結構：

物理學與哲學對時間的研究有個最基本的差異：在哲學裡，人們的興趣在於反省「時間的本質」而不必有任何實驗運作。但在物理學，則需要藉對時間進行測量。為了測量時間，便需要時鐘。


我們現在先設計一個光鐘，透明的圓柱體部分，作為光線活動的場所。圓柱上端有一閃光燈，下端有一個反射鏡，從上端閃光燈所發出的光射到下端的鏡面後，使反射回上端，於是設在圓柱體上的指針便走一個時間單位，這樣的時間單位，各為 nano second，簡稱為 NS。然後閃光燈又發射第二道光線，如此而不斷繼續下去。光鐘的簡圖如右上：




我們現在先設計一個光鐘，透明的圓柱體部分，作為光線活動的場所。圓柱上端有一閃光燈，下端有一個反射鏡，從上端閃光燈所發出的光射到下端的鏡面後，使反射回上端，於是設在圓柱體上的指針便走一個時間單位，這樣的時間單位，各為 nano second，簡稱為 NS。然後閃光燈又發射第二道光線，如此而不斷繼續下去。光鐘的簡圖如右上：

### 乙、在運動中的光鐘：

現在問題是：當光鐘在運動時，情形會如何呢？





上圖A及B分別為兩個在靜止狀態中的時鐘，而C則為在運動中的時鐘，C'及C''則分別為時鐘運動時的位移情形。以 $t_R$ 與 $t_m$ 分別表示靜止時鐘及運動中的時鐘之時間，這樣，從C我們便能夠得到 $t_m$ 和 $t_R$ 之間的關係：

$$\begin{aligned} l^2 &= (c t_R)^2 - (v t_R)^2 \\ l^2 &= t_R^2 (c^2 - v^2) \\ (c t_m)^2 &= t_R^2 (c^2 - v^2) \\ c^2 t_m^2 &= t_R^2 (c^2 - v^2) \\ t_m^2 &= t_R^2 c^2 (1 - v^2/c^2) / c^2 \\ t_m &= t_R \sqrt{1 - v^2/c^2} \end{aligned}$$

從運動著的時鐘之立場看，則光線在圓柱體內向下發射走了 $l = C t_m$ 之路程，但從靜止時鐘的立場看，則光線實在走了 $C t_R$ 之路程，於是 $t_m$ 與 $t_R$ 之關係便如上述。結果是：

若一運動中的時鐘，在一組校正好的時鐘組合運動而過，則這個時鐘與靜止時鐘的時距比較時會變慢。設以 $v$ 表示運動時鐘與靜止時鐘的相對速度，則

$$t_m = t_R \sqrt{1 - v^2/c^2}, \quad (\text{變慢})$$

以上時間變慢的情況，不但在光鐘裡如此，在原子鐘的情形也如此，在高能物理學裡用粒子實驗亦然（註13）。

## § 2-5 相對的同時性問題

### 甲、“同時”的定義

愛因斯坦在上述“運動物體的電動力學”一文中分析同時（Simultaneity）這個概念，他說：

「若果在空間上一點A有個時鐘，則處於A點的觀察者能夠藉著觀察時鐘的指針而對A點周圍的物體作出時間的判斷。設在空間的一點B處有個時鐘，則處於B點的觀察者能夠判斷在B周圍事件的時間之值。但是，如果沒有進一步的設準，則我們根本上無法對發生在A與發生在B的事件作時間方面的比較。我們直至現在為止，只有A時間及B時間，而尚沒有界定A B的共同時間。後者可以這樣界定：「光線由A往B所需要的時間與從B到A所需的時間相等。」（註14）

愛氏這裡對“相等時間”的定義，這種定義本身已表露了一種思想的方法，而這種思想的方



法是說物理學裡的概念要藉著某種經驗運作才能加以界定，這種定義法在科學的哲學（philosophy of science）裡名之為運作定義法（operational definition）。在上述的論文裡，愛因斯坦利用這個「相等時間」的概念進一步討論「同時性」的問題，而「同時」這個概念自然也只能用運作定義法而界定，愛氏對於這個問題的處理是這樣的：設有A B兩個時鐘，而A時鐘的時間為  $t_a$ ，當光線抵達B點時，B時鐘的時間為  $t_b$ 。然後，光線再由B處反射回A，當它抵達A點時，此時A時鐘的時間為  $t'_a$ ，這樣，我們便能夠根據上述定義而使A B兩個時鐘「同時化」。

關於上述把A與B兩個時鐘同時化的概念，是假定著下列兩個原則的普遍有效性的，此即：


①若B處的時鐘與在A處的時鐘“同時化”，則在A處的時鐘亦與B處的時鐘“同時化”。

②若A處的時鐘與B處的時鐘同時化，而A處的時鐘又與C處的時鐘同時化，則B C同時鐘亦同時化。

宜應特別注意的是，愛氏這裡是藉著靜止系統的靜止時鐘以界定時間、同時及同時化等概念。即是說：事物的「時間」是“同時地”由事發處的靜止系統裡的時鐘所指示出來，很明顯，在這些原則裡，我們還假定了光速的一般常數，即：

$$\frac{2d}{t'_a - t_a} = C$$

根據愛氏上述的同時性意義，我們也可以引伸出另一種界定同時的方法，設C為處於A B兩事件之中間，則倘若C處的兩個時鐘記錄得來自A B之光線的時間為一樣時，則此兩事件可稱為同時，即：




愛因斯坦這種對“同時化”這個概念的分析極為重要。在愛氏之前，大家總對兩件相距甚遠的事件也給與“同時”的概念，而沒有分析這個概念的根本意義，在愛氏上述的定義下，我們發現下列的重要情形，即是說：

兩個事件要在同一的參考系統下才有同時的意義，而與之相對地運動著的系統卻不然，此即所謂“同時的相對性”（the relativity of simultaneity）。總的來說，當一個觀察者處於中間，而從兩事件之地點所放射的光線訊號一齊抵達此觀察者，則此兩事件可謂之為同時。正如我們在上面已指出：這個定義引生出下列的結果，即：同時的概念是與參考系統連繫在一起的，也就是說，對不同的參考系統來說，同時性是沒有客觀意義的。

## § 2-6 相對運動的分析：

### 甲、加里略變換 (Galilean Transformation)

古典力學的基礎之一可以用“加里略變換”這個概念來表述之。假設有兩個觀察者， $O$ 及 $O'$ ，他們相對地運動著，這樣的相對運動可用以下的坐標系統表示之：



觀察者 $O$ 看到物體 $A$ 以 $v$ 速度隨 $x$ 軸而運動，反之， $O'$ 卻看到 $A$ 以 $-v$ 之速度運動，現在的問題是： $O$ 及 $O'$ 如何描述運動著的物體 $A$ ？亦即是說，這兩個坐標之間有何關係？

在古典力學裡，這兩個坐標之關係名為加里略變換，情形如下：

對系統 $(I)$ 來說：

$$x = x' + vt'$$

$$y = y'$$

$$z = z'$$

$$t = t'$$

對系統 $(I')$ 來說：

$$x' = x - vt$$

$$y' = y$$

$$z' = z$$

$$t' = t$$

而且 $(I) \iff (I')$ 。此外，加里略變換只限於當 $v$ 小於 $c$ 時才有效。

### 乙、羅連士變換 (Lorentz transformation)

愛因斯坦的光速原則是不變的，即是說，光速對所有的觀察者而言，皆是恒常的。在這個假定下，則加里略變換便失去其正確性，因為在加里略變換中， $t = t'$ ，而這個公式不能滿足

光的恒常速度這個原則。由於 $v = \frac{d}{t}$ ，要使 $v$ 保持恒常，便要調整 $\frac{d}{t}$ 中的 $d$ 及 $t$ 。換言之，

對於相對運動的觀察者來說，時距不會一樣的。因此為了保持光速的恒常原則，便要修改加里略變換，這種修改稱為“Lorentz transformation”。

由於Galilean transformation不能滿足光速的恒常原則，而為了要保持這個原則，我們

便要修正加里略變換，修正的辦法是補上一個修正的因子  $k$ ：

$$x = k(x' + vt') \dots\dots\dots ①$$

$$x' = k(x - vt) \dots\dots\dots ②$$

爲著要使  $k$  能夠滿足光速恒常原則，那麼便要考慮下列的條件：

(一)若一光子在  $t = 0$  時從坐標系統 (I) 發射，則在經過  $t$  時間單位後，它在  $x$  軸的路程爲

$$x = ct \dots\dots\dots ③$$

(二)若一光子在  $t' = 0$  時在坐標系統 (I') 裡射出，則經過  $t'$  時間後，其在  $x'$  軸的路程爲

$$x' = ct' \dots\dots\dots ④$$

以③④分別代入①②，得：

$$ct = k(x' + vt') \dots\dots\dots ⑤$$

$$ct' = k(x - vt) \dots\dots\dots ⑥$$

現在求  $k$  的恒等式：⑤×⑥得

$$c^2 t t' = k(ct - vt) \cdot k(ct' + vt')$$

$$= k^2 t t' (c - v)(c + v)$$

$$= k^2 t t' (c^2 - v^2)$$

$$= k^2 t t' c^2 (1 - v^2/c^2)$$

$$k^2 (1 - v^2/c^2) = 1$$

$$\therefore k = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - v^2/c^2}} \dots\dots\dots ⑦$$

時間的變換：

由①得：

$$x = k(x' + vt')$$

$$\frac{x}{k} = x' + vt'$$

$$vt' = \frac{x}{k} - x'$$

$$t' = \frac{\frac{x}{k} - x'}{v} = \frac{\frac{x - x'k}{k}}{v} = \frac{x - x'k}{kv} = \frac{1}{v} \left( \frac{x}{k} - x' \right) \dots\dots ⑧$$

由②代入⑧ (即以  $x' = k(x - vt)$  代入) 而得：

$$t' = \frac{1}{v} \left[ \frac{x}{k} - k(x - vt) \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{v} \left[ \frac{x}{k} - kx + kv t \right]$$

$$= k \left[ \frac{x}{vk^2} - \frac{x}{v} + \frac{vt}{v} \right]$$

$$= k \left[ t - \frac{x}{v} + \frac{x}{k^2 v} \right]$$

$$= k \left[ t - \frac{x}{v} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{k^2} \right) \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore k^2 &= \frac{1}{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}} \\ 1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2} &= \frac{1}{k^2} \\ 1 - \frac{1}{k^2} &= \frac{v^2}{c^2} \\ &= k \left[ t - \frac{x}{v} \left( \frac{v^2}{c^2} \right) \right] \\ &= k \left[ t - \frac{vx}{c^2} \right] \end{aligned} \quad \text{..... ⑨}$$

以  $x', x, t', t$  及  $-v$  代入  $x, x', t, t'$  及  $v$  即得：

$$t = k \left[ t' + \frac{v}{c^2} x' \right] \quad \text{..... ⑩}$$

至於  $y$  及  $z$  可用  $q$  作為修正因子：

$$\begin{aligned} y' &= qy \\ y &= qy' \\ y' &= q^2 y' \\ q &= \pm 1 \end{aligned}$$

結論：

$x = k(x' + vt')$	$\longleftrightarrow$	$x' = k(x - vt)$
$y = y'$		$y' = y$
$z = z'$		$z' = z$
$t = k\left(t' + \frac{v}{c^2}x'\right)$		$t' = k\left(t - \frac{v}{c^2}x\right)$
以 $k = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - v^2/c^2}}$		

### 丙、Lorentz 變換與時間變慢

設兩個事件發生於同一地點  $x'$ ，而  $x'$  是相對於觀察者  $O'$ ，對於  $O'$  來說，則時距為

$$T' = t_b' - t_a'$$

$O$  為另一觀察者， $O'$  是相對於  $O$  而以  $v$  速度（等速）向  $x$  方向運動，對  $O$  而言，時距為

$$T = t_b - t_a$$

現在的問題是找出  $O$  及  $O'$  對所發生的事件之時間記錄的關係（以  $T$  為出發點）：

$$t_a = (t'_a + vx'/c^2) / \sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}$$

$$t_b = t'_b + vx'/c^2 / \sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}$$

$$t_b - t_a = \frac{t'_b + vx'/c^2 - t'_a - vx'/c^2}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}}$$

$$= \frac{t'_b - t'_a}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}} = \frac{T'}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}}$$

$$T = \frac{T'}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}}, \text{ 因為 } \frac{1}{\sqrt{1-v^2/c^2}} \text{ 大於 } 1, \text{ 此表示 } T \text{ 比 } T' \text{ 為大}$$

，即觀察者O所記錄得的時間較O'所記錄得的時間為長。

### § 2-7 時間的本質——時間是幻想抑或真實？

愛因斯坦在狹義相對論對時間所作的分析，引起思想界對時間是否為真實（抑或虛幻）問題的爭論。二十世紀的偉大數理邏輯家哥度爾（K. Gödel）認為狹義相對論對時間的分析無疑是使到哲學上唯心主義的理論更堅固，如巴門尼底斯（Parmenides）否定變，以及康德把現象歸根於知覺形式等。哥度爾說：「“變”只在時間的流遷下才有可能，但是，既然時間的消逝是指由無窮的現在之連續存在所含有的真實性，此外，如果同時性只是在上述意義而為相對，那麼，這些真實性無法由這樣分割的層次所構成，每個觀察者都有他們自己的“現在”，不同系統裡的觀察者沒有人可以宣稱他的觀察是代表客觀的時間流（註15）。」

我們從上述的討論中，發現對“同時性”的問題作出新的分析，即在於否定絕對的同時性而認為“同時”只有相對的意義，也就是說，在不同的慣性系統中，所謂「A B兩事件是同時」是沒有客觀意義的，因為觀察者甲說兩者是同時，而觀察者乙卻可以說兩者不同時。哥度爾進一步指出，既然同時性失去它的客觀性，則時間的客觀性也沒有確實的意義了。理由是：時間是由客觀者的“現在”系列所組成的，但不同系統裡的觀察者有不同的“現在”，既然如此，則“現在”系列所構成的時間流自然也無客觀意義了。

物理學對時間的處理是在於測量時間，而不在對於時間本質作哲學性的反省。不過，相對論對時間的分析卻引起了對時間本質問題的討論。但是，哥度爾以為愛因斯坦的時間分析是加強了巴門尼底斯否定“變”的立論，這對時間問題的了解是有所混淆的，不但在希臘哲學中有巴門尼底斯否定變，即在中國哲學中，也有曾肇提出所謂「物不遷論」，大乘空宗的中論也有這一類的論述。但是，「從原則上否定變」與「時間沒有絕對的客觀性」之間是有分別的，因為即使我們承認時間沒有絕對的客觀性，但變仍然能夠在相對的時間裡出現。稍後我們將指出：時間秩序不能違背因果秩序，因果關係在時間上不能有倒逆互置的現象，而如果“變”可以藉因果關係而能夠被肯定，那麼，因果秩序既有確定意義，則「變」就自然非幻想。

### § 3-0 康德的時間理論

愛氏對時間的分析是從物理學作為進路的一種時間理論。在哲學方面，康德的時間理論也是很著名的，因此，我們在比較這兩種著名的理論之前，先分析康德的有關理論。康德的時間理論是在他的名著“純粹理性批判”（Kritik der reinen Vernunft）中提出的，我們現在先分

析他在該書裡“超驗的攝物學”(transzendente Ästhetik)一節對時間的討論。我們先分析他對時間的各種論證。

### § 3-1 對時間的形上論述

所謂形上學的論述，是要指出時間不是從經驗而來的觀念。在哲學上，所謂經驗是指以感官作為條件而有的感覺而言，也就是說，康德認為時間不是藉感覺而有的觀念。此外，康德不但否認時間為經驗觀念，而且否定它是“概念”(concept)。概念是理解活動的條件，康德否定之，而把時間視作感覺的形式之一(forms of sensation)。這種對時間的處理，便剛好與一般常識上對時間的了解相反。在一般常識中，人們總是把時間視作外在的東西，這種外在的獨立自存的時間是通過我們的感覺才被人類所認識。現在，康德的立論剛好與此相反，不是我們藉感覺(也稱稱之為內感覺)而認識時間，而是時間藉著我們的感覺或知覺才有意義。我們先分析康德的論證：

**論點一：**時間不是經驗概念，即是說，它不是從經驗中推論出來的。

論證：若時間這個意象(Vorstellung)不先行視作一種先驗(非出於經驗而又具有普遍性者為先驗)的基礎，則所謂“共存”或“連續”皆不會在吾人的知覺中出現。換言之，只有在這種時間的預設之下，我們才能把一堆事物當作“同時”或“不同時”地存想。(註16)。

康德在此主要認為一定要在時間是先驗的假設下，我們才能想像一些有關時間的意象如同時、共在、連續等意象，換言之，如果時間來自經驗，則我們便不能存想這些意象了。進一步而言，同時或先後次序的觀念是否有確定意義呢？有的，康德是從因果秩序處肯定時間秩序的客觀性。

**論點二：**時間為一必然的意象(觀念)，為一切直覺的基礎。

論證：對於一切意象而言，儘管我們完全可以把一切表象(現象Erscheinung)從時間中移掉，但是，我們卻不能從表象裡把時間除去。既然如此，所以時間是先驗地給與我們的(即謂吾人是先驗地具有時間這種觀念)。只有藉著時間，所有的表象之事實才成為可能。總言之，我們雖然能夠把這些表象全面除去，但時間本身則不能被我們除去(註17)。

康德在這裡更進一步指出，我們意識中的一切意象是無法脫離時間而獨立的，因為我們能夠存想沒有內容的時間，但卻不能存想沒有時間的任何意象內容。換言之，一切意象內容總是離不了時間這個因素的，故一切意象只能藉著時間這個條件才成為可能。因此，時間必定是先驗地存在於我們的意識之中，而非來自經驗。

**論點三：**時間關係的確定原則或時間公理之可能性亦建立在這種先驗必然性之上的。

論證：時間只有一向度，不同的時間不能一齊存在，而是互為相連續地存在的。這個原則不是來自經驗，因為經驗永遠不能提供我們一些嚴格普遍性及確實可靠性。我們只能說：一般的知覺是如此告訴我們，但卻不能說：經驗必然地如此。這個基本命題可視作一規則，經驗只有在這個規則下才成為可能(註18)。

康德在此處從時間只有一個向度而以「不同的時間不能共存」作為時間的基本原則。這個觀點與愛恩斯坦的「相對之同時性」似乎有衝突，其實沒有。依後者的理論，「同時」問題只在同一慣性系統中才有意義。康德這裡所謂「不同時間不能共存」，原是個分析命題，因為如果不同的時

間可以共存（同時），則就不算是不同的時間了。康德既然肯定這個時間原則，亦即肯定時間秩序的客觀性，這種時間秩序之客觀意義可以藉因果秩序而肯定之。這樣，則康德的「時間原則」與愛氏的「相對之同時性」其實也沒有衝突處，因為後者的時間秩序亦可藉因果秩序而獲得確定的保障。

論點四：時間不是思考的概念，或者說，時間不是我們所謂的一般性概念，而是感性直覺的純粹形式。

論證：不同的時間只是同一時間的部份，而「不同的時間不能共在」這個命題不能從一個一般性的概念中推演出來，它是在直覺及時間的意象中直接含藏着（註 19）。

康德在這個論證裡，再進一步不把時間視作概念，而只視之為感性直覺的純粹形式。感性（sensibilität）是指感官內容中的感覺資料的接受形式而言。又由於這些形式非來自經驗，而是具有先驗的普遍必然性，故名之為純粹。康德謂時間是這些純粹的感性直覺形式，而非理解的概念，因為“不同時間不能共存”這個命題不能從任何概念中推演出來，它的確定性只從感性形式處看，才能建立起來。

論點五：所謂時間的無限性，意思只不過是說：一切時間的量單位只有藉著獨一而又為一切時間單位之根基的那個時間才成為可能，因此，原有的那個時間意像一定要無限制地給予我們。

論證：部份及任何對象之單位量，只有通過“限制”才能被我們確定地意想出來。因此，意像的全部並不是藉著概念而給與我們，因為概念是包含有部份的意像。相反地，這些概念必須直接地建立在直覺之上（註 20）。

康德在這個論證中主要是指一切時間的單位量都要在“時間”的意像下才有意義，而這個“時間”既然是一切時間單位的基礎，而時間單位總是有限的量，因此，這些有限的單位量所“立足”的那個原本時間必為無限制的，這個無限制的時間不可能來自概念，亦即，只能來自直覺，並且是來自先驗直覺。總之，時間不是來自經驗，亦不是來自理解活動的概念群，而是一種先驗的感性直覺形式。

### § 3-2 對於時間的超驗性論述

超驗這個詞項是由康德的“transzendental”這個字翻譯過來的。康德所謂“transzendental”是指一些原則而言，這些原則不但是“先於經驗”的而且更是使到經驗成為可能的條件。我們就把這個字的意義譯為“超驗，意思是“先驗地使經驗成為可能的條件”而言。因此所謂對時間的超驗論述，是在於提出時間是使經驗對象成為可能的先驗條件之意，康德對時間的超驗性論述如下：

變遷（Veränderung）這個概念及與此一齊的運動概念只有藉著時間這個意像才能成為可能的。

論證：假使時間這個意像不是一種內在的先驗直覺，而是一種概念，那麼，運動便是不可理解的，為什麼呢？運動本身是含有內部對立的情形，譬如說，某物在此位置，以及該物在彼位置（不在於此）。沒有任何概念能夠使得兩個對立的狀態處於一物之中，但若把時間視作直覺，則這種對立只不過是一種先後連續的關係罷了。因此，康德便認為他的時間理論可以說明作為先驗綜合知識的運動理論之所以成為可能的根據（註 21）。

我們現在可以總結康德對時間問題的立論。

- 1 康德認為，時間不是獨立自存的事件，亦不是物體本身所具有的客觀條件。如果時間為物體自己的固有性質，那麼，當我們把所有的主體性之直覺條件抽離，則它仍然依舊存在。此外，時間亦不能藉著綜合命題而先驗地被認識之或直覺之。相反地，康德認為時間只是認知主體（cognitive subject）的認知條件，為一種內感官的直覺形式。
- 2 時間為一切現象的先驗形式條件，這是說，一切現象或對象，都是處於時間的必然關係之中，總之，一切事物都在時間之中（註22）。

### § 3-3 時間與理解

#### 甲、分析理解或思維的條件問題

對康德來說，理解是一種思維的能力，而思維就是判斷。因此，理解活動可以歸作一種制斷活動。思維或判斷卻是要藉概念才能夠進行，康德認為有些概念是來自理解本身的，也就是說，理解活動是有一定的先驗形式的，人的思維就是根據這些形式而進行，這種理解形式康德名之為範疇（Kategorien）或純粹概念。思維（理解）活動是怎樣進行的呢？那是它把純粹概念應用在對象上。換言之，則理解活動是根據思維形式而把從直覺而來的意像加以秩序化，這秩序化就是一種理解活動。因此，思維或理解其實是指理解依據它自己的理解形式而把來自感性的意像統一起來。我們怎樣才能夠說明這種統一過程呢？首先，讓我們看看由感官所接受下來的那些感覺內容，這些感覺內容都是一些「尚未確定的對象」，康德名之為雜多（Mannigfaltigen），感性是無法把這些未定型的感覺內容統一起來以構成對象。對象的構成一定要藉理解活動才能完成的，因此，這種自發性的理解活動為一種綜合作用，這種作用其實就是“雜多”（感覺內容）的綜合統一，這種統一活動亦即為綜合判斷。但是，當我們追問這種統一活動要預設是“我”的活動，這種自我的自覺是把這些理解活動視作“我的”意識活動，為思維主體的自我意識，因此，康德便認為理解或思維活動其實就在這種自覺活動的主體性之假設下才成為可能；康德又把這種自覺稱為“原初的統覺”（ursprüngliche Apperzeption），而把這種意像的統一名為“自覺的超驗統一”或“統覺的原初之綜合統一”，康德把這種自覺的超驗性統一視作思維的第一個綜合原則。

但是，上述這種原初的統覺只是統一在直覺中的雜多之必須條件而非充足條件，為要說明這種統一的充足條件，我們便要設想一種想像力。想像力是甚麼呢？康德說，想像力是一種把當前所缺乏的對象在直覺裡意想出來之能力。康德利用圖式論及判斷力這個概念而說明想像力的活動。

#### 乙、思維與時間的關係

理解既然具有一定的形式，我們也可以把之視作形式規則。這種規則所表現之功能，我們可名之為建造規則的純粹條件之能力。至於判斷力則為一種「把直覺意像置於規則之下」的能力，因而判斷力亦即分別一些直覺意像是否能服從於規則的能力。但是，若要把從直覺而來的意像放在理解的規則之下，那麼，這種意像與理解（思維）必為等同關係，然而純粹概念與雜多之間為不等同的，因此，若要雜多置於理解之下，這種可能性必定要在第三者的關係下才成為可能。這個第三者一方面要與理解形式有等同關係，而另一方面也要與現象（雜多）有等同關係。這樣說來，則這個第三者不但是理智上的，而且也是感性的。康德把具有這



種性質的第三者名爲“超驗圖式”(transzendentes Schema)，而只有“時間”才能負起這種圖式的任務。現在的問題是：想像力如何藉著時間使雜多(感覺內容)依據理解形式而組織成爲對像呢？

康德對這個問題的答覆是：超驗的時間決定作用與理解形式之間在下列意義下爲等同的，即：時間爲普遍條件，並且建基於先驗原則之上。此外，時間與現象之間亦屬同等的，時間是含蓋於任何雜多的經驗意像之中。基於上述理由，則範疇便能夠藉著時間的超驗決定作用而應用於現象之中。因此，所謂超驗圖式其實就是指時間依據思維規則而活動於時間系列，時間內容、時間秩序以及時間概念之中。圖式是想像力的一種普遍程序，通過這種程序而得的結果就是一幅圖像。換言之，圖式是想像力的一種方案，藉著它而使圖像成爲可能，設若沒有這些圖像，那麼概念應用於對像的活動便不可能。(註23)

上面我們已提及康德對思維活動的分析是：思維活動是根據一定的形式而進行的，這些形式稱爲範疇或理解的純粹概念。問題是：這些理解形式究竟怎樣？康德企圖有系統地從分析中世紀的邏輯語言之結構中研究這些理解形式，從而找出一個完整的範疇表，情形如下：

康德的範疇表：

(甲)量範疇：一、多、全體

(乙)質範疇：實在、否定、有限

(丙)關係範疇：屬性與本體、原因與結果共在

(丁)程態範疇：可能與不可能存在與虛無、必然與偶然

在上文，我們已指出，思維活動如果涉及對像，那麼它就涉及感覺內容，但這如何可能呢？由於理解與感覺內容不是同質的，那麼就必須要藉著第三者把它們聯合起來，這第三者與感覺內容有同質關係，而且與理解也有同質關係才行，這樣的第三者就是時間。進一步而言，所謂理解與思維其實是指判斷活動，這其實亦即使感覺內容在理解形式之下而秩序化或理解化。這樣理解的秩序化是靠「時間」進行的，亦即靠想像力所提供的時間程序而進行，這是說想像力提供有關的理解概念一幅圖像，而這圖像是在時間秩序之中。康德分別圖式(Schema)與圖像(Bild)，想像力對概念所提供的圖像之方法或程序名爲圖式。

首先，我們看看量方面的理解形式如何應用於感覺內容，康德說：所有感覺對像的單位量之圖式是“數”，數是同質的直覺雜多之統一，也是一種把一個一個的量連續相加的意像(Vorstellung)，因此，數是在直覺的統覺中，由時間所創生出來的統一體(註24)。再次，「質」方面的圖式是感覺具有時間意像或時間上的滿足，詳細言之，「真實」這個理解的純粹概念是“在時間上”指向實有，而「否定」則爲“在時間上”表現非實有。再其次，感覺之間的關係圖式把各種感覺置之於所有時間系列之下，因此實體的圖式是在時間之中的真實恒常性。因果性的圖式是無論甚麼總有(在任何時間)某種後果產生。最後，是有關程態方面。“可能性”的圖式是以時間作爲條件的綜合，並且指在“任一時間”上的決定；現實性(存在)的圖式是在某一“確定的時間”裏的存在；至於必然性的圖式爲在“一切時間”裏存在的對像。總言之，圖式是指依照規則而有的時間之先驗決定而言。

### § 3-4 康德時間理論的根本意義

綜上所述，我們發現康德的時間理論中有一特點，就是不把時間看作是客觀自存的外在實有

，而是當作人類（作為認知主體 cognitive subject）想像力所提供出來的感性之直覺形式（intuitive form of Sensibility）。藉著時間這種內在條件，而使理解的形式能夠活動於感覺內容（雜多）之中。但是，若我們理解時間的秩序時，這種「理解」也必然依照「理解形式」而進行的，這種理解的秩序形式亦即理解形式中的關係形式。康德就在「純粹理性批判中」討論「經驗的類比」時，分析這個問題（註25）。在「經驗的類比」一節中，第二個類比是說「時間的連續原則是因果律為根據的，也就是說，一切的變動，都依照因果關係的連結而進行的。

第三個類比是說「共在原則」是根據互相影響律（Gesetz der Wechselwirkung）的。也就是說，所有在空間裏可以同時「感覺到的物體，都是互相影響的」（註26）。第二個類比是分析時間的先後次第，第三個類比是說明「同時性」的時間秩序。總之，時間秩序是要藉理解活動中的「關係形式」才能被理解的，而時間的客觀意義，亦藉理解形式而獲得保障。但無論如何，時間是屬下「主體性的」條件，而非外在客體的原有性質。在常識層面裏，人們總是把時間視作客體的性質，即把時間當作獨立自存的客觀對象，康德的時間理論剛好與常識層面的見解相反。康德認為，當我觀察到一個事件跟隨着另一個事件時，這就把兩事件之間作前後關係的連結在一起，亦即把它們連結於時間系列之中。但是，這種連結是如何進行呢？康德的分析指出它是想像力的一種綜合活動的產物。由於我們無法觀察到時間自己，因此，這種「先後」關係不能屬於外物（客體）本身的性質，而只是主體自己意識到想像力把其一放在「先」，另一放之於「後」，進一步而言，這種先後秩序是有其必然性的，我們不容許有這種關係顛倒過來。然則這種關係的「必然性」之根據是在那裡呢？這種綜合統一的必然性一定在於理解的純粹概念，而不在於知覺之中，這種純粹概念亦就是「因果關係」的概念，這是指前者（因）在「時間」上決定後者，視之為前者之「結果」，這樣，我們對事件的連續知覺永遠是受一必然秩序所支配的，此即理解活動中的因果形式，這種形式次第關係決不能倒逆互換，這種不能倒逆的情形我們可以用下列的式子表示這種關係： $T_a \leq T_b$ 。這是說，「結果」在時間裡決不能「先於」「原因」。因此，當 $T_a = T_b$ 時，則a與b這兩件事便是「同時」，而同時亦就是「共存」（coexistent），這是康德在他的第三個類比裡所討論的問題。康德在論到事件A及B的「共存」時說：

「因此，除了A及B的存在之外，還一定要在時間上A決定B，及B決定A，只有在這條件下，物體才能在經驗上表現其共存，亦就是原因或它的決定作用，在時間上決定另一事件的位置（註27）。」

根據上述的分析，則康德的「共存」觀念可以引申出「同時」這個概念，而在他的言論下，同時性也可以藉因果性而加以說明，也就是說，AB這兩個事件要在下列的情況下便是同時：

$$T_a \leq T_b \text{ 及 } T_b \leq T_a$$

以上是對康德時間理論的分析。

#### § 4 愛氏的時間分析與康德的時間理論之比較

##### § 4-1 參考系統中的時間系列

讓我們先看看在下列各參考系統中AB兩事件的情形。在第一個參考系統裡，AB兩事件是

不是發生的。我們假定A事件是某甲買愛國獎券，而B事件是愛國獎券結果揭曉。在第二個參考系統裡，愛國獎券在2月11日已揭曉了，而購買獎券的日期則為2月24日，這是可能的嗎？在分析這個問題之前，我們再看圖二。

(圖二)是說設A B在第一個參考系統中在不同地點同時出現。我們假定A事件為交通意外，而B事件為新聞報告(註28)。在第三系統裡，它的意思是說某甲聽了關於他自己發生交通意外之後，過了一段時間才發生意外，這又是可能的嗎？

關於這些問題，如果A B有因果關係，則無論根據愛氏的時間分析或根據康德的時間理論，都是不可能有的事，這種想法都要列入思維的錯誤。狹義相對論對時間的分析有兩個結論：


第一：如果事件的發生純屬於空間形態的，則這事件在不同的參考系統中有不同的時間次第，這個是從「同時性」只有相對意義這個原則所含有的。這樣，如果上述的圖一及圖二之事件有因果關係，則其中之情形是可能的。

第二：如果事件之形狀為時間性的，這是說如果事件之間有因果關係存在，則無論在任何系統裡作為原因的事件永遠不能發生在作為「結果」的那個事件之「後」，否則便陷於思想上的錯誤。


以上兩個觀點正好符合康德在第二類比中所伸論的事件間之關係，藉因果性而說明事件的連續性。

#### § 4-2 因果秩序與同時性

根據愛因斯坦對同時性的分析，則對於所有不同的參考系統而言的同時性是不存在，也就是說，空間形狀的事件之時間秩序是依不同的參考系統而各異。故空間形態的事件之同時性自然也就依參考系統而不同，這就是說，絕對的同時性是沒有客觀意義的，換言之，沒有一個共通於所有參考系統的同時意義或同時性的標準。至於康德的時間理論，他是藉思維形式的因果關係而建立時間的客觀秩序，兩個事件之間時間的同時性之定義也藉因果概念而說明。這樣說來，則康德這個“同時性”的定義很明顯是獨立於各參考系統的。但是，雖然這個定義是獨立於參考系統，這卻並不是說這個定義可以“同時”應用於各參考系統，也是說，利用這個定義我們尚不能確定在不同的參考系統中是否“同時”。這個理由是：康德所謂事件(event)是藉著知覺而加以認識的。因此，事件的空間性必須要限制於知覺場(field of perception)內。由於知覺場會因參考系統的不同而改變，故康德的同時性的定義是不能同時應用於不同的參考系統的。



(圖一)



(圖二)

1. St. Augustine, City of God, Bk. XII, Chap. 14 – 28.
2. St. Augustine, Confessions, IX, 14.
3. 淮南子，傲真訓。
4. 莊子，齊物論。
5. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 452 – 458.
6. C. F. Parker, A short Account of Greek Philo. from Thales to Epicurus, p.50.
7. The basic Works of. Aristotle, On Heavens, Bk. I, Chap. 3, p.403, ed. by Makeon.
8. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part III, XCIX–C, in Philosophical Works of Cescartes, p.277. Cambridge University Press, 1931.
9. 同前, p.262
10. 同前, p.263.
11. B.G. Kuznecov, Von Calilei bis Einstein, Entwicklung der physikalischen Ideen.
12. 譯自論文集 “The Principle of Relativity”, Dover Publications, 1952. 該書收入 Einstein, Lorentz, Minkowski and Weyl 之英譯論文集，本節譯自該書 pp. 37– 8 .
13. 原子鐘在 1971 有 Hafele and Keating’s Experiment, 而粒子實驗是在 1959 年在 ECRN 利用 Myon 之實驗，見 Roman Sexl, Raum-Zeit-Relativitat, Vieweg, 1978, s. 35 – 45.
14. 12, pp. 39 – 40.
15. Kurt Gödel, A Remark about the Relationship between Relativity theory and idealistic philosophy, in Albert Einstein, as Philosopher and scientist, ed. by P.A. Schilpp.
16. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 31.
17. 同上 A 31.
18. 同上 A31 – 32.
19. 同上 A 32.
20. 同上 A 32.
21. 同上 A 32 – 33.
22. 同上 A 33 – 34.
23. 同上 A 95 – A 136.
24. 同上 A 142.
25. 同上 A 177 – 226.
26. 同上 A 211.
27. 同上 A 212.
28. 此例子見於 R. Sexel, p. 89.



## LOGICAL POSITIVISM, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND METAPHYSICS

Chung Ming Tse

Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University

Although the heyday of logical positivism is over and analytical philosophy is undergoing a change both in its direction and in its outlook, the after-effects of their criticisms of traditional metaphysics can still be felt among the "new metaphysicians" like John Dewey, P. F. Strawson, Stephen Pepper, and others. Metaphysics as a species is still very much alive, yet the way it is constructed, is quite different from the way it was done previously. Metaphysicians now are more cautious about the nature of their claims, and are more aware of the relevancy of their systems to experience. It is fair to say that, although logical positivism and analytic philosophy could not successfully accomplish their ambition of eliminating metaphysics, they nevertheless have effected a change in the conception of what metaphysics is. This paper will summarise the analytic movements *vis-a-vis* their antagonisms to metaphysics.

There are numerous conceptions of metaphysics. The most orthodox one is perhaps Aristotle's. According to Aristotle, metaphysics is the science that studies "being *qua* being and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature."<sup>1</sup> The knowledge obtained through this science is said to be the knowledge of the first principles or ultimate causes of the universe. Metaphysical knowledge, being respected as the knowledge of the highest genus, is the pinnacle of the Aristotelian hierarchy, and it alone deserves the name of wisdom, for it is not knowledge of *some* things but knowledge of *all* things in the greatest generality. Developments of metaphysics after Aristotle, however, rendered this conception inappropriate. Insofar as Aristotelian metaphysics primarily concerns itself with "Being *qua* being," it is now more properly regarded as only one division of metaphysics, namely, ontology.

A fuller account of the domain and subject matter of metaphysics is propounded by Kant. According to Kant, metaphysics is divided into two parts, viz., metaphysics of nature and that of morals, in correspondence with the twofold employment of pure reason, that is, the speculative and the practical employments.<sup>2</sup> Metaphysics of nature, regarding its subject-matter, has four subdivisions: ontology, rational physiology, rational cosmology, and rational theology.<sup>3</sup> Yet Kant's ontology must not be confused with Aristotle's, for it "treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relates to objects that *may be given*."<sup>4</sup> It is properly called, as did Kant, transcendental philosophy, and is distinguished from ontology as a science of "Being *qua* being." The other three subdivisions deal with the problems of the soul, the world as a whole, and God, respectively. The metaphysics of morals will not be discussed here for the reason that it calls for special treatment concerning its merits and possibilities.

## I. Positivist Criticisms of Metaphysics

Some important achievements in the fields of mathematics and physics during and before the first decades of the 20th century have been instrumental in the development of logical positivism. Poincaré's conventionalism, Hilbert's formalism, and Russell-Whitehead's logicism account for the *a priori* analytical nature of mathematical and logical truth on the one hand; Mach's physics, together with Einstein's, affirms the *a posteriori* synthetic nature of scientific truth on the other. The recognition of the nature of logico-mathematical truth and of scientific truth gives rise to one of the basic tenets of logical positivism — the strict and conclusive distinction between analytical and synthetic statements. It is also thought that all analytic statements are *a priori*, and *vice versa*, while all synthetic statements are *a posteriori*, and *vice versa*. It follows that the analytic and the *a priori* are extensionally equivalent, so are the synthetic and the *a posteriori*. One of the intended effects of this tenet, or "dogma" as Quine would say, has been what Reichenbach calls the "disintegration of the synthetic *a priori*"<sup>5</sup> in opposition to Kant's doctrine. So to "the insight into the nature of logic" is attributed "the great turning point," as Schlick proudly declares.<sup>6</sup>

Concerning the nature of analytical statements there have been extensive discussions about Kant's notion. For Kant an analytical statement is a statement the concept of whose predicate-term is contained in the concept of the subject-term. Philosophers of clarity and precision naturally do not feel comfortable with Kant's vague and metaphorical language. For it is not clear how a concept can be said to be "contained in" another concept. A number of theses are proposed purporting to explicate the nature of analytical statements. Some of the representative theses are listed as follows. A statement is said to be analytically true if and only if it is true 1) by definition, or 2) by convention, or 3) by virtue of explicit or implicit rules of language, or 4) in every state description, or 5) as consequent of any sentence, or 6) as an instance of substitution of a logical formula, or 7) *ex vi terminorum*. Although these theses appear different in wording, they express roughly the same idea. There is no disagreement about the idea that the validity of an analytical statement depends solely on some sort of logic without reference to added empirical evidence. The truth of an analytical statement can be ascertained purely on a non-empirical ground and is, therefore, *a priori*. The governing principle is the principle of noncontradiction. If the denial of a statement leads to a logical contradiction, the statement in question must be analytical, and is logically necessary. Since an analytical statement does not depend on, or is not related to empirical data, it is said to be empty, that is, void of cognitive content. This being so, an analytical statement does not convey any new knowledge or information about reality; it does not describe anything about the world. A tautology or an identity statement is *par excellence* analytical. It is worthwhile to note again that, for the logical positivists and other philosophers of the same persuasion, an analytical statement alone is *a priori*. So all *a priori* statements cannot be otherwise than being analy-

tical and all logical and mathematical statements are of this nature.

A synthetical statement is one which is not analytical. In Kant's terminology, a synthetical statement is a statement the concept of whose predicate-term is *not* contained in the concept of its subject-term. The connection therein requires something "outside" the mere concepts employed in the statement. For Kant some kind of synthetical statement can be construed on a non-empirical ground, that is *a priori*. Yet this *a priori* is not understood in a purely logical sense but rather in the sense of what he calls transcendental. A system of transcendental propositions, though not derived from experience, can yet function as a system of presuppositions of experience. So for Kant there is such a thing as the synthetic *a priori*. The logical positivists painstakingly oppose this Kantian doctrine, insisting that no synthetical statement can be at the same time *a priori*, and that all synthetical statements are *a posteriori*, i.e., thoroughly empirical in nature. The positivists maintain that the empirical import of a synthetical statement consists of the following two elements. First a synthetical statement carries new knowledge or information about experiential reality; it describes or reports something about the world. Second, and more importantly, the validity of a synthetical statement is ultimately based on empirical evidence alone and nothing else. Save for the minimum formal requirement of non-contradiction empirical observations constitute the sole ground on which the truth (or falsehood) of a synthetical statement rests. A synthetical statement is thus constantly subject to, and in principle capable of, scientific confirmation (or disconfirmation). Testability hence becomes a sure mark of synthetical statement.

The conceptions of the nature of synthetical statement and that of analytical statement, together with the conclusive distinction between the two, constitute the basis of the once famous principle of verification. The principle had enjoyed much attention and popularity before it retired to the background. During its lifespan it nonetheless underwent many phases of existence, or ways of being formulated, from very rough to highly sophisticated. Unfortunately the principle even in its most articulated form still involves some difficulties which its proponents failed to overcome satisfactorily. But it is interesting to see how the principle was utilized to attack metaphysics before we consider the merit of the principle itself.

A. J. Ayer was once a spokesman of logical positivism in the English speaking world. One of his earlier statements of the principle of verification reads as follows: "A statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable."<sup>7</sup> The principle, when it is formulated as such, goes beyond the above described conceptions of analytical statement and synthetical statement. It lays down not only the necessary and sufficient condition of truth (or falsehood) for a statement but also the necessary and sufficient condition of meaningfulness for a statement. That a statement can in principle be shown to be either analytically or empirically true or false entails that it is meaningful, and vice versa. It follows that any statement which can in no known way be verified as either true or false is cognitively meaningless. One must remember that for the positivists there are only two known procedures of recog-



nizing the truth or falsehood of a statement, namely, the *a priori* and the empirical methods. So the principle in effect amounts to ruling that only analytical or synthetic statements have literal, cognitive meaning, and are verifiable as true or false. By virtue of the principle the notions of verifiability and meaningfulness become interchangeable in certain contexts. Indeed the principle was also referred to as the empiricist criterion of meaning, as Carnap sometimes did.

The positivists did not fail to notice the existence of other types of linguistic expressions with which problems of truth or falsehood do not arise. Utterances expressing commands, exclamations, approvals (or disapprovals), moral appraisals (or reprisals), aesthetical appreciations (or depreciations), and others do have a place in our language. To account for these types of expression the positivists evoke what is commonly called the emotive theory of meaning and at the same time skillfully avoid the positions of ethical and aesthetical realisms (or objectivisms) — the thought that moral or aesthetical statements do have truth values just as a cognitive statement like “X is red” does. According to the emotive theory of meaning utterances like “X is good,” and “X is beautiful” are just ejaculations of feelings and emotions; they are not propositions but expressions or expressive acts. These utterances do not purport to report or inform about anything; they are meant to perform the functions of suggesting actions, commanding, and provoking responses on the part of the hearer. There is of course no problems of truth or falsity with respect to the utterances themselves, although there are considerations of sincerity or deceit, taste or distaste regarding the speaker. The emotive theory does have a very important impact on contemporary ethical and aesthetical theories.

Positivists’ attacks on metaphysics are leveled along two lines which we shall call the logical and the psychological. The logical criticisms consist in condemning metaphysical claims as meaningless by putting them against the measure of the principle of verification, while the psychological criticisms mainly draw our attention to the intellectual disposition of metaphysicians.

With confidence in the force of the principle of verification Ayer emphatically declares:

Our charge against the metaphysician is . . . that he produced sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.<sup>8</sup>

The metaphysician makes sentences which can in no known way be verified. When the metaphysician produces a sentence such as “The universe is spirit,” he or she will be pressed to respond to an interrogation like this: “How do you verify the truth of your statement? Is your statement analytical (tautological) or synthetic (factual)?” It is plain that the metaphysician would not say that his statement is analytical, for in this case his statement would not describe anything about the universe; and neither would he want to say that his statement is synthetic, for in this case it must be subject to

scientific investigation and thus belongs to a special science. The metaphysician's claim must be meaningless according to the principle of verification. All other metaphysical claims like "The soul is simple," "The substances of the world are mind and matter," "Being is nothingness," will be subject to similar criticisms. The basic positivist idea is that such sentences are not verifiable *a priori*, nor are they verifiable *a posteriori*. The conclusion seems to be inevitable, that, if metaphysics is "an inquiry into the nature of the reality underlying or transcending the phenomena which the special sciences are intent to study," it must be impossible.<sup>9</sup> Ayer remarks that metaphysics has a similar effect to that of poetry.

Besides logical criticisms, psychological criticisms are also set forth against metaphysics. Ayer thinks that philosophers tend to make metaphysical assertions partly because "they are not content to make observations and generalizations and predictions but desire also to express their feelings about the world."<sup>10</sup> Yet they do not express their feeling in proper language, for instance, poetic language but rather pretend to employ logical devices and construct seemingly rational theories so that they may "extrapolate their emotions."<sup>11</sup> Metaphysics arises thereby, and is really a work of literature. Another psychological reason for constructing metaphysical systems is because philosophers have a desire to unify human knowledge.<sup>12</sup> As Kant has pointed out, the demand for unity is a natural disposition of human intellect. A historian of philosophy sympathetically understands the history of philosophy as mainly "the chronicle of an unremitting struggle to bring within the same focus the good, the beautiful, and the true, and to contemplate them all as a single, self-consistent, all-explanatory object in which all our aspirations, including our yearning to satisfy our curiosity, find equal and complete fulfillment."<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately the search for unity often ends up with a "badly speculative physics — all-encompassing generalizations about the universe as a whole, which becomes especially preposterous when from its generalities one attempts to derive particular facts," as Brodbeck comments.<sup>14</sup>

The quest for certainty is also said to contribute to the indulgence in metaphysical speculation. Knowledge from empirical observations is always uncertain, and this uncertainty easily gives rise to a feeling of insecurity. Some great philosophers like Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza have taken pains to overcome this feeling of insecurity by attempting to rest human knowledge of reality on a sure basis. With the example set by mathematical knowledge which *seems* to be certain and at the same time descriptive, these philosophers believe that the intellect alone can produce (or apprehend) certain knowledge of reality. Descartes teaches that it is not our senses which perceive a piece of wax but "the mind alone which perceives it."<sup>15</sup> Sense perceptions are regarded as an inferior type of knowledge because they often trap us into error. As Reichenbach puts it, "it is the search for certainty which makes the philosopher disregard the contribution of observation to knowledge."<sup>16</sup> Indeed one may want to add that the philosopher has also been misled by his improper understanding of the nature of mathematical and scientific knowledge. Einstein rightly points out that "as

far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality."<sup>17</sup> The ideology that we may have certain knowledge of reality now turns out to be a mere illusion.

## II. Difficulties of the Principle of Verification

Indeed the principle has brought about more problems than it can solve. One of the major difficulties consists in the very notion of verification (or verifiability) itself. Exactly what constitutes verification is a crucial element in the principle. As far as analytical statement is concerned, this does not represent a real challenge, for there are well recognized logical rules and formulae in terms of which the notion can be defined. But if the truth of a synthetical statement is at issue, the principle displays its inability to operate effectively without a precise and workable definition of the notion of verification. The difficulty of formulating a satisfactory definition by and large arises from the requirements 1) that the definiens must be indubiously and unambiguously acceptable as ultimate grounds for reference and 2) that the definition must precisely exclude what is not intended and include what is intended. It is these two constraints among others that the positivists have struggled with, and failed. We may call them the problems of referential scheme and of precision, respectively. Take Ayer's re-formulation of the principle into consideration. In his Introduction to the second edition of *Language, Truth and Logic* ten years later than the first edition, Ayer puts it in this way:

I propose to say that a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone; and I propose to say that a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: first, that in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable. And now I reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be either directly, or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense.<sup>18</sup>

In Ayer's formulae, observation-statements are definiens (verifiers) that would constitute the terminal of the verification process. The problem of referential scheme immediately shows itself, as to what an observation-statement is and why philosophers must accept it as a meaning criterion in the last analysis. Several attempts have been made to answer the first question. Ayer suggests that an observation-statement is a direct, incorrigible sense report, like "I see a canoid patch of color." But this leads to a dead alley for the positivists. If the report is taken as a report of personal sensations

(sense data), then solipsism must follow and communication should become unintelligible. For sense data are private, mental occurrences without public reference and measurement. Science, the paradigmatic knowledge for the positivists, undoubtedly cannot rest on a purely subjective ground.

Morris Schlick hopes to avoid this solipsism by resorting to a kind of coherent theory. He contends that "my color experiences correspond to his tone experiences, . . . nevertheless . . . we should always understand one another perfectly . . . if the inner *order* of his experience agrees with that of mine," and that "a statement concerning the similarity of the experiences of two persons has no other communicable meaning than a certain agreement of their reactions."<sup>19</sup> Schlick has inadvertently betrayed the principle of verification as soon as he makes the notion of systematic agreement or disagreement the ultimate criterion of meaning — of course, communicable meaning. For he has departed from the basic assumptions of the positivistic program, namely, that there is an isomorphism between language and reality, and that there are incorrigible atomic facts. The coherent theory of truth does not need these assumptions. Indeed, the problem of referential scheme has forced many positivists to soften their position. Otto Neurath is one good example. Attempting to construct the bedrock of the process of verification Neurath introduces the notion of what he calls "protocol sentence." A protocol sentence is basically a linguistic representation of simple facts in terms of space-time specifications and physicalistic designations. An example of protocol sentence might read: "Otto's protocol at 3:17 o'clock: [At 3:16 o'clock Otto said to himself: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]."<sup>20</sup> If Ayer's "observation statement" is a representation of simple facts in gross language, then Neurath's "protocol" is a representation of the same facts in refined and articulated terms. Protocols are not incorrigible, however, and the frame of positivism is bent when Neurath turns himself in to the coherent theory of truth:

*There is no way of taking conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. No tabula rasa exist . . . . When a new sentence is presented to us we compare it with the system at our disposal, and determine whether or not it conflicts with that system. If the sentence does conflict with the system, we may discard it as useless (or false), as, for instance, would be done with "In Africa lions sing only in major scales." One may, on the other hand, accept the sentence and so change the system that it remains consistent even after the adjunction of the new sentence. The sentence would then be called "true."<sup>21</sup>*

This amounts to a declared abandonment of the principle of verification, for it is now nothing short of a Hegelian and/or pragmatic theory of truth.

Another well-known move was made by Carnap in tackling the problem of referential scheme. According to the once positivist Carnap, all factual languages can in principle be reduced to what he calls physical thing-language, a sort of language that

supposedly has only physically observable designata. The idea is sometimes referred to as physicalism. The failure is however well-known. The most stubborn resistance derives from the fact that many mental statements and terms are not reducible to physical language without losing their commonly understood meaning, the same fact that defies the program of psychological behaviorism. For instance, when I say "I feel sad," I do not mean, nor in normal situations will I be taken to mean, that my heart-beats, blood pressure, glandular secretion, *et cetera* have certain changes taking place. Mental statements as such, if rendered into purely physical language, should become unintelligible in daily discourse.

As far as the problem of precision is concerned, there are at least two difficulties which the principle of verification fails to overcome. With Ayer's formulation, a statement will be said to be verifiable when in conjunction with some other observation-statements it entails an observation statement. The principle so re-stated will be unable to exclude the unintended. To prove this let us first construct a formal argument, as follows.

1.  $M \supset O$  (True premise)
2.  $(M \supset O) \vee -S$  (1, and addition of an arbitrary term)
3.  $-S \vee (M \supset O)$  (2, and communitativity of " $\vee$ ")
4.  $S \supset (M \supset O)$  (3, and material implication)
5.  $(S.M) \supset O$  (4, and exportation)

From " $M \supset O$ " it is deducible that  $(S.M) \supset O$ . Now let "M" stand for the general statement "Magnet attracts iron," and "S" for "Satan is beautiful." it is then agreed, on the principle of verification, that M, "Magnet attracts iron," is a verifiable, and therefore meaningful statement, since it entails the observation statement O, "This piece of magnet attracts this piece of iron." Here we have a sound argument with the conclusion  $(S.M) \supset O$ . The argument establishes that, if M entails O, then  $(S.M)$  entails O. That  $(S.M)$  entails O qualifies itself as a (verifiable) meaningful statement. The outcome is that, if "Magnet attracts iron" is meaningful, then "Satan is beautiful and magnet attracts iron" is also meaningful, which Ayer might find it hard to accept.

Again, the principle, if carried out consistently, would lead to a consequence unacceptable to the positivists, that most scientific laws are unverifiable, and therefore meaningless. The fact is that most scientific laws especially the "covering laws" are formulated in the form of a universal statement, while a universal statement, if it covers or purports to cover an indefinite number of instances, can never be conclusively verified. Take for example the statement "With certain preconditions satisfied, magnet attracts iron." The statement can be conclusively verified only by complete enumeration of all instances. And this is obviously not possible. It might argue that this difficulty does not arise with Ayer's formulation, since it only requires an observation-statement to be derived from the statement in question. Yet the problem is still

there. For one can always ask how many observations are needed in order that the statement "Magnet attracts iron" can be said to be verified as true when complete enumeration is practically not possible. It would be scientifically naive to say that one or two instances of observation suffice. Indeed scientific explanation of the deductive model (also called covering-law model) faces the same problem, and many scientists would prefer to use the notion of confirmation in terms of probability instead of the notion of "verification."

To avoid the problem in connection with universal statement the notion of falsification or falsifiability was once introduced as a replacement of the notion of verification. Thus the principle turns into something like this: A statement is meaningful if and only if it in principle can be falsified. Still it would not do; one cannot turn sour milk fresh by merely changing the bottle. A particular negative statement, if it extends to cover an indefinite class of objects, can never be conclusively falsified either. Take for example the statement "Some crows are not black." Granted that 'black' is not a definition of 'crow,' the statement cannot be empirically proven as false when the species presumably continues to exist. Yet no one would want to say that the statement "Some crows are not black" is meaningless. Technically, to falsify the statement one must show that all crows are black. This takes us back to the very same difficulty which the notion of falsification is invented to overcome.

Apart from the problems of referential scheme and of precision, the principle also encounters many other challenges. One of the admitted challenges has brought the principle to a near self-defeating position. Antagonists of positivism have kept questioning the logical status of the principle itself. Is the principle of verification itself verifiable? Is it analytical or synthetic? The same question which the positivists pose for metaphysicians puts the positivists themselves in a dilemma. The principle cannot be analytical, for in this case it would be void of content; nor can it be synthetic, for in this case it would be subject to empirical test and circularity would follow. The positivists tend to take the last effort to save the principle from a total defeat by acknowledging it as a convention. But then it loses all its devastating force against metaphysics for there is no logic which compels philosophers to accept this particular convention. The disillusioned positivist Ayer eventually admits the failure:

It seems to me fairly clear that what they were in fact doing was to adopt the verification principle as a convention . . . But why should this convention be accepted? The most that has been proved is that metaphysical statements do not fall into the same category as the laws of logic, or as scientific hypotheses, or as historical narratives, or judgments of perception, or any other common sense descriptions of the "natural" world. Surely it does not follow that they are nonsensical.<sup>22</sup>

The history of logical positivism can be fairly characterized as the history of the struggle for survival of the verification principle. The movement at the outset proclaims its ambitious task of eliminating metaphysics and in the middle development it is reduced to a humble position of self-defense. Its conclusion can be stated in the

words of Ayer:

The question is whether one thinks the difference between metaphysical and common sense or scientific statements to be sufficiently sharp for it to be useful to underline it in this way. The defect of this procedure is that it tends to make one blind to the interest that metaphysical questions can have.<sup>23</sup>

The positivist attempt to eliminate metaphysics is not successful. Nevertheless the desire to erase metaphysics does not quiet down. Another wave of criticisms follows immediately. This time the slogan is not "the elimination of metaphysics," but rather "the dissolution of metaphysical problems." The new approach is linguistic analysis, which aims to set up some logico-linguistic devices to settle metaphysical disputes and to process metaphysical statements.

### III. Linguistic Criticisms of Metaphysics

It may be partly true that the failure of the principle of verification and the intra-Vienna-Circle disagreements make many positivists turn linguistic analysts, but the influences of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* should not be overlooked. Philosophers like Bergmann and Carnap realize that it would be futile to continue the search for an adequate meaning criterion that could prohibit the making of metaphysical statements. The reason is that the grammar and meaning of ordinary language are inherently liberal and vague, so much so that no meaning criterion with strict precision could be made out of it. Ordinary language is beyond repair, so to speak. Hence the idea of an ideal language has its natural birth. It is suggested that ordinary language be abandoned at least in the spheres of science and philosophy in favor of an artificially constructed language. An attempted construction of such a language is found in Carnap's *The Logical Syntax of Language*, where he says,

*In logic, there are no morals.* Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his method clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.<sup>24</sup>

An ideal language will be a logically perfect language system with explicit syntactical and semantical, or formation and transformation rules.

Yet some other philosophers who are more influenced by Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and G. E. Moore's commonsense philosophy hold that natural language should not and could not be dispensed with as it is basically sound. Metaphysical statements and problems do not come out of the inherent nature of ordinary language but rather they result from philosophers' misuses and abuses of the language. So, all that is needed is a sort of therapeutic program to rehabilitate the abnormal or

incorrect uses of language. Normal uses consist in the way ordinary people use it. Champions of this Ordinary Language program have been Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin among others. The practice of the "linguistic corrective" method can be exemplified with Ryle's most celebrated works *The Concept of Mind* and "Systematically Misleading Expressions." Ryle says,

I try to use *reduction and absurdum* arguments both to disallow operations implicitly recommended by the Cartesian myth and to indicate to what logical types the concepts under investigation ought to be allocated.<sup>25</sup>

So it has been Ryle's task first to detect the misuses and misplacements of concepts, which include for examples what he calls category mistakes and systematically misleading expressions, and then to set them right in accordance with their ordinary employments.

In spite of the difference in approach between the Ideal Language and the Ordinary Language programs there is a shared belief that philosophical enigmas are dissolvable through logical analysis of their linguistic representations. The result of this procedure is anticipated to be:

In the first place, there are a great many questions which look like questions because they are formed according to a certain grammatical order but which nevertheless are not real questions. In the second place, there are some "philosophical" problems which prove to be real questions. But of these it can always be shown by proper analysis that they are capable of being solved by the methods of science.<sup>26</sup>

In short logical analysis will eventually show that there are no genuine philosophical (metaphysical) questions. A few classical examples are given in what follows to illustrate the procedures of philosophical analysis as practiced by Carnap and Ryle, respectively.

Carnap makes a distinction between the material mode of speech and the formal mode of speech. Sentences in the material mode proper are sentences about extra-linguistic entities: properties, things, persons, and states of affairs. These sentences are also called object-sentences as they refer to realities of the world. Thus the sentence "The cat is on the mat" is an object-sentence properly couched in the material mode of speech. The sentence is about the cat, and/or the mat, and the fact that the cat is on the mat. Its truth of course depends upon matters of fact. To the same class belong "5 is a prime number," "Babylon was a big town," "Lions are mammals," *et cetera*. In short most of our daily utterances are typical object-sentences in the material mode of speech. The other kind of sentences is at the meta-language level and does not refer to extralinguistic realities. These sentences are about words or sentences at a lower level, and are also called syntactical sentences as they are about the syntax of the object-language. With Carnap logical syntax is "a *system* of the *formal* (i.e. not referring to



meaning) *rules* of the language, as well as of the consequences of these rules."<sup>27</sup> These formal rules govern the formation and transformation of sentences of a linguistic system. The following are examples of syntactical sentences in the formal mode of speech: "The sentence 'Cat mat on is the the' is not a well-formed sentence in English," and "The word 'daystar' is synonymous with 'sun'."<sup>28</sup>

Another useful distinction is that between *internal* and *external* questions. If a system of object-language is constructed for a class of entities, questions of existence can be asked of the framework. But, as Carnap says,

We must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them *internal questions*; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called *external questions*.<sup>29</sup>

Internal questions are answerable within the framework by logical or empirical methods. For instance, "Is the cat on the mat?" and "Is 7 greater than 5?" are internal questions that can be settled through procedures provided by our language. External questions transcend the domain of the linguistic framework and are not answerable in the way as internal questions are. Such questions are typical metaphysical questions, for instance, "Is matter the only substance of the world?" and "Are numbers the ultimate substances of the universe?" Carnap proposes a way of handling these questions.

The two distinctions are powerful weapons to attack metaphysical problems. With Carnap many sentences about language, i.e. syntactical sentences have been *misleadingly* formulated in the material mode of speech. Such sentences have the *appearance* of an object-language while in essence they express statements about syntax. Hence they are called "pseudo-object-sentences," or what amounts to the same, "quasi-syntactical sentences of the material mode of speech." In other words, these sentences about syntax are improperly couched with the material mode of speech, and so, are misleading. In Carnap's assessment there is a host of such pseudo-object-sentences in philosophical discourses. Many philosophical puzzles occur just because of this misleading and improper way of linguistic representations of facts or ideas; hence many classical controversies can be dissolved from a logico-linguistic perspective when the language in which they are expressed, is translated or reformulated into their proper form.

One of the ways Carnap handles philosophical disputes is shown with the following examples. First, the Pythagorean thesis that numbers are substances *versus*, for example, the Aristotelian thesis that numbers are quantities of substances but themselves are not substances. Carnap would see it as a syntactical dispute whether '5' (or other numbers) is a thing-word or a number-word in our language. So the pseudo-object-sentence "5 is not a thing" (or "5 is a thing") is rendered into its proper mode of

speech as "5 is not a thing-word" (or "5 is a thing-word"). And quite obviously, then, '5' is not adopted as a thing-word as for example, 'an apple' is in our language. Second, the Humean thesis that a thing is a complex of sensations *versus* the realist thesis that a thing is a complex of atoms. These two theses are translated into syntactical sentences by Carnap, as follows. The Humean thesis reads "Every proposition in which a thing-name occurs, is of equal content with a class of propositions in which no thing-names but sensation-names occur," while the realist thesis reads "Every proposition in which a thing-name occurs is of equal content with a proposition in which no thing-names but space time coordinates and physical functions occur."<sup>30</sup> Third, the realist thesis that there are universals *versus* the nominalist thesis that there are no universals but particulars alone. Both are seen as pseudo-object-sentences, and they should be rehabilitated in the formal mode of speech. The realist thesis, then, can be translated into the syntactical sentence "There are in the language general names which are not logically interchangeable with any class of singular names." The nominalist thesis can be reformulated as "There are in the language no undefined (primitive) general names," or "Every general name in the language is reducible to a class of singular names."

The distinction between internal and external questions also help dismiss many philosophical controversies. External questions like "Is the empirical world real?" cannot be solved "because it is framed in a wrong way."<sup>31</sup> For to be real in the accepted sense is to be an element of the linguistic system under consideration, and this at the same time can be settled by the syntactical and the semantical rules provided by the system. So there are established procedures to decide, for example, if unicorns are *real*. But the question, for example, whether or not the whole world is real cannot be solved because the word 'real' is employed in a way that transgresses its accepted meaning domain. There are no valid rules that can decide what 'real' is meant in the question. On such rendering both sentences, "The empirical world is real" and "The empirical world is not real," are not capable of expressing meaningful propositions and so are pseudo-statements.

In Carnap's opinion, negligence or ignorance about the logical syntax of language is often a cause of the philosopher's producing questions or statements which though grammatically permissible are however syntactically inadmissible. One of the common mistakes is confusion of syntactical categories. It consists in using words of certain categories in the capacities of other categories. For instance, the statement "Caesar is a prime number" is a case in point. For being a prime number is properly a predicate of *numbers*, and 'Caesar' is not a number-word but a person-name. To predicate 'Caesar' of 'being a prime number' confuses two syntactical categories, and the statement thus produced has no significance on ground of syntactical consideration. This sort of syntactical confusions is often seen in Heidegger's writings about "nothing." The logic of the word 'nothing' does not allow sentences like "We know the nothing," "Anxiety reveals the nothing," "The nothing itself nothings," *et cetera* to be constructed. For in our common language the word 'nothing' is not a thing-name, any more than is it a

verb, still yet it is not a name of any *thing* at all. To construct sentences with 'nothing' in the capacity of a name or a verb involves a confusion of syntactical categories.<sup>3 2</sup>

Upon Carnap's analysis traditional metaphysical problems or statements will evaporate in one of the following ways. First, some seemingly philosophical problems are shown to be questions concerning matters of fact, and therefore, should be referred to appropriate sciences. For example, the ancient Greek problem about the basic "stuff" of the universe should be assigned to modern physics. Philosopher *qua* philosopher has no business with it. Second, some metaphysical problems are understood to be problems about language, that is, about syntax or choice of alternative frameworks. Different philosophical positions are regarded as competing proposals or recommendations. Thus, for example, the sense-data theory will be considered as a *proposal* that we adopt a language system of which thing-names are not basic units but sensation-names are. The choice of a particular proposal or recommendation is dictated by economical and pragmatical principles. Carnap makes it clear that "the acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms . . . will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ration of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required."<sup>3 3</sup> Third, some metaphysical problems upon analysis are not genuine problems at all; they are simply "pseudo's" resulting from the philosopher's mistakes about the logic of the language. Such problems or statements are constructed with a grammatically correct appearance that conceals some kind of syntactical error. Ryle has much to say in this regard, as will be seen in the sequel.

Gilbert Ryle's treatment of metaphysical problems or statements resembles Carnap's in that metaphysical problems are seen as rooted in confusions of the proper functions of linguistic expressions. Yet Ryle does not believe that there is a need for an ideal language model as criterion for linguistic correctness. In his opinion the way ordinary people use the language suffice to serve as criterion, for metaphysical problems chiefly arise from misuses and abuses of common language by philosophers. Different genus of expressions behave differently; to lump them together without careful discriminations would result in linguistic inappropriateness such as "category mistakes" and "systematically misleading expressions." Hence to clarify and reformulate the muddle philosophical expressions is a major task of Ryle's philosophical activity.

An essential element of Ryle's corrective program is stated as followed:

There are many expressions which occur in non-philosophical discourse which, though they are perfectly clearly understood by those who use them and those who hear or read them, are nevertheless couched in grammatical or syntactical forms which are in a demonstrable way improper to the states of affairs which they record . . . Such expressions . . . must be reformulated into expressions of which the syntactical form is proper to the facts recorded. . . . When an expression is of such a syntactical form that it is improper to the fact recorded, it is systematically misleading in that it naturally suggests to some people . . . that the state

of affairs recorded is quite a different sort of state of affairs from that which it in fact is.<sup>34</sup>

A systematically misleading expression is an expression which, by virtue of its grammatical or syntactical form, suggests a state of affairs that the expression properly does not represent. It is misleading in that it directs the hearer or reader to conceive something that it really does not or cannot represent. It is *systematically* misleading in that its misleadingness derives from the formal structure it possesses. However, the expression needs not be false or senseless; it is just *misleading*. According to Ryle there are three kinds of such expression, namely, quasi-ontological statements, quasi-Platonic statements, and quasi-descriptions. Since quasi-descriptions are not so closely connected with metaphysics as the other two kinds are, they will not be discussed here.

Some metaphysical statements contain at least one linguistic part which seems to signify the ontological status of the thing being talked about by the statements. But, according to Ryle, they really do not have that signification. Typical quasi-ontological statements are such existential statements as "Satan does not exist," "Being is immutable," and "God exists," *et cetera*. With Ryle, take the statement "Satan does not exist" for analysis. Of the statement the grammatical subject is 'Satan' and the predicate is 'does not exist.' The statement bears the same grammatical form as that of the statement, say, "Mrs. Jones does not come." Since 'Satan' and 'Mrs. Jones' play the same grammatical role, and so do 'does not exist' and 'does not come,' it naturally suggests the thought that, there is an individual entity by the name Satan who has the attribute of non-existence as there is a person by the name Mrs. Jones who has the attribute *per accidens* of not-coming. Due to this sameness of structural appearance an impression is created that in both cases alike an individual is predicated of something.

Upon Ryle's analysis the two statements are not of the same logical type. The expression 'Satan' is not a proper name, viz., a denoting expression whereas the expression 'Mrs. Jones' is. This being so, 'Satan' is not a primary logical subject whereas 'Mrs. Jones' is. Furthermore, Ryle tacitly maintains that existence is not a predicate, and so the grammatically predicative expression 'does not exist' is not a logical predicate while 'does not come' is.<sup>35</sup> The statement "Satan does not exist" is then reconstructed as "Nothing is both devilish and alone in being devilish," or as "Nothing is both devilish and called 'Satan'," or again " 'Satan' is not the proper name of anything."<sup>36</sup> The reformulation of the statement into its proper logical form exposes what kind of a state of affairs it is that the statement actually represents. Other quasi-ontological statements are treated in like manner. Generally speaking, the idea of Ryle's analysis consists in this: " 'X exists' and 'X does not exist' do not assert or deny that a given subject of attributes X has the attribute of existing, but assert or deny the attribute of being X-ish or being an X of something not named in the statement."<sup>37</sup> In short, Ryle's thesis is simply this: When a person says "X exists" or "X does not exist," he is not expressing the proposition that X exists, nor is he expressing the proposition that X does not exist, but rather he is expressing the proposition that something is so-and-so

or that nothing is so-and-so. Whether there is that something as such is not being asserted or denied. Ryle charges that "those metaphysical philosophers are the greatest sinners, who as if they were saying something of importance, make 'Reality' or 'Being' the subject of their propositions, or 'real' the predicate."<sup>38</sup>

Quasi-Platonic statements are also systematically misleading as quasi-ontological statements are. Both types of statements tend to lead people to some sort of ontological commitment for which the statements themselves are not arguments. Yet quasi-Platonic statements do their trick in a slightly different way. They do not straightforwardly present the impression that something is or is not, but rather they induce people to make unwarranted inference from linguistic presentations to assumptions about existence. A quasi-Platonic statement is such a statement that its subject term, which is bogus upon analysis, is actually a predicative term yet functioning as if it were a proper name. In a quasi-Platonic statement a general name assumes the grammatical subject position thereby creating an atmosphere that it is also the logical subject of the statement which it in fact is not. Being a logical subject though bogus, it nevertheless is suggestive of a sort of entities to which it seems to refer. Hence a realm of Platonic universals appears necessary as answering referents. Typical quasi-Platonic statements are such as "Color involves extension," "Beauty shines on earth," "Justice is invincible," and others.

Ryle's analysis is to remove these bogus subject terms from the subject position and reduce them to predicative expressions. Take the statement "Color involves extension" for example. Ryle's analysis of this statement is as follows. The expression 'color' in the statement means what is meant by the predicative expression '. . . is colored.' The statement is translated as "Whatever is colored is extended." Or we could put it in another way as is commonly done in general logic, as this, "If X is colored, X is extended." Other quasi-Platonic statements are analyzed in the same way. So instead of "Beauty shines on earth" we have, for example, "Whatever is beautiful attracts our attention" and instead of "Justice is invincible" we have, for example, "Whatever act is just will prevail eventually."

Another set of linguistic abuses and misuses is recognized by Ryle as category mistakes. In his celebrated work *The Concept of Mind* Ryle aims to demolish the Cartesian dualism and other dualistic-shadowed theories of mind. His chief target has been the dualism that we have a mental life *plus* a physical life, or in a more Cartesian language, that we have a mind-substance inside our physical body. Ryle calls it the Cartesian Myth. In his own words, "one of the central negative motives of this book is to show that 'mental' does not denote a status . . ."<sup>39</sup> That the Cartesian dualism is a myth, is not because it is false, but because it is "the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another."<sup>40</sup> Thus for example, to talk about a football game in the language appropriate to economics would be mythical. What Ryle has in mind is a Wittgensteinian concept of language, according to which different language games are played differently as dictated by their logic of depicting proper. To

use one certain class of expression to represent facts to which this class of expression is not appropriate would involve violations of its logic. Hence some sort of linguistic mistakes arise and, as a result, a myth is produced. Descartes' Myth is a case in point. There is a series of "category mistakes" involved in the Cartesian dualism.

To show what category mistakes are, Ryle calls forth a number of illustrations. One of them is as follows. A foreigner visiting Oxford University would be said to make a category mistake, if he, after having been shown a number of colleges, libraries, play fields, museums, particular departments *et cetera* asks where the University is. The foreigner's error is that he makes an assumption that 'the Oxford University' refers to the same *sort* of things as referred to by 'the Christ Church,' 'the Ashmolean Museum,' and the like. The assumption is erroneous because 'the Oxford University' does not refer to a *thing* as 'the Christ Church' or 'the Ashmolean Museum' does, but refers to the *way* things are organized. Thus the foreigner has confused the category as exemplified by 'the Oxford University' with the category as exemplified by 'the Ashmolean Museum' and 'the Christ Church.' He has made a category mistake. And if the foreigner should talk about the Oxford university in the same way as he talks about the Ashmolean Museum or the Christ Church, he will be said to be presenting a myth.<sup>41</sup> Ryle suggests that the Cartesian dualism has arisen from such a mistake about the logical status of mental terms. The dualists misconceive concepts like "mind," "thought," "feelings," to be on the same footing as concepts like "body," "heads," "hands." They mistakingly consider mental terms as thing-referring terms. But, since there is in the observable world nothing that satisfies the supposed denoting function of the mental terms, the dualists then assume a different field of existence where those terms could find their referents. Hence, a ghost in a machine — a mind in a body.

That 'mind' is not a thing-referring word, is a underlying theme of Ryle's treatment of Descartes's Myth. The word 'mind,' like 'British Constitution,' does not name an additional office or entity, any more than the word 'government' does. These words stand for the ways things are organized but not for any particular things. Parallel example can be drawn from the fact that, although 'a dime,' 'a quarter,' and 'a dollar' denote some things, the word 'money' does not. To assume or postulate an additional entity answering the word 'money' is to commit the sin of reification as done by Meinong's theory of reference. Taking the word 'mind' in the same category as 'body' is a mistake, and consequently leads to the postulate of an additional world.

On the basis of the distinction between the categories of mind-words and body-words Ryle furthers his attack on the problem of mind by identifying another species of category mistake involved in the issue. This species of category mistake results from conjoining or disjoining terms belonging to different categories. Ryle presents his point with the following illustrations: " 'She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair,'" " 'She came home either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair'."<sup>42</sup> The former is a conjunction of two propositions employing terms belonging to different categories, while the latter is a disjunctive proposition with the same character. Both

propositions are for Ryle absurd.

But why propositions conjoining or disjoining terms of different categories are absurd, Ryle has furnished no obvious reason. Perhaps it may be suggested, with plausibility, that we usually do not talk in that way. For it surely sounds odd or even ridiculous to say, for example, "Both my wife and my dog are beautiful," or "My wife is either beautiful or else taking a bath." In ordinary discourse no one would sensibly predicate the same 'beautiful' of 'my wife' in conjunction with 'my dog,' for these two words are in different categories. The ways people actually use a certain language do imply some informal, implicit rules (or conventions) for appropriateness of expressions in that language, although such rules need not be formally stated in a grammar book or a logic text. Expressions violating these rules may not be false but are most likely to sound or appear odd and absurd. The following examples are intended to further illustrate this point. It is proper to say, "This handsome boy is in love with that beautiful girl," while odd to say, "This beautiful boy is in love with that handsome girl." These expressions are idiomatic: "a herd of sheep," "a group of people," "a chrous of singers," and "a fleet of ships," while these are absurd: "a chrous of sheep," "a herd of people," "a group of ships," and "a fleet of singers." The fact that we normally do not use the language in such a way is the reason for their being absurd.

By the same token Ryle argues that the dualistic thesis, "There exist mind and body," is absurd, as much as "She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair" is, because 'mind' and 'body' belong to two different categories the conjunction of which produces absurdity. The same line of argument holds good for repudiating the materialistic and the idealistic reductionisms. Both forms of reductionism incorrectly presuppose the legitimacy of the proposition, "There exists either mind or else body," which in Ryle's view is absurd for the same reason as "She came home either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair" is.

#### IV. Some Difficulties of Philsophical Analysis

Like logical positivism analytical attempts to eliminate metaphysics have not been successful although these attempts are not without fruitful results. Both forms of philosoophical analysis have their own difficulties that have thwarted their continuous growth in the direction against metaphysics. One of the major blockadges the Ideal Language program could not overcome has been its becoming irrelevant to ontology.

The problem of ontological relevancy arises once an abstract linguistic framework is constructed. This problem however did not bother the early Russell and the early Carnap who held an isomorphic view of language in relation to realities. But isomorphism remains an unsolved enigma for empiricism.<sup>43</sup> Carnap later abandoned this view and turned to linguistic pragmatism. His pragmatic point of view is patently expressed in the article "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" where he holds that "the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need theoretical justification because it

does not imply any assertion of reality."<sup>44</sup> The reason (or reasons) for accepting or rejecting a linguistic system is based on the system's "efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity."<sup>45</sup> There is simply no or little consideration of its ontological reference.

Linguistic pragmatism inevitably leads to alienation of language from reality. For if the language is looked upon merely as a system of practically useful signs without existential imports, the system will not allow metaphysical questions to be constructed, but it will not be able to dissolve existing metaphysical questions either. The reasons are as follows. First, the rules and conventions of an artificially constructed language cannot abrogate or prohibit metaphysical questions from being constructed at all, for these questions need not fall within their ruling domain — the most these rules and conventions can do is to tell that the sentences expressing metaphysical statements are not sentences of the system. That a sentence is not a sentence of a particular system does not entail that the sentence can be sentence of no other systems at all. Insofar as there are alternative linguistic systems there is always room for metaphysical questions to be constructed. Second, if a particular linguistic system does not make any assertion about reality, it will bear no relevancy to sentences that do make assertions about reality. For in this case the system and the metaphysical statements are of different species and there is no common ground where they meet and come into conflict with each other. Although metaphysical questions may still be condemned as pseudo or meaningless, yet they are so only from the point of view of that particular system; it obviously does not follow that they are pseudo or meaningless in an absolute sense. And lastly, as far as linguistic pragmatism is concerned, there is no *a priori* argument proving that a metaphysics-free linguistic system is always more efficient, more fruitful, and more simple than a system that somehow tolerates metaphysical statements existing in it. Besides the problem of ontological relevancy, the Ideal Language program is also disturbed with the problem of completeness of a logical system. Yet this latter problem is far too technical to be discussed here.

The Ordinary Language approach to analysis also has some vital weaknesses. It is pointed out, for instance, that the approach is inevitably parochial and limited in scope and generality. But one of the most disturbing weaknesses has been its lack of an accepted criterion for linguistic propriety or a criterion for analysis. The problem is simply a problem as to what a correct analysis is, or what the criterion for correct expressions consists in. Let us consider Ryle's analysis to see how this problem works against it.

For Ryle's therapeutic program a criterion for analysis is desperately necessary. For unless there is some sort of measure there is no ground for condemning an expression as "misleading," or as involving some linguistic mistakes, nor is there any compelling reason to accept the reformulated expression as the proper expression to the facts recorded. Take the statement "Color involves extension" into consideration. In Ryle's view the expression is misleading in that it suggests to people that there is an added entity by the name color when in fact there is no such entity. Then Ryle proposes



that the statement be reformulated as "Whatever is colored is extended" which in his opinion is proper to the facts recorded. But, unfortunately, his analysis rests on sand when an acceptable criterion for analysis is still in want. It is not hard to construct an argument that undermines his analysis. One may argue with equal logical status that the statement "Color involves extension" is *not* misleading because it very well reflects the way we think and talk; and that the reformulated statement "Whatever is colored is extended" is *not* correct because common people usually do not talk in that way—it is in fact logician's and philosopher's jargon. Indeed Ryle is not unaware of the infirmity of his analysis as he admits that he does not "know any way of proving that our expression contains no systematic misleadingness at all."<sup>46</sup> If so, what logical force *de jure* will his analysis have?

Ryle and other Ordinary Language philosophers quite often appeal to the way common people use the language as their basis of analysis. Yet the way common people use the language is vague, fluid, and sometimes creative. There are of course well-established manners of linguistic expression according to which one can correct the improper diction of, say, a schoolboy's composition, there is nevertheless ample flexibility in natural language for growth and creativity. New ways of talking are constantly being introduced, and philosophers among others are noted creators of unparalleled novel expressions. Philosophical expressions may look and sound queer when first introduced, they become an inalienable part of the language after they are accepted by the language users. There is no categorical distinction between philosophical and ordinary languages, although there is some difference between a conventional and an unconventional expressions. Natural language displays a high degree of vagueness, flexibility, and fluidity, so much so that it does not always provide solid basis for serious philosophical criticism. Failing to take notice of this linguistic fact may render one's analysis groundless insofar as the linguistic approach to philosophy is concerned. Thus there is at least one instance of Ryle's inadvertently leaving his position with his analysis up in the air. When Ryle attacks Descartes' Myth presumably on ground of common language, he fails to see that the Myth is already part of the common language. But the above discussion by no means implies that the Ordinary Language approach to philosophical analysis is not possible at all. There are for sure some salient and universal features of common language, which could be adequate criteria for philosophical analysis. Yet to identify and unravel these features is itself a difficult task that requires meticulous and systematic investigations.

## V. Conclusion

An overall criticism of analytic philosophy as an antagonism of metaphysics can be put through Ayer's words:

The distrust which is rightly felt for speculative metaphysics is not a sufficient ground for limiting the scale of philosophical analysis: there is no reason to suppose that the only con-

cepts which are worth investigating are those that have a comparatively narrow range, or that we can usefully do is to describe how concepts of this kind are actually employed.<sup>48</sup>

Implied in Ayer's criticism is a broader and more liberal conception of analytic philosophy. Philosophers while exposing those linguistically deceiving aspects of metaphysical speculation have come to realize that "clarity is not enough."<sup>49</sup> Indeed, analysis as a philosophical approach has extended its reach to include aesthetics, ethics, religion, and even science with a more positive motive. It represents an effective way of looking at philosophical problems; its contribution to philosophy is beyond question. As a historian of philosophy rightly remarks, "the philosophy of the future, whatever other qualities it may have, will reveal clearly the permanent impact of the language theory of the past half-century."<sup>50</sup> This is very true.

The mutual enlightenment of both analysis and metaphysics has brought forth many fruitful results. A good example can be given with Strawson in whom we find an analyst doing metaphysics. Strawson characterizes his philosophy as "descriptive metaphysics" and declares the nature and aims of his endeavor as follows.

How should descriptive metaphysics differ from what is called philosophical, or logical, or conceptual analysis? It does not differ in kind of intention, but only in scope and generality. Aiming to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure, it can take far less for granted than a more limited and partial conceptual inquiry . . . when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to express, those general elements of structure which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged.<sup>51</sup>

The new conception is: Philosophical analysis is not merely to dissolve metaphysical problems nor to describe just the surface of linguistic behavior, but to reveal the hidden conceptual scheme of human understanding by analysing its linguistic expressions. And, unlike speculative metaphysics that is concerned "to produce a better structure," descriptive metaphysics is content "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world."<sup>52</sup> Here we see analysis and metaphysics walking hand in hand, both with a different flavor from what they had before. This may be a happy marriage with profits to follow.

#### Notes:

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Book IV, 1003 ff.
2. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 695: B869.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 662: B874.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 662: B873.

5. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 125.
6. Moritz Schlick, "The Turning Point in Philosophy," in A. J. Ayer edited *Logical Positivism* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 55.
7. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* 2nd edition (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 12.
8. Ibid.
9. A. J. Ayer, "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," reprinted in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 556.
10. Ibid., p. 562.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 3rd edition, 1955), p. 12.
14. May Brodbeck, "The Nature and Function of the Philosophy of Science," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 5.
15. Rene Descartes, *Meditations in The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes*, translated and with introduction essay by John Veitch (New York: Tutor Co., 1910): II, p. 231.
16. Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, p. 31.
17. Albert Einstein, "Geometry and Experience," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, p. 189.
18. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 15.
19. Quoted in W. T. Jones, *A History of Western Philosophy* Vol. V, 2nd edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 227.
20. Quoted in Ibid., p. 228.
21. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 228-9.
22. Quoted in Ibid., p. 248.
23. Ibid.
24. Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language* (Lodon: Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 52.
25. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barres and Noble, 1949), p. 8.
26. Morris Schlick, "The Future of Philosophy," in *The Linguistic Turn*, edited and with introduction by Richard Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 51.
27. Carnap, "On the Character of Philosophical Problems," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 56.
28. For details of the distinction see Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, "On the Character of Philosophical Problems," and "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology."

29. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 73.
30. Carnap, "On the Character of Philosophical Problems," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 61.
31. Carnap, "Empiricism," in *Ibid.*, p. 73.
32. For a detailed account of mistakes arising from confusion of syntactical categories see Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," in *Logical Positivism*, edited by Ayer, pp. 60-81.
33. Quoted in Jones, *History*, Vol V, p. 241.
34. Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 86-7.
35. There is a host of issues centered around the notions of a logical subject and a logical predicate. Interested readers are kindly referred to works by W. V. O. Quine, P. T. Geach, and P. F. Strawson among others. Also the author of this paper has an unpublished dissertation "Strawson and the Distinction between Subject and Predicate" (1977) that discusses these two notions and the distinction.
36. Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 88.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 199.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
41. For this illustration see *Ibid.*, p. 16.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
43. See James Cornman, "Philosophical Analysis and the Future of Metaphysics," in *The Future of Metaphysics*, edited by Robert E. Wood (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 33-5.
44. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 78.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
46. Ryle, "Expressions," in *The Linguistic Turn*, p. 100.
47. In a review of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* Hampshire charges that "Professor Ryle has from the beginning confused a general feature of common language with a particular metaphysical theory, it is never clear precisely whom he is attacking when he attacks the Ghost . . ." Hampshire is saying that "it is Professor Ryle, and not only Descartes, who displays an *a priori* theory of language involving a conflict with established usage." See Stuart Hampshire, "Critical Review of *The Concept of Mind*," *Mind* LIX (1950).
48. A. J. Ayer, *The Concept of a Person* (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 33.
49. To borrow the title *Clarity Is Not Enough*, edited by H. D. Lewis.
50. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* 3rd edition, p. 617.
51. P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., First published 1959; Reprinted 1969), pp. 9-10.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Books And Anthologies:

- Ayer, A. J. *Language, Truth, and Logic*. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 2nd Edition, 1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Logical Positivism*. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Concept of a Person*. London: Macmillan, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Problem of Knowledge*. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972.
- Carnap, Rudolf. *The Logical Syntax of Language*. London: Kegan Paul, 1937.
- Descartes, Rene. *Meditations*. In *The Method, Meditations, and Philosophy of Descartes*. Translated, with an introductory essay, by John Veitch. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1901.
- Edwards, Paul, and Pap, Arthur, edited. *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958.
- Feigl, Herbert, and Brodbeck, May, edited. *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Sellars, Wilfrid, edited. *Readings in Philosophy Analysis*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.
- Frank, Phillip. *Modern Science and Its Philosophy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949.
- Fuller, B. A. G. *A History of Philosophy*. 3rd Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1955.
- Jones, W. T. *A History of Western Philosophy*. 5 Volumes. Second Edition, Revised. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., First Published, 1952; Revised edition, 1975.
- Kaminsky, Jack. *Language and Ontology*. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1970.
- Körner, Stephen. *Fundamental Questions in Philosophy*. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Kant*. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, First Published 1955; Reprinted, 1967.
- Mundle, C. W. K. *A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
- Reichenbach, Hans. *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.
- Rorty, Richard, edited. *The Linguistic Turn*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Ryle, Gilbert. *The Concept of Mind*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949.
- Strawson, P. F. *Individuals*. London: Methuen & Co., 1969.

Wood, Robert E., edited. *The Future of Metaphysics*. Chicago: Quadrangle Book, 1970.

Articles:

- Ayer, A. J. "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics." In *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 555-64. Edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958.
- Bergmann, Gustav. "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics" (in part). In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 63-71. Edited by Richard Rorty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Black, Max. "Language and Reality." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 331-9.
- Carnap, Rudolf. "On the Character of Philosophical Problems." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 54-62.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 72-84.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language." Translated by Arthur Pap. Reprinted in *Logical Positivism*, pp. 60-81. Edited by A. J. Ayer. New York: The Free Press, 1959.
- Cornman, James W. "Philosophical Analysis and the Future of Metaphysics." In *The Future of Metaphysics*, pp. 32-49. Edited by Robert E. Wood. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
- Einstein, Albert. "Geometry and Experience." In *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, 189-95. Edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
- Feigl, Herbert. "Some Major Issues and Development in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Positivism." In *The Foundation of Science and the Concept of Psychology and Psychoanalysis*. Edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.
- Hampshire, Stuart. "Are All Philosophical Questions Questions of Language?" In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 284-93.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Critical Review of *The Concept of Mind*." *Mind* LIX (1950).
- Hempel, C. G. "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning." In *Meaning and Knowledge*, pp. 17-27. Edited by Ernst Nagel and R. B. Brandt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965.
- Morris, Charles. "Foundations of the Theory of Signs." In Vol I: *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, pp. 77-138. Edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Morris. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.
- Nagel, Ernst. "Logic Without Ontology." In *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 1-210. Edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949.

- Quine, W. V. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 196-213. Edited by Robert R. Ammerman. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1965.
- Reichenbach, Hans. "Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of Philosophical Error." *The Philosophical Review* LVII (July 1948): 330-46.
- Rorty, Richard. "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 1-39.
- Ryle, Gilbert. "Systematically Misleading Expressions." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 85-100.
- Shapere, Dudley. "Philosophy and the Analysis of Language." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 271-83.
- Strawson, P. F. "Analysis, Science and Metaphysics." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 312-20.
- Urmson, J. O. "The History of Analysis." In *The Linguistic Turn*, pp. 294-301.

## 邏輯實證論、分析哲學、與形上學

謝 仲 明

東海大學哲學系

### 摘 要

邏輯實證論及分析哲學對形上學都曾作過激烈的批評，認為形上學之問題及陳述，為不可能或無意義或虛假而企圖把形上學從哲學中剔除、或化解、或防止其出現。這些批評（或攻擊）對傳統的玄思形上學有一定的沖擊，但不能達成其消除形上學之企圖。形上學仍然存在，但有了新的方向而與傳統形上學有所不同。本文對邏輯實證論及分析哲學，就其針對形上學方面言，作一歷史性的追跡。

邏輯實證論的發展過程，可以就其所提出之檢證原則之發展過程而見。檢證原則規定語句之是否有認知意義在乎其是否能被檢證為真假。檢證之方法只有兩種，即先驗的和經驗的：前者決定一切邏輯和數學語句的真假值，稱為分析語句；後者決定一切關於事件的語句之真假值，稱為綜合語句。邏輯實證論認為形上學語句，既不可由先驗方法檢證，亦不能由經驗方法檢證，因而形上學的語句，並無真假值，故亦無認知意義可言。但邏輯實證論的檢證原則本身亦出現困難而最終被放棄。其主要的困難在於：一、此原則本身不能檢證自己其為真或假；二、很多科學的普遍語句，亦無法通過其檢證方法之檢證；三、對綜合語句而言，如何構成一「檢證」無法獲得堅定的根據；四、「意義」之觀念，過於狹隘。

一些邏輯實證論者，轉而從語言之邏輯方面，再企圖消解形上學之問題及語句。根據其人工構造的理想語法，一些語言哲學家試圖把形上學語句解釋為「假語句」、或屬於科學範圍的語句、或屬於人工語言之構造之提議。無論是何者，都有既定的處理方法。在其理想地構造的語法系統中，形上學語句將無法出現。另一些語言哲學家，認為形上學語句之出現，在於形上學家對日常語言之濫用及誤用所致；



消除形上學語句之方法，乃是把其濫用及誤用之處指出而更正之。語言之日常使用，乃是其正確之使用而為分析之根據。分析哲學給予形上學又一次沖擊，但仍然無法徹底地消滅形上學。其中一個原因，乃在分析哲學本身的根基，並不比形上學來得更穩固。人工構造的理想語法與形上學語言所企圖指涉的存在，出現愈來愈大的不相干性；而一理想語法系統之完整性，亦無法完成。另一方面，語言之日常使用，亦無法成為語言分析之可靠根據，因為日常語言帶着極大程度之含糊性、流動性、開放性、和局限性；而在很多事例上，日常語言與形上學語言之間，並無清楚之區分界線——很多所謂形上學語言，事實上就是日常語言之部份。

邏輯實證論及分析哲學與形上學之間的互相磨盪，使兩方面都謙虛下來。一方面分析哲學承認到形上學之現實性和頑固性；另一方面，形上學亦尊重分析哲學和邏輯實證論所作之批評之力量。由此種互相磨盪所產生之結果之一，乃是新形上學之出現，見於杜威、史陶生、比柏等之工作中。

## KANT'S "HUMANISTIC" CONCEPTION OF RELIGION

Tze-wan Kwan

Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University

That religion deals in one way or another with man's worship of supernatural deities seems to be a common understanding. However, this over-simplified definition of religion leaves one fundamental question untouched, namely, whether religion should primarily be theo-centrally or rather anthro-centrally understood. Indeed, the Latin word *religio* can as well be predicated of gods as of human beings. Traditional Christianity and some other religious faiths take their object of worship as in itself existent (*ens realissimum*), as omnipotent, as self-caused and as the ultimate cause of all creation (*ens originarium*), or in one word, as a highest being (*ens summum*). With such a conception of God as background, the God-man relationship tended to be a theo-centric one.

In contrast to this predominant conception of religion, there are throughout history traces of an opposing view concerning the essence of religion -- the anthropo-centric view. I ascribe "anthropocentric" to that point of view of religion which takes religion as, or at least is conscious of religions's being, a human intellectual activity. Instead of uncritically admitting the object of man's worship -- God -- as *per se* existent, some advocates of this view conceive God as a mere product of the intellectual activity of mankind. According to this view, religion's genuine object is never God himself, but rather man's notion or idea of God. It is in this sense that we use the word "humanistic" in the course of this paper.<sup>1)</sup>

The Greeks are probable the first occidental people who came to the insight that gods might only be human fictions. Herodotus frankly admits of his own ignorance concerning the knowledge about the gods but ascribes this to the composition of theogonies by Homer and Hesiod.<sup>2)</sup> The eleatic philosopher Xenophanes, although himself a pantheistic-monotheist, does give us a vivid description of Homer's and Hesiod's conception of God. He says: "Both Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all things that are shameful and reproach among mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception,"<sup>3)</sup> Indeed from this fragment alone we are not at all in a position to draw out the conclusion that the whole genealogy of gods which Homer and Hesiod describe were literally fictions, ie. anthropocentric projections of man. For it is not until Kant that we are able to show that both theoretical assertions and denials of the

existence of God are groundless. Nevertheless, the fragment of Xenophanes evokes some questions of great interest. John Burnet sharply points out that the gods of Greek antiquity are not necessarily objects of worship, they are in a sense non-religious objects. <sup>4)</sup> They signify nothing but simulated enemies of mankind, overagainst whom man tragically acquires his meaning of existence. <sup>5)</sup> In other words, the fragment of Xenophanes gives us a vivid example that the meaning of the "gods" lies in their meaning "for" man.

In the modern age, the "humanistic" conception of God and of religion becomes more evident. Fichte's involvement in the so-called *Atheismusstreit* and Feuerbach's thesis that God is nothing but a result of the alienation of mankind are two well-known examples of such a tendency. However, Kant's contribution to the "humanistic" conception of religion stands as the most important and forms the major topic of this present paper.

Kant's treatment of religion is by no means a self-sufficient subject-matter which can be isolated from his comprehensive philosophical system as shown in his "Critiques" The theoretical limits of theology and its dogmas can never be exposed apart from the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Without reference to the *Critique of Practical Reason* and other writings concerning morality, the positive role of theology and religion can never be adequately justified. This philosophical background of Kant's doctrine of religion as well as of theology purports to be our central issue that Kant conceives religion not as an independent realm of transcendent experiences, but rather as a special employment (*Gebrauch*) of human reason which has the tendency to acquire the greatest possible synthesis. Religion represents in this way nothing but one part of the intellectual endeavor of humanity as such. In order to expose this "humanistic" motive underlying Kant's doctrine of religion, we proceed from the following considerations.

## I. The "humanistic" approach in Kant's doctrine of religion

### 1. Summum bonum as an object of hope

Of all kinds of theology, Kant maintains that ethico-theology or moral theology is the only sound one. In other words, Kant does not admit of any way of asserting the existence of God through theoretical means. The most sophisticated argument in speculative theology, to be found in physico-theology, for example, gives us at the most the concept of a World-Designer which is far from being "God" in the fullest sense. And even this World-Designer, while unable to conform with the spatio-temporal forms of human intuition, can never be taken as real knowledge, but just a reflective and regulative, i.e. heuristic idea. However in our practical realm of moral actions, God can be postulated as an object of our will, so that our desire for the

fulfilment of goodness and happiness in this world may be safeguarded. While the physico-theological World-Designer, though purposive, can not account for a "final purpose" (*Endzweck*)<sup>6)</sup>, moral theology, based upon autonomous morality, finds it necessary to admit an all-mighty but at the same time all-good and just God, whose might and whose kindness "should" render the highest good (*summum bonum*) i.e. "a happiness of rational beings in harmony with the pursuit of moral laws"<sup>7)</sup>, to be realized.

Indeed, we do remember that Kant insists at the very beginning of his ethical theory, namely in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, that moral duties should be carried out only for duty's sake, and that the universality of the categorical imperative should not be impaired by "interest", whether this interest is "one's own or another's"<sup>8)</sup>. This basic attitude of Kant is no doubt violated to a certain extent by his later conception of God as the guardian of "happiness", which is to be "in harmony with" the moral law. In order to solve this seeming difficulty or antinomy in Kant's ethics<sup>9)</sup>, we observe as follows.

In Kant's terminology, the meaning of "good" is two-fold. Kant ascribes this duality of the meaning of Good to the ambiguous Latin term *bonum*, which bears the meaning of both "the good" (*das Gute*) and "well being" (*das Wohl*)<sup>10)</sup>. We have on the one hand "good" in the sense of the "good will" which Kant determines to be the only "good without qualification"<sup>11)</sup>. Good in this sense is no doubt based on the moral autonomy of the rationally self-determined will. This conception of good we may call the "morally good" as distinguished from good in the sense of "well being" which we may call the "naturally good". The "highest good" (*summum bonum*), which means the realization of happiness as well as its harmony with moral deeds, shows itself now as an overlapping of the naturally good with the morally good. Morally good actions remain good solely on rational grounds regardless of whether these actions are accompanied by good returns (i.e. happiness), even if according to common understanding they deserve reward. Therefore, the suffering or even martyrdom of a patriot, for example, or the self-sacrifice of a man who dies trying to save a fellow human being are good in the moral sense. But with respect to the unhappy consequences of these moral deeds for their agents, they are not good somehow.

Here lies one of the greatest dilemmas in Kant's attempt to finish his philosophical system. On the one hand, moral freedom has its peculiar "constitution", It initially determines its own "casuality" which is of a different type from natural causality.<sup>12)</sup> In a "free" causal series of actions, goodness is determined solely by the formal elements of the universal moral law. However, the pure practical reason, being at the same time a good will, i.e. the faculty of desire rationalized, does tend to desire the realization of happiness as well as its harmony with moral deeds. The materialization

of happiness, however, lies outside practical reason's domain of determinant constitution. It concerns rather the actual course of natural events, the constitutive determination of which lies but in the domain of theoretical reason. To put the matter in a different way: morality is *a priori* possible in virtue of moral freedom. Through the exercise of this freedom, moral deeds (free casuality) can be "constituted". Now, the desire for the *summum bonum*, though not essential to the constitution of morality, does "accompany" moral actions. How is then this claim for the realization of happiness possible? Here we may put Kant's solution in the following way: Morality governs what we as rational moral beings should *do*, but the desire for happiness which naturally accompanies our moral deeds demands that happiness should be objectively realized, i.e. to be somehow *known*. This is however not possible since knowledge and moral freedom have completely different domains of application. Man's urge for the fulfilment of the *summum bonum* involves so to speak "the whole series of all future alterations in the world" <sup>13)</sup>. An urge of this kind is for Kant nothing but a "creation of the mind (*ens rationis*)" <sup>14)</sup>. Eventually, the desire for the harmony of happiness with morality can only be something which we may *hope* for <sup>15)</sup>, and religion is an outcome of such a hope which now regulatively bridges the discrepancy between the world of nature and the world of morality.

In this way we touch upon the most interesting line of thought showing us what Kant thinks that the final goal of his philosophical endeavor should be. In the "methodology" (Part II) of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as well as in many other writings we find Kant saying:

"All the interest of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?" <sup>16)</sup>

As a product of hope, religion manifests itself to be a domain which is in close connection with that of the theoretical and practical reason. Only from out of such a context can we understand the real status Kant has granted to religion. The problem of Hope (religion) forms, together with that of Knowledge and Practice, an architectonic whole which Kant occasionally formulates in the form of a fourth question — "What is man?" <sup>17)</sup>, which by no means represents an additional fourth question, but one "to which the first three are related" <sup>18)</sup>, a thoroughly "humanistic" issue.

## 2. Religion as means and morality as end

Without detriment to the room made for religion as the product of hope, Kant insists that the postulate of the existence of God and the hope for the realization of

(98)

happiness can by no means precede morality. Kant maintains repeatedly that religion must be based on morality but not *vice versa*.<sup>19)</sup> The concept of God or genuine religion, when based on morality, can be called moral theology or moral religion. On the contrary, when morality is based on religion, we have as the outcome “theological morals”<sup>20)</sup>, or in other words, fetishism and idolatry.

Here Kant clearly shows us that ethics and religion are not of the same order, but rather, ethics must be granted a primacy over religion. This can best be illustrated when we draw our attention to Kant’s attitude toward the question “which. . . is the more natural in the first instruction of youth and even in discourses from the pulpit: to expound the doctrine of virtue before the doctrine of godliness, or that of godliness before that of virtue?”<sup>21)</sup> To this seemingly difficult question, Kant’s answer is determined and straightforward. No doubt, virtue and godliness “stand in necessary connection”; but Kant immediately points out that “they are not of a kind”<sup>22)</sup>. The question raised above can only be solved when “one of them is conceived of and explained as *end*, the other merely as *means*”<sup>23)</sup>. Here it is morality which is able to “subsist of itself ( even without the concept of God )”<sup>24)</sup>, since it “derives from the soul of man”<sup>25)</sup>. The doctrine of godliness, on the contrary, is meaningful only in relation to morality; it “cannot of itself constitute the final goal or moral endeavor but can merely serve as a means of strengthening that which in itself goes to make a better man.”<sup>26)</sup> This attitude of Kant indisputably speaks for an anthropo-centric conception of religion. Far from being a God-oriented idol-worship, religion is for Kant primarily a means for the self-determined moral endeavor of humanity as such.

At this point, we can further clarify the delicate relationship between theology, morality and religion in Kant. Kant says in his lectures on *Pädagogik*: “Man should not start with theology. Religion, when only based upon theology, can never yield anything moral. One will only get fear out of such a religion and fear can merely give rise to a superstitious cult. Therefore, morality must proceed in advance and should be followed by theology. This is what we call religion.”<sup>27)</sup> In other occasions Kant says: “What is then religion? Religion is the law within us. . . .”<sup>28)</sup> “we call this law within us our conscience”<sup>29)</sup>; “...conscience might also be defined as follows: it is the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself.”<sup>30)</sup> Therefore, religion has its final ground in the conscience (moral law within us) which is for Kant nothing but the highest moral tribunal. Religion so understood finds its ultimate ground no longer in God but in the very essence of human reason itself; it is basically not theo-centric or theo-cratic, but “humanistic”.

### 3. “Transcendental topic” of duties

In his late work on morality, the *Metaphysik der Sitten*. Kant further allows us

to confirm his humanistic standpoint with regard to religion. On demonstrating what he calls an “amphiboly of the moral concepts of reflection” Kant suggests that parallel to the amphiboly as it occurs in the theoretical realm (above all in Leibniz), there is also an amphiboly (ie. an ambiguous double application) in the practical realm. This takes place when we regard “certain duties which are directed to ourselves as duties to other beings”<sup>31)</sup>, no matter what these other beings may be (may they be nature, God or animals). No doubt, Kant repeats with emphasis that a human being must look up to his own duties and obey them *as if* they were divine commands.<sup>32)</sup> However, to say this does not mean that duties were commandments actually imposed upon us by a mighty deity (as in the case of the ten commandments of Moses<sup>33)</sup>).

The imposition of commands upon man can never give rise to genuine morality, but only to what Kant calls “theological morals” or “fetish faith”. What prevail here are just threat and “pathological fear”<sup>34)</sup> of possible sensuous punishment on the one hand, and flattery or “cold insinuation” (*kalte Einschmeichelei*)<sup>35)</sup> in face of possible sensuous reward on the other. By virtue of the fetish faith, men are “ruled and robbed of their moral freedom”<sup>36)</sup>. Man’s freedom for morality, which represents the hallmark of the dignity of humanity, is thus strongly violated. It is “wholly crushed under foot and no place is even left for the good will...”<sup>37)</sup>

In order to safeguard this utmost dignity of man as an honourably self-determining moral being, Kant must combat this “amphiboly” regarding the real status of moral duties. Here we may consistently speak of a “transcendental topic”<sup>38)</sup> of these duties. By this I mean we should “locate” the right place (*τόπος*) for the application of duties. Kant indicates in this connection that the acceptance of moral duties as divine commands “is not consciousness of a duty *to God*. For this idea proceeds entirely from our own reason...”<sup>39)</sup> It indicates nothing but the moral freedom of man. Kant explicates further that it is thoroughly possible and thinkable for a man, as a moral person, to take his moral duties as if they were divine commands and to obey them “not unwillingly (*nicht ungerne*)” and thereupon to feel himself “to a certain extent ennobled (*veredelt*)”.<sup>40)</sup> With this in mind we may conclude the question raised above concerning the “topic” of duties. To quote Kant’s own word: “... to have religion is a duty of man to himself<sup>41)</sup>, ie. not to God. In other words, the proper *topos* for religious duties lies not in theology but in humanity, and religion in this sense is “humanistic” throughout.

## II. Religion and the problem of “Willkür”

### 1. Theoretical relevance of the problem of Willkür”

The problem of Willkür is no doubt one of the most obscure topics in Kant’s philosophy. The manifold connotations of this term in different phases of Kant’s

(100)

development on the one hand and the interrelation of Willkür with other terms like *Wille*, *guter Wille*, faculty of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*) and freedom etc. on the other render the issue more difficult.

The concept *Willkür* itself is in fact not a new one. It has been used in various ways by philosophers before Kant.<sup>42)</sup> Kant himself reflects upon this concept as early as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or even in his handwritten *Nachlass* preceding the first *Critique*. In Kant's subsequent writings about morality, however, the development of the concept of *Willkür* follows a very peculiar path. In *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785), the concept *Willkür* is not mentioned at all. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1787), it is mentioned, but is given only an insignificant account in comparison to the other concept "Wille". It is not until *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793) as well as in *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797) that the concept of *Willkür* finds its new horizon of expression. This strange development can best be accounted for if we notice that *Willkür* touches upon problems which lie on the borderline between "nature" and "morality", i.e. between the subject-matters of theoretical and practical reason. Separating the earlier and later groups of moral writings stands the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), where (in the second Part) the gap between "physics" and "ethics" or between "nature" and "freedom" is for the first time sufficiently bridged by means of the "reflective-regulative judgment". Only then, upon the achievements made in the third *Critique*, the problem of *Willkür* assumes the position it should take in a matured system of Kant's moral philosophy.

In the *Grundlegung* and in the second *Critique*, Kant refers frequently to the good will or the pure will which in one way or another means that faculty of desire which is under the direction of our pure practical reason. Here stress is made on the fact that our pure practical reason produces a universal categorical imperative which, in its fullest exercise, demands us to act only according to those maxims which are to have universal application. In this way, the so called free will in the second *Critique* is in fact nothing other than the pure practical reason itself. It does not directly determine the content (maxims) of our actions, but imposes a universal law governing the form of our action in general.<sup>43)</sup> The universal moral law imposed by our *own* reason is not empirically given, but nevertheless it can have real application to our conduct and it has "objective reality ... at least in practical context."<sup>44)</sup> As a moral agent one may in practice act according to the moral law so as to initiate a series of causal effects independent of our natural inclinations. This possibility of self-determination through self-legislation Kant entitles practical freedom.

Here a divided line may be drawn between the moral theory of Kant in the period before the publication of the second *Critique* and that period since the *Religion*. To



say that our pure practical reason (ie. our free will or our will rationalized) through its practical freedom can *a priori* render morality possible does not necessarily indicate that our will, basically also a faculty of desire or appetite, will under any condition obey the moral law imposed by our own reason. To put it in a somewhat logical manner: that morality is *a priori* possible through practical freedom is one thing; that it be actually exercised is another, since the actual realization of morality may involve other parameters than that of reason alone. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant is already conscious of the subtlety of this issue. He indicates that the practical rule, as a product of reason, "is an imperative of a being whose reason is *not the sole determinant* of the will"<sup>45</sup>). As a matter of fact, Kant explicates further: the concept of "ought" (*sollen*) already implies an objective necessitation of the human action which has options other than following the imperative of the reason. The "ought" just formally demands that "if reason completely determined the will, the action *would* without exception take place according to the rule"<sup>46</sup>).

The greatest point of interest hidden in this passage is the interweaving of universality and necessity on the one hand and particularity and contingency on the other. While principally a sentence concerning the categorical imperative, we find it stated in the subjunctive mood. The reason why Kant puts the above sentence in subjunctive mood is clear: The "if... would..." structure in this context certainly would not impair the necessity and universality of the moral law and would not render a categorical imperative a hypothetical one. Without detriment to the formal necessity and universality of the moral law, the "if... would..." structure in the above quoted passage makes manifest the actual or material contingency of moral action as such. In another word, the moral law is necessary for morality only in the "pure" practical dimension, whereas in actual "applied" (*angewandt*) dimension<sup>47</sup>) it remains contingent whether the moral law is obeyed (is given respect (*Achtung*)) or whether it is ignored. This original contingency of action in a certain way precedes the "coming into force" (*Inkrafttreten*) of the moral law. This original *arbitrariness*<sup>48</sup>), to be called *Willkür*, should represent the true starting point of all discussion on morality, insofar as morality is to be viewed not only formally in its *a priori* possibility, but also in its actual applicability. It is exactly along this line of thought that we find the concept of *Willkür* of relevance and significance.

## 2. *Willkür* and its incomplete determination through reason

It is extremely difficult to give a straightforward definition of *Willkür*. As a faculty of the human mind in the widest sense, the meaning and function of the *Willkür* can never be fully determined apart from the structure of the human mind as a whole. In the *Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft* as well as in the

*Metaphysik - Vorlesungen* we find Kant giving us a penetrating treatment of the "complete system of all faculties of the mind" <sup>49</sup>). But in order not to entangle ourselves into unnecessary theoretical difficulties, we just pinpoint on one issue: That our faculty of desire is the source of all actions, and that it can be "affected" both by our sensuous surroundings and by our own reason through its practical employment. <sup>50</sup>) With this problem as background, we may pass over to a very important statement made by Kant in his late work, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, where Kant indicates: "The faculty of desiring in accordance with concepts is called the faculty of doing or forbearing as one likes (*nach Belieben zu tun oder zu lassen*) insofar as the ground determining it to action is found in the faculty of desire itself and not in the object. Insofar as it is combined with the consciousness of the capacity of its action to produce its objects, it is called *Willkür*; if not so combined, its act is called a wish. The faculty of desire whose internal ground of determination and, consequently even whose likings (*das Belieben*) are found in the reason of the subject is called *Wille*. Accordingly, the *Wille* is the faculty of desire regarded not, as is *Willkür*, in its relation to action, but rather in its relation to the ground determining *Willkür* to action. The *Wille* itself has no determining ground; but, insofar as it can determine *Willkür*, it is practical reason itself." <sup>51</sup>) Here a number of important distinctions are made. First: it is confirmed that *Willkür* and *Wille* are in one way or another the faculty of desire itself. Whereas *Willkür* represents the faculty of desire in the crude sense, *Wille* represents the faculty of desire supposedly fully rationalized. Second: as a faculty of desire, *Willkür* (as well as wish, which is not to be treated in this paper) can "freely" determine or choose its maxims for action. "Freedom" in this sense differs from practical moral freedom, it only signifies the original arbitrariness of actions, or the so called "original contingency of action" mentioned in the previous section: It represents nothing but the "as one likes", the "at one's discretion" <sup>52</sup>); or in German, the "*nach Belieben...*". Thirdly: That the ground determining the *Willkür* lies in the faculty of desire itself and not in objects means that *Willkür* is never completely conditioned and determined by sensuous inclinations, but remains literally arbitrary. Fourth and lastly: *Willkür* can under circumstances be determined by the *Wille*, which is nothing but our practical reason itself. To be more precise, becoming subject to the determination through our *own* practical reason remains one of the options which the *Willkür* as arbitrium is in possession of.

In another context Kant augments his differentiation between *Willkür* and *Wille* by saying: "Laws proceed from the *Wille* — maxims from the *Willkür*" <sup>53</sup>). To put the matter in the words of L.W. Beck, "...laws determine what *ought* to happen and maxims determine what *does* happen" <sup>54</sup>). As we have shown in the previous section, *Wille* concerns in fact the formal aspect of morality, whereas *Willkür* concerns the

actual applied aspect. Only Willkür can directly govern our action through maxims; *Wille*, however, only gives the formal legislation. Kant therefore argues in the *Metaphysik der Sitten* that, since the *Wille* "does not look to any thing beyond its law itself", it can not be spoken of either as free or unfree.<sup>55)</sup> On the contrary, a certain kind of freedom is now ascribed to the Willkür. Kant says further, "Thus the *Wille* functions with absolute necessity and itself admits of no necessitation. It is, therefore, only the power of choice (Willkür) that can be called free."<sup>56)</sup> What makes Willkür free is its capacity of "choice".

Willkür is usually misunderstood in the negative sense as unrestrainedness or recklessness. As a matter of fact, the concept of Willkür can be traced back to the Latin *arbitrium* (Wolff, Augustin, Aquinas) and the Greek *προκίρσις* (Aristotle),<sup>57)</sup> which both bear the connotation of "choice" (*Wahl*). In Old High German we find the word "kuri" with a similar connotation.<sup>58)</sup> Man as a being with Willkür is in possession of a very subtle kind of freedom, an original susceptibility to either good or evil. Or in Beck's formulation: whereas the practical freedom is a freedom of legislation which does not directly determine maxims for action, but only imposes a universal law of morality, the freedom of the Willkür is freedom of spontaneity in action,<sup>59)</sup> But what is "choice"? What is *arbitrium*? What is freedom of spontaneity? To understand the full meaning of Willkür, we consider as follows.

Probably no one would doubt that the human will (or here better the Willkür), as a faculty of desire, is susceptible to sensuous impulses. However, man's susceptibility to sensuality does not imply that man is exclusively or definitely bound to be only sensuous. Kant points out already in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that "there is in man a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses"<sup>60)</sup>. It is in this respect that the human Willkür basically differs from the animal Willkür (*arbitrium brutum*) which is supposedly completely conditioned. To put the matter in more precise wording: The human Willkür is though *affected* but not *determined* by the sensuous. Kant says in his *Metaphysik-Vorlesungen*: "If the *arbitrium* were not just affected by *stimuli*, but determined by them, then it would be *brutum* overagainst the *liberum*, which is affected but not determined."<sup>61)</sup> This utmost possibility to free oneself from sensuous conditioning is for Kant freedom in the negative sense. In this way we arrive at a first proposition concerning the human Willkür: The Willkür of man is never completely determined in the passive sense (ie. through sensuous impulses). It is not an *arbitrium brutum* but is by virtue of its spontaneous "freedom" of refraining from sensuality an *arbitrium liberum*.

Man is not at times *arbitrium brutum* and at times *arbitrium liberum*, rather, "*Das arbitrium humanum ist liberum*"<sup>62)</sup>. Only as an *arbitrium liberum* can man have "choice" of action (*actus arbitrii*). In his posthumously published *Reflexionen*

zur *Metaphysik* Kant indicates: "Our *arbitrium* is nothing sensuous, but it is the *actus arbitrii* either to be sensuous or intellectual, since *arbitrium* is not inclination, but the choice (*Wahl*) between inclination and reason." <sup>63)</sup>

The freedom of choice or option which *Willkür* possesses is a kind of freedom which is even more original than the practical moral freedom of legislation. *Willkür* itself is completely "free" in the sense that it is on the one hand not exclusively determined to be an *arbitrium brutum*, for the *Willkür* can at any time spontaneously refrain from sensuous affection and become a moral agent, i.e. become subject not to the affection of inclination but to the practical reason. On the other hand, although *Willkür* can be affected by our reason, it nevertheless can in real practice never guarantee itself to be "fully" rational, or in the long run to remain free, even though it is at the present moment self-determined to be free and moral. Or in other words: practical freedom only gives the *a priori* and universal condition of the possibility of morality, but it does not and cannot guarantee man to be perpetually moral. Still in another formulation: practical freedom only guarantees the *a priori possibility* of morality but not its *perpetual actuality*. In such a way, we arrive at the second proposition concerning human *Willkür*: It is never completely determined in the active sense (i.e. to be moral).

In the handwritten and posthumously published marginal notes on Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, Kant makes the above proposition even more explicit by introducing the notion of "incomplete determination of reason". Kant remarks: "Whether a good will in itself is determined to good actions... So would yet the blend (*Vermischung*) with the *sensitivo* be precisely that much, as the incomplete reason is to be determined (*rationes ad determinandum incompletæ*)" <sup>64)</sup> Here Kant indirectly hints that the human free *Willkür* is on the one hand rational but on the other hand not completely determinable through reason. This notion of incomplete determination of reason has in fact the most important bearing on Kant's later treatment on ethics and religion. For if man were completely rational, i.e. if man were positively or "actively" determined to be moral, then there would be no domain of the "ought" or of the "imperative": Morality would immediately vanish and the morally good (*das Gute*) would be exclusively substituted by natural "well-being" (*das Wohl*) ...

The above arguments of Kant can be concluded in one point: "Man is thus neither actively nor passively determined." <sup>65)</sup> Whereas negative determination would render man an *arbitrium brutum*, positive determination (in the "complete" sense) would in a certain sense render morality a natural state of well being. Therefore, in order that morality be possible, man must, while remaining to a certain "extent" rational, make allowance that he is also susceptible to the opposite option to morality. This is to say that the determination of our *Willkür* by reason must be an incomplete

one. Moral deeds taken as an *officium* (duty) are no doubt “necessary” outcomes of the practical freedom according to the “universal” categorical imperative; but moral deeds taken as a *factum* is for Kant nothing but a “certain degree of preponderance (*Übergewicht*) of the reason over the sensibility”<sup>66</sup>). Kant also indicates: “All stimuli of the sensuous Willkür can not render the active in man passive. Yet the *obere Willkür* decides itself, why it in one occasion decides for sensibility and in other occasion for reason. No law is obtainable as regards such a decision, because there is no fixed law governing the two forces.”<sup>67</sup>)

With all these nuances in mind we may arrive at the conclusion that, for Kant, the human Willkür is “free” in a literally “arbitrary” sense which transcends even practical freedom. Being “neither actively nor passively determined”, man is equally and at any time susceptible to sensation and reason. No matter what his choice may be, he has to bear responsibility for his very choice.

### 3. The ambivalence of the Willkür

#### — The “hybrid definition” of Willkür reappraised

We have shown in the previous sections that, for Kant, the human Willkür presents itself as a “blend” between reason and inclination.<sup>68</sup>) Human Willkür, basically a free Willkür, can never be completely determined by reason alone; this state of affair Kant calls an “incomplete determination of our Willkür by reason”. For Kant explicitly states that the action of human Willkür as *arbitrium liberum* is “contingent”.<sup>69</sup>) All these indicate in one way or another that Willkür as *arbitrium* and as free choice possesses an original susceptibility to both morality and sensuality. In other words, hidden in every individual is an original ambivalence or antagonism. In a marginal note from his *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, Kant even calls the Willkür of man, owing to its ambivalence, a “mixed human Willkür” (*ein Vermischte Menschliche Willkür*), or in Latin a *libertas hybrida*, a further qualification of human Willkür as *arbitrium liberum*. Kant says: “The animal Willkür (*arbitrium brutum*) behaves according to rules which are determinable through sensation. The mixed human Willkür (*libertas hybrida*) also acts according to rules, the grounds of which, however, are not present in appearances; therefore, under the same empirical conditions the same man can act differently.”<sup>70</sup>)

This conception of human Willkür as a “hybrid” again confirms Kant’s view that human Willkür is “free” but basically ambivalent. The “spontaneous” freedom of Willkür never demands that man must necessarily be moral. Willkür is by definition an *arbitrium*, a free choice between options. Nevertheless, an over-emphasis of the ambivalence of the Willkür very easily leads the whole doctrine of Willkür into difficulties. To say that the human Willkür is an *libertas hybrida* evokes immediately the questions: Are there any real connections between the options of the Willkür? Are

these options somehow related with one another or are they two indifferent possibilities of action lying asunder? In What sense is the Willkür a “hybrid”?

In his *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Kant explicitly remarks that a “hybrid definition” (*definitio hybrida*) of Willkür presents the concept itself “in a false light”<sup>71)</sup>. In this same context Kant argues that “only freedom with regard to the inner legislation of reason is really a power”, whereas “the possibility of deviating from legislative reason is a lack of power”.<sup>72)</sup> Kant obviously wants to safeguard the concept of free Willkür against the misunderstanding which takes moral actions and indulgence in sensuality to be two parallel and distinct options engendering arbitrarily and indifferently from the Willkür. Such an understanding of Willkür would render the two options into two unconnected and “indifferent” natural tendencies. Such a misunderstanding of the Willkür Kant entitles “*libertas indifferentiae*”<sup>73)</sup>.

To solve that seeming difficulty, we may put the matter in the following manner: Since man is never an *arbitrium brutum* (ie. never passively determined), it is not possible that he would indulge himself in the sensuous world totally without any afterthoughts and without having ever considered the possibility of moral determination. In fact, even indulgence itself is never pure indulgence; indulgence takes place in the opposing light of the other alternative of “rational duty”, which then acts as the “limiting concept” of indulgence. In other words, both morality and indulgence are to be understood in the light of the moral duties of reason respectively as submission to or as conscious deviation from them. In this context we may understand why Kant says in his lectures on *Pädagogik*: “Whether man is by nature morally good or evil? None of the two, since man is by nature not a moral being at all; he will become so only if his reason is raised to concepts of duty and law.”<sup>74)</sup> To put the issue in an emphatic way: Even when a man is indulging, he indulges in a way which is worthy of him as human being, as a being with rational choice but not as mere animal. To quote a jargonized word of Aristotle: man is after all a ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, even though we are here dealing with a λόγος which has only an “incomplete power of determination”.


#### 4. Radical evil and “original sin” (peccatum originarium)

A morally free person no doubt derives justification for his action exclusively from the universality of the moral law within him. But as one who is conscious of the totally “arbitrary” ground on which he as a moral agent is resting, and as one who notices the fact that he is not “once and for all” moral, but that a moral person is always “in the making”, one would very likely start to fear and tremble before such an arbitrary *libertas hybrida*. At this point, the significance of religion emerges. The occasionally and positively determined moral agent might envisage, or in Kant’s lan-

guage, might postulate a realm of religious objects and takes it as an "idea of the good principle". The religious realm thus postulated is however of no "humanistic" value unless it is preceded by man's determination for morality.

Now the problem may be seen from two aspects. On the one hand, religion serves merely as a means for the moral end. But on the other hand, the moral end alone, though always pure-practically possible, is in need of certain means which should be of *use* if it is to be actually and perpetually fulfilled. This is exactly the line of thought which underlies Kant's religious treatise — *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. There, Kant starts the discussion with the notion of radical evil in man, which stands overagainst that of the rationally good principle. This juxtaposition of the evil and the good unmistakably reflects the utmost ambivalence and antagonism of the human Willkür as *Libertas hybrida*.

As regards terminologies like "good" and "evil", a remark is necessary. Kant repeatedly draws our attention upon the fact that the terms "good" and "evil" are throughout history not precisely enough defined. The reason for this is the ambiguities of the two corresponding Latin words — *bonum* and *malum*. Both terms possess a two-fold meaning as shown in the following table. <sup>75)</sup>



According to the differentiation made here, only "good" and "evil" are moral terms in the real sense, whereas "well being" and "bad" are just natural (istic) terms. To say that man is radically or *by nature* evil is in fact quite ambiguous and in need of clarification. It by no means indicates that the *nature* of man were so constituted, that he were determined exclusively to be evil; for such a demand means nothing but that man is completely conditioned, a thesis already refuted above. For if this were the case, then we could not soundly speak of man as "evil", since "evil" is already a moral term. It represents man's conscious choice between the two possible options of action — indulgence in the sensuous or full exercise of the practical reason. If man were bound to be "evil", ie. if man were left without any opposite choice for being good, then he could not be "evil" in the strict sense, but just "bad" — "bad" just like an egg being bad.

Therefore Kant concludes that radical evil is not to be understood merely as non-moral *factual* indulgence of the Willkür in the sensuous (which is then just bad and not evil), but as active and conscious deviation from the moral duties. This tendency toward evil Kant calls "propensity to evil" (*Hang zum Böse*) which he further differ-

entiate into frailty, impurity and wickedness. <sup>76)</sup> To put the issue in more precise wording: even propensity to evil presupposes the "freedom" of the Willkür, ie. the possibility of choice. As we have pointed out in the previous section, both options of the Willkür must be understood in the light of our capacity of morality respectively as submission to or conscious deviation from it. For Kant there is in fact no such thing as natural evil. Evil in the strict sense is always "morally evil," which can be found only in our own act. To quote Kant's own word as conclusion: "Hence a propensity to evil can inhere only in the moral capacity of the Willkür." <sup>77)</sup>

As an *arbitrium* man is left alone to adopt his own maxim of action. Man as a free but yet "incompletely free" Willkür can either subject himself under the moral law, but can as well consciously deviate from it. This tendency or propensity to adopt evil maxims is the radical evil. This conscious but evil choice precedes any evil action. It is itself not an empirical action and may be called the "original sin" (*peccatum originarium*) in a philosophical sense in contrast to a concrete evil deed as *peccatum derivativum*. Original sin in this sense is only an intelligible fact and it concerns merely the very option of the human mind (*Gemüt*); it rests finally on nothing but the "incompleteness" of our rational power as such. It has no temporal origin like the fall of Adam and Eve but has its origin in the reason itself (*Vernunftursprung*). <sup>78)</sup>

Kant's introduction of the doctrine of the radical evil as an original propensity or choice explains why one should be responsible for one's own evil deed. All evil deeds as derived sins owe their origin in the *peccatum originarium*, the radical evil, which is rooted antagonistically together with rational goodness in our own reason. This antagonism Kant characterizes as "the conflict of the good with the evil principle for sovereignty over man" <sup>79)</sup>

As shown above, the moral law itself provides the *a priori* condition of possibility of morality, but from an "applied" practical point of view, the radical evil in man steadily threatens a moral agent with the possibility of fallenness, for our Willkür is "by nature" evil as well as good. Here, religion sets in to furnish as a means for the "application" of morality. What serves as a means necessarily has its "uses".

### III. The "Use" of religion

After the publication of the *Religion* in 1793, Kant finds himself involved in conflict with the Prussian censoring authority. Even the Prussian monarch Frederick William II himself showed displeasure of Kant's provocative treatment of the Christian faith. Subsequently, Kant has to write the King a letter submitting his "error". While remaining humble in his letter, Kant does not miss the chance of expressing the genuine aims of his doctrine of religion. In the letter says Kant: "They were only written as scholarly discussions... in order to determine how religion may be inculcated



most clearly and forcefully into the hearts of men... ”<sup>80</sup>) As to the Christian faith, Kant goes further: “For I do not regard it as a depreciation of a revealed doctrine to say that, in relation to its *practical use* (which constitutes the essential part of all religion), it must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of pure rational faith and must be urged on openly.”<sup>81</sup>)

As stated in the first part of this paper, we are dealing in religion primarily with the “idea” of God as an example of moral perfection. But before embarking upon this idea and its use to humanity, we must repeatedly stress the point that, for Kant, theology must be preceded by morality. Kant strongly safeguards the integrity of morality as an end in itself which is possible even “without the concept of God”<sup>82</sup>). This attitude of Kant immediately evokes the question: If ethics subsists of itself, what is then the point of having religion; Here we again embark upon the question: what is the “use” of religion, understood as basically “humanistic”, to humanity?

The idea of God acts as a useful means to render morality, which is in the pure practical domain a priori possible, actually realizable in its application. In face of the hidden antagonism of evil and good in human Willkür, an acting person who is freely determined to be moral and is conscious of his possible retreat back to the evil envisages the idea of God which is for Kant nothing but the “personified idea of the good principle”<sup>83</sup>). In his letter to Fichte, Kant says: God is useful (*nützlich*) as a means “for my inner improvement”<sup>84</sup>). God in this sense acts as nothing but an “Example”, an “archetype” (*Urbild, prototypon*)<sup>85</sup>), an “Ideal”<sup>86</sup>) or a “moral hero”<sup>87</sup>), in whom we find moral perfection in its complete manifestation (*telos*). As a moral person, one is “entitled to look upon himself as an object not unworthy of divine approval”<sup>88</sup>). God as an Ideal is for Kant an object of “imitation”<sup>89</sup>). This especially applies to the Christian faith which understands Christus as an “archetype (who) has come down to us from heaven and has assumed our humanity”<sup>90</sup>). As an object of our imitation, the ideal of God or simply Christus himself enables the morally determined agent to acquire “new strength and courage”<sup>91</sup>). The Ideal of Christus serves here as the “motive power” (*Kraft der Triebfeder*)<sup>92</sup>) which safeguards man against “the obstacles in his nature”.

In the previous sections, we have drawn our attention to the fact that, a moral person, as a momentary free agent, can never guarantee his state of morality to be perpetually actual, since the radical evil is always with him. A moral person is always in the making, namely through his constant combat against the obstacles within his reason. Exactly here the usefulness of the *prototypon* God comes to manifestation. On this account Kant speaks not only of a “moral improvement of man”<sup>93</sup>), but also of a “continuous” or “unending progress”<sup>94</sup>).

*Christus* (Χριστός), which usually means the “anointed” (Messiah in Heb-

rew), now manifests to be nothing but *Chrestus*, a name, which Greek original, *χρηστος*, exactly bears the meaning of "the useful".<sup>95)</sup> Before ending up our discussion of the "useful" in this sense, it seems relevant here to mention the subtle distinction Kant has made between taking Christus as an archetype and taking Christus as anthropomorphically existent. Christus as an archetype is just a product of human reason, precisely, an idea, or an Ideal. An anthropomorphically existent Christus, however, is taken not merely as a rational fiction, but as a factum which should be objectively schematizable. As an archetype, Christus can only be of "symbolic meaning".<sup>96)</sup> Here we conceive Christus as an archetype only "according to analogy" (*secundum analogiam*)<sup>97)</sup>, or in other words, by means of schematism of analogy. "Schematism of analogy" is for Kant just another expression of "symbolization"<sup>98)</sup>, which differs totally from objective schematism. Whereas the former is just of regulative and heuristic function, the latter supposedly purports to have real reference. "To transform the schematism of analogy into a schematism of objective determination (for the extension of our knowledge) is anthropomorphism, which has, from the moral point of view (in religion), most injurious consequences."<sup>99)</sup>

The two conceptions of Christus — the "archetypic" and the "anthropomorphic" — therefore have completely different uses and hence different outcomes. Whereas Christus as archetype presupposes the integrity of morality and in this way leads to moral theology, the anthropomorphic conception of God or Christus leads to mysticism, fetishism and statutory faith and has as its outcome the dogma of "theological morals" in which freedom and dignity of man are utterly suppressed.

To serve as the morally "useful", God or Christus (understood as *Chrestus*) is just a human fiction, a projection, an idea or an Ideal. The God-man relationship built thereupon is therefore not a theocratic, but a "humanistic" one, of which the final end is nothing but the promotion of the moral worth of humanity. Thus a true moral agent would not be able to stand an anthropomorphic God who would impose upon him divine commandments. As a moral agent, the idea of God which he postulates is in harmony with the principle of goodness in him. It is therefore thoroughly possible that a moral agent looks up to his duties "not unwillingly" *as if* they were divine commands. However, if this intellectual fiction of God should be rendered objective and man's morality should be preceded by an all-mighty God, divine commandments would become "annoying" (*lästig*) for those who actually want to be moral themselves. In this way, dogmatic theology and revealed religion might become an impairment of morality which is the end and the worth of mankind as such.

In the third and the fourth parts of the *Religion*, Kant defines the "pure religion" and the "true church" on the one hand but makes allowance for the different historical and revealed faiths on the other. Here Kant touches upon the notion of "kingdom of

God". Just like the notion of God itself, "kingdom of God" is also an Ideal "which is to exert a propelling force in the understanding of those who want to be morally good".<sup>100)</sup> In the *Religion*, Kant makes the symbolic nature of this notion clear by quoting a famous passage from *Luke*: "The kingdom of God cometh not in visible form. Neither shall they say, Lo here; or lo there! For, behold, the kingdom of God is within you ..."<sup>101)</sup>

Likewise and in opposition to the clericalism (*Pfaffentum*) of the revealed faith, Kant characterizes the "service of God" as a purely moral service. "The true (moral) service of God... is itself, indeed, like the kingdom, invisible, ie. a service of the heart."<sup>102)</sup> Moral service (*officium liberum*) differs from the pseudo-service (*officium mercenarium*) in that it does not worship God for God's sake. It has no pathological fear of God (since he is himself willingly moral), nor does he have to flatter God in face of possible sensuous rewards (because morality is for him already an end in itself). Service in this moral sense is ingenuously engendered from a moral agent who never fears God but has the "sincerest reverence"<sup>103)</sup> or the "deepest veneration" (*die wahrhafteste Ehrfurcht*)<sup>104)</sup> for a divine realm which he as a moral agent readily postulates so that he might conceive the world in its highest synthesis -- as a harmonious moral world (*regnum gratiae*).<sup>105)</sup>

As to the historical faiths, Kant's attitude is though critical but not completely nullifying. In a somewhat Hegelian manner Kant attributes historical significance to all existing faiths (with all their impurities like fetishism, idolatry and other religious illusions) with the expectation, however, that they may step by step strive for the goal of a pure religion. To do so, the church should become conscious of itself being a mere "vehicle" (*Leitmittel*)<sup>106)</sup> toward the pure rational religion so that it might "steadily approximate" to the pure rational faith and "in time... dispense with the churchly faith".<sup>107)</sup>

In the posthumously published *Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, Kant remarks however with resignation: "It is remarkable, the more annoying (*lästiger*) a religion or a belief may be, the more will man stick to it, because they are then freed from self-improvement and they then try to be more obedient."<sup>108)</sup>

Just like a moral person being always in the making, we may consistently say that the "kingdom of God"; which is itself an Ideal of reason, is also in the making. How far is mankind with this process of self-fulfilment and self-ennoblement? This is a question which human reason itself has to answer. No God will tell us if we are really on our way toward a pure rational faith or if we are constantly indulged in the most "artificial self-deception"<sup>109)</sup>. Only the human conscience, which is the highest tribunal of morality, can judge whether we are honorably using religion, or if we are just inauthentically misusing it.

## Notes

1. Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960). 2 erweiterte Auflage, p.315.
2. *The History of Herodotus*, Vol. 1, (London: Dent, 1949), p. 141.
3. Cf. Hermann Diels/Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 1. Band. 5 Auflage, (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1934), P. 132. English translation, cf. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962). P.22.
4. For this secular view of the power of gods, cf. John Burnet, *Greek Philosophy, Part 1, Thales to Plato*, (London: MacMillan, 1914), pp. 29-30.
5. Aristotle indicates that epic poetry represents the forerunner of Greek tragedy, both of them stress a "metrical imitation of heroic action" (μιμησις πράξεως). (Cf. *Poetica* 1449B 7-8). Here, the object of imitation is however not gods, but in most cases the "tragic hero" who stands overagainst the "evil" might of certain gods in a most upright and courageous manner which fully manifests the sublime worth of humanity. Therefore, the gods in epic poetry and in tragedy are usually even not objects of worship but opponents of struggle. This may account for the secular view about gods by Homer and Hesiod, as suggested in the fragment of Xenophanes.
6. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translation by J.H.Bernard, (New York: Hafner, 1972), p. 305-306.
7. *Ibid.* p.302.
8. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, translation by H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper, 1964), p.100.
9. For the antinomy of practical reason see Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. by L.W. Beck, (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 117f.
10. *Ibid.* p.61, see also Note no. 75.
11. *Groundwork...* , p.61.
12. *Critique of Practical Reason*, P.57.
13. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A337/B384, Translation by. Kemp-Smith.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.* A804f/B832f; cf. also *Critique of Practical Reason* , (Beck), p. 135: "...then only can ethics be called a doctrine of happiness, because the hope for it first arises with religion."
16. *Ibid.* A805/B833.
17. Cf. Kant's *Logik: Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen* , in. *Kant's Gesammelte Schrif-*

- ten (hereafter cited as KGS) , Band IX, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923), p. 25.
18. *Ibid.*; Cf. also Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4. Auflage, (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1973), p.201.
  19. Cf. for example, *Kants Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie*, KGS Band XIX, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1934), p. 148-150, Refl. 6753, 6759.
  20. Cf. Kant's *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie*, KGS Band XXVIII, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972). p.1142.
  21. Kant, *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, transl. by Th.M. Greene and H.H.Hudson, (New York' Harper, 1960), (hereafter cited as *Religion*), p.171.
  22. *Ibid.*
  23. *Ibid.*
  24. *Ibid.*
  25. *Ibid.*
  26. *Ibid.*
  27. Kant, *Pädagogik*, in KGS, Band IX, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923), pp.494-495, (translation by the present author). That religion represents a union of theology and morality is already suggested by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cf.B395
  28. *Pädagogik*, p.494.
  29. *Ibid.* p.495. See also *Reflexionen zur Religionsphilosophie*, in KGS, Band XIX, p.650, Refl.8110.
  30. *Religion*, p.174.
  31. Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, in KGS, Band VI, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1907-14), p.442, translation by the present author.
  32. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Dialectics, Chapter 2, §5; *Critique of Judgment*, translation by Bernard, p.334; *Reflexionen zur Religionsphilosophie*, Refl.8110.
  33. *Religion*, p.116.
  34. *Critique of Judgment*, p.335.
  35. *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie*, Refl.6753.
  36. *Religion*, p.168.
  37. *Ibid.* p.178.
  38. The concept of "transcendental topic" is first formulated in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as an antidote against the theoretical amphiboly of concepts of reflection. Cf.a268/B324f.
  39. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.442, English translation by Mary J. Greger, *The Doctrine of Virtue*, Part II of the *Metaphysic of Morals*, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). p.110.
  40. *Religion*, p.171.
  41. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.443, Gregor's translation, p.110.

42. In his *Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p.177 note) Lewis White Beck has made a brief remark on the history of the term Willkür. There he mentioned Wolff and Baumgarten. To make ourselves more conscious of the historical background of the problem of Willkür, it seems beneficial for me to trace the issue back to: 1. Aristotle's concept of προαίρεσις (preferential choice) and 2. St. Augustin's concept of "free Will" (Cf. *De libero arbitrio*). It is well known that Socrates represents a kind of moral intellectualism. For Socrates, man never commits an evil deed deliberately. Overagainst this moral optimism of Socrates, Aristotle differentiates between errors out of ignorance and vices out of voluntary actions (cf. *Ethica Nicomachea* Book III, 110aff). Underlying all voluntary actions is an utmost "preferential choice", which renders all voluntary actions liable to responsibility. In this connection, the Aristotelian concept of preferential choice stands as the earliest proposal of the question of Willkür later systematically treated by Kant. For reference, cf. Gustav Teichmüller, *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe III*, (Gotha: Perthes, 1879) pp.89ff.
43. *Ibid.* p.178.
44. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Beck's translation, p.45.
45. *Ibid.* p.18.
46. *Ibid.* Italics by the present author.
47. For this duality of the "pure" and the "applied", please refer to Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.488: "Aber alsdann ist sie auch nicht reine, sondern auf eine vorliegende Geschichte angewandte Religionslehre..."
48. For the original contingency of the Willkür, cf. Kant's *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, Refl. 3715, KGS Band XVII, p.254. There, Kant says: ... arbitrium est vel liberum vel brutum, in ienem ist man sich der contingentiae internaе und externaе der Handlung bewusst."
49. Cf. Kant, *Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft*, KGS, Band XX, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1942), p.244.
50. This same issue occurs already in Aristotle, although in a somewhat different context. In Book III, Chapter 9 of *De anima* (contrary to demarcations made elsewhere) Aristotle differentiates human capacities ( δυνάμεις ) in the following manner: "The soul in living creatures is distinguished by two functions, the judging capacity which is a function of the intellect and of sensation combined, and the capacity for exciting movement in space (*De anima*, 432 a 15f). The second faculty or capacity mentioned here refers exactly to the faculty of desire or appetite ( ὄρεξις ) which is now determined to be the the source of actions, ie. the actual practices of intentions. Aristotle further divides ὄρεξις into

desire (in the narrow sense), spirit and wish (ἐπιθύμια, θύμος and βούλησις which are nothing but different degrees of the determination of the ὄρεξις through reason or intellect (νοῦς).

51. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.213, English translation by John Ladd, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1981), p.12. Here cited with slight modifications.
52. *Ibid.* Translation by Gregor, p.9-10.
53. *Ibid.* p.225, translation by Gregor, p.25, here quoted with slight modification.
54. L.W. Beck, *op. cit.*, p. 178
55. In other words, since *Wille* is understood as the formal ground of morality in its "purity", freedom does not occur here while it concerns only the law but not actions themselves. Whereas laws are bound to be universal, actions on the other hand are optional, capable of either submitting to the moral law or deviating from it. Only through such an antagonistic contrast (which does not occur at all in the *Wille*) is freedom a meaningful subject-matter. This issue will become more clear in the subsequent treatment of this paper. Here cf. also *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.225, Gregor's translation, p.25.
56. *Ibid.*
57. See note 42.
58. Cf. Gerhard Wahrig, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1975), Sp.2263.
59. For the differentiation of freedom of spontaneity from freedom of legislation cf. L.W. Beck *op. cit.*, 176ff. The freedom of spontaneity of the *Willkür* differs essentially from practical moral freedom. It falls somewhat in the domain of the so-called "cosmological" or "transcendental freedom" which Kant has decided in his *Critique of Pure Reason* to be antinomically open.
60. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A534/B562.
61. *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie*, KGS Band XXVIII, p.744. Translation by author.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, Refl. 4222, KGS, Band XVII, p.463 translation by the present author.
64. *Ibid.* Refl.4226, p.465. translation by author.
65. *Ibid.* Refl.4227, p.466. translation by author.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.* Refl.4226, p.465. translation by author.
68. The notion of "choice" as a "blend" or as "hybrid" is again another problem already touched upon in classical Greek philosophy. In his *Phaedrus* Plato tells us the famous allegory of the Charioteer and his horses, suggesting that there are

- two ruling principles governing the human mind — desire and reason (*Phaedrus*, 237f, 246f, 253f). Aristotle's position is even more explicit with respect to the hybrid-problem. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines "choice" (προαίρεσις) literally as "a union of desire and intellect" (*Ethica Nicomachea* 1139 b5, See also 1102 a30).
69. *Ibid.* Refl. 4227, p.466. translation by author.
  70. *Ibid.* KGS, Band XVIII, p.257, Refl. 5618, translation by author.
  71. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, p.226, translation by Gregor, p.26.
  72. *Ibid.*
  73. *Ibid.* p.225. Gregor 25.
  74. *Pädagogik*, KGS, Band IX, p.492, translation by the present author.
  75. Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Beck's translation, p.61f.
  76. *Religion*, pp. 23-25.
  77. *Ibid.* p.26.
  78. *Ibid.* pp. 26-27.
  79. *Ibid.* pp. 50ff.
  80. *Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1757-99*, ed. by Arnulf Zweig, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1967), p.218.
  81. *Ibid.* pp. 218-219.
  82. *Religion*, p.171.
  83. *Religion*, p. 54.
  84. *Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, op. cit.* p. 187.
  85. *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie*, Refl.6904.
  86. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A571/B599.
  87. For the concept of "moral hero" cf. Friedrich Kaulbach, *Immanuel Kant*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), p.259.
  88. *Religion*, p.55.
  89. Compare the similar context in Greek tragedy, in which the actions of the tragic hero are objects of imitation (μίμησις). Here, Aristotle points out that tragedy is nothing but the "representation (imitation) of man better than us", cf. *Poetics*, 1454, 1449b7-8.
  90. *Religion*, p.54.
  91. *Pädagogik*, p. 495.
  92. *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, Refl.5633, KGS, Band XVIII, p.265.
  93. Cf. *Religion*, 102; cf. also Arnulf Zweig (ed.) *op. cit.* p. 187.
  94. Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Beck's translation, p.33.
  95. Vincent A. McCarthy points out in his paper "Christus as Chrestus in Rousseau and Kant" that Jesus and his followers were at first referred to in earliest Roman



reports (like that of Suetorius and Tacitus) as Chrestus and Chrestiani. Cf. *Kant-Studien*, Jg. 73, Heft 2, 1982, pp. 191ff.

96. *Religion*, p.58, 126, 159.

97. *Religion*, p.58 note; see also *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, Refl. 4604.

98. Kant, *Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, KGS, Band XX, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1942), p.279, 332.

99. *Religion*, p. 58.

100. *Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie*, Refl. 6904

101. *Religion*, p.126.

102. *Ibid.* p.180.

103. *Critique of Judgment*, Bernard's translation, p.335.

104. *Critique of Judgment*, Meredith's translation, part 2, p. 159.

105. *Critique of pure Reason*, A815/B843.

106. *Religion*, p.106.

107. *Ibid.* p.140.

108. *Vorarbeiten zu Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, KGS, Band XXIII, p.90.

109. *Religion*, p. 188.

## 康德的「人文」宗教觀

關 子 尹

東海大學哲學系

### 摘 要

本分為三部份。第一部份旨在顯出康德對宗教處理時，所採取的態度並非神本的，而是人本的。對於康德而言，以神為本的宗教最後終不免導至教條與權威的束縛與人性尊嚴的壓抑。因此康德指出，宗教必要以道德作為基礎，也即是說，道德乃是目的，宗教只為成就道德之手段。在這一意義下，宗教其實只是人類心靈於行使其道德立法性之餘，因企求道德圓善能客觀實現，而油然而生的願望而已。換言之，宗教純為「人文」之成果。

本文第二部份是理論問題之焦點，旨在於闡明，作為目的的道德在那一意義下，有喚出宗教作為其手段之需要。康德道德哲學其實涉及兩大課題。其一是，道德先驗如何可能之問題；其二是，於具體的實踐歷程中，道德如何成就之問題。一般論康德哲學者，順著康德「批判哲學」之立場，大多只注意第一個問題。在「純粹」的角度下，道德之先驗可能性全建基於實踐理性或意志之自由，在這一角度下，宗教之意義並不明顯。本文主要透過上述第二個問題之處理尋求指出，在道德的具體的，「應用的」(anggewandt)層面下，宗教之意義如何顯出。這一項處理以康德的「意念」(Willkür)概念為主要討論對象，並指出，作為人類具體行為主體的意念於行使抉擇時，具有能善能惡的兩可性。換言之，處於抉擇中的意念，既不命定為「惡」(否則人將與動物無異)，復不命定為「善」(不然人將與神等同，而人之為善將成理之所當，因而將失去其「勉成」之崇高性)。而人類尊嚴之所在，即由於在這兩雙對立的局面下，人類具有能作最後選擇之自由。在這一具體的

實踐過程中，成德與否，在理論上雖有先驗之保證，但在應用上却是「如臨深淵，如履薄冰」。就在這種情況下，宗教可能產生之功用便顯出了。

本文第三部份概括言康德哲學中宗教可能之功用。所謂「可能之功用」是說，宗教並非非要不可的，只是說，宗教之開展有助於道德之完成。大致言，宗教之功用有如下幾點：一、上溯第一部份所言之圓善問題，宗教可讓人類於實踐道德生活之餘，能寄託成全圓善之悲願。二、宗教可提出一些「典範」(Ideal prototypen)，透過類比，構成人類成德之策動力。一、道德雖然理論上先驗地可能，但是，可能性終歸只是可能性；具體實踐中，道德之「實在性」却非一蹴即至，再者一朝實在地成德，並不保證可永遠當聖人，一個人未蓋棺論定以前，永遠處於抉擇之中；換言之，成德真正艱難之處，在於其涉及一恒久之歷程。而宗教之「用」，即顯於實踐理性有窮之時刻。然而，能為吾人成德所用之宗教是什麼意義下的宗教呢？這一問題，康德交待甚詳。正如「基督」可有「類人性」的與「典範性」兩種意義一般，宗教亦可相應地大分為二。康德認為第一個意義下的宗教是以神權壓抑道德與人性，是一切偶像崇拜與繁文縟節所由出的，是本有志於道德者所感到「令人煩擾」(lastig)的。這一意義的宗教，不是以為道德之用之餘，且是以為道德之害。康德認為，真正能為道德之用之宗教，是所謂一「道德宗教」，或所謂「純粹理性宗教」。此中，神只是人類理性求構想一最為綜合調和的世界時所產生的一個「觀念」，神只是「人文」之成果，只具有象徵意義。這意義的宗教並不與道德對立，而能為道德之用。康德論及歷史上出現的「信仰」和論及「教會」時，批判之餘，同情地給與其一定程度的首肯。却仍按語道：教會實在只是導向純粹理性宗教之「乘」(Leitmittel, vehicle)，它應該「逐漸演變為純粹理性信仰，而於合適的時候，放棄其教會信仰」。南北朝代我國僧人嘗言：「見解名悟，聞解名信；信解非真，悟發信謝。」或許正道出康德對宗教未來發展的道路的期待吧。

中華民國七十二年六月出版  
東海學報 第二十四卷

發行人：梅 可 望

編輯者：東海學報編輯委員會  
出版者：私立東海大學

臺灣臺中市大度山  
經售者：中央書局

臺中市中正路一二五號  
郵政劃撥：中字二〇〇六六號

幼獅文化事業公司

臺北市延平南路六十一號  
臺北市漢中街五十一號  
郵政劃撥：二七三七號

永茂書報社

臺南市正興街六號

天恩書報社

高雄市建國二路五一之四號

印刷者：吉成文具印刷有限公司

臺中市南區福平東巷二六號  
電話：(〇四二)二〇一九八八

